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ABSTRACT

The drafters of the Constitution wisely and delib
erately subordinated the armed forces of the nation under
a civilian, the President of the United States.

In the

turbulent years since the early l ^ O ’s the military com
mand function of the presidency has increased dramatical
ly in importance as the Chief Executives have emerged as
virtually unchecked wielders of enormous military m ight*
This work examines Harry S. Truman’s role as
Commander in Chief during the full period of his tenure,
19i|-5“1953*

The methodology employed is a generally

chronological narration of the military events of the
period as they relate to Truman.

In each instance, an

attempt is made to analyze the President's decision
making process in terms of the information available to
him, the existing pressures, and the relationship of his
decision to his own rather well-defined concepts of how
a commander in chief should function#

Although recog

nizing that it is not entirely possible to isolate any
one function of the presidential office, or to determine
with any great precision whether an act is political,
diplomatic, or strategic in motivation, this study is
preraissed on the belief that sufficient military distinc
tions can be determined.

The implicit operating assumpiv
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tion is, of course, that there is value to be derived
from an examination of the military function of the
modern presidency.
This dissertation does not attempt a full military
history of the period.

Rather, it is a selective recount

ing of those events in which T r u m a n ’s decisions were of
some historic significance.

Among the subjects examined

at length is Truman's stewardship in the waning days of
World War II.

A separate chapter is devoted to the deci

sion to use the atomic bomb against Japan and the postwar
nuclear policies which the President established.

As a

reformer, Truman had a major effect on the military.

His

unification of the armed services, attempts to obtain a
system of universal military training, and his order end
ing racial segregation in the military are all analyzed
in detail.

A chapter on the Cold War concentrates on the

Berlin Blockade, aid to Greece and Turkey, and the con
tainment doctrine.

The decisional process by which Tru

man determined to involve the nation in the Korean War
merited extended study, as did the President's conduct of
the war itself.

The activities of General Douglas Mac-

Arthur as commander in the Par East in opposition to the
limited-war policies of the President endangered the very
basis of the civil-military relationship.

How Truman r e 

sponded to this major challenge to his authority as Com
mander in Chief formed a fitting conclusion to this study.
v
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In the preparation of this work the major unpub
lished sources employed were found in the Truman Library
in Independence, Missouri, and the Modern Military Records
Division of the National Archives in Washington, D.C.

Ad

ditional archival materials were found in the Historical
Records Division, Chief of Naval Operations, Washington
Naval Yard, and the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in
Abilene, Kansas,

These materials, along with numerous

government publications, published memoirs,

and various

secondary sources were examined in an effort to provide
a balanced account of Truman's conduct of his role as
Commander in Chief,

vi

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER I

THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
H e ’8 the absolute commander of the armed forces of
the United States in time of war. H e ’s the commander
of the armed forces when they're called out for any
purpose, if he wants to take control of them. Nobody
else can do it. It's his business to outline policy
for the military. . . . He has to know what the
policies are about, and then he has to go to work on
them. It's his privilege to appoint generals— and
sometimes to fire them. • « .-*•
The awesome military powers of the presidency are
derived from one brief line in the Constitution (Art. II,
Sect. 2) which reads:

"The President shall be the

Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States, and of the militia of the several States, when
called into the actual service of the United States."
This vaguely-worded clause provides the American President
with power resources that are both difficult to fully
define and untested as to their absolute limits.

2

The war powers of the President are in fact so great
and so indefinite that their nature will not be fully
known until our Republic has passed through all its

1

Truman Speaks (New York: Columbia University Press,
I960), 6. Hereinafter cited as Truman Speaks.
^Dorothy Schaffter and Dorothy M. Mathews (eds.),
"The Powers of the President as Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States," House Miscellaneous
Documents, 8L|. Cong., 2 Sess., Vol. 1, No. I4J4.3 (Washington:
1956), 16. Hereinafter cited as Schaffter and Mathews,
"Powers of the President as Commander in Chief."
1
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2
trials and ceased to be. The President’s war powers
are the unexplored "Dark Continent” of American
Government .3
The broad spectrum of military powers now available
evolved through customary usage, judicial interpretations,
legislative enactments and the obvious exigencies imposed
by modern military technology.

Certainly James Madison

and the other drafters of the Constitution had not
anticipated that the clause meant any more than that the
President was to have a general, supreme authority over
the military.

In the Federalist Papers (No. 69),

Alexander Hamilton wrote that the title of Commander in
Chief "would amount to nothing more than the supreme
command and direction of the military and naval forces,
as first general and admiral of the Confederacy. • • .
Discussing this military command function at greater
length in No. 7^ of the Federalist Papers, Hamilton wrote:
The propriety of this provision is so evident in
itself and it is at the same time so consonant to the
precedents of the State constitutions in general that
little need be said to explain or enforce it. Even
those of them which have in other respects coupled
the Chief Magistrate with a council have for the most
part concentrated the military authority in him alone.
Of all the cares or concerns of government, the

^Wilfred E. Binkley, The Man in the White House: His
Powers and Duties (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1958),
2 2 S 7 ----------------

^Clinton Rossiter (ed.), The Federalist Papers (New
York: New American Library of World Literature, 1961), ljJ.8.
Hereinafter cited as Rossiter (ed.), Federalist Papers.
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3
direction of war moat peculiar demands those qualities
which distinguish the exercise of power by a single
hand. The direction of war implies the direction of
the common strength; and the power of directing and
employing the common strength forms a usual and
essential part in the definition of the executive
authority.5
Hamilton seemed to feel that the division between
civilian and military powers of the executive office should
disappear, particularly in time of war.°

Certainly,

Hamilton, and most of the other Pounding Fathers, believed
that the primary purpose of the Commander in Chief clause
was to ensure that the President, in the exercise of his
war (emergency) powers, would be unmistakably superior to
any of his military or civilian subordinates.

They

conceived of a clearly-established path of authority all
emanating from a single source, the civilian head of the
executive branch of the national government.7

Slbid., No. 7k, W .
^Ernest R. May, "The President Shall Be Commander
in Chief," in May (ed.), The Ultimate Decision: The Presi
dent as Commander in Chief (New York: George Braziller,
1960),
Hereinafter cited as May, "The President Shall
Be Commander in Chief."
?At the beginning of the twentieth century, Secre
tary of War Elihu Root accomplished a major re-organization
of the War Department. Root was influenced in these reforms
by the "New Hamiltonianism," which was an adaptation of
business organizational techniques to governmental opera
tions advocated by the Progressives. The Root reforms were
predicated on the assumption that, ". . . clear lines of
accountability provide effective political control." See
Paul Y. Hammond, Organizing for Defense: The American
Military Establishment in the^Twentieth Century (Prince
ton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961), 22> •
Hereinafter cited as Hammond, Organizing for Defense.
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Civilian control over the conduct of military
operations was accepted as a fundamental tenet.

It was

felt that the democratic process would be under constant
threat if a military commander were to be granted ultimate
authority for the conduct of the armed forces of the
nation.

In the states' ratifying conventions the only

objection to this clause, as Joseph Story explained in his
Commentaries, was that "it would be dangerous to let him
(the President) command in person."

But, Story added,

"The proprietary of admitting the President to be
Commander-in-Chief, so far as to give orders and have a
Q
general superintendency, was admitted."
Numerous court tests of the war and emergency
powers have worked their way through the judicial system.
The general principle which has emerged is that the courts
accept the President's supremacy over the military without
significant limitations.
After studying hundreds of court cases involving
tests of the President's military powers, Clinton Rossiter
has concluded that the commander in chief enjoys ". . . a
peculiar degree of freedom from the review and restraints

^Quoted in Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office
and Powers, 1787-1957 (New York: New York University Press,
1957)» 228. Hereinafter cited as Corwin, The President.
See also Clarence A. Berdahl, War Powers oif ‘ttie~“Executive
In the United States (Urbana, Illinois: University of
Illinois, 1920), 117. Hereinafter cited as Berdahl, War
Powers of the Executive.
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of the judicial process."

Rossiter1s study of the

subject of the military functions of the Chief Executive
led him to offer five "general propositions" by way of
conclusions:

(1) Judicial opinions regarding these powers

are expressed in uncharacteristically "guarded" terms;
(2) The teiminology of these Supreme Court decisions are
quite general, avoiding explicit definition of the limits
of the President's powers and any express delineation of
those military powers belonging to the Congress or the
President exclusively; (3) With respect to an "improper
exeroise of the war powers" the Supreme Court has
vacillated considerably regarding its own authority to
act, leaving this a shadow area with respect to
precedential evidence;

(ij.) When granting the validity of

an exercise of martial authority, the Supreme Court never
bases its decision on the commander in chief clause alone,
preferring, whenever possible, to cite any congressional
action that can be construed as endorsement of the
President's decisions;

(£) The Court has been "realistic"

in its decisions in this area, following in general the
observation made by Chief Justice Hughes, in 193^+, that
"the war power of the Federal Government . . . is a power

q
7Clinton Rossiter, The Supreme Court said the
Commander in Chief (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University
Press, 19^17, 2. Hereinafter cited as Rossiter, Supreme
Court and the Comnmnder in Chief.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

to wage war successfully (and that) so, also, we have a
fighting constitution."'1’0
There seems little doubt that, so far as the courts
are concerned, the President’s control over the armed
foroes of the nation are complete and little subject to
legal restraint.^

The judiciary, when confronted with '

tests of the war powers, have generally accepted Hamilton’s
view that

. . there can be no limitation of that

authority which is to provide for the defense and
protection of the community . . .

in any matter essential

to the formation, direction, or support of the national
f o r c e s . " ^ 2

Ross iter's study of this subject has led him

to conclude that not only do the courts accept Hamilton's
view, but that the Constitution encourages exercise of the
war powers and the restraint on presidential use of these

•L0Ibid., l|-7» Rossiter cites the Hughes statement
from Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290
U.S. 3 W 7 l|2STTOliT:-------------------------------13-U.S., Congress, Senate, Committees on Foreign
Relations and Armed Services, Powers of the President to
Send the Anaed Forces Outside the UniTed States. CommTE’tee
Print, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., l^jpl, 1-2. Hereinafter cited
as Powers of the President to Send Armed Forces Outside the
United states. See also U.S. Congress, House, Committee on
Foreign Affa'irs, Background Information on the Use of United
States Armed Forces in FtreignCounirl'es. House Report N o .'
127, 02nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951» 50-52. Hereinafter cited
as Background Informat ion on the Use of United States Armed
Forces in Foreign Countries.
^Rossiter (ed.), Federalist Papers, No. 23,
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powers is a "moral limitation" alo n e . ^
The Constitution specifically delegates to Congress
the power to declare war, to raise and support an army and
navy and "to make rules for the government and regulation
of the land and naval f o r c e s . T h e

language of these

clauses would seem to indicate that the drafters of the
Constitution intended that the legislative branch have
coextensive powers over the armed forces in order to
offset the possibility of a military dictatorship.

While

permanent military dictatorships have not resulted,
Congress has failed to exercise an effective check on
presidential control over military policy . ^
Not only has the Congress been generally ineffective
in limiting the President's use of military powers, but
it has also often been unable to protect its own delegated
military authority from executive usurpation.
particularly true of the post-World War II era.

This is
The

congressional role in formulation of military policy is

^3Rossiter, Supreme Court and the Commander in
Chief, 8.
^ S e e Article I, Section 8.
■^Dorothy B. James, The Contemporary Presidency
(New York: Pegasus, 1969)* 15^*165. Hereinafter cited as
James, Contemporary Presidency. See also, U.S., Congress,
House, The Powers of the President as Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy o7 the United inTaTTes. House Misc. iDoc.
Tj3j3, 81). Cong., 2 Sess., 1956, 1'6-lY. Hereinafter cited as
Powers of the President as Commander in Chief*. . . .
See
also, Berdahl, War Powers of the Executive, 117-18.
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peripheral at best, ordinarily being confined to lobbying
for certain defense programs, the development of particular
weapons systems and the creation, expansion or continuation
of various military bases, " . . .

for reasons of

constituency politics.
Aside from these considerations, in the normal
course of events, Congress provides the force levels and
military budgets requested by the President.

It is

difficult for Congress to challenge the validity of
presidential requests in these two areas where the Presi
dent must have legislative sanction.

The only solid

ground for attack would be that

the troop or budget

requests are not consonant with

the broad objectives of

the nation’s military policies.

As often as not, these

goals are established by the President (as a popular leader)
in the first place.

To attack these goals, or their

proposed legislative implementation, would require sub
stantial proof often not available to Congress.

The

President’s advantage lies in the fact that through control
of the executive agencies, he monopolizes the available
information.

The Congress obtains its knowledge of

military policy matters through hearings conducted by the
various committees concerned with military and foreign
affairs.

Of necessity, the witnesses are high-ranking civil

^James, Contemporary Presidency, 165.
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9
and military officials of the Pentagon, directly
responsible to the commander in chief:
As a result, the military exercises a near monopoly
on presentation of alternatives to Congress. The
widespread feeling of Congressmen has been found to
be one of grudging acquiescence in military proposals,
on the grounds expressed by one leading Representative
on military affairs:
"How the hell do we know that
should be considered anyway? We mostly reflect what
the military men tell us.”17
The other great military check held by the Congress,
the exclusive power to declare war, has seldom been
employed, simply because the United States has been in a
formally-declared state of war on only a few occasions.
Yet, in the period 1789-1956, there are more than one
hundred separate instances of American military forces
engaging in hostile actions on foreign soil at the order
of the President, without a declaration of war or other
form of prior approval on the part of the Congress.
In most cases the President's action was based on his

1 7ibid., 165-66.
^Charles S. Murphy to Richard B. Russell, February
19, 1951* Papers of Charles S. Murphy, White House Piles,
"Presidential Powers" folder, Harry S. Truman Library,
Independence, Missouri. Hereinafter cited as Murphy Papers,
Truman Library. See also, Powers of the President to Send
Armed Porces Outside the United Stages, 27 8. In an article
on the war powers, a national magazine wrote: "• • .U.S.
Presidents have ordered troops into position or action
without a formal congressional declaration a total of llj.9
times." Time, XCVI (June 1, 1970), 37. For a detailed
listing of the occassions on which U.S. troops were engaged
on foreign territory, see, Background Infomation on the
Use of United States Armed Forces in Foreign Countries,
--------------
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judgment that an "emergency" situation existed, neces
sitating immediate decision.

Often the Congress has

subsequently approved the President's action by a
resolution or war declaration.^

The problem is, of

course, that Congress is confronted with a fait accompli;
it can endorse or condemn; it cannot undo . . . the
spilling of blood being an irrevocable action by its very
nature.

A distinguished senator, Arthur H. Vandenberg,

writing in 19h7> expressed the congressional dilemma this
way:
The trouble is that these "crises" never reach
Congress until they have developed to a point where
Congressional discretion is pathetically restricted.
When things finally reach a point where a President
asks us to "declare war" there usually is nothing
left except to "declare war."20
In practice, if not in law, once war or a national
emergency has been declared, total military authority is
assumed by the President.

This power of command given to

■^Rossiter, Supreme Court and the Commander in
Chief, 66; Henry H. Fowler, War Powers of the^P'reaicfent
(Washington: Industrial College of "the Armed Forces, l9i|8).
12-llj.» Hereinafter cited as Fowler, War Powers of the
President. In fact, Congress has never declared war on
its own' initiative, nor has it ever refused a President's
request for a war declaration. Background Information on
the Use of United States Armed Forces In Foreign CoutvErTes,

T9T

^ A r t h u r H. Vandenberg,
of Senator Vandenberg (Boston:
T952) , 3ij.2. Hereinafter cited
Papers. Senator Vandenberg, a
chairman of the Senate Foreign
80th Congress.

Jr. (ed.), The Private Papers
Houghton Mifflin Company,
as Vandenberg, Private
Republican from Michigan, was
Relations Committee in the
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the President is not effectively limited by the Congress,
nor willingly shared with that body by the commander in
chief.

PI

A staff study by lawyers attached to the White

House, Justice, Defense and State departments in 19h®
offered the opinion that ". . . i t seems doubtful whether
Congress has the Constitutional power to limit the
President’s freedom of action in disposing of the forces
under his command."

??

It is a fair general iz at ion to

conclude from the published authorities and historical
evidence that the constitutional separation of military
powers is ignored in practice.

The President today enjoys

an almost exclusive control over the military forces of
the United States.
James Madison was the first President to serve while
the country was engaged in war.

Marcus Cunliffe, in an

^ U n s i g n e d Report, "Constitutional Power of the
President and of Congress to Determine Roles and Missions
for the Armed Forces," Record Group (RG) 3i+C, Office of
Administrative Assistant, Secretary of the Air Force,
Special Interest File 1|A, National Archives.

??

Charles S. Murphy to John McCormack, February 19,
1951* Murphy Papers, White House Files, "Presidential
Powers" folders, Truman Library.
2^Berdahl, War Powers of the Executive, 121; Fowler,
War Powers of the Pr e s i'dent', ITT; Ros si ter, Supreme Court and
^EEe Commander in Chief, 75-77* Background Information on the
Use of United l-TEates forces in ForelgrTCountriea, 50-5IiT
Edwarcl h. Foley, Jr., "Some Inspects of the Constitutional
Powers of the President," American Bar Association Journa l ,
XXVII (August, 19*|1), h86.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

12
essay on Madison as commander in chief, acknowledges that
"there seems to be an almost unanimous conviction (among
historians) that . . . Madison was a ludicrous commander in
chief.

Cunliffe’s own view is that such a conclusion

has not been proven.

However, Cunliffe does agree that the

Canadian campaign of 1812 resulted in a complete rout of
the American forces; that the command of the war showed no
discernible improvement in 1813; and, in l8ll|, "Madison was
fortunate to escape military disaster and the possible
collapse of the Union.
Madison lacked the leadership qualities necessary in
a commander in chief, and his Secretary of War, William
Eustis, was incompetent.

Early in 1813, Madison improved

American military prospects by replacing Eustis with John
Armstrong.

The new Secretary reorganized the command

system of the War Department and replaced the superannuated
Revolutionary War veterans with younger and more aggressive
field commanders.

The efficiency of the command structure

was further advanced by the Congress in March, 1813:

Legis

lation passed authorizing the President to re-establish the
offices of Inspector General, Surgeon General and Adjutant
General and to appoint eight topographical engineers to the

^Ma r c u s Cunliffe, "Madison (I8l2-l8l5)," in May
(ed.), Ultimate Decision, 25. Hereinafter cited as Cunliffe,
"Madia on (l6l2-l815)7"
2% b i d . , 25-26.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

13
pc.

War Department. °

All of this would certainly not have

been enough had England not been so completely preoccupied
with defeating Napoleon.

However, combined with a con

siderable amount of good fortune, it was sufficient.
War of 1812 represents neither victory, nor defeat.
was a draw.

The
It

27

Historians, as Marcus Cunliffe has indicated, have
been all but unanimous in ascribing this military debacle
to the timidity and ineptness of the Commander in Chief.
Cunliffe has defended his own unwillingness to judge the
Presidents exercise of the war powers by listing five
factors that "inhibit" a true appraisal of Madison:
a) the unpopularity of the War of 1812
b) the limited, ill-defined, and peripheral nature of
the war
c) the nature of Republican party doctrine
d) the lack of precedents to guide the nation or the
president in war
e) friction between the principal figures involved in
the war effort.28
Perhaps the judgments passed on Madison by others, such as
Bradford Perkins ("He reigned but he did not rule"),2^ have

2^U.S. Army, Office of the Chief of Military History,
American Military History (Washington, 1969), 139. Herein
after cited as OCMH, American Military History.
27Ibid., llj.6.
2®Cunliffe, "Madison (1812-1815)," 1+5*
^ B r a d f o r d Perkins,

"Madison Was a Failure," in
Perkins, (ed.), The Causes of the War of 1812: National Honor
or National Interest? (New Sorlc:~Hoi't,"“Rinehart and Winston,

i$62), 114.
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been too severe.

And perhaps Cunliffe is correct in saying

that the only fair assessment of Madison as commander in
chief is that he conducted the war to the best of his
a b i l i t y . He is certainly on firm ground in (d) above:

Madison was handicapped by being the first to administer an
unknown quantity, the executive power over the nation in
war.

But his conduct in this unfamiliar condition left

few precedents to guide James K. Polk, the next wartime
president.
Polk had indicated to the cabinet on his very first
day in office that he would insist on the Rio Grande River
as the southern border of Texas and that he considered
acquisition of California a major objective of his
presidency.^

Polk's offer to purchase the California

territory was a sham exercise for he would accept only his
own terms.

And when Mexico refused to treat with the

minister bearing his demands, the President ordered
Zachary Taylor to move his forces south from the Nueces
River to the Rio Grande, "an order that altered the
situation by making war a probability rather than a mere
possibility."-^

There can be little doubt that Polk

3°Cunliffe, "Madison (1812-1815)," 52.
^ O t i s A. Singletary, The Mexican War (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, I960), lij.9.
32ibid., 150-51.
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precipitated hostilities with Mexico.

His objective in

doing so was to take by military conquest all Mexican land
north of the Gila and Rio Grande Rivers and from Texas
westward to the Pacific. ^
When war broke out he made it . . . clear that he
intended to be the commander in chief. The president,
Polk declared, was held responsib'le for the conduct of
the war; he intended to be responsible, and he
exercised that responsibility to the limit of his
endurance. He determined the general strategy of
military and naval operations; he chose commanding
officers; he gave personal attention to supply
problems; he energized so far as he could the General
Staff; he controlled the military and naval estimates;
and he used the cabinet as a major coordinating
agency . . . . The president was the center on which
all else depended; Hamilton's doctrine of the unity
of the executive power was seldom more truly
exemplified.34
Polk clearly interpreted his function as commander
in chief as including not only military policy-making and
supreme command, but leadership in determining overall
campaign strategy as w e l l . ^

Although devoid of any

^^OCMH, American Military History, 166.
^ L e o n a r d D. White, "Polk,11 in May (ed.), Ultimate
Decision, $Q. Hereinafter cited as White, "Polk."
•ac?
•^ I b i d ., 60. Since general military terminology
must be employed throughout this study, it is necessary to
define what is meant by some of these terms. Tactics refers
to the choioe of battle formations and the actual direction
of forces when actively engaged with an enemy. Strategy
originally meant the planning of operations by a nation's
commanding generals, utilizing the personnel and materiel
made available by the civilian leadership. With the growing
technological complexity of modern warfare in the twentieth
century, for the United States at least, this has come to
mean that the civilian leaders in the executive branch
determine general strategy and exercise control over all
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military training, as were the majority of his cabinet and
other advisers, the President did a sound job of
administering the war effort.

His decisions were sound and

generally correct.
President Polk also established a precedent for
future commander:.; in chief with respect to the war powers
of the Congress.

In the first place, it was Polk’s ordering

of Taylor’s army into territory between the Nueces and the
Rio Grande that led inevitably to blood-letting on both
sides.

Then, Polk asked the Congress to declare war on the

basis of the hostilities which were engendered by his
decisions.

The Congress exercised its constitutional

power to declare war, but, in reality, it merely acknowl
edged an existing condition created by the President.
With respect to the other military controls granted
specifically to the Congress by the Constitution, Polk also
had his way.

He demonstrated that in this area, the

principle of separation of powers simply was not operable.

major operational decisions in the theaters of command.
In
either case, strategy is designed to implement policy, the
latter being defined as the purpose for which a war is
fought.
Policy is formulated by civilian leaders, usually
the President, who determine the priorities of men and
supplies to be allocated to the military. These definitions
are taken, in large part, from T. Harry Williams, Americans
at War (Revised edition, New York: Collier Books, 19£>2) ,
TT-I^7 Hereinafter cited as Williams, Americans at War.
49-50

.

3^White, "Polk,” 73; Williams, Americans at War,
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Congress, being a large, deliverative body with an inherent
inertia, showed that it was structurally incapable of
exercising coordinate authority over the conduct of war.
Polk led the Congress in the establishment and financing of
the military and the disposition of these forces.

37

In the

first real test of its military authority, the Congress
had - more by default, than design - relinquished its
powers to the commander in chief.
During the Mexican War an effective unity of the
military command structure was established, with James Polk
as the single, ultimate source of all military decisions.
The President had clearly shown in his conduct of the war,
as Leonard White concluded in his study of Polk that "a
president could be a commander in chief.

A president

Oft

could run a war."
It is an irony of history that a Whig Representative
from Illinois, who was highly critical of Polk’s extra
ordinary war powers, was to become the next wartime
commander in chief.

Abraham Lincoln first gained national

attention by his "Spot Resolutions" which attacked the
President for ordering Taylor down to the Rio Grande and

37White, "Polk," 73.
38Ibid., 7k-7$>
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justifying his demand for war on the resultant fighting.

39

Lincoln consistently maintained that the Mexican War
"...

was unnecessarily and unconstitutionally commenced

by the President."^0
Lincoln not only attacked Polk for unlawfully
initiating the war with Mexico, he also condemned the
methods exercised by the President in his conduct of the
war.

For example, in a speech at Wilmington, Delaware, in

June, 181^.8, a newspaper recorded that Lincoln denounced
Polk's administration as despotic, unresponsive to the
will of the people and one characterized by an abusive
use of power.

The article, apparently paraphrasing

Lincoln, continues:

"The manner in which the present

Executive had carried on the Mexican war should condemn it
. • • before the whole people.

...

it was a war of

^ T e x t of Lincoln's "Spot" Resolution, introduced in
the House of Representatives, December 22, 18^7, is in Roy
P. Basler (ed.), The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln (8
vols., New Brunswick', New Jersey: kutgers University Press,
1953), I> i|20-22. Hereinafter cited as Basler (ed.J,
Collected Works of Lincoln.
^ L i n c o l n to William H. Herndon, February 1, l81j.8,
ibid.,
Lincoln repeated substantially the same
contentions elsewhere in this period. See, for examples,
Lincoln, Speech to House of Representatives, January 12,
I8k8, ibid., 2+31-32; Lincoln to Usher F. Linder, March 22,

18^8, TbTd., k57-58.
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conquest brought into existence to catch votes.
There is little reason to doubt that at least part
of Lincoln’s attack on Polk's application of the war
powers was motivated by partisan political considerations.
In addition, Lincoln found himself in the awkward position
of denouncing the autocratic powers of the commander in
chief but voting in the House for war legislation that had
the effect of continuing and extending these powers.
Lincoln voted his approval of the Administration's requests
because he recognized the need to fully support the armed
forces in what, in the final analysis, he believed to be a
just war.^-2

Certainly many congressmen during Lincoln's

presidency, finding themselves in the same quandary,
could sympathize with the Representative from Illinois.
Even granting that Lincoln was influenced by

^ T h e newspaper account of Lincoln's speech at
Wilmington on June 10, l8k8, is taken from the Delaware
State Journal, June 13, 18J+.8, as reprinted in Basler (ed.),
Col 1 ected Works of Lincoln, I, If.75-76. The account of
Lincoln's views Ts undoubtedly accurate, for in a letter two
weeks earlier, Lincoln urged that the Whigs campaigning for
Zachary Taylor in l8if.8, should not attempt to justify,
". . .Mr. Polk's mode of prosecuting the war." Lincoln to
Usher P. Linder, February 20, l81f.8, ibid., lf.53*
^ I n a House speech in January, l8i|.8, Lincoln said
he hoped Polk could prove that Mexico attacked Amerioan
territory, since he (Lincoln) was concerned about the "doubt
ful propriety" of some of his votes on the war. Speech,
January 12, l8ij.8, ibid., lf.31-if.2. See also Lincoln to
Herndon, June 22, TBZjH, ibid., if.90-92.
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partisanship and the limited perspective of a back row seat
in the House, it must still be acknowledged that he
sincerely deplored in principle this erosion of congres
sional authority.

He revealed this genuine concern in a

letter written in February, l8ij.8:
Allow the President to invade a neighboring nation,
whenever he shall deem it necessary to repel an
invasion, and you will allow him to do so, whenever he
may choose to say he deems it necessary for such
purpose— ancTyou allow him to make war at pleasure.
Study to see if you can fix any limit to his power in
this respect. . . .
The provision of the Constitution giving the warmaking powers to Congress, was dictated, as I under
stand it, by the following reasons. Kings had always
been involving their people in wars, pretending
generally, if not always, that the good of the people
was the object. This, our Convention understood to be
the most oppressive of all Kingly oppressions; and they
resolved to so frame the Constitution that no one man
should hold the power of bringing this oppressi'ori upon
us. But your view destroys the whole matter, and .
places our President where kings have always stood.n-3
Less than fifteen years later the author of this
letter will stand, in the totality of the war powers he
acquired as President, "where kings have always stood."
It fell to Lincoln to act as commander in chief in
the first modern total war, a war involving all of the
people and a complete commitment of all the nation's
resources; a war without compromise or any limitation on its
objectives.^

In the end, Lincoln, having tested many of

^ L i n c o l n to Herndon, February lfj>, l8ij.8, ibid.,

lj-51-52.
^Williams, Americans at War,
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the outer reaches of his constitutional grants of authority,
emerged in the role of "emergency dictator," in effective
control of a mighty military a r s e n a l . ^
With the fall of Fort Sumter on April llj., 1861,
Lincoln began immediately to employ his emergency powers.
The effect of his actions will be to make the commander in
chief clause "one of the most highly-charged provisions of
the Constitution."^

The President called for a special

session of the Congress to convene on July lj., 1861.

But

in the ten-week interim, Lincoln took steps that represent
"perhaps the widest use of unilateral Presidential power
without prior congressional sanction."^-7
Lincoln, basing his actions on the commander in
chief clause of the Constitution as well as the clause
instructing him "to take care that the laws be faithfully

^Rob e r t A. Dahl, Pluralist Democracy in the United
States: Conflict and Consent (Chicago: Rand, HcNally, X967)t
96 . "Hereinafter cited as Dahl, Pluralist Democracy. The
term, "dictator," is used here only "bo indicate the extent
of Lincoln’s powers and the absence of any efficacious
method of dividing the decisive powers with Congress.
Lincoln's actions were justified by the emergency condition.
While he often acted without statutory authority, the
Congress willingly, ex post facto, provided the President
with the legislative sanctions• Lincoln was a democratic
ruler, granted a dictatorial range of powers as an ex
pedient. Had he been a dictator in truth, he would not have
submitted to a popular election in l86i|.
^Corwin, The President, 229*
^Background Information on the Use of United States
Armed Forces in Foreign Countries, TBT
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executed," began by issuing a presidential proclamation on
April 15* 1861, calling the militia into Federal service
and demanding an end to insurrection.^"®

In the weeks

remaining before Congress convened, Lincoln ordered several
extraordinary measures which he deemed necessary:
During this period of ten weeks Lincoln amalgamated
the available state militias into a ninety days'
volunteer force, called lj.0,000 volunteers for three
years' service, added 23,000 men to the Regular Army
and 18,000 to the Navy, paid out two millions from
unappropriated funds in the Treasury to persons un
authorized to receive it, closed the Post Office to
"treasonable correspondence," subjected passengers to
and from foreign countries to new passport regula
tions, proclaimed a blockade of the Southern ports,
suspended the writ of habeas corpus in various places,
and caused the.arrest and military detention of
persons "who were represented to him" as being engaged
in or contemplating "treasonable practices"— and all
this for the most part without the least statutory
authorization.49
When Congress was assembled on July 4> it heard a

4®Dahl, Pluralist Democracy, 96; Paul M. Angle and
Earl S. Miers (eds.T. H&e Living Lincoln: The M a n , His
M i n d , His Times, And the War He Fought, Re construe ted~From
His Own Writings (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers
University Press, 1955), 395-96.
^Corwin, The President, 229. Similar lists,
varying only in detail, can he found in 0CMH, American
Military History, 189-90; Background Information on the Use
of United States Armed Forces in ForeTgn Countries, TETjT
Uilward S . Corwin and Louis "W7 Koenig, The~presidency Today
(New York: New York University Press, 1956) , 3^* Hereinafter cited as Corwin and Koenig, Presidency Today. See
also, T. Harry Williams, Lincoln and His Generals (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), 7* Hereinafter cited as
Williams, Lincoln and His Generals.
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powerful defense of his conduct by Lincoln-*® and soon after
passed a series of statutes authorizing the emergency
<1
actions taken by the President.
But this does not
diminish the fact that Lincoln had acted unilaterally and
boldly, establishing a number of precedents to guide
future chief executives.

The belated congressional

sanction of these steps was little more than a gesture of
approval, albeit significant for the future.

It is not

really noteworthy that Lincoln - or the other wartime
presidents - did not face any considerable opposition to
the use, or usurpation, of the war powers.

During times

of national emergency the Congress has quite freely
transferred its war powers to the commander in chief, for
a fixed period of time, or the duration of the emergency.
"Congress too, likes to win wars," Clinton Rossiter has
pointed out, "and Congressmen are more likely to needle
the President for inactivity and timidity than to accuse
„52
him of acting too swiftly and arbitrarily.

^Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session,
July Ji, 1861, Basler (ed.), Collected Works of Lincoln, IV,

lj.21-lj.1.
^ C o r w i n and Koenig, Presidency Today, 32-33;
Background Information on the W e o£ UnTted States Armed
Forces in Foreign Countries, 1'8.
-^Clinton Rossiter, The American Presidency (New
York: New American Library of World Literature, 1956),
18. Hereinafter cited as Rossiter, American Presidency.
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During the first three years of the fighting Lincoln
did more than just determine policy and general strategy.
He decided theater and campaign strategies and, on occasion,
developed and directed tactical maneuvers of forces in the
field.

He did so out of necessity, for he felt the

ranking generals in the command structure had talents
ranging from ineptness and timidity to gross incompetency.
When Lincoln found - in Ulysses Grant - a soldier superbly
capable of commanding a m i e s in war, he turned over most
tactical and strategic direction to his new commanding
general, which is not to infer that Lincoln relinquished
his authority to Grant.

The President did allow Grant a

great deal of command latitude, but only because Grant
conformed his tactics to the President's strategic
concepts.
Lincoln apparently believed and acted on the
assumption that his emergency powers as commander in chief
were sufficient for all situations produced by the Civil
War.

While he did work with and through the Congress as a

general rule, he apparently felt no impelling obligation
to wait for congressional authorization or for the
judiciary's blessings, if he believed conditions dictated
otherwise.

This fundamental assumption of power was the

^Williams, Lincoln and His Generals, 8~9> 305-6.
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underlying policy upon which Lincoln's war administration
was predicated.-^

Lincoln's own words can be used to

support this contention.

The most obvious example is his

oft-quoted remark to the Congress in defense of his
suspension of habeas corpus:

11. . . are all the laws,

but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself to go
to pieces, lest that one be v i o l a t e d ? A g a i n ,

in August,

1863, Lincoln replied to a critic who demanded retraction
of the Emancipation Proclamation by saying, "You say it is
unconstitutional— I think differently.

I think the con

stitution invests its commander-in-chief with the law of
war, in time of w a r . " ^

Finally, in an explicit statement

on his concept of his role, Lincoln wrote:
I did understand . . . that my oath to preserve the
constitution to the best of my ability, imposed upon
me the duty of preserving, by every indispensable
means, that government--that nation— of which that
constitution was the organic law. . . . I felt that
measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become law
ful, by becoming indispensable to the preservation of
the nation. Right or wrong, I assume this ground, and
now avow it.57

-^William Archibald Dunning, Truth in History and
Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 19371 $
165- 66 .
^Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session,
July i}., 1861, Basler (ed.), Collected Works of Lincoln, IV,
i|.30; Fowler, War Powers of the President,' ITT"’
^Lincoln to James C. Conkling, August 26, 1863,
Basler (ed.), Collected Works of Lincoln, VI, lf.08.
^ Lincoln to Albert G. Hodges, April ij., lQ7k> ibid.,
VII, 281.
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The story of America’s brief involvement in war with
Spain is a well-worn tale of gross Inefficiency in the
command and logistical systems of the War Department,
blundering victories and an anti-climax in the Philippines
full of savage brutality.

What is curious about this story

is that William McKinley is not the central character.
Whereas the history of the Civil War invariably revolves
around the compelling, tragic figure in the White House,
McKinley seems somehow a minor actor in the accounts of
America’s experiment in imperialism.
The President did not lead the nation into war:
McKinley yielded to jingoistic pressures generated by
expansionists desirous of emulating England’s imperi
alistic successes as well as a deep popular idealistic
impulse to aid the Cuban people.

Nor did he openly direct

the military efforts of the country during the war.
the outset, McKinley " . . .

At

had only hazy notions of what

kind of war he wanted to fight."

The President was

constantly urged to expand America's military effort,
particularly by the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs.
However no clear-cut, overall strategy can be perceived at
any point in the war.

Instead, McKinley apparently worked

from day-to-day, not neglecting his duty to make the

^®Ernest R. May, "McKinley," in May (ed.), Ultimate
Decision, 95*
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ultimate decisions when need be, but not achieving any
effective unity of command either.

7

In fairness to McKinley, he did choose to work
behind the scenes; quite often, his major function was to
act as a mediator and liaison between the War and Navy
Departments.

Since these sessions were confidential,

little can be determined about the President's role.
Additionally, McKinley was not given to making direct
public statements about the war:

"A captain who stayed on

duty at the helm, without a message to the frightened and
indignant passengers."

60

Perhaps the only reasonable

conclusion regarding this President as commander in chief
is that arrived at by Margaret Leech:

"McKinley's actual

contribution is impossible to evaluate."

6l

Pew students of American history, asked to name a
great national leader in time of war, would be likely to
invoke the name of William McKinley, or the next wartime
leader, Woodrow Wilson.

The popular image of Wilson is

not that of a great commander in chief, but of an
impractical moralist who fumbled his country into war and
bungled the peace that ended it.

Quite soon after taking

^ I b i d ., 96-103, passim.
k°Margaret Leech, In the Days of McKinley (New York:
Harper and Brothers, 19£9T7 232-33V

61Ibid., 233 .
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office Wilson had ordered a mil itary expedition to attack
and occupy Vera Cruz, Mexico, without requesting congres
sional authorization.

He later ordered a punitive military

expedition into northern Mexico in a vain pursuit of Pancho
Villa.

In 1917» Wilson asked the nation to take up arms

in the most horrible war mankind had yet inflicted upon
itself.

62

All of this caused Wilson a great deal of

anguish, for of all American presidents, none was a more
avowed pacifist.^
The decisions that Wilson made as commander in chief
are few in number and can be briefly summarized:

The first

was that the American Expeditionary Force was not to be
amalgamated into the Allied armies, but was to maintain a
separate identity.

Thus, the United States became in

World War I, not one of the Allied Powers, but an
"Associated Belligerent."

Another early decision was that

the United States would concentrate its military contri
bution in France, the major theater of the war.
these decisions originated with Wilson.

Neither of

He simply approved

Richard F. Haynes, "Woodrow Wilson as Commander in
Chief in World War I," Unpublished Master's Thesis, Louisiana
State University (1963), 212-13. Hereinafter cited as
Haynes, "Wilson as Commander in Chief."
^ R i c h a r d Hofstadter, The American Political
Tradition and the Men Who Made It (frew York: Vintage, 19$k)»
260. Hereinafter cited' as Hofstadter, American Political
Tradition.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

29
both of them after they had been recommended to him by the
War Department General Staff and the Secretary of W a r . ^
Wilson also approved of the Allied Supreme War Council's
appointment of Ferdinand Foch as supreme commander of the
Allied armies, thus subordinating the American commander,
General John J. Pershing, to foreign authority.

The only

other command decision of any consequence made by Wilson
was his decision to permit American troop participation in
the military interventions at Vladivostok and MurmanskArchangel in the Soviet Union.

In this decision he ran

counter to the advice of General Pershing and Secretary of
War Newton Baker, but in almost every other instance he
accepted their proposals,

"...

deliberately evading the

necessity for making military decisions."^
In sum, it must be said that Woodrow Wilson, while
never completely abdicating his military functions, did
avoid acting as commander in chief whenever it was possible
for him to do so.

One writer has suggested that perhaps

Wilson "evaded duty as Commander-in-Chief in order to do

^%»ouis Smith, American Democracy and Military
Power: A Study of the Military Power T n IsHe United States
(Chicago: UniversTty of Chicago Press ,~~T951T, £l. H'ereinafter cited as Smith, American Democracy and Military
Power. See also, Haynes, "Wilson as Commander in Chief,"

2n rr

^Er n e s t R. May, "Wilson," in May (ed.), Ultimate
Decision, 129.
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his larger duty as President of the United States.

„66

There is validity to this, for Wilson clearly considered
the direction of military forces to be a distasteful task
that could be safely delegated to his functionaries.

He

had a messianic sense of mission in which he conceived his
chief responsibility to be the making of peace, not the
waging of war.
The next wartime commander in chief, Franklin
Delano Roosevelt, ’’who had read about Lincoln and lived
with W i l s o n , w a s

the political heir of the Lincolnian

tradition of an autocratic commander in chief.
Roosevelt who " . . .

It was

carried the wartime Presidency to

breathtaking heights of authority over the American economy

„68

and social order. 1

A confluence of vast technological advancements and
congressional acquiescence served to elevate FDR to these
"breathtaking heights" of power.

Even before the first of

66Ibid., 131 .
American Presidency, 18. Franklin
Roosevelt had served as Wilson’s Assistant Secretary of the
Navy in World War I. As President, he wrote to Joseph
Tumulty, Wilson’s fommer secretary:
"I wonder if you
realize how often I think of your Old Chief when I go about
my daily tasks. Perhaps what we are doing will go a little
way towards the fulfillment of his ideals." Quoted in
Thomas H. Greer, What Roosevelt Thought; The Social and
Political Ideas of W a n k l i n D .HRoo seveTt (teast“ Lansing,
Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1958 )» 105*
^ R o s s i t e r ,

^®Roesiter, American Presidency, 18.
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the world wars the American industrial revolution had
created such refinements in military weaponry that domestic
industry itself became, according to Edward Corwin, " . . .
an industrial theater of war of immense

p r o p o r t i o n s . " ^

Corwin goes on to explain, convincingly, that . . .
Great industry in the United States had . . • become
part and parcel of the fighting forces not only of the
United States but of its allies as well, and as such it
had to be subjected to detailed regimentation by the
government. . . . To meet this requirement Congress
was compelled to develop a new technique in legis
lative practice, one capable of meeting the
fluctuating demands of a fluid war situation. This it
did by delegating vast unchanneled powers to the
President, to be exercised by him through men of his
own choosing.
John Locke's ban on delegated legis
lation simply went by the board, nor has it since
been revived so far as concerns powers shared by the
two departments.70
Wilson had employed this delegated legislation to
create extremely powerful administrative agencies
responsible only to him.?!

Roosevelt, confronted with a

far larger war, involving vast technological changes,
built upon World War I precedents so that "the quasi
legislative powers of Franklin Roosevelt as

Ao
yCorwin and Koenig, Presidency Today, 33*
?°Ibid.
?^Among these agencies were, U.S. Shipping Board,
Council of National Defense, Committee on Public Informa
tion, War Industries Board, Fuel Administration, Food
Administration, Railroad Administration, National War
Labor Board and the War finance Corporation.
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'Commander-in-chief in wartime,' to use his own favorite
formula, burgeoned correspondingly.”72
In his preparedness moves prior to American involve
ment, Roosevelt expanded the historical definition of the
commander in chief function.

On September 8, 1939, the

President issued a proclamation declaring the country to be
in a state of "limited national emergency."

Under the

authority of this proclamation Roosevelt increased the
National Guard by 35>000 and the Army by 17,000 over
prior limits.

This cautious early step was, Roosevelt

felt, about all he could do in view of the prevailing
isolationist sentiment.73

as this isolationist spirit

withered in the face of Axis advances into Scandanavia
and the Low Countries of Europe in early 19^0, Roosevelt
was able to move more boldly.

In an earlier budget message

to Congress in January, the President had requested $1.8
billion for national defense and asked for $1.18 billion
in additional military appropriations.

On May 31, 194° *

he requested a supplementary appropriation of $1.27 billion

72corwin and Koenig, Presidency Today,

3l±,

73v/alter Millis, Arms and M e n : A Study of American
Military History (New York: New America*n L'ibrary," T9f&),'
Hereinafter cited as Millis, Arms and Men.
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to accelerate old, and develop new, military programs.^
In June, 19i|.0, on Prime Minister Churchill's request,
Roosevelt ordered the War Department to release to Great
Britain "surplus or outdated" rifles, planes and other
military hardware.

In this busy summer of 19i}-0, FDR also

dispatched American technicians and military advisers to
England.

He allowed British pilots to be trained and

British warships to be repaired in the United States.

And

on September 2, 19l|0, the Administration concluded an
executive agreement with England called the "DestroyerBases" deal.

By its terms, fifty "outdated" (but recently

reconditioned) naval warships were transfered to English
control in return for the leasing to the United States of
sites for military bases on British p o s s e s s i o n s . ^

"The

deal was an abandonment of any pretense of neutrality.
*76
was an act of war. . . . "

It

R i c h a r d B. Morris, Encyclopedia of American
History (rev. ed., New York: Harper and Row, 1961), "36I4..
Hereinafter cited as Morris, Encyclopedia of American
History.
7^The naval and air bases provided by Great Britain
on a ninety-nine year lease arrangement were located in
Newfoundland, the Bahamas, Bermuda, Jamaica, St. Lucia,
Antigua, Trinidad, and British Guiana. See John E. Wiltz,
Prom Isolation to War, 1931-19lj.l (New York: Thomas Y.
Crowell, 19&B ) »"~Bi• Hereinafter cited as Wiltz, From
Isolation to War.
7^Ibid., 82.

See also, Corwin, The President, 202.
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Roosevelt further compromised the quasi-neutral
posture of the United States in securing the enactment of
H.R. 1776, the Lend-Lease Act of March, 19i|l»

By

terms

the President could, whenever he believed "national
defense" to be involved, authorize his administrators to
procure and "sell, transfer, exchange, lease, lend or
otherwise dispose of the same to any government whose
defense the President deemed vital" to United States
security, on whatever terms he cared to

s

e

t

.

The

Commander in Chief now had power over and control of the
dispersal of all arms and munitions manufactured in the
United States as well as control over all its armed
forces.

He was the most powerful single human being in

the world.

Edward S. Corwin rightly states with respect

to the Lend-Lease Act that "no more sweeping delegation of
legislative power has ever been made to an American presidient. . . .”7®
A good case can be made that American participation
in World War II was inevitable.

But such an argument does

not justify the propriety of the destroyer-bases deal and
the Lend-Lease Act.

The former was an executive caveat,

77corwin and Koenig, Presidency Today, 35* See also,
Dahl, Pluralist Democracy, 96; Selig Adler, The Uncertain
Giant; 1921-1941: American Foreign Policy Between the Wars
(Toronto, Canada: Collier-Macmillan, 1^65), 249-51*
rjQ

Corwin, The President, 237»
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exercising the commander in chief powers to determine
future foreign relations and military alignments.^

The

latter represented a sweeping abdication of military
responsibility by the Congress, giving the commander in
chief extremely broad controls over an America still
(technically) at peace.

80

The opponents of Lend-Lease

recognized this and argued in vain that the act changed
and distorted the traditional commander in chief theory.
As Senator Burton Wheeler expressed it, "the proponents
of this bill . . . are proclaiming a new constitutional
theory which places the actual power to involve our
country in war at the uncontrolled discretion of the

81

Executive."

Roosevelt’s direct command of the military during
World War II was affected by his issuance of a formal
Military Order in July, 1939.

The order removed from the

service departments the Joint Array-Navy Board and a
number of procurement agencies and placed them in the
Executive Office of the President.

Among other things,

James, Contemporary Presidency, llf.6 ,
flf)
Corwin and Koenig, Presidency Today, 3^-35?
Millis, Arms and Men, 2k 9-51; Wiltz, From’ Isolation to
W a r , 19 3 1 - W , ' 85-87. See also, Powers of the President
To Send Aimed Forces Outside the United sTates, 16.
^ S e n a t o r Wheeler is quoted in an undated report,
"Power of the President to Send Troops Abroad, (Appendix
D)," Murphy Papers, White House Files, Truman Library.
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this order had the effect of placing the Chief of Naval
Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army, directly
under the command and supervision of the commander in
chief:
The immediate results of this new arrangement were
modest but significant. The principal war agencies in
both the strategic and the production fields were
clearly established as presidential, not departmental,
agencies. . . . The Military Order of 1939 had the
effect of raising the Joint Board above the
departmental level. By placing the chiefs in a
special relationship to the President, it made them
in some way independent of their immediate civilian
superiors. . . • Increasingly after 1939 the Joint
Board, under the control of the President, concerned
itself with questions of national rather than service
strategy. . . .
By this little-noticed Military Order of 1939,
Franklin Roosevelt laid the institutional foundations
of his powers as commander in chief. The new arrange
ments were not a model of administrative symmetry. • .
In particular the service secretaries were placed in
an anomalous position; they retained control over, and
responsibility for, their departments but not their
military chieftains, who, with their advisers,
operated directly beneath the President.
If the
service secretaries were indeed the principal agents
of civilian control over the military, it would seem
that in strategic matters the chiefs, as Admiral Leahy
was to remark at the end of the war, were "under no
civilian control whatever," apart, of course, from
that exercised by the President himself.82
Despite FDR's own unsystematic and often haphazard
style of leadership he found his command authority highly
institutionalized by the very vastness of the military
structure he had to command.

Roosevelt discovered that

even the commander in chief could have little direct effect

W i l l i a m R. Emerson, "Roosevelt," in May (ed.),
Ultimate Decision, 136-37* Hereinafter cited as Emerson,
'’Roosevelt.
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on the machinery of command in such a vast undertaking.
Nor was there much need to.

He set the grand strategy of

the war with his Joint Chiefs, with whom he maintained a
personal, amiable relationship, and they implemented it
throughout the command structure.

Because the system

worked, Roosevelt did not involve himself in operational
planning, nor did he attempt to dictate tactics to the
theater commanders.

While for a time in the midst of the

war FDR doubted the strategic advice of his Joint Chiefs,
leaning more toward politically-oriented Allied proposals,
he soon relented, relying generally upon his military
planners to determine strategy.®-^

William R. Emerson, in

an essay on Roosevelt as war leader, came to this fitting
conclusion s
. • . he performed truly the function of the American
commander in chief, which is to bind together the
varied political and military strands which make up
war, keeping each in its proper relation to the whole.
If criticism must fall upon his war presidency it
probably should fall upon the soundness and realism
of his political motives rather than upon his military
actions4
On April 12, 191+5, with victory in Europe a
certainty, but the war in the Pacific still far from over,
Franklin Roosevelt died of a massive cerebral hemorrhage.

% e w York Times, April 13> 191+5; Maurice Matloff,
"Roosevelt" as War Leader,,f in Abraham S. Eisenstadt (ed.),
Ameri can History; Recent Interpretations, Book II, Since
1
2nd ed. (New York; Thomas Y. Crowell, l96^T, 1+25-26.
^•Emerson, "Roosevelt ,11 176.
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And so, with a brutal suddenness, the Vice-President
found himself in full command of the most powerful military
apparatus the earth has ever known.
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CHAPTER II
FROM THE MISSOURI TO THE POTOMAC
One thing I am certain about, there's nothing in
our history . . . that shows that a man can be trained
to be President of the United States, or that we could
ensure that he would ever become President even if
trained for the job, because there are so many factors
that enter into the making of a President.!

Harry S. Truman
1881]..

was b o m in Lamar, Missouri,

May 8 ,

His early years fit the American stereotype:

Born

of solid, rural, middle-class, Midwestern, Protestant
stock, his youth was spent on a six hundred-acre farm, and
in Independence, an unexceptional small town near Kansas
City.

His early life was uneventful, full of those minor

tribulations and small victories that characterize the back
ground of most Americans.

If Harry Truman was anything, he

was "average," showing no particular abilities or special

2

promise.

Truman's family
college.

He did apply

could not afford to send him to
for

admission to

the United States

lHarry S. Truman, Mr. Citizen (New York: Popular
Library, 1961), 111. Hereinafter cited as Truman, M r .
Citizen.
2Luther Huston, New York Times, April 1$, 19k$>
Harry S. Truman, Year of Decisions, Vol. I, Memoirs (Garden
City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Incorporated, 1955)*
112-25, passim. Hereinafter cited as Truman, Memoirs, I.
39
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Military Academy (West Point) and passed the entrance
examinations, only to be rejected for his poor eyesight.^
Although his schooling ended with his high school gradu
ation, Truman remained an avid, life-long student of
history and government.
formal training:

However, he regretted his lack of

"I've always been

university education.

But I got it

sorry I did not get a
in the Army the hard

way— and it s t u c k . T r u m a n ’s first job after high school
was as a timekeeper for a railroad construction crew.

He

went from that to bank clerking, and, in 1916, became a
one-third partner in the Atlas-Okla Oil Lands Syndicate, a
wildcat drilling company.

Because of manpower shortages

brought on by World War I, the company sold

off all its

leases at the outset of the war.^
The future commander in chief got his first taste
of the military life in 1905•

As he wrote in his Memoirs,

". . . having been something of a student of military

^John Hersey, "Profiles--Mr. President," Part 2,
"Ten O'clock Meeting," The New Yorker, XXVII (April lij.#
1951)> 38* Hereinafter cited as Kersey, "Profiles," Pt. 2.
^Alfred Steinberg, The Man From Missouri: The Life
and Times of Harry £3. Truman (New Tories- 0. P. Putnam's
Sons, 196277 5l. Hereinafter cited as Steinberg, Man From
Missouri.
^Irving Brant, "Harry S. Truman-I," New Republic
CXII (April 30, 191*5), 578. Hereinafter ciied as Brant,
"Harry S. Truman-I." See also, Truman, Memoirs, I, 126-27«
In March, 1917> Atlas-Okla was re-organized as Morgan Oil
and Refining Company.
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history, I decided to join the ’militia 1 referred to in
Washington’s message of 1790."

So he enlisted in Battery

B of the National Guard at Kansas City in the year it was
organized.

In his first National Guard encampment at Cape

Giradeau, Missouri, Truman was a private, acting as "No.
2 man" on a three-inch gun .7

He remained in the Guard

until activated for federal service in 1917*
With American entry into the First World War the
Kansas City-Independence National Guard batteries were
expanded into a full regiment.

In the fashion of the time,

Guard officers were elected by the members of the regiment
following this re-organization} and Truman found himself
elected a first lieutenant of light artillery in Battery F
of the 2nd Missouri Field Artillery.

Three months later,

in August, 1917* Truman’s unit was sworn into federal
service as the 129th Field Artillery of the 35th Division.
The unit was activated and ordered to Camp Doniphan, Fort
Q
Sill, Oklahoma on September 26, 1917*

^Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, Vol. II,
Memoirs (Garden City, New York:*""!)outleday and Company,
1955), lf.6 . Hereinafter cited as Truman, Memoirs, II.

7Ibid., I, 125.
®Ibid., 127-28} Steinberg, Man From Missouri, U2.
See also, Jonathan Daniels, The Man of independence
(Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott,19557"* 90# Hereinafter
cited as Daniels, Man of Independence.
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After training in Oklahoma, Truman was shipped to
Prance in March, 1918.

In Prance he received more training

in Artillery schools at Montigny-sur-Aube and Coetiquidan.
On July 11 Truman, by now a captain, was given command of
Battery D, 129th Field Artillery, in the Vosges Mountains.
He fired his first combat barrage there on September 6 ,
1918.

Prom then until the Armistice in November, Captain

Truman commanded his unit at St. Mihiel, the Meuse-Argonne,
Q
Varennes, Verdun and Metz.
Truman referred to these months of combat many times
during his later career, always with a mixture of pride
and nostalgia as, for example, in a radio address he
broadcast to all the Armed Forces following FDR's death:
I have done as you would do in the field when the
Commander falls. My duties and responsibilities are
clear. I have assumed them. These duties will be
carried on in keeping with our American tradition.
As a veteran of the First World War, I have seen
death on the battlefield. When I fought in France
with the 35th Division, I saw good officers and men
fall, and be replaced. • . .
I know the strain, the mud, the misery, the utter
weariness of the soldier in the field. And I know

^New York Times, April 13, 19i|5; Truman, Memoirs, I,
128-31. See also, Cabell Phillips, The Truman Presidency:
The History of a Triumphant Succession (New York: The
m!acmilla!n Company, I 960), 1.3" Hereinafter cited as
Phillips, Truman Presidency.
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to

too his courage, his stamina, his faith in his
comrades, his country, and himself.
10
We are depending on every one of you. . . .
Following his return to Missouri after the war,
Truman continued his interest in the military by reamining
active in the Field Artillery Reserve, in which he
attained the rank of major.

In addition, he was

instrumental in creating the first chapter in Missouri of
the Reserve Officers Association, at Kansas City in 1921.
Later, when the organization had spread across Missouri,
he became the first president of the state-wide associ
ation. ■
L1
"My whole political career," Truman would say many
years later, "(was) . . . based upon my war service and
war associates."
beginnings:

12

This was certainly true of its

Truman had opened a haberdashery at Kansas

City in 1919 with a friend from the war days, ex-sergeant
Eddie Jacobson.

Following a successful initial year, the

business went downhill, after— as Truman put it in his own
partisan fashion— ". . . the Republicans took over the U.S.

^Address Broadcast to the Armed Forces, April 17*
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States,
Harry S. Truman: Containing tlhe Publicities sages, Speeches,
and Statements of the' Prealdent (6 vols., Washington, t/sCPO,
1961-66), l9to,“"Hl. Hereinafter cited as Public Papers
• . . Truman, (year). See also, Truman, Memoirs ,~I, 1-52.

£

•^Truman, Memoirs, I, 138-39.

12Phillips, Truman Presidency , 11±.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Government under the presidency of Warren G. Harding."

13

In the spring of 1922, with his business at the point of
bankruptcy, Truman was urged by Jim Pendergast to seek
election as county judge.

Pendergast had served with

Truman as an officer in the 129th and later commanded his
own battery in the 130th Field Artillery.

His father was

Michael J. Pendergast, who, with his brother Tom, ruled
the political machine that controlled Kansas City and
Jackson County.

In a meeting of the Pendergast organiza

tion Truman won support for his candidacy.

Mike

Pendergast secured the endorsement for him, according to
Truman, by arguing that he was a veteran and one of the
few officers "whose men didn't want to shoot him."
Truman won the race for country judge in 1922, but
lost his bid fcr re-election in 192lj., the only defeat in
his political career.

In 1926 he ran for "presiding

judge" of Jackson County and won by the substantial margin
of sixteen thousand v o t e s . ^

Four years later, by a far

wider margin of fifty-eight thousand votes, Truman was

■^Truman, Memoirs, I, 133-3h*
^ I b i d ., 136; Daniels, Man of Independence, 113-11+*
For a somewhat different version 6 T ~these events', see
Phillips, Truman Presidency, 15-16.
•^Truman, Memoirs, I, 139; Phillips, Truman
Presidency, 17- In Missouri, County judges are actually
administrators, performing a function similar to that of
county boards of supervisors in other states.
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re-elected to his judgeship.

His energetic program of

road-building, hospital and courthouse construction had
apparently won him the support of the voters as well as
the Pendergast machine.^
In 193i|-> as his term came to an end, Truman
considered running for county collector, governor or
congressman from the newly-created Fourth Congressional
District of eastern Jackson County.

But ''Boss’1 Pender

gast, for political reasons of his own, insisted that
Truman m m for the Senate.
slim, Truman agreed.

Although his chances were very

It would have been an exercise in

utter futility for a Democrat to seek any of the other
posts Truman had considered running for, without the
blessings of the Kansas City machine.

17

In the Democratic primary Truman faced two
experienced Congressmen, John Cochran of St. Louis and
Jacob Milligan of Richmond.
forty-four thousand votes.

He won by a plurality of some
In the general election,

Truman opposed the incumbent, Roscoe C. Patterson, a con
servative Republican from Springfield.

Despite the fact

that he was running with the endoresement of Tom Pendergast,

■^Luther Huston, New York Times, April 1 $ , 19k5l
Truman, Memoirs, I, llj.0;"T?KiIlTps, Truman Presidency, 17•
■^Truman, Memoirs, I, lip.. See also, Huston, New
York Times, April If?, ItyUS; Steinberg, Man from Missouri,
TTFlTf.
------------------
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who was often anti-Roosevelt, Truman campaigned on a proNew Deal platform.

He took the Senate seat from Patterson

with a 2 $l± , 0 0 0 vote majority.

1 fl

During his senatorial campaigns and in his first
months in the Senate, Truman was villified as a "messenger
boy" for Pendergast and, later, as "the Senator from
Pendergast."

The Pendergast machine had become nationally

infamous for its brazen election frauds and use of
brutality, intimidation, kidnapping and murder to achieve
its ends.

Yet Truman was able to shake the onus of this

association for— to the amazement of his political
opponents— he was absolutely honest in his personal and
public conduct.

Despite intensive digging by many, no

shred of evidence has ever been unearthed to discredit
Truman’s conduct in office.^

Cabell Phillips, a

"I was a New Dealer from the start," Truman wrote.
"In fact, had been a New Dealer back in Jackson County.' . . .
I believed in the program from the time it was first
proposed." Memoirs, I, lip., llj.9. See also, Phillips,
Truman Presidency, 2 I4.; Steinberg, Man from Missouri, 120.
•^Irving Brant, "Harry S. Truman-I," £77; Phillips,
Truman Presidency, 18-19, 2J+-2£; Daniels, Man of Independence,
l"6£- 6”6 . Nowhere is it more evident thatTrumanTs image was
not permanently tarnished by his alliance with the Kansas
City machine than in a Times editorial following his
assumption of the Presidency:
"There is no need to blink
at the one-time association with Pendergast," the editorial
reads. The writer describes Truman as a "practical poli
tician" who, like A1 Smith, was educated in ". . . the hard,
tough schools of the ward machines • • „ whose experience
in the practical ways of accomplishing sound public pur
poses . . • (make) them particularly useful to their
country in a time of crisis." New York Times, April Ilf., 19l|.£.
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biographer of Truman, sees this contradiction as political
pragmatism:
One of the most fascinating anomalies of Harry
Truman's career is that he, a man of such impeccable
personal honesty and political integrity, could have
maintained so close a relationship and dependence upon
the Pendergast machine without being corrupted by
it. . . . But Truman's political enemies, as well as
more objective students, have combed through the
records time after time and not found one substantial
clue of Truman's complicity in any of its myriad
misdeeds.
Moralists will find it difficult to exculpate
Harry Truman while condemning the machine of which he
was a part. To Truman himself there was no paradox in
his relationship with the Pendergasts. He understood
the nature of organization politics and the code of
loyalty by which it survives. . • . So he did what
many another smart political comer has done: He rode
the machine as far as it would take him but kept his
hands clean along the way. That is a pragmatic rather
than a moralistic philosophy, but under the rules of
our political system it is what pays off .20
Though it would have been politically expedient to
disavow his connections with Tom Pendergast once in the
Senate, particularly after the machine was crushed in the
late '30's, Truman remained loyal to the man who put him in
office, while always voting his own way.

As Truman him

self put it, "Tom Pendergast never asked me to do a
dishonest deed. . . .

He was always my friend.

He was

always honest with me, and when he made a promise he kept
it ."21

20Phillips, Truman Presidency, 18, 20.
^1Time, XLI, (March 8 , 19^3i, 15* See also, Brant,
"Harry S . tfruman-I," f>77-78; Phillips, Truman Presidency,

18.
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Truman's first term in the Senate was unmarked by
any particular contribution.

As a freshman senator he

accepted the rules of the club, remaining quietly in the
background, voting generally with the administration.
Truman was a typical New Deal Democrat, "who combined the
party regularity of the older Democrats with the liberal
fervor of the older progressives.

..."

22

Truman's value to the Roosevelt Administration was
not recognized.

FDR ignored him, giving all of the

patronage for Missouri to the senior Senator, Bennett
Champ Clark, who often voted against New Deal measures.

23

With the Pendergast machine destroyed and without the
support of the President or any substantial power bloc
back in Missouri, Truman's prospects for re-election in
191+0 were extremely gloomy.

His campaign was not made any

easier by having to face two tough challengers for his
seat, Governor Lloyd C. Stark, FDR's personal choice, and
Maurice Milligan, the crusading United States District

22Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New
Deal (Vol. II of The Age of Roosevelt. Boston: Houghton
Mi’fflin Company, 19£7-o0), 55¥» Truman was assigned to the
Interstate Commerce and Appropriations Committees. He
regretted not being assigned to Military Affairs:
"Ever
since World War I, I had maintained an active interest in
the Army and its administration, and I would have welcomed
an assignment to the Military AffairsCommittee." (He was
in his second term.) Truman, Memoirs, I, li+7-1+8*

2^Brant, "Harry S. Truman-I," £78-79.
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Attorney for Kansas City, who had led the investigation
that exposed and destroyed the Pendergast machine.
Additionally, the only newspaper of any size in all of
Missouri to endorse the candidacy of Harry Truman was the
Kansas City Journal. ^
Despite the odds, Truman won the 191+0 Democratic
primary by a margin of less than eight thousand votes in a
triumph as surprising and unpredictable as his upset
presidential victory eight years later.

In the general

election, Truman had a relatively easy time of it,
25
defeating Manvelle Davis, the Republican nominee.

Now

he could return to the Senate free of any labels, for he
had clearly won in his own right.
In January 191+1 > as Truman's second term began in
the Senate, the Roosevelt Administration was pushing its
military preparedness program in earnest.

Through his

membership on the Senate Appropriations Committee, Truman
was intimately aware that billions of dollars were
rapidly being expended -under contract to manufacturers for
the production of war material.

Besides these defense

expenditures, the Administration requested an additional

^Truman, Memoirs, I, 159-61. See also, Brant,
"Harry S. Truman-17 579 J Phillips, Truman Presidency,
29-31.
^Truman, Memoirs, I, 160-2.
See also, Time, XLI,
(March 8 , 191+3)» ll+; Daniels, Man of Independence, 210.
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four billion to expand the Army and seven billion dollars
for aid to England.

The total additional appropriations for
pi
the first few months of 19*j.l exceeded $25 billion.
During
his campaign he had heard tales of gross inefficiency and
mismanagement of government contracts.

As the rumors of

waste, corruption and favoritism continued to pile up,

Truman decided to conduct his own investigation.

Trav

eling in his car, he drove down the eastern seaboard from
Maryland to Florida, across the Gulf Coast to Texas, north
ward through Oklahoma and Nebraska to Wisconsin and
Michigan, and back to Washington.
thirty thousand miles:

In all, he covered about

"I visited war camps, defense

plants, and other establishments and projects which had
some connection with the total war effort of the country,
27
and did not let any of them know who I was.”
His

personal odyssey confiiroed the rumors and convinced him
of the need for a public watchdog over these vast
expenditures.
On February 10, 19*f.l» Truman made a speech

26

Truman, Memoirs, I, l61f.— 65-

27

Ibid., 165. See also, Steinberg, Man from
Missouri, TdO-ol; Phillips, Truman Presidency, 33-3*1-.
Commenting in a 1950 interview, Truman said:
" . . . I came
back and set up the Truman Committee.
If I hadn't taken
that drive, I'd still be just Senator Truman instead of
being in all this fix.” John Hersey, "Profiles— M r .
President," Part 1, "Quite a Head of Steam," The New
Yorker, XXVII (April 7, 1951), *l-5« Hereinafter cTEed as
Hersey, "Profiles," Pt. 1.
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denouncing the methods for awarding defense contracts,
condemning the concentration of these awards among a few
large manufacturers and citing several abuses by corpo
rations, particularly in "cost-plus" contracts.

Truman

proposed Senate Resolution 71» calling for a five-member
committee to investigate the national defense program on
28
a budget of twenty-five thousand dollars.
Truman's
timing was excellent:

A similar resolution had just been

offered in the House by a Congressman bitterly hostile to
the administration.^^

Roosevelt, with the encouragement

of Senator James 1?. Byrnes, chairman of the committee to
which Truman's resolution had been referred, decided to
support the Senate investigation headed by a consistent
loyalist.

After considerable haggling and in-fighting,

Truman was named chairman of the Special Committee to
Investigate the National Defense Program.

The bipartisan

membership was raised to seven from the five Truman had
proposed and the appropriation reduced from twenty-five to
fifteen thousand.

Both changes were forced on Truman by

Byrnes, who wanted to prevent the committee from becoming
powerful enough to hamper or embarrass the Administration.-^®

^®Truman, Memoirs, I, 165-66. See also, Phillips,
Truman Presidency, 3 k * Steinberg, Man from Missouri, 181-82.
^Eugene Cox of Georgia.
3°Steinberg, Man from Missouri, 182; Truman, Memoirs,
I, 166 . See also, Phillips, Truman Presidency, 3k>
Luther Huston, New York Times,' April 15/ l9lf-5.
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Truman was concerned about the role his committee
was to play.

He had been granted a broad franchise by the

Senate to investigate every phase of military spending, but
he was determined to avoid interfering in policy or strategy
decisions, which he firmly believed were the sole province
of the Chief Executive.

"The Special committee never dis

cussed military strategy, although we took testimony from
many generals and admirals," Truman wrote in his Memoirs,
adding, "the military policy of the United States was
entrusted to the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
31
and not to any congressional committee."
He recalled,
too, that on several occasions other senators, usually
Republicans like Robert Taft, Oren Brewster and Arthur
Vandenberg, tried to convert the Truman Committee into
something resembling the Committee on the Conduct of the
War which bedeviled Abraham Lincoln in his exercise of the
war p o w e r s . " T h a n k goodness," Truman said, "I knew my
history and I wouldn't do it."33

•^Truman, Memoirs, I, 189.
^2Ibid.; Steinberg, Man from Missouri, 181+. A few
months prior to U.S. entry into World War II and shortly
after entry, resolutions were offered in Congress to create
a "joint committee on the conduct of national defense."
Both efforts were blocked by the Democrats, who argued that
military policy matters must reside with the President. A.
Russell Buchanan, The United States and World War II (2 Vols.
New York: Harper and How, Publishers, 1 9 , 11 , 3T5-15*
Hereinafter cited as Buchanan, United States and World War
II.
^Steinberg,

Man from Missouri, l81j..
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The history of congressional/presidential relations
during the Civil War was known to Truman long before he
entered the Senate from his avid reading of military
history.

However, when he became head of the special

committee, he borrowed the Reports of the Joint Committee
on the Conduct of the War from the Library of Congress,
studied them carefully, and came to this conclusion:
These historic records constitute a most interesting
set of documents. That committee of the Union Congress
was said by Douglas Southall Freeman, the biographer of
Robert E. Lee, to have been of material assistance to
the Confederacy.
I became familiar with its mistakes
and was determined to avoid the same errors in the con
duct of ray special committee. Here, as in many other
instances, I found the teachings of history to be
valuable in my own approach to current problems.34
Cautioned by his knowledge of historical precedent,
Truman established rigid guidelines within which his
committee operated.

Truman functioned as a "chief of

staff," firmly guiding the committee, but freely
delegating responsibility.

He made the committee

apolitical by insisting that all reports submitted to
Congress by its bipartisan membership had to be unanimous.

3^Truman, Memoirs, I, 168, 188-89; Truman Speaks,
38. See also, Daniels,' Man of Independence, 2l?-lo;
Irving Brant, "Harry S. Truman-II, New kepublic, CXII
(May 7, 1 9 h$ ), 635. Hereinafter cited as Brant, "Harry S.
Truman-II.
William Hillman (ed.), Mr. President: The
First Publication from the Personal M a r i e s , Private
Letters, Papers and Revealing Interviews of Harry S. Truman,
ffhirty-Second President of Bhe"United Stages of America
(New York: Farrar, Straus and' Young, 195>2), 9l£7 Hereinafter cited as Hillman (ed.), Mr. President.
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No attempt at supervision of service conduct or military
policy determination was allowed.

The committee concerned

itself with fact-finding in respect to military procure
ment, construction, types and terms of gonverment contracts
and the method of awarding such contracts.

Through the

committee, Truman also made certain that small manufac
turers and suppliers got a fair percentage of the govern
ment’s business, especially through sub-contracting with
the principal contractual agents.

The committee concerned

itself with the practices of all manufacturing and labor
units operating within the national defense program.

"In

other words," as Truman summed it up, "the committee was
directed to examine every phase of the entire war
program. "^5
In the four years it existed, the Truman Committee
accomplished much with very little:

Truman has estimated

that his committee saved the nation $15 billion while
spending about $1+00 thousand for e x p e n s e s . T h r o u g h
tireless investigations, endless hearings, annual reports
and thirty-two special reports to the Senate, the Special

•^Truman, Memoirs, I, 167. See also, Buchanan,
United States and World War II, II, 315; Brant, "Harry S.
Truman-II," 635-36; Phillips, Truman Presidency, 35-37;
Huston, New York Times, April l5, 1914-5; Steinberg, Man from
MissouriT l8li-b5; Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., American Foreign
Tol'icy Tn the Nuclear Age: Principles, Problems', and Prosects (Svanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson and Company, i960),
17-18. Hereinafter cited as Crabb, American Foreign Policy.

f

^Truman, Memoirs, I, 186; Hersey, "Profiles," Pt. 1,
1*5.
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Committee generated a great deal of publicity that must
have had a strong deterrent effect on those who might
otherwise have been tempted to misuse government funds.
As the committee grew in stature, the Administration and

military services became more cooperative.

Roosevelt,

once he became convinced Truman was not out to smear him,
gave "wholehearted cooperation."

37

The Army and Navy were not always quick to cooperate
with the Truman Committee.

One example of this military

opposition concerned industrial reconversion.

As early as

1914-3, Donald M. Nelson, head of the War Production Board,
urged that planning begin for reconversion of industry to
peacetime production.

In February I9I4I4 Bernard Baruch

made the same appeal.

In March 191|ll- the Truman Committee

reported that the "plans for reconversion should be started
immediately."3®

The War Department, desirous of preserving

full strength, responded to this appeal with a forceful
progaganda campaign that garnered public and Administration
support by ringing all of the changes on patriotism and
predicting that troops would be without guns or ammunition
because of production lags.

The result of this campaign

was a failure on the part of the government to adequately

^^Hillman (ed.), Mr. President, 9I4..
38Richard N. Current, Secretary Stimson; A Study in
Statecraft (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University
Press',' 195k) * 20ij.. Hereinafter cited as Current, Secretary
Stimson.
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prepare or initiate any substantive reconversion steps
prior to Harry Truman's taking office.

39

In 191+6, in the midst of runaway inflation brought
on--at least in part— by War Department hostility, Donald
Nelson reflected on the role of the military.

Nelson con

cluded that the economic and social systems of the nation
were endangered when military men could exercise power
over civilian affairs.

l+o

Truman, who through his

struggles with the services in his Special Committee inves
tigations had lost some of his overly-romantic views of the
military, had expressed similar concern in an interview:
The function of generals and admirals is to fight
battles. . . . They have no experience in business or
industry, and the job of producing what they ask for
should be left to businessmen under the direction of
experienced civilians.
I am firmly convinced that any
attempt on the part of these ambitious generals and'
admirals to take complete control over the nation's
economy would not only place vital functions in
inexperienced hands, but would present a definite
threat to pur post war political and economic
structure .4-1
Truman steadfastly maintained that his committee
functioned only as an investigative body " . . .

trying to

remove obstructions to the success of the production program

39ibid., 201+-205.
^°Ibid., 205.
^•Transcription of interview with Truman, "March of
Time" radio broadcast, November 26, 191+2, Truman Papers,
RG-1, Senatorial Piles, "National Defense Committee-General,
Truman Library.
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and to prevent the repetition of costly e r r o rs."^

In

fact, because of its prestige, it began to influence the
way the services, defense agencies and the Roosevelt
Administration conducted the military efforts of the
nation.

The "Doghouse," Truman's name for a small meeting

room within his senatorial offices, was visited by a
steady stream of military personnel, defense agency heads,
private contractors and legislative liaison personnel from
the White House.

To these men Truman often pointed out

irregularities in their conduct that caused them to
change their method of operation.^
Roosevelt found himself confronted by a determined
Senator Truman on several occasions.

In January 19lj.2,

for example, Truman told FDR that his committee was going
to recommend that wartime production be concentrated under
a single person for greater efficiency.

The following

day, the White House announced that Donald Nelson was to
coordinate all defense production as director of the
Office of Production Management.

A short time later, when

^ T r u m a n to Joseph P. Smithers, April ij., 19i+2,
"Special Senate Committee to Investigate the National
Defense Program-General," Senatorial Files, Truman Papers,
(Truman Library).
^Steinberg, Man from Missouri, 188; Buchanan,
United States and World War II, 31&;' Brant, "Harry S.
Truman--II, " 6 ^ - 3 IT. For Truman's own explanation of the
unique methods he employed in operating his committee, see
his Memoirs, I, 187-90.
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the Truman Committee became critical of the OPM and called
for a drastic reorganization, Roosevelt responded by
establishing the War Production B o a r d . W h i l e Truman
greatly admired FDR, he was not intimidated by him.

"Mr.

President," Truman told him during one exchange, "the
White House and Capitol are not connected by a one-way
street.
With sincere humility but little accuracy, Truman
characteristically understated the role he and his
committee played in the war effort.
to a correspondent in 19^3 i
legislative body.

Typical is this reply

"The Congress is only a

. . . There is not very much a Senator

or Congressman can do but publicly discuss the shortcomings

^Wil f r e d E. Binkley, President and Congress. (3rd
rev. ed., New York: Random House, 1962) ,""rjj'28. Hereinafter
cited as Binkley, President and Congress. See also,
Daniels, Man of In dependence',""221; Time', (March 8, 19i|-3)> 13 J
Crabb, American Foreign Policy, 118.
^Brant, "Harry S. Truman-II," 638. President
Roosevelt was able to use the Truman Committee to help
keep his administrators in line. As Truman recalled in
April 1959, FDR called him down to the White House
frequently to make the same request: "I’d go down and talk
to him (Roosevelt), and h e ’d say, 'So-and-so over here, I
can't do anything with him, and he's causing me trouble. I
wish you'd give him a poke or two.' I'd do it and the
thing would straighten out. That got me into a lot of
trouble. He finally decided that maybe I'd make a good
Vice-President." Truman Speaks, 38 .
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of those who are supposed to administer the law."^*
Brant, in a profile he wrote on Truman in

Irving

may have

come closer to the truth, if overstating his oase somewhat,
when he wrote, "I believe, that aside from President
Roosevelt, Senator Truman has contributed more than any
other civilian to the winning of the w a r . " ^
The Truman Committee made mistakes, usually minor,
often involving faulty data or the misuse of sweeping
critical generalities, but it is very difficult to find
criticism of their total effort during World War II.
the contrary, the reverse is true.

On

It is easy to find

praise of Truman and the committee from all quarters.
For example, James Forrestal, then Under Secretary of the
Navy, wrote to Truman, M The Truman Committee has served
a useful purpose in providing a medium for the explor
ation of criticisms of the war effort. • • . The Navy
. . . welcomes the kind of additional outside scrutiny

^ T r u m a n to Marion J. Bowles, March 13, 19^3*
"Special Senate Committee to Investigate the National
Defense Program-General," Senatorial Files, Truman Papers.
Vferant, "Harry S. Truman-I," f?77« Brant's
sentiments were akin to those of most Washing corres
pondents. They found Truman to be, "The one civilian
member of the Government, who, next to the President him
self, knew most about the war." See New York Times,
April llj., 1J?, 19^5. See also Binkley, President and
Congress, 328.
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which your Committee provides."^®

"I would like to

express the appreciation of the War Department," Under
Secretary of War Robert Patterson testified in 19i|2,
’’for the very constructive assistance that this Committee
has rendered. . . • Some of the very best features of our
war program have their origins from the investigations
made by this Committee."^

In a similar vein, Donald

Nelson, Chairman of the War Production Board, wrote:

”1

wish to express the hope that your Special Committee. . .
may continue to serve the same high purpose that it has
comprehended so well since its creation.

That purpose

. . . has been to obtain the best possible results in our
march toward total economic mobilization for war."
Most of the news media were equally impressed with
the work of the Truman Committee.

Luther Huston, in a

profile of Truman for the New York Times, wrote that the
Special Committee had probably averted numerous national
scandals and saved the country billions of dollars.
An editorial in the same newspaper, following Truman’s

^■®Forrestal to Truman, January 6, 19b3> "Special
Senate Committee to Investigate the National Defense
Program-General," Senatorial Files, Truman Papers.
k9
^Transcript, Patterson testimony before Truman
Committee, (undated), ibid.
^ N e l s o n to Truman, January 9, 19k3> ibid.
^Huston, New York Times, April 15, 19i|-5«
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swearing-in at the death of FDR, found reassurance in
". • . the ability which Mr. Truman has shown, and of which
the work of the Truman Committee is sufficient proof, to
grow in stature with the assumption of increased responsibility."

The New Republic editorialized about the

"voluminous and excellent series of reports about the
conduct of the defense effort and the war economy . . . "
that were a product of the Truman C o m m i t t e e I n

a cover

story on Truman in 19k3* Time Magazine called the Special
Committee the most useful agency of the Government in
World War II.

The article described the Committee as

"the closest thing yet to a domestic high command" and
went on to say:
Its members had no power to act or order. But, using
Congress's old prerogative to look, criticize and
recommend, they had focused the strength of public
opinion on the men who had the power. . . . With
battle-royal impartiality, they had given thick ears
and red faces to Cabinet members, war agency heads,
generals, admirals, big businessmen, little business
men, labor leaders. . . . For a Congressional
committee to be considered the first line of defense
.. . . i s encouraging to believers in democracy. So
is the sudden emergence of Harry Truman, whose
presence in the Senate is a queer accident of
democracy. . . .^4

^% e w York Times, April 15>> 19i|5*
^% e w Republic (April 23, 19^5)*
For a detailed
listing of the major accomplishments of the Truman Commit
tee, see Brant, "Harry S. Truman-II," 636.
^ T i m e , XLI (March 8, 19lj.3), 13.
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There is little reason to doubt that the Truman
Committee had served the nation well.
chairman well.

It also served its

Harry Truman would most surely have

remained an obscure Senator, a footnote in the political
history of the nation, had he not chaired the Special
Committee.

His chairmanship brought him a large, deserved

degree of favorable national recognition.

It earned for

Truman a reputation for dedication and incorruptibility
which dispelled the shade of Tom Pendergast and the
attendant fumes of rotten politics from automatic associa
tion with his name.

And while there is no office that can

fully prepare a man for the singular office of the
presidency, Truman's committee work had given him in
valuable experience in leadership and administrative
organization and a unique insight into the myriad
complexities of commanding a nation involved in total war.

55

On August 3, i 9i4.li-, Truman submitted a letter to the
President of the Senate, resigning as chairman and member
of the Special Committee.

He was now the vice-presidential

nominee of the Democratic Party.

He feared that continued

association with the Committee would lead to attacks on the

^Phillips, Truman Presidency, 37» Binkley, Presi
dent and Congress, 327-20; Steinberg, Man from Missouri, 191}..
For a view somewhat contrary to that expressed here, see
Wilber W. Hoare, Jr., "Truman," in May (ed.), Ultimate
Decision, 181-82. Hereinafter cited as Hoare, "Truman•"
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bipartisan nature of its w o r k . ^

Members of the Special

Committee urged him to stay but respected the reasons for
his resignation.

The members adopted the following reso

lution on the occasion of his departure, which, of all the
encomiums he received for his efforts on the Committee,
must have pleased Truman most, for it represented the
judgment of his peers:
WHEREAS Hon. Harry S. Truman, U.S.S., has submitted
his resignation as Chairman of this Committee, and the
members of this Committee with the greatest of
reluctance have accepted his resignation,
THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED that the Committee
insert into its permanent records this unanimous
expression of its sentiment.
Under the leadership of Hon. Harry S. Truman, the
United States Senate, Special Committee Investigating
the National Defense Program, which appropriately
became known as the Truman Committee, has established
a record which speaks for itself.
The Senator from Missouri conceived this Com
mittee. . . . His work has been characterized by
modesty, tact and diplomacy, and by his infinite capac
ity for preserving harmony within the Committee. • • •
His devotion to duty. . . , his good judgment, his
patriotic love of his country, all are reflected in
the Nation’s confidence in this Committee. . . .
The accomplishments of the Committee reflect these
characteristics of its great Chairman, and its members
say to their colleague from Missouri, Colonel Harry S.
Truman, Field Artillery, Officers Reserve Corps,
"Well done, soldierI "57
Guessing about Roosevelt's possible running mates
began in early 19ljij-»

Henry Wallace, the incumbent

£6

Truman to Henry Wallace, August 3, 19i|4» reprinted
in Truman, Memoirs, I, 185-86.
^Resolution, (undated), ''Special Senate Committee
to Investigate the National Defense Program-19i|lj.#"
Senatorial Files, Truman Papers.
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Vice-President, had acquired numerous enemies because of
his strident liberalism, out-spoken belief in the occult
and undiplomatic candor.

Late in the spring of 191^,

Edward Flynn, boss of the Democratic machine in New York
City, made an informal survey of key areas of the country
at FDR's request.

Flynn reported back to Roosevelt that

Wallace would hurt the ticket more than any other nominee
58
he could propose.
The President gave no visible sign of
diminished confidence in Wallace as his running mate.
However, the rumors that Wallace was going to be dumped
persisted, and the conjecture in the press continued up
until the convention in July.

The most prominent names

being touted in the Vice-presidential betting were those
of James Byrnes, Director of War Mobilization, Justice
William 0. Douglas, and two members of the Senate, Alben
Barkley and Harry Truman.
For reasons known only to him, Roosevelt refused to
end the guessing game by positively endorsing one man.
Throughout the year, he had allowed others to conclude
that he was endorsing one or the other among the aspirants,
or that he was sticking with Wallace.

Even as the concjg

vention opened in July, FDR remained uncommitted.-77

^Phillips, Truman Presidency, 38-39; Steinberg,
Man from Missouri, 202.
^Steinberg, Man from Missouri, 203-206, passim.
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Truman can probably be believed in his contention that he
did not want to leave the Senate for the Vice-Presidency.
The best evidence for that is the commitment he made to
nominate Jimmy Byrnes for the office just prior to leaving
for the convention.^
At the Democratic convention in Chicago, Robert
Hannegan, Chairman of the Democratic National Committee,
tried in vain for several days to convince Truman that he
was the President’s choice.

Truman refused to accept this

and continued to promote Byrnes' candidacy.

The intrigues,

deals and maneuvers by the various factions ended after
five days in a telephone conversation between Hannegan
and FDR on July 2l±,

Truman was in Hannegan's suite at the

time, along with most of the major big city bosses of the
party who were trying to convince him to allow his name to
be placed in nomination.

Truman heard both ends of the

conversation, because of Roosevelt's habit of talking very
loudly on the telephone.
accepted.

FDR asked Hannegan if Truman had

When told he had not, Roosevelt said, "Well you

tell him if he wants to break up the Democratic party in

60

Truman has since decided that Byrnes knew FDR had
indicated he wanted him (Truman) on the ticket when Byrnes
asked him to make the nominating speech. Truman, Memoirs,
I, 190, 192. See also, Phillips, Truman Presidency,
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the middle of a war, that's his responsibility."^

Truman

has recorded his reactions in his Memoirs:
I was completely stunned. I sat for a minute or two
and then got up and began walking around the room.
All the others were watching me and not saying a word.
"Well," I said finally, if that is the situation,
I'll have to say yes, but why the hell didn’t he tell
me in the first place?" . • . The following day I was
chosen by the convention as its nominee for the vice
presidency of the United States. ^
The Democratic ticket won easily, carrying thirty-six
states, over the Republican slate of Thomas Dewey and John
Bricker.

Harry Truman’s apprenticeship lasted only

eighty-two days.

He saw the President on very few

occasions, much less had he had as a Senator . ^

The Vice-

President found himself at loose ends with little to do

Truman, Memoirs, I, 192. See also Steinberg, Man
from Missouri, 215; Phillips, Truman Presidency, 1*7;
Buchanan, United States and World War II, 1 1 , 3 3 2 - 3 3 i Dean
Acheson, Present at the Ureation: My Years in the State
Department (Hew York ; W.~~W." Norton and Company , 1969),
l37. Hereinafter cited as Acheson, Present at the
Creation. The party leaders present at this meeting, in
addition to Truman and Hannegan, were Edward Flynn, Frank
Hague, Edward Kelly, Edwin Pauley, and Frank Walker.
^2Truman, Memoirs, I, 192-93. The selection of
Truman was described by"at least one newspaper as the
"Second Missouri Compromise". New York Times, April 11*,
191*5.
^ I n his capacity as Chairman of the Special
Committee, Truman used to meet with the President, " . . .
at least once a week, and more often if he (FDR) thought
it necessary." During Truman's Vice-Presidency, Roosevelt
was in Washington a total of about thirty days. See
Truman, Memoirs, I, 56, 195* See also, Steinberg Man From
Missouri, 230.
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aside from presiding over the Senate, a task more
ceremonial than exacting.

Truman anticipated this:

"I

had spent a great deal of time reading the history of past
administration.

. . , when I became Vice-President, I was

familiar with the incongruities and inadequacies of that
office."^

It is an irony of history that Truman is

related in his ancestral lines with John Tyler, the first
Vice-President to succeed to the Presidency.^
Late in the afternoon of April 12, 19lj-5, Truman
received a message at the Capitol asking that he come to
the White House immediately.

Upon his arrival he was

taken to Eleanor Roosevelt's study where she met him with
the words, "Harry, the President is dead."

After a

pause, he asked her if there was anything he could do.
Truman recalls being quite moved by the grace and under
standing of Jier reply:

"Is there anything we can do for

you?" Mrs. Roosevelt asked.

"For you are the one in

trouble n o w . " ^

^Truman, Memoirs, I, 53.
65
"Tyler's brother was the father of my great
grandmother, and the whole Tyler family is mixed up with
both sides." Truman, Memoirs, I, 53*
66Ibid., 5.
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CHAPTER III
WORLD WAR II STEWARDSHIP
I had hurried to the White House to see the
President, and when I arrive, I found I was the
President.!

Some two hours after being called to the White House,
Harry Truman was sworn in as the thirty-second President
by Chief Justice Harlan Stone.

In the brisk but polite

manner that became commonplace, Truman completed the oathtaking ceremony in little over a minute, made a few
announcements and told reporters he was "going home, to
bed.1,2
Before leaving the White House, Truman asked all
of FDR’s cabinet^ to remain in their positions, at least
temporarily.

He tried to allay fears of any great changes

^-Harry S. Truman to Martha Truman, April 16, 19i|-5>
reprinted in Truman, Memoirs, I, 1±3-i+4*
^Hew York Times, April 13> 19lj.5>»
3The Cabinet, as Truman took office, consisted of
Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Secretary of State; Henry
Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury; Henry L.
Stimson, Secretary of War; Francis Biddle, Attorney-General;
James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy; Frank C. Walker,
Postmaster General; Claude R. Wickard, Secretary of
Agriculture; Harold L. Ickes, Secretary of the Interior;
Henry L. Wallace, Secretary of Commerce; and Frances
Perkins, Secretary of Labor. Truman, Memoirs, I, 32I4..

68
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by stating that he intended to carry on as Roosevelt
would have.

He underscored this with an announcement that

the organizational meeting of the United Nations, due to
open in San Francisco on April 25, would convene as
scheduled by FDR.

Truman's final announcement on this

fateful evening also struck a note of assurance, although
it hardly seemed necessary under the circumstances:

"The

world," he said, "may be sure that we will prosecute the
war on both fronts, east and west, with all the vigor we
possess to a successful conclusion."^
Reflecting back on these crowded days of April some
four years later, Truman said:

"No one, I think, in the

history of the country ever assumed a greater responsibility
than I did."'*

In the sense that Truman awoke on April 12,

19lj.£>, comfortable in the impotent obscurity of the VicePresidency and went to bed that night commander in chief
of the greatest military force ever assembled on earth,
he is correct.

He had no more knowledge of current

military policy and strategy than any other citizen could
obtain from the censored accounts appearing in the

^•Statement by the President, April 12, 19
Public Papers . . . Truman, 19k5* 1; New York Times,
April 13 , l9l|5.
^Louis W. Koenig (ed.), The Truman Administration:
Its Principles and Practices (New York: New York Univer
sity Press, 1956), 30• Hereinafter cited as Koenig (ed.),
Truman Administration.
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newspapers.
successor.

Roosevelt had not confided in his Immediate
It was as if the understudy to the lead

character in a drama had not been allowed to see the
script.

Truman later acknowledged that he was not

"adequately informed" on matters of foreign policy.^

He

had not been told of the atomic bomb, for example; nor had
he ever been invited inside the "Super Secret Map Room" of
the White House, which contained detailed maps of current
troop dispositions and battle situations throughout the
7

world.

Given the condition of Roosevelt's health and the

complexities of the massive war effort, PDR must be
faulted for not keeping Truman apprised of major military
developments.

While such a procedure seems dictated by

common sense, it was not required by law and would have
been precedential.®

The British Prime Minister, Winston

Churchill, was amazed to discover that Truman had not been
kept abreast of events.

Truman had requested that

Churchill meet with him for two or three days talk follow
ing Roosevelt's funeral.

Because of the press of affairs

in England, Churchill decided not to attend the funeral and

^Truman Speaks, 66.
7

Truman, Memolrs, I,

8

Buchanan, United States and World War II, II,
ij.99-500; Hoare, "afruman, " T 8T- 62"
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sent Truman his regrets.

Q

Reflecting on his decision

later, the Prime Minister felt he had made a mistake:
In the after-light I regret that I did not adopt
the new President’s suggestion.
I had never met
him, and I feel that there were many points on which
personal talks would have been of the greatest value,
especially if they had been spread over several days
and not hurried or formalised. It seemed to me
extraordinary, especially during the last few months,
that Roosevelt had not made his deputy and potential
successor thoroughly acquainted with the whole story
and brought him into the decisions which were being
taken. This proved of grave disadvantage to our
affairs. . . . In these early months his position was
one of extreme difficulty.10
While it is certain that Truman could be benefited
from being taken into Roosevelt’s confidence, it appears
equally certain that few men in the nation were better
prepared to assume civilian direction of the military.

It

was a fortunate accident of fate that his work on the
Truman Committee had provided the new President with an
unparalleled knowledge of military affairs.
go unnoticed.

This did not

An editorial in the New York Times on

April llj., 191*5, noted:

"No member of the Senate, no

elected official of the Government of the United States,
has had a better and more intimate view of the whole war
machine than the man who directed the activities of the

^Winston S. Churchill to Truman, April 13, 191*5,
reprinted in Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, Vol. VI,
The Second World War (6 vols., Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1953)> i+79- Hereinafter cited as Churchill, Triumph and
Tragedy.
1QIbid., 1*79-80.
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Truman Committee. . . .

To inform himself of current

military and foreign policies, Truman summoned his military
leaders and Secretary of State to meet with him on April
13, 191+5, his first full day in the Presidency.
Truman's first official caller as President was
Secretary of State Stettinius, who briefed him on all
current diplomatic matters.

Truman asked the Secretary to

continue the practice begun under Roosevelt, whereby the
State Department prepared a two-page summary of diplomatic
developments for daily presentation to the President.
Truman found these summaries, along with the daily reports
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "immensely helpful in
filling gaps in my information” and "indispensable as aids
in dealing with many issues.

.

.

.

Truman asked

Stettinius to have a report for him before the day was out
on the background and status of all international problems
confronting the Administration.

That part of the report

analyzing relations with the Soviet Union contained a
prophetic line:

"Since the Yalta Conference the Soviet

Government has taken a firm and uncompromising position on

^ New York Times, April llj., 19kS»
•^Truman, Memoirs, I, llj.. The military intelligence
reports were compiled by a central intelligence staff
headed by Major General Hoyt S. Vandenberg. See Arthur
Krock, Hew York Times, July 16, 192-J.6.
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nearly every major question that has arisen in our rela
tions •m1^
The military leadership1^- met with Truman at 11:00
A.M. April 13» to acquaint the new Commander in Chief with
the existing military situation and strategic planning.
At the time of their meeting, some units of the Ninth
A m y had crossed the Elbe River and were moving eastward.
The '*Ruhr Pocket'*— last major German resistance west of
the Elbe--was crumbling rapidly.

In the East, the Soviet

forces had crossed the Oder and were moving against Ber
lin.

It was obvious that Germany was beaten, that the

tide was irreversible.

The military chiefs told Truman

that it would take at least more months to completely
defeat Germa n y . ^

This very pessimistic estimate (Ger

many capitulated in less than a month) was based in part
on Allied intelligence reports of a heavily-fortified
**National Redoubt** in which the Germans planned to resist

■^State Department, Memorandum to the President,
April 13, 1914-5* reprinted in Truman, Memoirs, I, lJLp—17•
"^General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, Army;
Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations; Secre
tary of War Stimson; Secretary of the Navy Forrestal; Lt.
General Barney M. Giles, Army Air Force; General A.A. Vandergrift, Marine Corps Commandant; Admiral William D.
Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief. Truman,
Memoirs, I, 17. See also, New York Times, April lip, 1914-5.
•^ N e w York Times, April 13* 1914-5J Truman, Memoirs,
I, 17. See also, Vincent J. Esposito (ed.), West Point
Atlas of American Wars (2 vols., New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1559), II* Sect. 2, Map Plate No. 70. Herein
after cited as Esposito (ed.), West Point Atlas.
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to the last man.

This redoubt did not exist.

16

As to the Pacific, the Chiefs were able to report
to the President that Japan had now been driven out of most
of the islands it had conquered, with the major fighting
at the time being concentrated on Okinawa.

The bitter

fighting for Iwo Jima in March had provided the Army Air
Force with airfields within fighter escort range from
which to strike at mainland Japan using the B-29 "Super
fortresses" based in the Marianas Islands.

These massive

bomber strikes at heavy industries, particularly aircraft
plants, failed to substantially lower production.

General

Curtis LeMay, in charge of the XXth Bomber Command,
received approval for a change in tactics to the use of
incendiaries (fire-bombs) on urban population centers.
The new bombing targets, according to A. Russell Buchanan
in his history of World War II, were "the congested
inflammable cities and the people in them."^

Buchanan has

described the first massive demonstration of the "firebombing " technique:
On March 8, counting on the surprise of low-altitude
night attack, General LeMay ordered a mass fire bomb

■^Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower and Berlin, 19ll5*
The Decision to Halt at the Elbe (New York: W. W. Norton and
d'ompany, Incorporated, l96>7) ,Y3-79, passim. Hereinafter
cited as Ambrose, Eisenhower and Berlin’
. See also,
Cornelius Ryan, The Last Battre (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1966), 209-13. hereinafter cited as Ryan, The Last Battle.

^^Buchanan, United States and World War I I , II, 575-76.
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raid on Tokyo. On the following day 33b bombers,
carrying about two thousand tons of bombs, left
bases in the Marianas. • . . The result was one of
the worst holocausts of all time. The target was a
part of Tokyo into which people were crammed on an
average of 103,000 to the square mile. The con
flagration gutted about a fourth of the city's build
ings and rendered homeless more than a million
persons. Casualty lists were terrific; 83,793
persons died and q.0,918 were injured. People caught
in the bombed area were helpless for there was no
place to go, and the fire-fighting equipment was
utterly inadequate. Water boiled in some of the
smaller canals running through the flaming city.
Not excepting later raids, the Tokyo fire raid on
March 9-10, X9if-5, was the most destructive air raid
in history.1®
Truman accepted these new air tactics against the
Japanese mainland, and on his authority the Joint Chiefs
of Staff approved a list of thirty-three Japanese cities
that the Army Air Force could attack with incendiary
devices.1*^ Although LeMay and the Air Force hoped that
their air attacks would be a substitute for invasion,
most of the military were convinced that only by invasion
would the Japanese be conquered.

Their estimated time for

the final conquest of Japan was as conservative as it was
for Germany:

They told Truman it would take about a year

and a half.20

•^ I b i d ., 578-78. For detailed maps and a textual
explanation of these bombings, see Esposito (ed.), West
Point Atlas, II, Sect. 2, Map Plate No. 166.
■^Buchanan, United States and World War II, II, 578.
po

Truman, Memoirs, I, 17.
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As the military chiefs were leaving his office,
Truman asked Admiral Leahy to remain.

He asked Leahy to

continue in his unique post as chief of staff to the
Commander in Chief.

FDR had created the post; it consisted

simply of meeting with the President each morning and
briefing him on all military events of the past twentyfour hours, along with any other factors— political
events, economic or production problems, etc.--which might
have a bearing on the conduct of the war.

Truman noted in

his Memoirs that he asked Leahy to stay on in the post
because he found in the Admiral a blunt and direct man who
would not equivocate in his presentations.

21

Truman apparently decided on his first day in office

Ibid., 18. One scholar of the Cold War period,
D(enna) F)rank) Fleming, sees the retention of Leahy as
military adviser to Truman as a factor in the coming of the
Cold War. Fleming says that Leahy, because of these daily
briefings, was in a unique position to influence the Presi
dent and that the Admiral had "a long time aversion to the
Russians." Fleming perceives a Leahy-influenced antiSoviet bias emerging in Truman some ten days after taking
office. See, The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917-1960 (2
vols., Garden C'i'ty,' toew York'f DouFleday and Company,
Incorporated, 1961), I, 266. Hereinafter cited as Fleming,
The Cold W a r . Cabell Phillips, in his study 6f Truman,
disagrees with Fleming. He claims that Leahy, along with
Stimson and Marshall, advocated "getting along with the
Russians at all costs." Truman Presidency, 71. There can
be little doubt of Leahy's bluntness, however. When informed
by FDR that he wanted Truman as his Vice-President, Leahy
asked, "Who the hell is Truman"? Steinberg, Man from
Missouri, 13. Later, at a meeting where scientists
explained the atomic bomb project to the new President,
Leahy observed: "That is the biggest fool thing we have
ever done. The bomb will never go off, and I speak as an
expert in explosives." Truman, Memoirs, I, 11.
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that the nation and the allies needed pointed reassurance
that the change of Executives did not mean a change in
American policy.

Accordingly, he asked the leaders in the

House and Senate to convoke a joint session of Congress on
Monday, April 16, 191+5 > that he might address them.*^
Underlining the concern of the allies toward changes in
U.S. policy was a meeting between Truman and Anthony Eden,
the British Foreign Secretary, the morning of the Presi
dent's address to the Congress.

During the course of their

discussion Truman assured Eden that it was his intention
11. . • to continue on exactly the same lines of foreign
po
policy as the late President had followed." J
In his address to Congress, which was broadcast
live by the major radio networks, Truman began by
eulogizing Roosevelt as " . . .

a great man who loved, and

was beloved by, all humanity."

He pledged himself to

carry out the military plans and peace proposals of FDR.
The President warmly endorsed the existing military
leadership and promised they would remain "unchanged and
unhampered."

In a warning to Germany and Japan, he said

that they should not misunderstand, "that America will

2^Truman, Memoirs. I, 19.
Times, April llj., 191+5.

See also, New York

^ A n t h o n y Eden to Churchill (cable) , April 16, 191+5,
reprinted in Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, 1+71+-85.
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continue the fight for freedom until no vestige of
resistance remains!"

Truman said that anything short of

total victory would endanger a future peace.

Thus, "Our

demand has been, and it remains— Unconditional Surrender!"
The remainder of the speech (about half) was devoted to an
earnest plea for all Americans to support the efforts
about to begin at San Francisco to foim the United Nations
2k
organization as the one great hope for enduring peace.
It was quite clear after a few days in office that
Truman's concept of his role as Chief Executive and his
relationship with his war cabinet and the military chiefs
was quite dissimilar to FDR's.

For example, Roosevelt

usually met with individual cabinet officers before
cabinet meetings to discuss the problems of their depart
ments.

Seldom was there any contention or open discussion

in FDR's cabinet meetings, which were largely cut-and-dried
affairs.

Truman felt that Roosevelt expended much time and

energy going those things that should have been the
delegated responsibility of cabinet members.

Truman

faulted Roosevelt for acting as his own Secretary of State,
Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of the Navy and

^Address Before a Joint Session of Congress,
April 16, 19k£> Public Papers . . . Truman, 19kf>* 1-6,
pas aim. Text is printed in Hew York Times, April 17 >
19l+f>. See also, Truman, Memoirs, IT
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Secretary of War.
and more direct:

25

The Truman style was quite different

All matters were normally discussed in

open cabinet meetings.

Personal leadership now gave way

to an institutional approach to administrative matters
that was more efficient and less colorful than the
26
flamboyant style of the Roosevelt era.
The Joint Chiefs and the Service Secretaries found
that they were dealing with a very different commander in
chief.

While Truman did have to be brought up to date on

present operations, he was in no sense dependent upon the
military for command decisions.
Chief " . . .

The new Commander in

acted as a full-fledged master of the guild

from the day he took o f f i c e . I t

was Truman’s con

viction that the President must be the "absolute commander"
of the country's armed forces.

He believed the President

had to set policy guidelines for the military, approve
their strategic and major tactical recommendations when

2^Truman, Memoirs, I, 328-29. Senator Vandenberg
agreed with Truman, at least as far as the post of Secretary
of State was concerned. On the day Truman took office he
confided to his diary:
"Stettinius is now Secretary of
State in fact. Up to now he has been only the presidential
messenger. He does not have the background and experience
for such a job at such a critical time. . . . Now we have
both an inexperienced President and an inexperienced
Secretary. . . ." Vandenberg, Private Papers, 167-68.
2^Roy Roberts, New York Times, April l£, 19^5*
also, Truman, Memoirs, I, 329.
2?Hoare, "Truman," 182.
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proper and see to it that they implemented the policies of
pO
the Administration.
The mo3t obvious immediate change
that Truman made with respect to the command function was
that, unlike Roosevelt, he insisted that all military
decisions above the very routine receive his approval
prior to their implementation.

He makes this clear in his

Memoirs;
From the time I became President I made it plain, in
my relations with the military, that I was interested
in the details of actual administration as much as the
larger objectives.
. . . I took the position that the
President, as the Commander in Chief, had to know
everything that was going on. I had had just enough
experience to know that if you are not careful the
military will hedge you in.29
Truman's relationship with his military chieftains
began well and, with few exceptions, continued harmoniously
throughout the five months remaining in World War II.
Stimson noted early that he was encouraged ". . . b y the
calm, decisive demeanor of Harry S. Truman, the new
30
Commander in Chief."
All of them were impressed with
his energy and ability to absorb and retain lengthy
technical reports.

The relationship was made easier by

pQ

Truman Speaks, 6.
^Truman, Memoirs, I, 88.
^°Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr.,
The New World, 1939-19i|.6 (Vol. I of A History of the United
States Atomic Energy Commission. University Park: Pennsyl
vania State University Press, 1962), 3k7» Hereinafter
cited as Hewlett and Anderson, The New World.
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Truman’s great admiration for men like General Marshall and
Admiral Leahy.

On their part, the military leadership were

grateful for Truman's frankness and acceptance of command
responsibility.

When things went wrong, he sought

solutions, not scapegoats.
Truman was able to write:

31

Because of these factors,

"My meetings with the Chiefs of

Staff were always highly informative and productive."
he hastened to add the qualification that, " . . .

But

the

policy of the government determines the policy of the
military.

The military is always subordinate to the

government."^2

At a later date, in another war, this same

Commander in Chief was compelled to make a very unpupular
decision in defense of this principle.
In Europe, as April drew to an end, the German
forces that remained found themselves pressed into an
increasingly narrow and deadly corridor between the
Russians advancing from the East and the Allied troops
driving forward from the West.

The latter halted their

advance generally along the Elbe River line, where, in
the first days of May, they were joined by advance units of
the Soviet Army.

As the jaws of this martial vise were

drawing together, and European victory became a certainty,

^Hoare,

"Truman," 182-83 .

^2Truman, Memoirs, I, 210.
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a struggle went on within the Allied camp over military
'j'}
objectives
The original plans for the conquest of Germany had
called for the major push of the Allies to be directed
against Berlin.

But the unanticipated speed with which

the advance proceeded on both fronts in March changed the
strategic situation.

Toward the end of March, the Allied

Supreme Commander, General Dwight Eisenhower, determined
that a concentration of these forces in movement against
Berlin was no longer militarily worthwhile.
major German strength was south of Berlin.

The bulk of
Eisenhower

ordered a movement of his major forces southward, deciding
that his proper objective was the destruction of enemy
forces, not the capture of a geographic area of limited
military significance.^

Eisenhower's decision is clearly

consonant with one of the basic principles of warfare:
The object of military activity should be the destruction
of enemy forces in the field, not the capture of places.
Therefore, Eisenhower's decision to abandon a futile race
with the Soviet armies for the capture of a place--Berlin~

Uni ted States in World War II, II,
Esposito (e d .), West PoinTT"Atlas , II, 'S’ect. 2, Map
Plate No. 71.
^ B u c h a n a n ,

^ A m b r o s e , Eisenhower and Berlin, 60-62; Truman,
Memoirs, I, 211-12; Buchanan, \Jnited States and World War
II, II,
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was based primarily on military, not political consider
ations.^
The American Joint Chiefs of Staff, President
Roosevelt, just prior to his death, and President Truman,
had all approved of Eisenhower's decision.

However, the

British Chiefs of Staff and Prime Minister Churchill took
strong exception to this decision to leave the capture of
Berlin to the Russians.

On April 18,

Churchill

sent a message to Truman asking that Eisenhower extend his
advance as far eastward as possible and hold these
"tactical zones" pending final settlement of the permanent
zones of occupation with the Russians.3^

Churchill's

arguments for the extension of the Allied advance, which
he hoped would include Berlin, were based on political
considerations.

Truman indicated later that he recognized

the request as such:

"Churchill was worried over Russian

intentions and wanted all the territory we could get for
bargaining purposes after the war. . . . For him, Berlin
was not just a military matter but a matter of
state. . . ."87

8^ln Eisenhower and Berlin, Ambrose disagreed,
holding that Eisenhower’s- decis ion was "rooted in political
considerations."
(See pp. 28-29.)
8^Churchill to Truman, April 18, 19k5* printed in
Truman, Memoirs, I, 61-2, 211, 213.
37ibid., 213.
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By the end of April the success of Eisenhower’s
troops in southern Germany added a new dimension to the
controversy over military and political objectives.

[The

British were urging Eisenhower to advance into
Czechoslovakia at least as far as Prague, the capital.

On

April 28 Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall communi
cated the British suggestion to Eisenhower, indicating that
if military considerations were not involved he would be
TO

against the loss of lives to obtain political advantage.
Eisenhower replied that he agreed with Marshall and that he
considered his primary mission to be the capture of Linz
(Austria) and the "National R e d o u b t . C h u r c h i l l appealed
this decision of the generals to their Commander in Chief
on April 30.

The Prime Minister told Truman that Allied

liberation of Prague and western Czechoslovakia could well
determine the postwar political environment of that
country as well as many neighboring nations.

Although

this movement toward Prague must be secondary to
Eisenhower’s movement against remaining organized
resistance in Germany, Churchill concluded, " . . .

the

highly important political consideration mentioned above

3®Ambrose, Eisenhower and Berlin, 83-81]..
39Ibid., 84 .
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should be brought to his attention."^0
While Truman worried over what response to make to
the British, he received a memorandum from the Acting
Secretary of S t a t e , ^ indicating that the State Department
felt the proposal had merit.

The note argued that an

American occupation to the Moldau River line (Prague)
would significantly enhance the bargaining relationship
vis a vis the Russians.

Truman was urged to ask the

Joint Chiefs of Staff to give the proposal serious con
sideration.^
Truman did submit the proposal to the JCS, and he
also cabled Eisenhower asking for his views.
President's military advisers were agreed.

The
On May 1,

19i|.5> Truman, after noting that the proposal would
necessitate high casualties for questionable gains, sent
the following unusually curt reply to Churchill:
General Eisenhower's present attitude, in regard to
operations in Czechoslovakia, which meets with my
approval, is as follows:
QUOTE. The Soviet General Staff now contemplates
operations into tho Vltava Valley. My intention, as
soon as current operations permit, is to proceed and
destroy any remaining organized German forces.
If a. move into Czechoslovakia is then desirable, and
if conditions here permit, our logical initial move

^Churchill to Truman, April 30, 1 9 printed in
Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, 506. See also, Truman,
Memoirs, I, 216.
^"Joseph C. Grew.
^Truman, Memoirs, I, 216.
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would be on Pilsen and Karlsbad. I shall not attempt
any move which I deem militarily unwise. UNQUOTE. 43
The controversy between Truman and Churchill hinged
upon a prior agreement between the Allied Powers respecting
eventual zones of occupation to be established following
the defeat of Germany.

The operational lines of the

Western Allies had already passed these boundaries by
late April, and they were fighting for land they would
eventually have to surrender to the U.S.S.R.

The American

Army had continued on into these areas for military
reasons; they were pursuing a force in retreat in hopes of
eliminating all armed resistance.

Churchill encouraged

3till deeper penetrations (toward Berlin and Prague) to
capture geographic trophies of psychological and political
importance in postwar negotiations.

Truman and his

military leadership demurred because the price in
casualties would be too high.

Truman further disagreed

because he felt committed to the zonal agreements
Roosevelt had made.

Also, he was not inclined to dictate

a change in strategy to a general who was carrying out
an eminently successful military operation.

"The only

^ T r u m a n to Churchill, May 1, 1945 > printed in
Truman, Memoirs, I, 216-17. See also, Churchill, Triumph
and Tragedy, 5o6-507; Ambrose, Eisenhower and Berlin, 65»
The Piisen-Karlsbad line noted by Eisenhower would have
been some forty to fifty miles short of Prague. The war
ended before Eisenhower's forces attained that line.
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practical thing to do," Truman recalled in his Memoirs,
"was to stick carefully to our agreement and to try our
best to make the Russians carry out their agreements.
The zonal agreements on Germany to which Truman
felt committed, were drafted by FDR and Churchill at the
Quebec Conference in September of 1 9 ^ . ^
(Yalta) Conference of February, 1
accepted by S t a l i n . ^

9

In the Crimean

t*1® Quebec Plan was

In a message to Truman on April 18,

Churchill admitted, with obvious regret, that these zones
were decided upon ". . . rather hastily at Quebec . . .
when it was not foreseen that General Eisenhower's armies
would make such a mighty inroad into Germany."^
The "mighty inroad" made by Eisenhower's forces
had a telling effect by the last week in April.

On the

twenty-fifth Truman received a "scrambler" telephone call

^■Truman, Memoirs, I, 21ij..
Truman Presidency, 72-73.

See also, Phillips,

^Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, £08-£l0j Truman,
Memoirs, I, 213.
^ A map describing the original agreement at
Quebec appears in Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, 509.
^Churchill to Truman, April 18, 19i|-5, printed in
Truman, Memoirs. I, 62. From the security of his nonin
volvement, Truman has written with respect to the military
boundaries:
"This shows conclusively that heads of state
should be very careful about horseback agreements, because
there is no way of foretelling the final result." See
ibid., 213.
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from Churchill.^

The Swedish government had informed

Churchill that they had been contacted by Heinrich Eflinmler,
head of the Gestapo, proposing to surrender all German
troops on the Western Front.

The Germans would continue

to fight the Russian advance on the Eastern Front.

Truman

agreed with Churchill that the offer, even if valid, was
unacceptable.

The Allies had previously agreed to an un-

conditional surrender on all fronts, simultaneously.^-7
Truman immediately informed Premier Stalin of the offer and
<0
his response.
Apparently the President clung to
insistence on unconditional surrender because of the Yalta
Pact.

In defense of the doctrine he acknowledged it had

no moral or educational value, but it was of value in
facilitating the take-over and control of a defeated
n a t i o n .^
On April 27 Eisenhower's headquarters informed
Truman that American and British forces had met a Russian
force advancing from the east at Torgau, south of Berlin.

^•®The "scrambler" telephone is a security device
that garbles the voice into unintelligible patterns until
the signal is rearranged by a properly-encoded receiving
device.
^ H i m m l e r falsely claimed that Hitler had suffered
serious brain damage and that he was in effective command
and able to make a legitimate surrender offer. Truman,
Memoirs, I, 88-91.
£°Truman to Stalin (Cable), April 2£, 19k$> printed
in Truman, Memoirs, I, 91+•
^Ibid., 208-209.
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The remaining German forces were bisected and crumbling.
Truman issued a statement praising the cooperative spirit
of the Allies, the troops and the courageous leadership of
Roosevelt.

He also used the occasion to endorse the

efforts to create the United Nations, a theme that
recurred often in his messages during this period:

"Nations

which can plan and fight together shoulder to shoulder in
the face of such obstacles . . . can live together and
can work together in the common labor of the organization
of the world for peace.
Events in Europe were moving swiftly.

The German

forces in Italy, along with their Fascist divisions,
ended their resistance on May 2.

Truman sent a message of

congratulations to General Mark Clark, the American
commander in Italy and issued a statement on the surrender
heavy with the leaden phrases he resorted to at such
moments:
The Allied Armies in Italy have won the unconditional
surrender of German forces on the first European soil
to which, from -the West, we carried our arms and our
determination. Let Japan as well as Germany under
stand the meaning of these events. Unless they are
lost in fanaticism or determined upon suicide, they
must recognize the meaning of the increasing,

^ P r e s s Release, April 27* 19lj-5> Public Papers
. . . Truman, 19ij.f?» 2f>-26. See also, Truman, Memoirs, I,

106.

—
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swifter-moving power now ready for the capitulation
or the destruction of the so-recently arrogant
enemies of mankind.53
The last few days of the fighting in Europe were
characterized by desperate movements of German troops away
from the Russian front toward the American and British
lines, where they hoped to surrender to more forgiving
enemies.

Accepting the inevitable, on May 5, Admiral

Karl Doenitz^*- ordered Admiral Hans von Friedeburg to go
to Eisenhower’s headquarters (SHAEP), then located at
Rheims, to attempt to surrender on just the Western
Front.

Backed by Truman’s express position that only a

total capitulation on both fronts was acceptable,
Eisenhower rejected the offer.

The following day,

Friedeburg was joined by General Alfred Jodi, apparently
with orders from Doenitz to stall the negotiations as
long as possible, thus permitting more troops to move

^ Truman to Clark, May 2, 19k$ (Cable), Public
Papers . . . Truman, 19U5, 32; Statement by the w e a l dent
on the Surrender of German Forces in Italy, May 2, 19ij-5>>
ibid., 31; Truman, Memoirs, I, 201.
^ Hi t l e r apparently took his own life on April 30
Prior to this, on April 28, he had denied any authority
to Himmler or Hermann Goering, his Luftwaffe chief. Both
had attempted to take command in the last weeks of the
fixating. As head of the government and the military,
Hitler named Admiral Doenitz, who assumed command on
May 1, 19b%» Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command in
Kent Roberts Greenfield (ed.), Tbe~tfnTted States Army in
World War II (Washington: USGPO,' 195b)>
HereTnaflier
cited as Pogue, Supreme Command. See also, Buchanan,
United States in World*-War II, II, 2j.6l.
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westward and surrender to some force other than the
Russians.

Eisenhower ordered the negotiations ended unless

the Germans ended their delaying tactics.

Informed of

this, Doenitz allowed Jodi to sign a temporary surrender
document, subject to formal ratification in forty-eight
hours.

The lethal machines fell silent in Europe with the

formal acceptance of surrender at 11 :l\.$ P.M., May 8 ,
191tS.55
"In recognition of the unconditional and abject
surrender of the Nazi barbarians," the President cabled
Eisenhower, "please accept the fervent congratulations
and appreciation of myself and of the American
people. . . .

Responding in kind, the General said,

"Permit me to assure you of my personal gratification that
my Commander-in-Chief has found my efforts worthy of
tin

special commendation."^'

A friendship was developing

between the General and the President that would endure
until the campaign of 195>2.

Truman did, in fact, greatly

^ Pogue, Supreme Command, 2+86; Buchanan, United
States in World War 1 1 ," II, lj.62-63.
■^Truman to Eisenhower, May 8, 19lj.5 (Cable), Eisen
hower Papers, Personal Piles 1'08, "Truman, Harry S. (1),"
Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. Hereinafter
cited as Eisenhower Library. Text of message to Eisenhower
also appears in Public Papers . . . Truman, 19k5* 51-52.
^Eisenhower to Truman, May 10, 1945 (Cable),
Eisenhower Papers, Personal Piles 108, "Truman, Harry S.
(1)," Eisenhower Library.
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admire many of the military men that commanded in World War
II.

On various occasions, in addition to Eisenhower, he

noted his admiration for General Omar Bradley and Admirals
Chester Nimitz and Ernest King.

He always reserved his

most lavish praise for General Marshall.

He has said that

Marshall was the "brains" that made the military organi
zation function properly:

"General Marshall . . . was in

every sense the chief architect of the grand strategy of
the war for the Allies. . . .
When the fighting ceased, Western armies occupied
Germany to the Elbe River line, a small portion of western
Czechoslovakia and most of Austria.

Churchill, whose

distrust of the Soviet Union seemed to him vindicated by
Russian activities in the liberated eastern European
nations, attempted once again on May 6 to get Truman to
hold the furthest line of advance rather than retiring
some one hundred miles westward to the prearranged zones.
Churchill's desire to use the occupied territory to force
Russian concessions met with Truman's intransigence.

As

for immediate withdrawal, the President was willing to
allow the field commanders to decide whether or not they

^®Truman, Mr. Citizen, 181, 185-86.
"I have said
it many a time . . . f think General Marshall is the out
standing man of that war period." Truman, Press Conference,
January 7, 19ij.9, Public Papers . . . Truman, 19i|-9, 9. For
a similar tribute, see Truman, Memoirs, I, 235.

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

93
could vacate a zone safely.

As for eventual retirement to

the Quebec Plan zones, he intended to keep Roosevelt’s
promises, as he understood them.

Churchill, probably

anticipating Truman’s attitude, called for a meeting of
the Big Three to settle the postwar status of Europe and
the final plans for the defeat of Japan.

Truman accepted

this call, for what became the Potsdam Conference, but in
his reply to Churchill he emphasized that "in the meantime
it is my present intention to adhere to our interpretation
of the Yalta agreements, and to stand firmly on our
present announced attitude. . .
On May 11 Churchill repeated his request of the
sixth, asking Truman not to order his troops out of the
Russian zones.

In fact, Churchill asked Truman to issue

a freeze order on all troops in the European theater of
operations.

Truman rejected Churchill’s requests after

consultation with his own military leadership, while
acknowledging that he, too* was concerned about Russian
intentions in Europe. u

This seems a fairly clear instance

of Truman’s being inclined to allow military factors to
dominate his thinking.

He had sound reasons for pulling

^Churchill to Truman, May 6 , 19l|5, quoted in
Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, 501; Truman to Churchill,
May 9j 19k5> reprinted in Truman, Memoirs, I, 218-19.
^°Truman, Memoirs, I, 298.
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troops back:

His interpretation of the Quebec and Yalta

agreements; a desirous redeployment of forces into the war
in the Pacific; an unwillingness to antagonize the Soviet
Union, whose promised aid against Japan appeared necessary
at the time.

6X

In retrospect, it seems that Churchill's

urgent pleadings— although on purely political grounds—
deserved a more through hearing than the record would
indicate they received.

Truman's chief advisers, General

Marshall and Secretary Stimson, while not unaware of the
English objections to withdrawal, had their minds fixed on
concentrating maximum force against the Japanese.^

Their

advice quite naturally reflected their orientation and
their primary objective, victory in the Pacific.

Given

these factors, it is reasonable to conclude— with
Churchill— that, "Mr. Truman was of course only newly
aware at second hand of all the complications that faced
us, and had to lean heavily on his advisers.

The purely

^ I b i d ., 298-99. In commenting on Churchill's fear
that redeployment meant leaving Europe "prostrate and at
the mercy of the Red Army," Truman said that he would pull
out of Europe only those troops that could be spared:
"We
were committed to the rehabilitation of Europe, and there
was to be no abandonment this time." Ibid., 262.
62Walt W. Rostow, The United States in the World
Arena: An Essay in Recent~HTstory (New York: Harper and
Brothers, PublisEers, I960), 116. Hereinafter cited as
Rostow, United States in the World Arena. See also, Truman,
Memoirs, I, 79.
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military view therefore received an emphasis beyond its
proper proportion."^
Despite Churchill’s numerous p l e a s , ^ Truman
remained adamant.

On June 3 he had the Joint Chiefs of

Staff inform Eisenhower that the removal of his forces
from the Russian zones was essentially a military
matter.^

Five days later Truman met with Harry Hopkins,

a presidential adviser, who had just returned from
separate talks with Premier Stalin and General Eisenhower.
Hopkins advised Truman to set a positive date for with
drawal from the Russian zones.

The President set the

date for June 21, advising Churchill,

"In consideration of

the tripartite agreement . . . approved by President
Roosevelt after long consideration and detailed discussion
with you, I am unable to delay the withdrawal . . .

in order

to use pressure in the settlement of other problems.

^Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, 513-lh*
^Churchill repeated his request that Truman not
withdraw troops from Europe on several occasions. See,
for example, Churchill to Truman, May 12, June k, 9, 19k5i
in Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, 572-7h> 603-oOlj-J
Truman, Memoirs, I , 30k-3Qg!T
65>Truman, Memoirs, I, 301*
^ T r u m a n to Churchill, June 12, 19lj.5» quoted in
Truman, Memoirs, I, 303J Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy,
60lj.-605» John Lukacs, among other scholars of the period,
believes that Truman, in accepting the Yalta zonal
boundaries against Churchill’s pleas, set ". . . the
geographical conditions of the Cold War." A History of the
Cold War (rev. ed., Garden City, New York: DouSleday and
Company, Incorporated, 1962), 53*
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Because of a Soviet-requested delay, the actual removals
did not begin until July 1, 19lj-5.^
At a Columbia University symposium in 1959 a
student asked Truman what his role as Commander in Chief
had been with respect to the diversion from Berlin and
subsequent events.

Truman1s reply was that an agreement

had been reached at Yalta " . . .
be drawn in Germany.

...

that certain lines would

I simply carried out the agree

ment, by ordering the troops to the lines which had been
agreed upon.

That's all there was to it."

68

The agreement to which Truman alone seemed totally
committed had been worked out at a conference at Yalta, in
the Crimea, between Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin in
February, 19Aj-5«

The Big Three agreed to convoke a con

ference at San Francisco on April 25 to establish the
United Nations.

The Yalta Protocol also prescribed the

voting f o m u l a for the Security Council of the U.N.

The

signatories reaffirmed the principles of the Atlantic
Charter:

"the right of all peoples to choose the form of

government under which they will live— the restoration of
sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who

^Truman, Memoirs, I, 30l|-305.
^ Truman Speaks, 22-23. Truman had earlier noted
the same conviction in his memoirs when he wrote:
"My
intention was always to carry out to the letter all agree
ments entered into by Roosevelt with our allies." Memoirs,
I, 305-306.
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have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor
nations.At

Yalta the U.S.S.R. also agreed to enter the

war against Japan within two or three months following the
surrender of Germany.

The tripartite administrative

division of Germany was accepted, with the details to be
decided upon by the Allied Control Council for Germany.
Several territorial concessions were made to the Soviet
Union in Eastern Europe and the Par East.

These latter

were in return for Stalin’s agreement to bring his nation
into the war with Japan.
AQ
7Document 10, Agreements of the Yalta Conference,
February, 19h5>» in William Appleman Williams, The Shaping
of American Diplomacy; Readings and Documents inAmerican
Foreign Relations, 1750-1955 (Chicago: Rand McNally and
Company, 1955)> 930^31. Hereinafter cited as Williams
(ed.), Shaping of American Diplomacy.
7°Ibid., 931-5* passim. See also, draft statement,
W. AverelI Harriman to Senate Armed Services and Foreign
Relations Committees, August (?), 1951* Papers of Theodore
Tannenwald, "MacArthur— Copies of Memorandums re Hearings,"
Truman Library. Hereinafter cited as Tannenwald Papers.
Harriman's statement is reprinted in U.S., Congress,
Senate, Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, Military Situation in the Far East: Hearings . . .
to Conduct an Inquiry Into~"£he Military Situation in the
Far teast amT"the Facts Surrounding the Relief of General of
the Army Douglas MacArthur From His Assignments In ThatT*
Area, 5 Parts, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951* P t . "57
Appendix NN, 3328—1+2. Hereinafter cited as Far East Hear
ings . For full description and text of the Yalta Agree
ments, see U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of
the United States, Diplomatic Papers: The Conferences at
Malta and Yalta, 19h5 (Washington: USGPO, 1955)• See
also, "The Crimean (Yalta) Conference, February h~ll>
19h5* ” Far East Hearings, Pt. 5* Appendix I, 3607-612. As
with other security matters, Truman did not learn of the
secret portions of the Yalta Pact until he became
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Truman has recorded that the most pressing reason
for his meeting Stalin and Churchill at Potsdam was to
secure the immediate involvement of the Soviet Union in
the war with Japan.

The service chiefs’ plan for the

defeat of Japan was based on the assumption that the
Russians would enter the Par Eastern conflict as Stalin
had promised.

The planners in the Pentagon were urging

the President to secure a specific date from the
Russians.*^

The meaning of Russian entry had been

President. See memorandum, (unsigned) to Theodore
Tannenwald, June 12, 1951* Tannenwald Papers, "MacArthur—
Copies of Memorandums re Hearings," Truman Library.
^Truman, Memoirs, I, 3l4”l5* 322-23, I4.ll;
Phillips, Truman Presidency, 96-97} Walter Millis (ed.),
The Forrestal BTaries (New York: Viking Press, 1951 )»
78- 7^
Hereinafter cited as Millis (ed.), Forrestal
Diaries. Stalin had first agreed to declare war on
Japan— following the defeat of Germany— in October, 1943*
at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers. At the
Teheran Conference the following month, the Soviet
Premier personally re-affirmed this commitment to
Roosevelt and Churchill. At Yalta, in February, 1945*
Stalin agreed to a general date of "two or three months"
after Germany's surrender for Russian entry into the
Pacific fighting. In May, in talks at Moscow with
Harriman and Harry Hopkins, Stalin said he would be ready
to strike by August 8 , with the actual date of Russian
entry dependent upon Chinese acceptance of the terms of
the Yalta Agreement on the Far East. Cable, Hopkins to
Truman, May 28, 1945* quoted in Truman, Memoirs, I, 264.
See also, Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 351-52.
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stressed by the Joint Chiefs in a memorandum to Roosevelt
early in 1945 s
Russia's entry at as early a date as possible
consistent with her ability to engage in offensive
operations is necessary to provide maximum
assistance to our Pacific operations. . . .
The objective of Russian’s military effort
against Japan in the Par East should be the defeat of
the Japanese forces in Manchuria, air operations
against Japan proper in collaboration with United
States air forces based in eastern Siberia, and
maximum interference with Japanese sea traffic
between Japan and the mainland of Asia.72
Like Roosevelt before him, Truman accepted the
military arguments for the desirability of involving the
Soviet Union in the war against

J a p a n .

However, in

Memorandum, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to
Pranklin Roosevelt, January 23, 1945, quoted in Draft
Statement, Harriman to Senate Armed Services and Foreign
Relations Committees, August (?), 1951* Tannenwald Papers,
"MacArthur— Copies of Memorandums re Hearings," Truman
Library. This document is reprinted in Par East Hearings,
Pt. 5, Appendix NN, 3332. Some six years after the fact,
during the hearings cited above, Republican Senator Styles
Bridges (N.H.), introduced a document which he claimed was
the recommendation of the senior officers of'the War
Department. Dated April 12, 1945, the report was very
strongly opposed to Russian entry into the war with Japan.
The twelve reasons given are much more political than
military in nature. The Department of the Army was unable
to locate the original, indicating that it may have been
one of several staff studies on the subject which were
later destroyed, since no action was taken on them. Par
East Hearings, Pt. 4, 2915-17*
^ William L. Neumann, After Victory: Churchill,
Roosevelt, Stalin and the Making of the Peace (New York:
Harper and Row, 195?)* 165 • ftereTnafter cited as Neumann,
After Victory. The chief military reason was, of course,
that the Red Army could hold or destroy Japanese forces in
Manchuria, thus facilitating the planned American invasion
of the Japanese home islands. Truman, Memoirs, I, 265,
314-15• The Joint Chiefs of Staff were unanimous in
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doing so, he again had to reject political objections to
Russian involvement.
involve the Russians.

Churchill saw no genuine need to
In fact, at some time prior to the

Potsdam meeting, he had become convinced that the United
States did not desire Soviet participation at all.7^Averell Harriman, wartime ambassador to Russia, was
generally distrustful of Soviet intentions in all their
diplomatic dealings and felt that they had compelling
reasons to enter the war without American encouragement.
Harriman had acquainted the President with his doubts on
numerous o c c a s i o n s G e o r g e P. Kennan, then MinisterCounselor of the Moscow Embassy, cabled a message to
Harriman (in April, 19l|j?) that eventually reached Truman's
desk.

Kennan warned that the Soviet Union would undoubt

edly use intervention to secure "maximum power with

earnestly desiring Soviet entry, as General Marshall later
testified in the Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, £62-63. See
also, Dean G. Acheson testimony, ibid.. Pt. 3, 1989.
General Douglas MacArthur, Commanding General, Pacific
Theater, was in complete agreement. Memorandum, George A.
Lincoln to Marshall, March 8, 19i+£, quoted in Barton J.
Bernstein and Allen J. Matusow (eds.), The Truman Adminis
tration: A Documentary History (New York': Harper and Row,
T9'66) , 3l£-l?. Hereinafter cited as Bernstein and Matusow
(eds.), Truman Administration.
^Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, 639.
7£
^Phillips, Truman Presidency, 97; Truman, Memoirs,
I> 77-79; Draft Statement, Harriman to Senate Armed Services
and Foreign Relations Committees, August (?), 19£l, Tannen
wald Papers, "MacArthur— Copies of Memorandums re Hearings,"
Truman Library.
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minimum responsibility" in areas of Asia beyond their own
borders.

"It would be tragic, Kennan believed, "if our

natural anxiety for the support of the Soviet Union at
this juncture . . . were to lead us into an undue reliance
76
on Soviet aid. . . .
Truman concluded that military
considerations outweighed the possible political dis
advantages that might accrue with Russian entry.

His

decision was not altered when, just before the Pot3dam
Conference, code intercepts indicated that the Japanese
were actively seeking to end the fighting, although somewhat short of total unconditional surrender.

77

The Potsdam Conference opened on July 17 and lasted
for two weeks.

Stalin reaffirmed at the very outset his

promise that the Soviet Union would declare war on Japan.
In a meeting of the American, British and Russian Chiefs
of Staff, the Russians indicated they were concentrating
forces along the Manchurian border as rapidly as possible.
They anticipated their initial attack would come in the
latter part of August.

The exact date of their entry

would be dependent upon concurrence of the government of

^Cable, George P. Kennan to Harriman, April 2ij.,
19i|5> quoted in George P. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950
(Boston: Little Brown and Company, 19^7)7 238 . Hereinafter
cited as Kennan, Memoirs. See also, Truman, Memoirs, I,

81^-85.
^Buchanan, United States and World War II, II,
589.
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China with the Yalta concessions.^®
In all of this concern over involving Russia against
Japan nobody on the American side seemed to appreciate
Harriman's belief that Stalin had to involve his nation in
the war.

The important concessions made at Yalta could

only be had by the Russians fighting the Japanese.

The

military operations would not be costly, since Japan was
already beaten to the point of making peaceful overtures.

79

The rewards in glory and opportunity for

hegemony to the liberators of the Par East would have been
inducement enough.

Truman would have found it far more

difficult to convince Stalin that he should remain
neutral.
After agreeing at Potsdam to enter the war, the
Russians then questioned the method of their entry.

They

felt it would be best for all of the Allies actively
engaged in the Par East to make a formal public request of

7®Truman, Memoirs, I, 382. The Sino-Soviet Agree
ment was signed at Moscow on August li|. The Soviet Union
had declared war on Japan and invaded Manchuria on August 8 ,
six days earlier. The Soviet timetable may have been
changed by the atomic destruction of Hiroshima on the 6th.
For an excellent account of the Potsdam Conference see
Herbert Peis, Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference
(Princeton, New Jerseyf'Tffrince''bon University Pres¥, I960) .
Hereinafter cited as Peis, Between War and Peace.
^Buchanan, United States and World War II, II,
£89; Phillips, Truman Presidency, '97*
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the Soviet Union.

flo

At this, Truman drew the line.

In

explaining his refusal in his Memoirs, Truman effectively
summarizes his own thinking on the entire question:
I did not like this proposal for one important
reason. I saw in it a cynical diplomatic move to make
Russia’s entry at this time appear to be the decisive
factor to bring about victory. At Yalta, Russia had
agreed, and here at Potsdam she reaffirmed her
commitment, to enter the war against Japan three
months after V-E Day, provided that Russia and China
had previously concluded a treaty of mutual assistance.
There were no other conditions. . . . Our military
advisers had strongly urged that Russia should be
brought into the war in order to neutralize the large
Japanese forces on the China mainland and thus save
thousands of American and Allied lives. But I was
not willing to let Russia reap the fruits of a long
and gallant effort in which she had no part.ol
At the beginning of the Potsdam meetings, Stalin
had confirmed what Truman already knew from American
intelligence activities:
Op
of peace through Moscow .0

The Japanese were seeking terns
In discussing the matter

privately with Churchill on July 18, Truman balked at the
Prime Minister’s suggestion that they might consider
accepting a Japanese offer short of unconditional surrender.
"I had in mind saving their military honour and giving them
some assurance of their national existence. . . ,"
Churchill recalled telling Truman.

Truman's response,

as Churchill remembered i t , was to the effect that "the

Oa

Truman, Memoirs, I, if.01.

8lIbid., if.02-ij.03 .
®2jbid., 396.
New World, 387*

See also, Hewlett and Anderson, The
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Japs had no longer any military honour after Pearl
Harbour."®®

Truman had insisted upon it in the case of

Germany and— when announcing the German surrender--he
called for the Japanese to lay down their arms uncon
ditionally, promising only that they would not be enslaved
or exterminated.®^Just prior to the opening of the July 28 meeting at
Potsdam, Stalin announced that his government had received
another peace overture from Japan.

The gist of the message

was that the Emperor wished to send Prince Konoye to
Moscow to present the Japanese position on ending the war
QO
^Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy , 6/j.l-i|.2. See also,
Lord Moran's diary entry™^r"^Juiy~io7T945> in which he
quotes from Churchill's dictated notes on his meeting with
Truman in Charles Wilson (Lord Moran), Churchill, Taken
From the Diaries of Lord Moran: The Struggle for Survival
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1968), 293-9'I£• Herein
after cited as Wilson, Churchill. In their first personal
contacts at Potsdam, Truman and Churchill formed very
favorable impressions of one another. Truman recalls:
"I
had an instant liking for this man. . . . There was some
thing very open and genuine about the way he greeted me.
Churchill and I never had a serious disagreement about any
thing." Truman, Memoirs, I,
For h *3 part, Churchill
recalled being impressed with Truman's, ". . . gay, precise,
sparkling manner and obvious power of decision.
Churchill, Triumiiiand Tragedy, 630. He was delighted by
Truman's bluntness and high resolve in his talks with
Stalin:
"Winston," Lord Moran wrote, "has fallen for the
President." Wilson, Churchill, 293-9^, 306.
®^Ttem No. 28, Statement by the President
for the Unconditional Surrender of Japan, May 8,
Public Papers . . . Truman, 1914-5, 50. See also,
Memoirs, I, 206-207; Buchanan, United States and
II, II, 598.

Calling
19l|5,
Truman,
World War
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and obtain the services of the Soviet Union as mediator.
Stalin told Truman that he intended to send a negative
reply to the message. Truman thanked him and the matter
85
was dropped.
The Japanese efforts to obtain a
negotiated settlement were futile for two reasons.

First,

their request to have the Soviet government act as
mediator was in vain, for, as one student of the war has
noted, ” . . .

the leaders in the Kremlin had secured

advantages at Yalta which they could insure only by
entering the war against Japan, not by interceding on the
latter’s behalf to terminate the w a r . "®6

Second, two

days prior to this last request the governments of Great
Britain, the United States and China had jointly issued
an ultimatum that precluded Japanese efforts to obtain
an end to the hostilities short of an abject surrender.
The ultimatum to Japan (called the Potsdam Declara
tion) had its genesis in late May 191+5*

Acting Secretary

of State Grew, a former Ambassador to Japan, suggested to
Truman that he consider issuing a proclamation calling on
the Japanese to surrender, with the express assurance that

®■'’Truman, Memoirs, I, 396-97 > Hewlett and Anderson,
The New World, 397^ See also, James F. Byrnes, Speaking
Frankly (New York: Harper and Brothers, 19^7)* 2b 5 • Here
inafter cited as Byrnes, Speaking Frankly.
£Q9<

®^Buchanan, United States and World War II, II,
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the Emperor could be retained as head of state.

Truman

asked Grew to forward his proposal through the State-WarNavy Co-ordinating Committee (SWNCC) and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff for their views.

The President felt the idea

had m e r i t . G r e w reported back to Truman on June 1$ that
all involved were agreed that such a statement should be
made, but while Grew favored immediate issuance, the
majority favored delaying publication until a more
appropriate time.

The military chiefs wanted to wait

until such time as they could answer a refusal of the
surrender demand with invasion of Japan.

88

The President accepted the idea of the proclamation
but rejected the proposed timing of both Grew and the
military.

He decided to issue the surrender ultimatum

during the Potsdam Conference, which was then a month away.
Truman's reasoning was that such a statement, coming from

^Truman, Memoirs, I, 1^16-17; Millis (ed.),
Forrestal Diaries, 66; Hewlett and Anderson, The New World,
3^2; Louis Morton, "The Decision to Use the Atomic komb,"
in Kent R. Greenfield (ed.), Command Decisions (Washington:
OCMH, I960), 507. Hereinafter cited as Morton, "Decision
to Use the Atomic Bomb." The SWN3C was a group composed
of the Assistant Secretaries of the State, War and Navy
Departments. It was established in 19l|lf- to assist these
three agencies in integrating their policy recommendations
to the Administration. It had separate subcommittees for
Gennany and Japan. Current, Secretary Stlmson, 223-2lj..
OO

Truman, Memoirs, I, J4.17 . See also, Hewlett and
Anderson, The New World. 352, 3&3; Peis, Between War and
Peace, 115•
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Potsdam, would demonstrate allied unity.

He also would

know by then the Soviet intentions on entering the war and
whether the atomic bomb had been tested successfully; two
factors that could change the military strategy and effect
8b
the terms of surrender. 7
Secretary of War Stimson, who, at Truman’s request,
had been working on a memorandum concerning the ultimatum
to Japan, submitted his efforts to the President on July 2,
and discussed it with him at Potsdam on July 16.

Truman

and the new Secretary of State, James P. Byrnes, reviewed
Stimson’s memorandum.

The Secretary of War advocated

immediate notification to the Japanese of the unconditional
surrender demand, guaranteeing their internal polity, not
excluding "a constitutional monarchy under her present

8q

Truman, Memoirs, I, Ip-7. Frazier Hunt, an unscholarly biographer of MacArthur, claims that the delay
in issuing the surrender demand was to allow the Soviet
Union time to enter the war: " . . . with all the deadly
consequences of that act." He indicts "a leftist crowd
calling themselves liberals," claiming that Dean Acheson,
George Marshall, Archibald MacLeish, Owen Lattimore,
Elmer Davis, e_t. al., were deliberately causing the delay.
See his, The UntoTd Story of Douglas MacArthur (New York:
Devin-Adair Company,” !
, 392-9l|. Hereinafter cited
as Hunt, Untold Story of MacArthur.
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dynasty.”

On July 17, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent

the President a memorandum giving their views on the draft
warning.

They indicated their objection to the lines

which told the Japanese that following the restoration of
peace a new government could be established that would
". . . include a constitutional monarchy under the
present dynasty."^1

Truman’s military advisers recommended

that a more general statement on a postwar government,
designed to appeal to all elements in Japan, would be
more likely to achieve the desired result.

Stimson told

Truman that he accepted the reasoning of the Joint Chiefs,

^Current, Secretary Stimson, 232; Byrnes, Speaking
Frankly, 206; Hewlett and Jhiderson, The New World, 371-727
383 . See also, Bernstein and Matusow, (eds.), The Truman
Administration, 33-36; Lansing Lamont, Day of Tr'ininty
(New York: Atheneum, 1965), 1J+5* Hereinafter cited as
Lamont, Day of Trinity. Urs Schwarz, American Strategy?
The GrowtK oT~Politico-Military Thinking in t5e~United
States (Garcfen City, New York": Doubleday and Company, In
corporated, 1967), 57. Hereinafter cited as Schwarz,
American Strategy. Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy,
On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 194-7), 6^0-'2I^ Hereinafter cited as Stimson and
Bundy, On Active Service. President Truman gave his
"generaT”approval" to Stimson’s memorandum. For text of
the July 2 memorandum, see Stimson, "The Decision to Use
the Atom Bomb," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, January 28, 1947•
^"Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 384-85*
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with which Byrnes also concurred.7

The Potsdam Declaration was drafted without any
mention of the fate of Emperor Hirohito or the monarchical
institution, the very factors.that had impelled Grew to
initiate the discussions that led to this document.
Truman accepted a purposely-ambiguous statement that did
not improve the possibilities for a prompt surrender, but
he did so on the advice of his Secretaries of War and
State, and his Chiefs of Staff.

In the light of sub

sequent events— preservation of the imperial order being
the condition that the Japanese would make and that Truman
would accept— the decision was unfortunate.

However, to

fault Truman is to accuse him of lack of prescience and to
assume that the Japanese government would have surrendered
prior to the atomic-bombings had they been reassured with

Ibid., 38^, 389; Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, 206.
The JCS position is in conflict with an A m y G-2 (Intelligence Division) report dated June 30, which indicated
Japan might accept a modified surrender demand that
assured retention of the imperial system. Report is
quoted in Morton, "Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb,"

50^-505.
93

Neumann, After Victory, 176; Hewlett and Anderson,
The New World. 385"! Afl^the" text of the declaration
eventually said was that the conquerors would restore the
government to Japanese control as soon as, ". . • there
has been established in accordance with the freelyexpressed will of the Japanese people, a peacefullyinclined and responsible government." Truman, Memoirs, I,
391-92.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

110

9Il

respect to the Emperor. ^

Truman did not comment substantively in his
Memoirs on the decision to exclude mention of the Emperor.
However, in 1959* he was asked, "Would it have been better
to have made it clear in the Potsdam Declaration that the
Japanese would be permitted to retain the Emperor?"
Truman's reply is couched in phrases typical of his
response to controversial questions; earthy and direct:
How could you do it? When we asked them to surrender
at Potsdam, they gave us a very snotty answer. That
is what I got. They didn't ask about the Emperor. I
said, if they don't surrender, they would be
completely, totally destroyed. They told me to go to
hell, words to that effect.95
Churchill approved the draft of the declaration
that Truman showed him at Potsdam.

Both agreed that China

should be invited to become a signatory to the ultimatum.
The text was transmitted to Chiang Kai-shek by radio, and
he sent Truman his approval.

The U.S.S.R., still

technically at peace with Japan, was not invited to sign.

^The Secretary of War had, by the 2l\.th, returned
to his original position on including an assurance to the
Japanese that the imperial dynasty would be preserved. He
told Truman he hoped that he would at least keep his mind
open on the subject and if the Japanese made this a con
dition of surrender he would grant it to them. Truman
said he would if those circumstances arose. Hewlett and
Anderson, The New World, 392-93; Truman, Memoirs, I, 1|.29;
Herbert Peis', Japan SuFdued: The Atomic Bomb ancT the End of
the War in the Pacific (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 196T), 78-79. Hereinafter cited as Peis,
Japan Subdued.
95

Truman Speaks, 7^.
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The President issued the Potsdam Declaration at Berlin on
July 26.
After issuing the proclamation Truman sent orders
to the Office of War Information to inform the Japanese
people as fully and rapidly as possible of its pro97
visions.
Immediately, strong radio transmitters
located on Saipan began beaming a continuous broadcast
to the Japanese home islands.

On July 28 American bombers

dropped about twenty-seven million leaflets over Japan.
The leaflets summarized the terms of the Potsdam ulti
matum.

They also contained a list of eleven cities,

indicating that soon four of them would be totally
destroyed from the air.

What the leaflets did not

mention and what the Potsdam Declaration did not note,
was that plans called for these cities to be destroyed
not by the massive fire bombings which were becoming
98
commonplace, but by individual nuclear devices.

96

Truman, Memoirs, I, 387> 390; Lamont, Day of
Trinity, 263; Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 395«
For a copy of the text of the Potsdam declaration see
Truman, Memoirs, I, 390-9^. For a full account of the
Potsdam Conference see U.S., Department of State, Foreign
Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers: The
Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), l9Ij.5 (2 vols., Washington,

I960).
^Truman, Memoirs, I, 390.
q

Q

Steinberg, Man from Missouri, 259. See also,
Phillips, Truman Presidency, 3 9 i Fleming, The Cold War,
I, 30i^.
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The reaction within the Japanese government to the
Potsdam ultimatum was divided; the pivotal issue in the
Supreme War Direction Council concerned the fate of the
imperial house.

The military members offered a strong

argument that the absence of any mention of the Emperor
was proof that their enemies wanted to destroy the
Japanese nation.

They must fight on through an invasion

if necessary and win concessions from the Allies that
would assure national existence and the imperial order.
The Prime Minister and Foreign Minister were able to
moderate the views of the military chiefs only slightly.
On the afternoon of July 28, Prime Minister Kantara
Suzuki told a press conference that his government found
little that was new or of any value in the Potsdam
Declaration.

He concluded with the fateful phrase

". . . there is no other recourse but to ignore it
entirely and resolutely fight for the successful conclu
sion of this w a r . " ^

This statement set in motion the

events that would bring the war to a swift and dramatic
end.
The Potsdam Conference ended officially on August 2,
Most of the discussions and decisions were

qq

7 Feis, Japan Subdued, 97* See also, Current,
Secretary Stimson, 232-33; Hewlett and Anderson, The New
World, 39^-96; Phillips, Truman Presidency, 59.
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political and diplomatic in nature.

The Big Three powers

agreed, for example, on the establishment of a Council of
Foreign Ministers, the divisions and government of
Germany, reparations payments, the government of Poland,
admission requirements to the United Nations, the trial of
war criminals and similar matters

The "Joint Report"

of the decisions made at Potsdam is very loosely-worded in
many instances, representing compromises that were quite
transitory in nature.

George F. Kennan, the distinguished

authority on the U.S.S.R., has made it clear in his
Memoirs that he felt Truman had shown a great deal of
naivete in dealing with the Russians:

"I cannot recall

any political document . . . which filled me with a greater

°®Item No. 91> Joint Report with the Allied
Leaders on the Potsdam Conference, August H, 19l}.5, Public
Papers . . . Truman, 19^5* 179-95* passim. Winston
Churchill was adamantly opposed to the trials of Germany's
leaders as war criminals . He felt that this was a
dangerous principle, since it would encourage leaders
facing defeat to fight on after all hope was gone, need
lessly sacrificing lives. But Churchill, having lost his
parliamentary majority, was replaced in the midst of the
conference by Clement Atlee. Churchill, Triumph and
Tragedy, 631 . The former Prime Minister offered the same
views three years later in a conversation with then
Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, concerning the
Japanese "war crimes" trials then in session. Millis (ed.),
Forrestal Diaries, 52l|.«. George F. Kennan opposed the Nazi
t'rialsi as well, but for an entirely different reason:
"These men had placed themselves in a position where a
further personal existence on this earth could have no
positive meaning for them or anyone else. I personally
considered . . . that if any of these men fell into the
hands of Allied forces they should . . . be executed forth
with." Kennan, Memoirs, 2o0.
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sense of depression than the communique to which President
Truman set his name at the conclusion of these confused
and unreal discussions.
By the time the Potsdam Conference ended, so had
most of the ground fighting in the Pacific theater, except
on the Asian mainland.

The last major land battle of the

war had been won in late June, with the capture of
Okinawa, largest island of the Ryukyus group.

Located

only 350 miles from Kyushu, one of the four main islands
of Japan, Okinawa was considered an essential target by
American strategists.

The island would provide air bases

within medium bomber range of Japan and was to serve as a
major staging area for the planned invasion of the

102

Japanese home islands.

|The aerial bombardment of Japanese cities had been
gradually intensified.

By mid-June the destruction

The "communique" referred to is the Joint Report
cited in the preceding footnote. Kennan, Memoirs, 258ff.
See also, Neumann, After Victory, 173» 177-78J Buchanan,
United States in World War II, II, 5o5> 507-508. Kennan's
view of Truman7!? diplomacy Ts substantially that of D. P.
Fleming, who wrote:
"Truman's narrative (in his memoirs),
makes it clear he was not a negotiator." The Cold War, I,
292. As for Truman's view of Potsdam, he s a i d " Y o u never
saw such pig-headed people as are the Russians.
I hope I
never have to hold another conference with them." Quoted
in Steinberg, Man from Missouri, 259.
102ggpOsjL-bo (ed.), West Point Atlas, II, Sect. 2,
Map Plates Nos. 161, 165.
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planned for the five principal cities of Japan^°3 had been
achieved.

In Tokyo an estimated 3,100,000 persons had

lost their homes to the fires generated by the incendiary
bombs.

The bombers were ordered to attack other cities of

J a p a n . B y

late July-early August, the Strategic Air

Force B-29's based in the Marianas were meeting only
limited resistance from enemy fighter planes and were
sending several hundred bombers to strike Japan nightly.
For example, on the night prior to the atomic bombing of
Hiroshima, six hundred B-29's attacked Japan with the
pilots reporting results from "good to excellent."-1-0^
As the fighting in Europe had drawn to an end,
Truman had consulted several times with his military
chiefs and the cabinet as to the best method of concen
trating military efforts against Japan.

The President

implemented their suggestion that there be a rapid

103The cities were Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, Kobe and
Yokohama.
■**°^Tn all, American aircraft will deliver incendiary
attacks against sixty-six Japanese cities, destroying
about 169 square miles of these urban areas,killing 260,000
and leaving 9*200,000 homeless. Esposito (ed.), West
Point Atlas, II, Sect. 2, Map Plate No. 166. For other
accounts' of the effectiveness of these fire raids, see
Buchanan, United States and World War II, II, 579-80J
Fleming, The Cold War, I, 297-98.
10^Carl Spaatz (Commanding General, Army Strategic
Air Forces) to Henry H. Arnold (Commanding General, Army
Air Forces), August 6, 19i|5* RG18, Army Air Force (AAF),
312.1-Operations Letters-1945> National Archives.
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redeployment of troops to the Pacific, with those military
units having seen the least combat being the first to go.
American force levels in Europe were to be reduced to a
number sufficient for occupational duty only.
Most of the land, sea and air combat in the Pacific
Theater had been undertaken by the United States, with some
assistance from Britain and the Commonwealth Nations
Exclusive supreme command of these forces was exercised
through the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, as
opposed to Europe, where Eisenhower was under the
authority of the Combined (British and American)Chiefs of
Staff.

Truman went along with his Joint Chiefs, in July

of 19l|-5, in rejecting a British suggestion that a
Combined Chiefs arrangement be adopted in the Pacific.
However, he overrode the Joint Chiefs' recommendation that
all military Lend-Lease to Britain's occupation forces in
Europe be t e r m i n a t e d . T r u m a n ' s general policy toward
further expenditure of Lend Lease military and naval
equipment was that it be limited to that which would be

■^^Truman, Memoirs, I, 222.
"^Memorandum, Brehon Somervell to George C.
Marshall, RG18, AAF, Judge Advocate General (JAG),
i+OO.336-Lend Lease, National Archives; Telegram, Truman to
Clement Atlee, August 15, 191*5, ibid. See also, Buchanan,
United States in World War II, II, 50lj-505,* Truman,
Memoirs, 1 , 23^33, 3&2.
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a

Q

used directly against Japan.
Commenting on his struggles with Congress over LendLease appropriations, Truman revealed that— like many
another commander in chief before him— he believed the
President's war powers should not be limited by the
Congress :
A great many of the war powers that are delegated
to the President when a war is actually going on are
made for the duration of the war. But Congress is
very jealous of its authority to keep the purse
strings tight, as in the case of appropriations for
Lend-Lease. That is all right in a republic when the
republic is not in danger, but it always seemed to
me that matters such as Lend-Lease should have been
authorized for the duration of hostilities. . • •
I made a fundamental distinction between powers
that I requested during wartime and those that I
expected during peacetime. . . . in connection with
Lend-Lease appropriations, I felt all along that
Congress should have given the President authority
there for the duration of hostilities instead of
renewing the legislation periodically.
When a nation is at w a r , its leader, who has the
responsibility of winning the war, ought‘~To‘ have all
the tools available for that purpose.109

Presidential Directive, July 6, 19k$f quoted in
memorandum, Thomas Goodman (Acting Air Judge Advocate) to
General Hood, August 29, 19ljSt RG18, AAF, JAG, lf.00.336Lend Lease, National Archives. A change in lend-lease
policy which he approved was recommended to Truman in
August. See memorandum, (unsigned) Foreign Economic Admin
istration to Truman, August 13 » 19k-5> ibid. A full state
ment of Truman's interim policy respecting lend-lease can
be found in a directive, Secretary of War, "Presidential
Policy on Military Lend-Lease," August 15, 19l|5, ibid. See
also, Truman, Memoirs, I, 227-28, 231. In a directive
dated August 21, 19^5> the President cancelled all lendlease operations. For text of the directive, see Public
Papers . . . Truman, 19lf5, 232.
l°9Truman, Memoirs, I, 232, 23^4-•

Emphasis supplied.
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In their planning for the conquest of Japan, the
President’s military advisers were generally agreed that
this could only be accomplished by a massive amphibious
invasion of the Japanese home islands.

The strategic use

of atomic weaponry was never a major factor in their
deliberations since less than a month elapsed between the
successful testing of the nuclear bomb and its operational

At the Quebec Conference in September 19^i}., PT)R and
Churchill, on the advice of their military staffs, agreed
in principle that the unconditional surrender of Japan
necessitated an invasion of the home islands.

The first

strategic proposal for this invasion was presented to
Roosevelt by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a memorandum
dated January 22, 1914-5;
1.

2.

The agreed over-all objective in the war against
Japan has been expressed as follows:
To force the unconditional surrender of Japan by—
(1) Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist
by establishing sea and air blockades, con
ducting intensive air bombardment, and
destroying Japanese air and naval strength.
(2) Invading and seizing objectives in the
industrial heart of Japan.
The United States Chiefs of Staff have adopted the
following as a basis for planning the war against
Japan:
The concept of operations for the main effort in
the Pacific—

The development of the atomic bomb, Truman's
decision to employ it and the postwar policies he established
for nuclear weaponry are the subjects of the following
chapter.
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(a) Following the Okinawa operation to seize
additional positions to intensify the
blockade and air bombardment of Japan in
order to create a situation favorable to:
(b) An assault on Kyushu for the purpose of
further reducing Japanese capabilities by
containing and destroying major enemy forces
and further intensifying the blockade and
air bombardment in order to establish a
tactical condition favorable to:
(c) The decisive invasion of the industrial
heart of Japan through the Tokyo
Plain. . . . m
With the success of operations by April of 19l|-5,
the Navy was arguing that the JCS plans should be amended.
Admirals Leahy and King were now convinced that an
expanded naval blockade and an intensified bombardment by
air would force Japan to surrender.
the lead in opposing this idea.

General Marshall took

The Army Chief of Staff

argued that an invasion would be faster and less costly.
He also noted that massive aerial bombardments had failed
to bring about Germany's surrender.

In his position,

Marshall had the support of Admiral Chester Nimitz and—
most importantly— of General MacArthur, the Far Eastern
Commander.112

Quoted in Far East Hearings, Pt. 5, Appendix NN,
3332. See also, draft statement, Harriman to Senate Armed
Services and Foreign Relations Committees, August 1951 t
Tannenwald Papers, "MacArthur— Copies of Memorandums re
Hearings," Truman Library.

112

Schwarz, American Strategy, 56 j Hewlett and
Anderson, The New World, 3h8-U9. Reports from intelligence
experts supported the Army's view that bombings and block
ades would not likely force surrender prior to an in
vasion. Morton, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb,"
50lj..
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MacArthur disagreed with the Joint Chiefs’ plan in
respect to the operation against Kyushu.

He thought the

major initial landing should be directed against the Tokyo
Plain in concert with a Russian move against Manchuria.
However, MacArthur felt there was little possibility of a
blockade and bombardment strategy being effective in
bringing about s u r r e n d e r B o l s t e r e d by such argu
ments, the plan to force unconditional surrender by
invading Japan remained unchanged.
In May Truman was approached by T. V. Soong,
China's Foreign Minister, who said that his government
hoped that the showdown battle against Japan would be
fought by the United States on the Asian mainland.
Secretary of War Stimson was opposed to this strategy,
believing— with Marshall— that a direct invasion of Japan
would be the least costly plan in the long run.

Meeting

with the President on May 16, shortly after Soong’s visit,

^Paul Freeman, Jr. to George C. Marshall, Feb
ruary 13, 19i|-5, quoted in Bernstein and Matusow (eds.),
The Truman Administration, 315-16? Cable, MacArthur to
Marshall, April 20, 19l}-5> quoted in Morton, "The Decision
to Use the Atomic Bomb," 501? Marshall testimony, Far East
Hearings, Pt. 1, £ 63- 614.. It is difficult to reconcTTe
MacArthur's views at the time with his subsequent statements
during the hearings on his dismissal six years later. He
told the Senators that the American naval blockade
established after the capture of the Philippines and
Okinawa blocked supplies from the armed forces within
Japan.
"The minute we applied that blockade," MacArthur
testified, "the defeat of Japan was a certainty." Far East
Hearings, Pt. 1, 57-58.
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Stimson argued against the Chinese proposal and outlined
the grand strategy advocated by the military planners
Stimson told Truman that the War Department favored
attacking Japan itself, and not involving American ground
forces in China.

While deferring an immediate decision,

Truman noted that ,!the plans for the campaign being
worked out by the Joint Chiefs would, in their opinion,
be adequate for the defeat of Japan without such a
sacrifice of American lives as would be involved in a
major engagement in China.
Truman postponed any decision on the invasion plan
because there was no immediate need to decide.

He was

probably hoping that the two unknown factors at the time,
Russian entry into the war in the Far East and a workable
atomic bomb, would be settled before he had to decide.
The Joint Chiefs continued to refine their plans and,
increasingly, what they proposed was an exclusively
American action.

They did not want the proferred British

assistance, and more and more they were coming to feel
that the Russian invasion of Manchuria, while desirable,
was probably not essential.

In a meeting on May 25, the

JCS issued a directive setting the date for the invasion
by the Sixth Army of Kyushu (Operation Olympic) as

l-^Hewlett and Anerson, The New World, 350-51•
^■^Truman, Memoirs, I, 236.
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November 1, 19k-Z*

116

The invasion plans for the attack on

Honshu (Operation Coronet) , the major island of the
Japanese group, set the assault onto the Kanto (Tokyo)
Plain for about March 1, 1 9 4 6 . ^ ^
These were the plans formally presented to Truman
for his approval by the Joint Chiefs and the Service
Secretaries on June 18, 1945*

In defending the plan

General Marshall told the President that he was certain
that the Japanese would not surrender until they had
actually been invaded.

This, he said, combined with a

Russian attack in Manchuria and the havoc being inflicted
by aerial bombardment of the cities and naval blockade of
its sea lanes, should bring about Japan's capitulation.
The General estimated the first month of fighting on
Kyushu would entail some thirty-one thousand casualties.
Truman asked each of the others present for their views on
the proposed invasion.

No one d i s a g r e e d . W h e n he had

•^^Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 351 » Hunt,
Untold Story of MacArthur, 391*
■^■^Marshall testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 1,
£63; Esposito (ed.), West PoinF"Atlas, II, Sect. 2, Map
Plate No. 167j MortoriT "The Decision to Use the Atomic
Bomb," 502.
H^Truman, Memoirs, I, ij.16. While no one disagreed
with the plans, several offered related views. For
example, Stimson hoped to find some approach to the
Japanese that would bring about their surrender short of
actual invasion. He was doubtlessly thinking of the up
coming Potsdam Declaration and the availability of the
atomic bomb. Admiral Eeahy denounced the unconditional
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heard everyone out, Truman ordered the War Council to
proceed with preparations for the invasion of Kyushu.

As

for Coronet, the operation against the heavilyindustrialized central plain of Honshu, Truman told the
military to continue its preparations, but that he was
withholding final approval until it was essential for him
to decide.
At Potsdam, on July 17» 1

9

Truman called

together his advisers to re-examine military planning in
view of the successful testing of the atomic bomb the
previous day.

120

The advice given the President was to

continue with the invasion plans as drafted.

Truman

recalls in his Memoirs:

surrender formula adopted at Casablanca as making the
invasion necessary. Admiral King told Truman that entry
of the Soviet Union was still desirable, but was no longer
considered indispensable to victory. Hewlett and Anderson,
The New World, 363— 6I4.• For a detailed description of
Marshall^s presentation to Truman of the JCS strategy
recommendations, see U.S., Department of State, Foreign
Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers:
Conference of Berlin (Potsdam),
5 (2 vols., Washington,
I960), I, 9^-9.' An abridged version of the same can be
found in Bernstein and Matusow (eds.), The Truman Adminis
tration, 5-8 .
H^Morton, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb,"
501-502; Schwarz, American Strategy, 56-57*
•^^In addition to Truman, those present were
Secretaries Byrnes and Stimson, Generals Marshall and
Arnold, and Admirals Leahy and King.
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We reviewed our military strategy in the light of
this revolutionary development. We were not (sic.,
"now”) ready to make use of this weapon againsTThe
Japanese, although we did not know as yet what effect
the weapon might have, physically or psychologically,
when used against the enemy. For that reason the
military advised that we go ahead with the existing
military plans for the invasion of the Japanese home
islands.121

A few days after this meeting with his War Council,
the Commander in Chief decided to use the new weapon, and,
suddenly, the invasion plans, along with most contemporary
military strategy, became obsolete.

Truman's decision

inaugurated an entirely new age in the history of man.

12lrpruman^ Memoirs, I, ijJLf?. In a subsequent meeting
on July 2 k t Churchill and Truman received the final report
of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. They both approved of
this document, whose recommendations showed little change
from the original JCS memorandum to Roosevelt on January 22,
19i|.5. For text of the latter, see ibid., 381-82. For
text of the Combined Chiefs memorandum of July 2k, see
Far East Hearings, Pt. $, Appendix NN, 3338-39* As Louis
Morton commented:
”. . . the question of the bomb was
divorced entirely from military plans and the final report
of the conference accepted as the main effort the
invasion of the Japan.ese home islands. See, "The Decision
to Use the Atomic Bomb,” $12.
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CHAPTER IV
TRUMAN AND THE ATOMIC BOMB
"To me, it was a weapon of war, an artillery
weapon. We faced half a million casualties trying
to take Japan by land.
It was either that or the
atom bomb, and I didn't hesitate a minute, and I've
never lost any sleep over it since.

Secretary of War Stimson had his last meeting with
Franklin Roosevelt on March 15> 19i|.5«

They discussed the

Manhattan Project to develop an atomic weapon.

Roosevelt

was concerned about criticism he had received from a man
Stimson identifies as "a distinguished public servant"
who maintained that the project was a multi-billion dollar
p

"lemon" that scientists had sold to FDR.

Stimson calmed

Roosevelt's fears by pointing out that every physicist of
note, including four Nobel Prize winners, was working on
the bomb.

The remainder of their conversation dealt with

future control of atomic secrets, postwar policy and a

^■Quoted in Cabell Phillips, "Truman at 75*" New
York Times Magazine (May 3> 1959), 107* Hereinafter cited
as Phillips, "Truman at 75*n
Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 615. The
"distinguished public servant" alluded to was probably
Admiral Leahy. He was one of the few people who knew of
the project and was certain it would fail. See Chapter
III, footnote no. 21, supra.
125
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statement to be issued following the first use of the bomb.
Implied throughout the conversation, but never explicitlystated, was that Roosevelt would use the bomb against
Japan once it was ready.^

His death left the decision to

Harry Truman.
Following the swearing-in ceremony on April 12,
19kS> Stimson told Truman only that an immense project
was underway to perfect a new explosive "of almost un
believable destructive p o w e r . T h i s was the second time
that Stimson had discussed the subject with Truman.

In

June 19i|-3 the Truman Committee had become curious about
several secret military plants (notably one at Pasco,
Washington) and the budgetary masking of vast expenditures
for these installations.

Stimson called Truman and

explained to him that the project was of the utmost

^Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 6ljj>-l6;
Stimson, "Decision to Use tKe Atom Bomb," S t . Louis PostDispatch, January 28, 19l±7 • See also, Morton, "The tfe'cision
to Use the Atomic Bomb," li96. Most writers on the subject
seem agreed that the decision by Roosevelt to make the
bomb was the decision to use it. See, for example,
Buchanan, United States and World War II, II, 582; Stimson
and Bundy, On Active Service, 613; jMatToff, "Roosevelt as
War Leader,
^Truman, Memoirs, I, 10. Stimson, in whom Truman
had total confidence, was a pivotal figure in the atom bomb
decision. As Secretary of War, he was charged with overall
supervision of the Manhattan Project, and he was senior
adviser to the President on the military applications of
atomic energy. Current, Secretary Stimson, 229. See also,
Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 3k7 •
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secrecy and asked him to call off his investigation.
Truman had complied immediately, without demanding further
explanation.
On April 2l± Stimson wrote to the President requesting
a meeting at the earliest possible time.

The Secretary

wanted to fully brief the President on atomic develop
ments and determine what Truman's policy would be.^*
meeting was scheduled for the next day, the 2£th.
Stimson recalls it.

The

as

. . .

I went to explain the nature of the problem to a man
whose only previous knowledge of our activities was
that of a Senator who had loyally accepted our
assurances that the matter must be kept a secret from
him. Now he was President and Commander in Chief, and
the final responsibility in this as in so many other
matters must be his. . . .7

^Elting E. Morison, Turmoil and Tradition: A Study
^he Life and Times of Henry L. Stimson (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, I960), 616. iov Truman's account, which varies
somewhat in details, see Memoirs, I, 10-11. See also,
Buchanan, United States a n d .World War II, II, 318-19;
Hillman (ed.), Mr. President, 21+7-1+8Y “ This is not the only
instance of Truman respecting military security.
In May,
19l+2> Julius H. Amberg, Special Assistant to Stimson,
asked the then Senator Truman to quash an investigation by
his committee counsel, Hugh Pulton, into an experimental
project on target-seeking bombs. Again, Truman agreed
without complaint or question. See Amberg to Truman,
May 7* 191+2 and reply, May 16, 191+2, Truman Papers,
Senatorial Piles, National Defense Committee-General,"
Truman Library.
^Stimson to Truman, April 2l+,
Truman, Memoirs, I, 8£.

quoted in

^Stimson, "Decision to Use the Atom Bomb," St.
Louis Post-Dispatch, January 28, 191+7•
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Stimson began the briefing by telling the President
he felt it imperative that Truman know that this new
weapon--which he was certain would work--would not only
affect our future foreign relations, but would also
revolutionize military thinking.

If used, the bomb would

undoubtedly shorten the war; but the question of using
such an awesome device remained for Truman to decide.
Stimson also told Truman that he must consider the postwar
implications of American possession of the secrets of
atomic energy.

Scientists involved in the project were

convinced that the United States could not maintain
exclusive knowledge of the atomic process indefinitely.
Perhaps, Stimson suggested, international control through
the then-forming United Nations might be the best course
to follow.®

The Secretary of War, in his presentation to

Truman, was clearly looking beyond the immediate military
applications of the new weapon.

Truman later observed:

"Stimson . . . seemed at least as much concerned with the

®Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 63ij.-36;
Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 3k3 » See also, Morton,
"Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," 1+96; Truman, Memoirs, I,
87; Phillips, Truman Presidency,
Strangely enough,
almost a month after this briefing Budget Director Harold
Smith, in a conversation with Truman, mentioned the "Man
hattan Project." Truman asked him what it was. Apparently
no one had mentioned the project’s overall code name to
the President. Diary entry, May 21, 19k$> Papers of
Harold D. Smith, Diary (April 18, 19^5 “ June 19, 19^6),
Truman Library. Hereinafter cited as Smith Diary.
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role of the atomic bomb in the shaping of history as in
its capacity to shorten the war."^
General Leslie Groves, chief administrative officer
of the Manhattan District, had accompanied Stimson to this
meeting with the President.

Groves brought Truman up to

date on the entire project, indicated its current status
and offered approximate completion dates on the bombs.
The general anticipated a test of the bomb in mid-July at
the proving grounds near Los Alamos, New Mexico.

If the

test proved successful, an operational bomb could be
ready some time in August.

A special air group was already

in training to deliver the bomb.^®
Before the meeting ended, Stimson suggested to
Truman that a committee be created to advise the President
on all of the ramifications of the new weapon, particu
larly, whether it should be used against Japan or not.

^Truman, Memoirs, I, 87 .
l°Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 3i]-3j Phillips,
Truman Presidency, 52^. General' Groves had made sub
stantially the same report to Roosevelt just prior to the
Yalta Conference. Bourke Hickenlooper to Groves and
reply, June 2£, 19^1, printed in Par East Hearings, Pt. it,
3119-20, 3132.
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Truman agreed and the Interim Committee was established.^
Later various panels were created to advise the Interim
Committee on particular aspects (scientific, military,
12
political) of their problems.
The members of the Interim
Committee met together for the first time in the Pentagon
on May 9, 191+5•

The discussion dealt mainly with defining

the major problem areas.

The group dwelt at length on what

the President should tell the nation about the bomb test,
what other nations should be told about the process, and
how long it would take the Soviet Union to develop their
own bomb (estimates varying from three to twenty years).
The other question explored by this meeting had been
raised by several scientists working on the bomb's

•^Truman, Memoirs , I, 1+19• See also, Stimson and
Bundy, On Active Service, 616-17. The membership of the
committee was as Tollows": Stimson, Chairman; George L.
Harrison, Adviser to Stimson and President, New York Life
Insurance Co., Co-Chairman; James P. Byrnes, Personal
Representative of the President; Ralph A. Bard, Under
Secretary of the Navy; William L. Clayton, Assistant
Secretary of State; Vannevar Bush, Director, Office of
Scientific Research and Development and President, Car
negie Institute; Karl L. Compton, Chief, Office of Field
Services in OSRD and President, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology; James B. Conant, Chairman, National
Defense Research Committee and President, Harvard Univer
sity. List taken from Stimson and Bundy, On Active
Service, footnote, 616.
12
Among those advising the Interim Committee were
Generals Marshall and Groves and distinguished nuclear
scientists, such as Enrico Fermi, Arthur Compton and J.
Robert Oppenheimer. Truman, Memoirs, I, i+19. See also,
Morton, "Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," i+97j Hewlett
and Anderson, The New World, 3i+l+“l+5»
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development:

Should the atomic bomb be used at all,

especially considering

that Japan*s defeat was now

certain?

day, in another room of the

On that same

Penta

gon, General Groves, who had already answered that
question in his own mind, met with another committee to
select the Japanese city that would be the target of the
first b o m b . ^
The decisive meetings of the Interim Committee
occurred on May 31 and

June 1, 19lj-5-

Their recommenda

tions to the President

can be stated briefly: (1)

The

atomic bomb should be used directly against Japan as soon
as it becomes operational.

(2) The target should be a

war plant or military installation surrounded by build
ings of light construction.

(3) No advance warning as

to the nature of the weapon should be given to the
Japanese
James Byrnes informed Truman of the report soon
after the second meeting ended.

It is his recollection

that Truman said ". . . regrettable as it might be, so far
as he could see, the only reasonable conclusion was to use

■^Lamont, pay Qf Trinity, 103-101;; Morison, Turmoil
and Tradition, 62l^2^T~
% r u m a n , Memoirs;~~I~r4rI9. See also, Morton,
"Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," 1+975 Stimson and Bundy,
On Active Service, 617; Bernstein and Matusow (eds.), The
Truman Adminis tration, 10.
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the b o m b . " ^

The reasoning behind the Committee's

recommendations to Truman are obscured by conflicting
accounts of the participants and security restrictions on
the records of the Interim Committee.

However, it is

possible to make some general observations:

There was

only limited discussion of whether or not the bomb should
be used at all.

1

The question of a nonmilitary demon

stration of the weapon— upon a deserted island, for
example--was considered.

Objections were made that such a

test might not be a strong enough argument to convince the
militarists in control of Japan.

It was also proposed that

an uninhabited area of Japan be destroyed.

The consensus

view seemed to be that, like the island test, such a
demonstration might not be convincing, would be a waste of
fissionable materials; American prisoners might be moved

^ B y m e s , Speaking Frankly, 261-62.
Japan Subdued, 39.

See also, Peis,

•^Urs Schwarz believes that no serious consideration
was given to not using the bomb. American Strategy, 65.
Interim Committee member Ralph Bard! does not recall
discussion of the subject, nor does physicist J. Robert
Oppenheimer. Arthur Compton, on the other hand, recalls
that "fullest consideration" was given to using the bomb,
but that it was his impression that the Committee viewed
it as a "foregone conclusion that the bomb would be used."
Morison, Turmoil and Tradition, 625-27.
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to the site, and it could be costly, should the bomb fail
to detonate.1?
The Interim Committee did not absolutely reject the
idea of a demonstration to the Japanese of the power of
the atom.

Instead, they asked the Scientific Advisory

Panel to consider the subject and make recommendations.
The scientists submitted their report on June 16.
statement of their report read:

The key

"We can propose no

technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the
war; we see no acceptable alternative to direct military
1 ft
use."
It should be noted that the Interim Committee did
not wait for this study, which confirmed their judgments.
The Committee recommendation to the President that a
Japanese city be bombed was submitted two weeks earlier.
"The committee's function was, of course,
entirely advisory,"

Stimson wrote some years later.

He

continued,
The ultimate responsibility for the recommendation to
the President rested upon me, and I have no desire to
veil it.
The conclusions of the committee were
similar to my own, although I reached mine independ
ently.
I felt that to extract a genuine surrender
from the Emperor and his military advisers, there
must be administered a tremendous shock which would

?Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, 261-62; Schwarz,
American Strategy, 66. See also, Morison, Turmoil and
Tradition, 626; Lamont, Day of Trinity, 110.
1®Truman, Memoirs, I, i|19. For full text of the
report, see Feis, Japan Subdued, ij.2-l|3 •
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carry convincing proof of our power to destroy the
Empire. Such an effective shock would save many
times the number of lives, both American and
Japanese, that it would cost.19
Truman called a meeting of the War Council to discuss
strategy against Japan on June 18, 19l±$.

Of)

Present were

the Joint Chiefs, Navy Secretary Porrestal, Stimson and
John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War.

Most of the

meeting was taken up with Marshall’s presentation to
Truman of the invasion plans, with which the Joint Chiefs,
Porrestal and Stimson agreed, when queried by Truman.
McCloy was the only person present not to offer an
opinion, since Stimson, his superior, was present.

Just

as the meeting broke up, Truman turned to McCloy and said
that no one was going to leave without expressing his
Pi

views.

McCloy had been surprised by the entire meeting.
All present were familiar with the Interim Committee
report and yet no one had proposed to the President the
use of the atomic bomb.

McCloy suggested to Truman that

•^Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 617. In a
19^1 hearing, General MarshaTT testified to the same
effect, the opinion of the Joint Chiefs being that,
". . . nothing less than a terrific shock would produce a
surrender." Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, $62. There is some
sketchy evidence in SltTmson's diaries that he had assumed
for some time that the bomb would be used. Morison,
Turmoil and Tradition, 628-29.
20
This meeting was discussed at length in the
preceding chapter.
^Hew l e t t and Anderson, The New World, 117.
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some consideration should be given to the bomb's ability
to bring about unconditional surrender.

He favored, as he

told Truman in the discussion that followed, telling the
Japanese that the United States had the bomb and would use
it unless they surrendered.

22

Truman was interested in

the idea of including this warning in the ultimatum to be
issued at Potsdam.

However, as McCloy later reported,

"not one of the Chiefs nor the Secretary thought well of a
bomb warning, an effective argument being that no one
could be certain . . . that the thing would go off."2-^
Because of this, McCloy's proposal was put aside, only to
be reconsidered and rejected at Potsdam.2^
It is worth recording here that in the weeks just
prior to the testing and use of the bomb, many atomic
scientists— the only group aside from Truman's military
advisers who knew of the atomic project— tried to persuade
the Administration not to use the bomb against Japan.
Having heard and reacted against the recommendations of the
Interim Committee, a seven-man group was formed at the
Chicago Metallurgical Laboratory, calling itself the

22Ibid., 361)..
^ Q u o t e d in Morton, "Decision to Use the Atomic
Bomb," 502.
^Morison, Turmoil and Tradition, 630-31. See
also, Hewlett and Anderson, Qftie Hew World, 3>^b* Lamont,
Day of Trinity, 132-33*
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"Committee on Social and Political Implications."

25

Their

report, drafted for submission to Secretary Stimson,
argued against the use of the bomb without warning.

Such

use, the report contended, would shock allied and neutral
nations, undermine confidence in subsequent American
attempts at obtaining an international agreement to ban
atomic warfare, and probably would not be supported by
American public opinion which would be hostile to this
nation ". . . being the first to introduce such an indis
criminate method of wholesale destruction of civilian
life ."26
The basic recommendation of the Committee was that
a test demonstration of -the bomb be performed before
representatives

of all the

area.

such a demonstration the Japanese

If after

United Nations in somedeserted

rejected an ultimatum specifically warning that the bomb
would be used, then perhaps the bomb should be employed
(after obtaining the sanction of the American public and

^ T h e committee was
chaired by James 0. Franck, a
Nobel Laureate.
Among the membership were famousatomic
scientists such as Glen Seaborg and Leo Szilard. Feis,
Japan Subdued, 1^.0.
Of.

Feis, Japan Subdued, 1|1. For text of this
report, see ibid.,
"Franck Committee Report,"
printed in Bernstein and Matusow (eds.), The Truman
Administration, 12-13; Current, Secretary Stimson,
230-31.
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the United Nations)

The report was brought to Washing

ton by Janies Franck, the Committee Chairman.

On June 12,

unable to see Stimson, or George Harrison, alternate
chairman of the Interim Committee, Franck left the report
po
with an aide in Harrison’s office.
The report of the Scientific Advisory Panel to the
Interim Committee on June 16 (discussed earlier) took note
of the Franck Committee report:

"The opinions of our

scientific colleagues on the initial use of these weapons
are not unanimous.

. . ," the Panel reported.

They

described the alternatives suggested as ranging from a
technical demonstration to direct military application.
The Panel rejected a demonstration as unlikely to bring
about surrender and offered no alternative to direct use
29
of the bomb against Japan.
In late June Ralph Bard, a member of the Interim
Committee, reversed his opinion with respect to bombing
Japan without warning.

In a memorandum on June 27 Bard

^Feis, Japan Subdued,
See also, Fleming,
The •Cold W a r , I, 299; "Franck Committee Report," printed in
Bernstein and Matusow (eds.), The Truman Administration,
12-13; Current, Secretary Stimson, ~23b-31.
pQ

Editor's Note, "Franck Committee Report," in
Bernstein and Matusow (eds.), The Truman Administration, 10.
^"Scientific Advisory Committee Report," reprinted
in ibid., 15 .

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

138

said that Japan should be given a few days’ notice,
ascribing his new views to a consideration of America's
spirit of fair play and humanitarianism.

Bard also felt

that Japan was seeking an opportunity to surrender that
such a warning could provide, especially if accompanied by
assurances from the President with respect to the treat
ment of the Emperor and the Japanese nation following
surrender
These early dissenters from atomic policy recom
mendations were joined by a substantial number of atomic
scientists in July.

Leo Szilard, one of the members of

the Franck Committee, drafted and circulated a petition
addressed to Truman directly.

On July 17 Szilard sub

mitted the petit ion— bearing the signatures of sixty-nine
of his colleagues at the University of Chicago's Metal
lurgical Laboratory— to Washington.

The petition argued

the moral and political implications of using the bomb;
it began and ended with pleas to Truman to use his powers
as Commander in Chief with prudence and in consideration
of the future, as the following excerpts indicate:
Discoveries of which the people of the United States
are not aware may affect the welfare of this nation in
the near future. The liberation of atomic power which
has been achieved places atomic bombs in the hands of
the Army.
It places in your hands, as Commander-inChief, the fateful decision whether or not to sanction

^°Bard Memorandum, June 27, 19 k$» ibid., l£-l 6 .
also, Fleming, The Cold War, I, 300.
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the use of such bombs in the present phase of the
war against Japan. . . .
In view of the foregoing, we, the undersigned,
respectfully petition:
first, that you exercise your
power as Commander-in-Chief to rule that the United
States shall not resort to the use of atomic bombs in
this war unless the terms which will be imposed upon
Japan have been made public in detail and Japan,
knowing these terms, has refused to surrender; second,
that in such an event, the question of whether or not
to use atomic bombs be decided by you in the light of
the considerations presented in this petition as well
as the other moral responsibilities which are
involved.31
Other atomic scientists were becoming aroused over
the bomb question during July.

For example, on July 12 a

poll of one hundred and fifty scientists at the Metal
lurgical Laboratory revealed that forty percent favored
options other than the bombing of Japan without warning.

32

^Petition, Leo Szilard, et. al. to the President of
the United States, July 17, 194.£7""in Bernstein and Matusow
(eds.), The Truman Administration, 16-17. See also,
Fleming, TEe Cold W a r , I, 300-301. Szilard had perhaps a
greater feeling of responsibility for the bomb than most
other scientists. He had helped convince Albert Einstein
to write the fateful letter to Roosevelt that brought about
the creation of the Manhattan Project. Feis, Japan
Subdued, footnote, J4.O.
32Poll of 1^0 Chicago Scientists, July 12, 19l4-5>
printed in Bernstein and Matusow (eds.), The Truman Admin
istration, 19-20. See also, Hewlett and Anderson, The New
World, 399-^4-00. The figures given are confusing, since
numerically, only fifty-eight chose the poll options that
called for some action short of bombing without warning.
However, seventy names appear on the Szilard petition
completed in the next few days, calling for just such
action. Either the poll was in error, or many did not
participate. Louis Morton claims that the poll results,
along with the Szilard petition were given to the Scientific
Advisory Panel for consideration prior to their June 16
report. See, "Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," I4.98—99.
This could not have been possible since the poll was taken
on July 12 and the petition completed on July 17.
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In this period, a petition from Chicago bearing eighteen
names, and another from the atomic plant at Oak Ridge,
Tennessee, carrying sixty-eight names, were submitted
through channels, indicating varied reservations about
military use of the

b o m b .

33

Prom all indications, few, if any, of these
dissenting views ever reached Truman.

At least one

petition was held up on a decision apparently made by
General Groves.

A memorandum attached to the petition

explained that since the scientists had an opportunity to
express themselves through the Scientific Advisory Panel,
"no useful purpose would be served by transmitting . . .
(the petition) to the White House, particularly since the
President was not in the country."

3>k

Truman was, in fact,

at the Potsdam Conference, having left the United States
on July 6 .

The momentous decision Truman made to use the

bomb was based on military advisories and the Interim

33Editor's Note, Bernstein and Matusow (eds.),
The Truman Administration, 18.
3^-ibid., 16-17. See also, Lamont, Day of Trinity,
llp6 ; Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 399-IjSo. The
Szilard petition could h a v e b e e n forwarded to the Presi
dent, for he received White House mail pouches which were
flown in daily to him at Potsdam. See Truman to Martha
Truman, July 3, 1 9 quoted in Truman, Memoirs, I,
330-31* Herbert Feis, Japan Subdued (p. 63), feels it was
"improbable"that the Szilard petition was forwarded to
Truman. Steinberg claims, without offering any documen
tation, that Truman was aware of the Chicago poll. Man
From Missouri, 25>9.
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Committee recommendations.

Much of the information that

there existed a substantial number of objections to this
line of reasoning was not made known to the President.
At 7:30 P.M., July 16, the day following Truman’s
arrival at Potsdam, a cable was received with the infor
mation that an implosion-type atomic fission bomb had been
successfully detonated at the Alamogordo test site in New
Mexico.

Subsequent messages indicated the force of the

bomb exceeded expectations.^^

The blast yielded a force

equivalent to 20,000 tons of TNT; its light could be seen
for 250 miles and the shock wave broke a window 125 miles
from the epicenter of the explosion.^
Truman had been waiting for.

This was the news

The bomb strengthened his

position, for it meant that the Soviet Union was no longer
needed in the Par Eastern War.

17

^Harrison to Stimson, July 16, 17, 191*5 (Cables),
Poreign Relations of the United States: Potsdam Papers, II,
1360-61;' Groves "to Stimson, July lb, 191*5, ibid.,- 136I- 8 .
See also, Lamont, Day of Trinity, 255* David Rees, The Age
of Containment: The CoTS War, 191*5-1965 (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1‘96'7), 13• Hereinafter cited as Rees,
Age of Containment.
-^Groves to Stimson, July 18, 191*5 (Cable),
Poreign Relations of the United States: Potsdam Papers,
II, 1361-68, passim.
3"^Truman probably pushed back the Potsdam date to
await the test results. He did have the estimated test
date (mid-July), when he asked for the postponement from
July 1. Lamont, Day of Trinity, 108-109. The scientists
at Alamogrodo were definitely pushed to test around
July 16. Oppenheimer recalled (in 1951*) that both Stimson
and Vannevar Bush had told him it was very important that
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At a Pentagon meeting on July ij., 19kS» the British
■a q

had agreed that the bomb should be used against Japan.
However, they noted that one problem existed in that Russia
was officially ignorant of the bomb.

If Truman said

nothing about the weapon to Stalin at Potsdam, relations
between the Big Three would be jeopardized when the bomb
was used a short time later.

The general feeling was that

Truman should inform Stalin of the bomb sometime during
the c o n f e r e n c e T h e recommendation of the Interim
Committee, made to Truman a few days earlier, was in
agreement with this position.

The Committee had also

he test before the Potsdam meeting. Oppenheimer testimony,
quoted in Bernstein and Matusow (eds.), The Truman Admin
istration, 20-21. See also, Lamont, Day of Trini'ty, li|7.
Truman had said that "preparations were beTng rushed for
the test . . . at the time I had to leave for Europe
(July 6 ), and on the voyage over I had been anxiously
awaiting word on the results." Memoirs, I, ij.15« At
Potsdam, prior to receiving the test results, Truman
reportedly remarked, with respect to the test and negotia
tions with the Russians : "If it explodes as I think it
will, I'll certainly have a hammer on those boys." Lamont,
Day of Trinity, 228. Hewlett and Anderson claim that
Truman, with the atomic test date in mind, told Stimson in
a meeting on June 6 that he had postponed the Potsdam Con
ference until July 1
The New World, 360.
3®Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, 639. Senator
Vandenberg, Chairman o f t h e Senate Poreign Relations
Committee, discovered in the summer of 19lj.7 that Great
Britain's consent was required for any use of the atomic
bomb by a secret executive agreement made by PDR and
Churchill at the Quebec Conference. In January, 19kB> the
British agreed to rescind this requirement. Vandenberg,
Private Papers, 359-61.
39Lamont, Day of Trinity, lij.6 .
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suggested to the President that he might invite further
talks with the Soviet Union relative to a postwar policy
on atomic energy, but they did not think Truman, if asked,
should divulge any particulars yet.^®
At lunch with Churchill on July 18, Truman dis
cussed with the Prime Minister what Stalin should be told
about the bomb.

Churchill had been informed on the

previous day of the successful test of what he would
later refer to as "the Second Coming in Wrath.

Since

it was settled that Stalin had to be informed, the dis
cussion dealt only with how much he should be told and
when to tell him.

Truman said he would simply disclose

to the Soviet Premier the fact of the weapon without going
into any detail.

"I think," Churchill recalls Truman

saying, "I had best just tell him after one of our meetings
that we have an entirely novel form of bomb. . . , which
we think will have decisive effects upon the Japanese
will to continue the war."

Churchill agreed .^-2

As the evening session ended at Potsdam on July 21±,
Truman approached the Soviet Premier privately:

"I

casually mentioned to Stalin that we had a new weapon of

fy°Ibid., 136-37.
^■Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, 637-38.
^ I b i d ., 6ij.0-lp.. See also, Truman, Mr. Citizen,
201; Hewle'tt' and Anderson, The Hew World, 385.
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unusual destructiveness.”

The President was quite

surprised by the reaction he received:
Premier showed no special interest.

"The Russian

All he said was that

he was glad to hear it and hoped we would make "good use
of it against the Japanese I

Churchill, watching the

scene from a few yards away, but out of earshot, remembers
that Stalin’s face remained "gay and genial" and that "he
seemed to be delighted."^

As they waited together for

their cars a few moments later, Churchill asked the
President, "How did it go?"
"He never asked a question," Truman replied.^

^Truman, Memoirs, I, lj.16. See also, Neumann, After
Victory, 175>J Peis, Between War and Peace, 177^Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, 670.
^ I b i d . Secretary of State Byrnes, who was also
present, corroborates both Truman and Churchill’s accounts
of the brief encounter with Stalin. Speaking Prankly,
263. All three men were clearly surprised by Stalin's
mild reaction to Truman's information about the atomic
bomb. In their accounts, Truman and Byrnes did not note
the possibility that Stalin already knew much more than
Truman told him. Churchill stated emphatically that
Stalin's response was proof that the Soviet Union had not
penetrated the project’s security prior to this meeting.
Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, 669-70.
Cabell Phillips,
in his biography of^Truman, says Stalin and other Soviet
officials, " . . . had enjoyed for more than a year fairly
accurate and up-to-date intelligence. . . ," on the Man
hattan Project. See his, Truman Presidency, 53. Lansing
Lamont, Day of Trinity (passim.) makes frequent detailed
references to Soviet espionage activities at Alomogordo.
Herbert Peis believes that Stalin knew the weapon was
being developed and that it was close to success, but that
he was not yet aware of its full power.
Japan Subdued,
90.
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There was no further discussion with the Soviet Union at
Potsdam with regard to atomic energy.
Once the reports were in confirming the success of
the bomb test, Truman met with his chief military advisers
I16
on July 1 7 p
All present were conversant with the midJuly status reports prepared by the intelligence branch
of the War Department General Staff.

The reports

estimated Japanese strength in the home islands at
2.000.000, on the Asian mainland and Formosa, another

2 .000 .000, and 600,000 more scattered about in small
groupings for a total of just under 5,000,000.^

The

intelligence reports, while taking cognizance of the
Japanese mediation feelers to Russia, indicated that they
discerned no real weakening in Japanese determination to
continue the war.

As Stimson put it • • .

As we undex-stood it in July, there was a very strong
possibility that the Japanese Government might
determine upon resistance to the end, in all the
areas of the Far East under its control. In such an
event the Allies would be faced with the enormous
task of destroying an armed force of five million men
and five thousand suicide aircraft, belonging to a
race which had already amply demonstrated its ability
to fight literally to the death.m-8

^ T h o s e present were Stimson, Byrnes, Leahy,
Marshall, Arnold and King. Hillman (ed.), Mr. President,
----------------2ij.8.
~
^ S t i m s o n and Bundy, On Active Service, 618.
^ 8Ibid. There is no clear agreement on Japanese
determination to fight on. One who has taken exception to
Stimson's interpretation of these reports is Alexander H.
Leighton, who was Co-Director, Foreign Morale Analysis
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The invasion plans Truman had approved in June
called for a combined American military and naval force
Kg
estimated at £>000,000 men.
The President asked each of
his advisers present for their opinions on using the bomb.
General Marshall opposed a surprise attack, but he told
Truman that if the bomb brought about surrender without an
invasion, it would mean saving a quarter of a million
American lives along with the lives of millions of
Japanese.^

There was apparently little or no discussion

Division, Bureau of Overseas Intelligence. Leighton holds
that Japan would have surrendered without the atomic bomb
or Russian intervention and prior to the planned invasion
of the home islands. See Leighton, "Was Atoraic-Bombing of
Japan Necessary?," Richmond (Va.) Times-Pispatch, April 20,
19i|.7« Leighton was a member of a survey team that in
spected Japan at the end of the war. What he says is quite
similar to the conclusion reached by the United States
Strategic Bombing Survey Report, reprinted in Bernstein and
Matusow (eds.), The Truman .Administration, \\$. D. P.
Fleming believes""that Soviet interventioh alone would have
been sufficient to force Japanese surrender. The Cold War,
I, 30£.
^ S t i m s o n and Bundy, On Active Service, 619.
^°Hillman (ed.), Mr. President, 2ij.8. Truman’s fig
ures on the estimate of ITves that" would be lost by in
vasion vary. In his Memoirs (I, ljl7) he said it would cost
one half million American lives. Earlier (p. 31 lj-) > he
recorded the JCS casualty estimates as just, "grim."
Steinberg, in Man from Missouri(p. 2£9) quotes Truman as
saying the bomb saved half a million Americans and as many
Japanese. In a 196£ television broadcast, Truman referred
to "saving hundreds of thousands of American lives."
Quoted in Lamont, Day of Trinity, 303* In a speech to
newly-elected congressmen at ‘
t!he Carlton Hotel in Washing
ton on April 6 , 191^9, the President spoke of saving two
hundred thousand American lives and about three or four
hundred thousand of the enemy. Item No. 70, Public
Papers . . . Truman, 191+9, 200.
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about the possibility of a specific warning to the
Japanese that this new weapon was to be used against
them.^

"The consensus of opinion," Truman said in

summarizing this meeting, "was that the bomb should be
used."^2
The last two weeks of July must have been exhausting
to the President.

He was engaged in daily complex

negotiations over the conference table with Great Britain
and the Soviet Union, determining the structure of the
postwar world; he was meeting often with Stimson, Byrnes
and Churchill with regard to the language of the Potsdam
Ultimatum; he was pressed from the seventeenth to the
twenty-fourth to make a decision respecting the issuance
of orders for the atomic-bombing of Japan.

He had been

^ "Marshall . . . was deeply disturbed at the idea
of a surprise atomic attack on Japan," according to
Lamont, Day of Trinity, 261+. Louis Morton says that, "No
one at this TTTme, or later in the conference, raised the
question of whether the Japanese
should be informed of the
existence of the bomb." Morton,
"Decision to Use the
Atomic Bomb," 511. Interviewed in I960, General Eisenhower
said that when informed by Stimson of the bomb he said he
hoped that American would not be
the first to use such a
weapon, especially against an almost-defeated nation.
Peis, Japan Subdued, footnote, 178.
^Hil l m a n (ed.), Mr. President, 21+8. It may be
recalled that while the participants in this meeting
agreed that the bomb should be used, the decision was also
made to continue with preparations for the invasion of
Japan. The military advisers to the President were by no
means convinced that the bomb would end the war.
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informed that the bomb could be used on or after August 1,
but the preparations required that his authorization to
C '.i

proceed be given prior to July 25.
As he moved toward a decision on the bomb, Truman
continued to consult with his military and civilian
advisers:

"I gave careful thought to what my advisers

had counseled.

I wanted to weigh all the possibilities

and implications."-^

The President also talked about it

with Churchill, with Leahy and Marshall present.

"There

never was," Churchill recalls, "a moment's discussion as
to whether the atomic bomb should be used or n o t . " ^
Churchill was very emphatic on this point, as his further
discussion of this session with Truman indicates:
The final decision now lay in the main with President
Truman, who had the weapon; but I never doubted what
it would be, nor have I ever doubted since that he was
right.
. . . the decision whether or not to use the
atomic bomb to compel the surrender of Japan was never
even an issue. There was unanimous, automatic,

5^
Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 389-90.
^Raymond G-. O ’Connor, "Harry S. Truman: New
Dimensions of Power," in Edgar E. Robinson, et. al.,
Powers of the President in Foreign Affairs, T9U^-T965
(San FrancTsco: The Commonwealth Club of dal ifornia,
1966), 29. Hereinafter cited as O ’Connor, "Harry S. Truman:
New Dimensions of Power."
-^Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, 638-39 . " . . .
when I talked to Churchill he unhesitatingly told me that
he favored the use of the atomic bomb if it might aid to
end the war." Truman, Memoirs, I, Ijl9.
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unquestioned agreement around our table; nor did I
ever hear the slightest suggestion that we should do
otherwise.
The President had not only to worry out the final
decision to bomb Japan, he had also to pick which cities
to use as targets.

He wanted to be sure, he said, that

the bomb was used against a military target.

That way,

Truman reasoned, he would be employing ". . . a weapon of
war in the manner prescribed by the laws of w a r . " ^

He

had earlier instructed Stimson to tell the War Department
Target Committee to propose only cities of "prime military
importance."

Essentially, this meant a city with

industrial plants producing military equipment.

All of

this was in conformance with the Interim Committee’s
recommendations with which the JCS had concurred.
Stimson brought the target recommendations to Truman,
and, along with Marshall and Arnold, a list of four cities
was compiled.

Listed in order of their military

importance, they were Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata, and
Nagasaki.
In the preface to his Memoirs, Truman commented

^Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, 639.
^Truman, Memoirs, I, i+20.
£8Ibid. See also, Hillman (ed.), Mr. President,
21+8'; Lamont, Day of Trinity, 261+-65; Current, Secretary
Stimson, 233. Current errs in placing Truman in Washington
during this period.
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from his own experience on the times a president is con
fronted by crucial decisions:
for him.

"No one can make decisions

No one can know all the processes and stages of

his thinking."^

He concluded his thoughts on this subject

with the following insightful line:

"To be President of

the United States is to be lonely, very lonely at times
of great decisions ."^0

Although surrounded by his

advisers as they chose the target cities in Japan, Harry
Truman must have felt very lonely.

The President recalls

that after the target selection was completed, "I then
agreed to the use of the atomic bomb. . . .
With the Commander in Chief’s authorization, orders
dated July 2ij., 1

9

were dispatched by the War Department

to General Carl Spaatz, Commanding General of the A m y
Strategic Air Force.

The orders authorized the 509

Composite Group of the 20th Air Force— a special unit
trained for this task— to " . . .

deliver its first

59
Truman, Memoirs, I, Preface, ix.
^Ibid.
In a similar vein Truman said:
"The
Presidential chair is the loneliest place a man can be."
See, "Harry S. Truman— The Government Story," Group W
television network telecast, July 19, 1969.
6l
Hillman (ed.), Mr. President, 2l|8. The date of
Truman's decision was proHabXy July 23. A cable from
Stimson to George Harrison of the Interim Committee, dated
the 23rd, indicated that the bombing decision had now
"been confirmed by highest authority." Quoted in
Bernstein and Matusow (eds.), The Truman Administration,
25.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

151
special bomb as soon as weather will permit visual bombing
after about 3 August 19l{.5 on one of the targets:

62

shima, Kokura, Niigata and Nagasaki.”

Hiro-

The orders also

stated that additional bombs were to be dropped on the
designated targets as soon as they were constructed.
Copies of Spaatz's orders were also to be personally
delivered by him to General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz
for their information .63
Since the order to use the atomic bomb was given
prior to the promulgation of the Potsdam Declaration on
July 26, it could be assumed that the document was a
cynical gesture.

The assumption is unwarranted.

If the

bomb was to be used as soon as it was operational, as
advocated by the Interim Committee, then technical
necessity required that Truman initiate the orders when
he did.

The order was not irrevocable, but no further

62

Truman, Memoirs, I, ij.20.

^3puii text of orders appear in ibid., J|20-21j
Bernstein and Matusow (eds.), The Truman Administration,
25-26 . See also, Peis, Japan Subdued, 9l~ A copy of the
orders was sent to General MacArthur and this was probably
his first knowledge of the new weapon. MacArthur said he
first learned of tha bomb ”jua.t prior” to its use on
Hiroshima. See Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences r General
of the Army Douglas MacArthur (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
"Company, I 96I4.), 262. Hereinafter cited as MacArthur,
Remini sconces. See also, Charles A. Willoughby and John
Chamberlain,' MaoArthur, 191+1-1951 (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, 195h) > 286. Hereinafter cited as Willoughby
and Chamberlain, MacArthur.

R eproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1^2
commands were required from the Commander in Chief or any
one else in the military hierarchy for the bomb to be used
on or after August 3 .^Jwere clear:

"...

Truman's instructions to Stimson

the order would stand unless I

notified him that the Japanese reply to our ultimatum
was acceptable."^
The Potsdam Ultimatum, which said nothing about the
Emperor and nothing about the atomic bomb, was not
rejected by the Japanese.

Premier Suzuki told the press

he would ignore it, and this, to Truman, was unacceptable.
C.L

He felt that there was no longer an alternative course.
While the Japanese still vainly placed their hopes for a
negotiated surrender on the Russians, American technicians
were assembling an atomic weapon on Tinian Island in the
Marianas.

Since the Japanese response gave him no cause

^Schwarz, American Strategy. 58-59J Morton,
to Use the Atomic

"Decision

^Truman, Memoirs, I, If.21.
^Ibid.
Secretary Stimson felt that Suzuki had
rejected the ultimatum:
"In the face of this rejection we
could only proceed to demonstrate that the ultimatum had
meant exactly what it said . . . destruction of Japanese
forces and devastation of the homeland." Stimson and
Bundy, On Active Service, 625. Morton errs in saying that
following the Suzuki statement: "Truman held off orders
on the use of the bomb for a few days." See "Decision to
Use the Atomic Bomb," 513* As indicated textually, no
orders had to be given after the order to General Spaatz,
and none were given as far as can be determined from
available sources.
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to, Truman did not countermand his decision, a decision he
said he reached after long and careful study:
an easy decision to make.

"It was not

I did not like the weapon.

But

I had no qualms if in the long run millions of lives
67
could be saved. The rest is history."
History records that sixty percent of the city of
Hiroshima, Japan, was destroyed at 8:15 A.M., August 6,
19l|5»

The B-29 crewmen returning to their base reported

that the results exceeded expectations.®®
indeed, exceed expectations.

The results did,

The predicted twenty

thousand that would be killed by the bomb became, in
fact, seventy-eight thousand men, women, and children.
Thirty-seven thousand others were injured; thirteen
thousand were missing.

One single bomb in one apocalyptic

minute had transfored Hiroshima from the eighth largest
69
city in Japan into a village.
Receiving the news
aboard the U.S.S. Augusta on route back from the Potsdam
Conference, Truman told a group of sailors around him

^^Hillman (ed.), Mr. President. 2I4.8—1|.9.
®®General Spaatz to General Arnold, August 6 , 19k$t
RG18, AAP, 312.1— Operations Letters— 19i|.5» Vol. 3>
National Archives. The time noted is for Japan. It was
7:15 P.M., August 5* in Washington.
69
7Lamont, Day of Trinity, 265. In a research study
in progress at Hiroshima's Institute of Nuclear Medicine
and Biology, sociologist Minoru Yuzaki offers "highly
tentative projections" placing the city's death toll at
200,000. Time, XCVI (August 10, 1970), 31.
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"this is the greatest thing in history ."^0
In a prepared statement released in Washington the
same day, the President told the nation of the bomb and
warned the Japanese that more would follow:
Sixteen hours ago an American airplane dropped one
bomb on Hiroshima, an important Japanese Army base.
That bomb had more power than 20,000 tons of
T.N.T. . . .
The Japanese began the war from the air at Pearl
Harbor. They have been repaid many fold. And the
end is not yet. . . .
We are now prepared to obliterate more rapidly and
completely every productive enterprise the Japanese
have above ground in any city. . . . Let their be no
mistakej we shall completely destroy Japan's power to
amek war.
It was to spare the Japanese people from utter
destruction that the ultimatum of July 26 was issued
at Potsdam. Their leaders promptly rejected that
ultimatum. If they do not now accept our terms they
may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of
which has never been seen on this earth.71
On August 9, seventy-five hours after the attack on
Hiroshima, the seaport of Nagasaki was atom-bombed.
casualties numbered above 100,000.

The

A one square-mile area

was instantaneously cratered by the force of the blast

^Truman, Memoirs, I, 1+21; Byrnes, Speaking
Frankly, 261+.
7^ Item No. 93, Statement by the President Announcing
the Use of the A-Bomb at Hiroshima, August 6, 191+5*
Public Papers . . . Truman. 191+5* 197-200. Full text is
reprinted as Document No. 1315, in Richard L. Watson, Jr.,
(ed.), The United States in the Contemporary World, 191+51962 (VoT. ilx! of George H. Knoles (ed.;, Sources in
American History, 9 vols., New York: The P’ree Press, 196£),
1+2-1+5* Hereinafter cited as Watson (ed.), United States
in the Contemporary World. An abridged version of the
statement appears in Truman, Memoirs, I, 1+22-23*
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which detonated some two thousand feet above the city.
The bomb, much more powerful than the device used on
Hiroshima, left a pall of radioactive dust over Nagasaki
that did not dissipate for several days.?2
Questions must inevitably arise about the time span
between the dropping of the bombs.

Some believe Truman

should have waited longer; Nagasaki was destroyed before
the Japanese government could react to the reports from
Hiroshima.Truman,
sufficient.

of course, thinks the time was

He gave them three days to surrender, he

said, and would have given them two more were it not for
unfavorable weather forecasts.?^The idea of dropping two bombs, rather than
dropping one and waiting a substantial interval for
Japanese reaction had been developed by military planners
in December of 192f!|.

The reasoning was that the first

bomb would demonstrate the magnitude of the weapon; the
second use of the weapon would be proof to the Japanese
the first was not an experimental fluke and that the

?^Truman, Memoirs, I, 2+26. See also, Lamont, Day
of Trinity, 266; Buchanan, United States and World War II,
II, 5B5.
Schwarz, American Strategy, 59.
7^-Truman, Memoirs, I, 1+26. The original date for
the second bomb drop was August 11, but meteorologists
indicated that the targets would not be visible by then.
Peis, Japan Subdued, footnote, 116. See also, Schwarz,
American Strategy, 59.
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United States had the capacity to continue these attacks.'^
General Groves liked the second-bomb strategy and
described the concept to Truman, who neither accepted nor
rejected it.

a s

Groves said:

"There was never any

definite approval of this conclusion and there was no
limitation placed in our plans on the number or bombs to
76
be used."
When the Commander in Chief approved the
orders to General Spaatz to use the atom bomb on Japan—
which Groves had drafted— he tacitly accepted a
multiple-bomb strategy.

The order is clear on this:

"Additional bombs will be delivered on the above targets
as soon as made ready by the project s t a f f . H e r b e r t
Peis has written that Generals Groves and Spaatz, " . . .
and all their colleagues, military and civil, were eager
to strike the second blow as quickly as possible to get
the most impressive effect and hasten s u r r e n d e r . "7®
Truman did have an order sent to Spaatz, probably on
August 7> telling him to continue the bombing as ordered

75>Lamont, Day of Trinity, 30l{.-305>- The idea
originated with Admiral William R. Purnell of the Military
Policy Committee.
76Ibid., 305.
f^Truman, Memoirs, I, i|20.
78peis, Japan Subdued, footnote, 116.
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unless advised to the contrary by the President.
As Truman had ordered the situation, the atomic
attacks were to continue unabated, with the frequency of
the attacks to be determined by field commanders, subject
only to the availability of fissionable material and
weather conditions over Japan.

The process would continue

until Japan accepted unconditional surrender.
In the course of discussions with Columbia Univer
sity students in 1959> Truman provided some interesting
insights into his thinking on the use of the bomb:
Student: How about the decision on dropping the
atomic bomb?
President Truman: That was not any decision that
you had to worry about. It was just the same as
getting a bigger gun than the other fellow had to win
a war and that's what it was used for. Nothing else
but an artillery weapon. . . .
The atom bomb was no "great decision". . . . It
was merely another powerful weapon in the arsenal of
righteousness. The dropping of the bombs stopped the
war, saved millions of lives. It is just the same as
artillery on our side. Napoleon said that victory is
always on the side of the artillery. It was a purely
military decision to end the war.°0
In another portion of his session with the students,
Truman was asked about the timing of the second bomb.

He

^Truman, Memoirs, I, i+23• Groves' deputy on
Tinian, General Thomas’ F. Farrell, was in direct field
command of the bombings. He believed that it was Groves'
wish that a second atom bomb should follow the first as
rapidly as possible. With this in mind, Farrell "decided
to rfcsh and risk the attack on the 9th rather than wait
out the forecasted worse weather." Feis, Japan Subdued,
footnote, 116.
Truman Speaks, 67* 93*
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does not actually answer the question in the dialogue
quoted below, preferring instead to attack his critics.
But that he did endorse the second (or, multiple)-bomb
strategy can be reasonably inferred from his remarks:
Student: Mr. President, would you be willing to
explain to us what led you to believe that the first
atomic bomb had failed to achieve peace with Japan
and made it necessary to drop the second one?
President Truman: It was a military procedure,
under which the armed forces decided that it would be
necessary to destroy both towns . . . and the
objective was, as nearly as we possibly could
determine, to shut off the supplies to the
Japanese. . . .
Student: The reason I asked this was that it
seemed to me the second bomb came pretty soon after
the first one, two or three days.
President Truman: That is right. We were
destroying the centers, the factories that were
making munitions.
Just a military maneuver, that
is all.
All this uproar about what we did and what could
have been stopped— should we take these wonderful
Monday morning quarterbacks, the experts who are
supposed to be right?
They don’t know what they are
talking about.
I was there.
I did it. I would to
it again.8l
If history is to be any more than reportage of
significant past events, then those who write 6f> a
nation's past must— of necessity— offer critical
judgments; they must assess the wisdom of decisions made
and judge the men who made them in the process.

By the

nature of the craft itself then, historians become the
"Monday morning quarterbacks" of Truman's prosaic phrase.
In one of his own works, Mr. Citizen, Truman criticized

8lIbid., 73.
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historians in general for their "astonishing" inaccuracy
and "deliberate distortions."
what he meant, Truman wrote:

As a specific example of
"The speculations and

assumptions • . . about my feelings on the use of the
atomic bomb on Nagasaki and Hiroshima were as contra
dictory as the varying stories written on the subject,
and most of them had no foundation in fact."

ftP

Even with

this caution, the speculations and assumptions, as with
this study, shall continue for many generations yet to
come, for Truman opened the door of the nuclear age, and
the world does not yet perceive what lies beyond— the
lady or the tiger.
Certain questions naturally occur in consideration
of the use of nuclear weapons.

Was the atomic bomb

^Truman, Mr. Citizen, 183-81;. Given his refreshing
pugnacity, Truman would never have fully agreed with any
view of his decision, but given his knowledge of history,
he would understand the reasons such judgments must be made.
In his autobiography he devoted ten pages to passing
judgment on his predecessors in the presidential office
(with Andrew Jackson— predictably— emerging as his favor
ite). Truman, Memoirs, II, 193-202. Truman had quite an
amazing grasp of historical data, with which he dazzled
everyone from his secretary to Winston Churchill, himself
a reknowned amateur historian. Truman’s own historical
allusions and the impressions of others on his talent in
the field are numerous. See, for example, his Memoirs, I,
2;60; II, 172-72;; Truman, Mr. Citizen, 125-26, 162, 167-68,
19)4.-95; Churchill, TriumpIT~and Tragedy, 2|8l; Koenig (ed.),
Truman Administration, 88-89; 0 ’Connor, "Harry S. Truman:
New Dimensions of Power," 2l;-25; Phillips, Truman Presi
dency, 13kt Hillman (ed.), Mr. President, ld-lll 81-82;
Steinberg, Man from MissourTT 355-561 Diary Entry,
November 9,1914-5/ Smith Papers, Truman Library.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

160
necessary to defeat Japan without a costly invasion?

If

the first was necessary, was the second bomb also required?
Was the time span between the bombs sufficient?

Can all

of "Truman's command decisions on the employment of the
bomb be justified?
all these questions.

It would be easy to answer "no” to
While the maimed, disfigured

children of Hiroshima live and a new generation of children
breathe air polluted by the radioactive fallout from the
testing of bombs over one thousand times more powerful
than those which scarred Japan, the urge to damn those who
advocated and initiated atomic warfare is strong.

But

any reasonable inquiry into the complex of circumstances
involved in the atomic decision reveals that no abso
lutely affirmative or negative judgment is valid without
qualification.
That Japan would have conditionally surrendered
without the atomic bomb being used and prior to the
invasion of Kyushu in November has been w e 11-demonstrated,
particularly by postwar research into the Japanese
records.®-^

Some high-ranking military officials have

®^An excellent study of the subject is Peis, Japan
Subdued. The distinguished diplomatic historian, Richard
W. Leopold said in a 1970 interview:
"I do not think there
is any doubt that if those who made the decision knew what
we know now, the bomb would not have been dropped."
Leopold, "The United States in World Affairs, 19l|.l-1968,"
in John A. Garraty (ed.), Interpreting American History:
Conversations with Historians (2 volsT, New York:
Mactalllan, 1 9J0)» II> 230. Hereinafter cited as Leopold,
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said, after the fact, that there was no military need to
drop the bomb--among them, Generals Arnold and MacArthur
and Admirals Halsey and L e a h y . E i s e n h o w e r was opposed
before the bomb’s use and Marshall had serious reserva
tions, as previously noted.®-’
Truman and all his military and civil advisers were
fully aware through intelligence reports that Japan was
actively seeking to end the war for some time prior to the
decision at Potsdam.

That there was little effort made,

aside from the ambiguously-worded Potsdam Declaration, to
follow up on the possibility of a political settlement is
Q/
quite clear.
Perhaps the President did not wish such a
conclusion to the war.

"United States in World Affairs." Norman Cousins and
Thomas K. Pinletter have written:
"The first error was
the atomic bombing of Hiroshima." See, "A Beginning for
Sanity," Saturday Review of Literature, XXXIX, No. 2 I4.
(June If?, 19^6), 6“ hereinafter cited as Cousins and
Pinletter, "A Beginning for Sanity."
®^Pleming, The Cold War, I, 297* Admiral Leahy
wrote that the atomic bomb, ". . . was of no material
assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were
already defeated and ready to surrender." Leahy, I Was
There (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950), lji+1. HereinaTter
cited as Leahy, I Was The r e .
®^See footnote number 51, supra.
®®Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 628 .
Schwarz believes that these "Japanese peace overtures were
"never even considered" by Truman and his advisers.
American Strategy, 58•
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If the first bomb was unnecessary, then it follows
that the second was doubly so, particularly in the brief
interim between them.

Even accepting the need for the

Hiroshima bomb, it is difficult to understand the haste
with which the second bomb was dropped.

Had the Japanese

been told after the first bomb that the attacks were to be
suspended temporarily, but would be resumed at some
specific date if they had not by then surrendered uncon
ditionally, there seems little reason to doubt that they
would have submitted.

The second-bomb strategy may have

been valid when proposed in 191+1+* but in August 19 b$>
Nagasaki was not needed to convince the Japanese their
cause was doomed.

"It was my responsibility as Presi

dent," Truman has said, "to force the Japanese warlords to
come to terms as quickly as possible with the minimum loss
of l i v e s . A n d

again, in a radio message to the nation,

the President said, "We have used it (the atomic bomb) in
OO
order to shorten the agony of war. . . . "
It was

®^Truman, Mr. Citizen, 202.
®®Item No. 97# Radio Report to the American People
on the Potsdam Conference, August 9* 191+5* Public Papers
. . . Truman, 191+5* 212. The line cited was' actually
written by Archibald MacLeish, then an assistant Secretary
of State, in some suggestions to Samuel Rosenman, a White
House adviser, who wrote the speech for Truman. MacLeish
to Rosenman, August, 191+5* Papers of Samuel I. Rosenman,
Subject Pile, Report to the Nation on Potsdam Conference,
Truman Library. Hereinafter cited as Rosenman Papers.
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excessive haste in employing the second bomb that brought
great agony to the people of Nagasaki.
The distinction between military and civilian
targets disappeared on both sides at some point in the
midst of World War II.

American fire-bombing of Japanese

cities had already killed over one-quarter of a million
Qq
civilians and left over nine million more homeless. ' In
the sense that the atomic bombs were just bigger, more
economical and efficient devices for destroying enemy
cities, no justification for their use was warranted by
either historical experience or prevailing international
practice.

The belligerent nations were all engaged in

research and development of more efficient and sophis
ticated war machines; the prevailing view being that
nations could use any weapon not explicitly barred by
international agreements.

Thus, although the Truman

Administration showed no particular concern over this
subject, the legal and historical precedents did exist for
using the bomb.^0

The only genuinely effective deterrent

to the use of insidious weapons has been the fear of

®^In recommending the fire bombings of Japan and
the Use of the atomic bomb, Stimson was, according to
Bundy:
" . . . implicitly confessing that there could be
no significant limits to the horrors of modern war."
Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 632-33.
^Peis, Japan Subdued, 179.
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retaliation in kind, as the absence of poison gas in the
Second World War demonstrates.

91

When the horrendous effects of the atomic bombs
became public knowledge, Truman was subjected to extreme
criticism from many nations.

As the years passed and the

nuclear arms race accelerated, many have looked back rue
fully to the initial act and bitterly condemned the
Commander in Chief who ordered the bombings.

92

Truman's

public posture never wavered; he did not attempt to deny
his responsibility:

"The final decision of where and

when to use the atomic bomb was up to me," Truman wrote
in his Memoirs.

"Let there be no mistake about it.

I

^ T h e insidious factor in atomic weapons is, of
course, the radioactive fallout. As Leahy said:
"It
(the bomb) is a poisonous thing that kills people by its
deadly radioactive reaction, more than by the explosive
force it develops." I Was There, ljlj.1. It has not been
possible to deteimine^iow mucii information on radioactivity
had been made available to Truman prior to the use of this
weapon.
92James MacGregor Burns, Presidential Government:
The Crucible of Leadership (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1966T7 215-16• Hereinafter cited as Burns,
Presidential Government. Criticism of use of the bomb
within the United States was minimal in the early postwar
period. For example, a poll taken in October, 19l4-5>
showed only four percent indicating the bomb should not
have been used. Fourteen percent favored a test on an un
populated area first. Fifty-four percent accepted the
two-bomb tactic used and twenty-three percent felt Truman
should have " . . . quickly used many more of them before
Japan had a chance to surrender." Elmo Roper, You and
Your Leaders: Their Actions and Your Reactions, 1936-1956
(New York: William Morrow, 195>77> l2i+. Hereinafter cited
as Roper, You and Your Leaders.
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regarded the bomb as a military weapon and never had any
doubt that it should be u s e d . " ^
While the American system does accord ultimate
authority to the Commander in Chief, in this instance,
there is ample reason to believe that it would have been
very difficult for Truman to have decided otherwise.

He

was new to command, overawed by the reputations of
Stimson and Marshall, and untutored in international
politics.

The flow of information about the extant con

ditions which would determine how he would decide
demonstrated a type of tunnel vision which admitted no
feasible alternative.

The military intelligence he

received created a false syllogism, by providing the
President with almost exclusively-military premises that
led him to an inevitable acceptance of a military con
clusion:

use the bomb.

Urs Schwarz, in his incisive study of American
politico-military thinking has described this decision
making process:
The events of July and August 19lf5» preceding the
decision to use the bomb and its actual dropping, are
further instances of by now well-known strategic
thinking and procedure. The decision-makers

^Truman, Memoirs, I, i|19. Truman repeatedly
avowed that it was his decision alone, often in almost
exactly the same language.
See, for example, Truman, M r .
Citizen, 202; Hillman (ed.), Mr. President, 2i|.8-ij.9;
Phillips, "Truman at 75>*" New York Times, May 3, 1959;
Truman Speaks, 73*
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concentrate, since they are engaged in war, on
military aspects, almost to the exclusion of any
considerations of policy. And the military aspects
are dominated by two viewpoints: end the war by
destroying the enemy's power to resist; end the war
quickly by a display of overwhelming power, so that
American casualties may be reduced.
Political means, even when suggested, even when
within easy reach, are neglected. Once the military
decision is taken, it remains for the military
commander on the
spot to put it into effect. His is
the final word. Even decisions that finally may turn
out to be of the
utmost political importanceare
left to him: the
political authority has abdicated in
his favor.94
Harry Truman did not so much decide to use the
atomic bomb as he decided to acquiesce in a vast project
that had cost billions of dollars and hundreds of
thousands of man-hours and that promised a speedy, lifesaving, dramatic finale to the most costly struggle in
the history of international warfare.

The atom bomb

project had developed an irresistible momentum of its own,
with the implication always clear that once the bomb was
perfected, it would be used against America's enemies.
Had Truman desired to stop this process, he would have had
to justify his decision to the bomb-makers and the
generals.

He would have had to argue for the uncertain

ground of future implications of the bomb's use; arguments
that James MacGregor Burns said "posed such huge

~^Schwarz, American Strategy, 59-60. Schwarz's
attack on such thinking is substantially the same as that
used by Bundy in defense of Stimson. Stimson and Bundy,
On Active Service, 629-30.
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imponderables and contingencies that they defied easy
calculation.

The proposed military solution, on the

other hand, offering an immediate, direct, readilycalculable result, was bound to have appeal to the Presi
dent.

Truman was a practical politician, used to direct

action and not given to abstract reasoning.

96

And so,

taken together, the system, circumstances and his own
predisposition led Truman to accept a military conclusion.
After the President discussed with the Secretary of War
and others the citiesto be marked as targets, herecalls,
"I then agreed to the

use of the atomic bomb. . . ."97

The decision to make the atomic bomb was, indeed, the
decision to use it.
It would be unreasonable to fault Truman for not
having the vision to see what the passage of decades has
revealed.

Nor is it at all probable that any other

decision he made on the bomb would have prevented the sub
sequent nuclear arms race.

But his acceptance of the

specious arguments against a test demonstration and
against a specific warning in the Potsdam Declaration can
be greatly regretted,

if not condemned.

95>Burns, Presidential

The wisdom of his

Government, 216.

96Ibid., 2l£-l6.
97Hillman (ed.), Mr. President, 2lj.8.
supplied.

Emphasis
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open-ended order to General Spaatz to continue the bombing
until otherwise informed may also be questioned.

What

cannot be questioned was that when he did act, Truman was
convinced his was the correct course:

"I could not worry

about what history would say about my personal morality,
I made the only decision I ever knew how to make.
what I thought was right."

I did

98

One last factor must be added in assessing the in
fluences on Truman's thinking in his use of this extra
ordinary weapon of war.

So far as can be determined, in

all of his public utterances regarding his decision, he
never varied from the position that he had no regrets over
using this "purely military weapon" against what were essen
tially military targets.
doubts:

But he may have had private

David Lilienthal, Director of the Atomic Energy

Commission, recorded in his journal a White House meeting
in mid-summer, 19i+8.

During the meeting, Secretary of the

Air Force Stuart Symington was recounting for the President
a conversation he had with a scientist at the Los Alamos
laboratory.

Symington was amused when the physicist told

him that he did not think the United States should ever use
the nuclear weapons being developed at the laboratory.
"I don't either," Truman said.

Lilienthal's memory of the

President's elaboration on this statement follows:

9®Quoted in Lamont, Day of Trinity, 303•
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I don't think we ought to use this thing unless we
absolutely have to. It is a terrible thing to order
the use of something that (here he looked down at
his desk, rather reflectively) that is so terribly
destructive, destructive beyond anything we have ever
had. You have got to understand that this isn't a
military weapon.
(I shall never forget this
particular expression.)
It is used to wipe out
women and children and unarmed people, and not for
military uses. So we have got to treat this
differently from rifles and cannon and ordinary
things like that.99

^^David E. Lilienthal, The Atomic Energy Years,
19115-1950* V o l . II of The Journals of David e T Lilienthal
(New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1961+), 391. Here'inafter cited as Lilienthal, Atomic Energy Years. (The
parenthetical interpolations are by Lilienthal.) In dis
cussing military problems with Truman just after World
War II, Budget Director Smith reminded the President that
he now had the atomic bomb to fall back on. Truman
replied:
"Yes, but I am not sure it can ever be used."
Diary Entry, October 5* 191+5* Smith Papers, Smith Diary,
copy in Truman Library of original in Franklin D. Roosevelt
Library. Or again, when talking of the bomb in private
(in 191+9), the President mentioned a book by a British
author which contended that the bomb was just another
weapon of war. Truman said that was "a very serious mis
take," and added:
"this isn't just another weapon, not
just another bomb." Journal Entry, February ll+, 191+9,
Lilienthal, Atomic Energy Years, 1+71+• When Admiral
William S. Parsons wrote an article for the Saturday Evening
Post to the same effect— that the atomic bomb was jusl;
another weapon— President Truman, acting through his
Special Counsel, Clark Clifford, ordered that the article
not be published as it was contrary to the national
interests. Memoranda, Lilienthal to Clifford, December ll+,
191+8; Clifford to the President, December 29, 191+8;
Clifford to Forrestal, December 31* 191+8, all in Papers of
Clark M. Clifford, Atomic Energy, Truman Library. Herein
after cited as Clifford Papers. When asked in a November,
1950> press conference if the bomb was being considered
for use in Korea, Truman said:
"There has always been
active consideration of its use. I don't want to see it
used. It is a terrible weapon, and it should not be used
on innocent men, women, and children who have nothing what
ever to do with this military aggression. That happens
when it is used." Item No. 295* Press Conference, November
30, 1950, Public Papers . . . Truman. 1950* 727•
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On August 10, 191+5> Radio Tokyo broadcast a message
accepting the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, 11. • .
with the understanding that said declaration does not
comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of
His Majesty as a sovereign ruler."100

Truman called a

meeting that morning with Admiral Leahy and Secretaries
Byrnes, Forrestal and Stimson to discuss a response.
The discussion centered around the reservation expressed
by the Japanese with regard to the Emperor.

The Secretary

of War, who had long advocated retention of the Emperor,
told the President that allowing the Emperor to govern
under American supervision, would greatly facilitate both
the surrender of all Japanese forces and the postwar
administration of the country.101

Admiral Leahy agreed

with Stimson, but Secretary Byrnes was against such a
suggestion.

He wanted to hold to the unconditional

surrender formula.

He also pointed out that many major

American officials had condemned the Japanese imperial
system and the Emperor during the war and that to accept
this condition now would appear to be a sharp reversal of
policy.

Truman was inclined to agree with Byrnes.

Navy

Secretary Forrestal settled the dilemma by suggesting that
the reply be drafted so as to reaffirm the Potsdam

lOOciuoted in Truman, Memoirs, I, l\27.
103-Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 627*
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Declaration but reassure the Japanese that the Emperor
would be retained.

Forrestal was proposing that the

response contradict itself by accepting the Japanese
condition while demanding unconditional surrender.

Truman

liked the suggestion and ordered Byrnes to prepare a draft
102
statement along these lines.
Truman further ordered
that the war effort against Japan was to continue at
current levels until further notice, except that no
atomic bombs were to be employed without his express
permission."*^
The Secretary of State’s draft response to Japan,
since referred to as the Byrnes Note, was ready for a
cabinet meeting on the afternoon of August 10, its apt
phrases walking the thin line of Forrestal’s suggestion.
Truman approved the note, and its text was radioed to the
Allied capitals of London, Moscow and Chunking for
approval.The

Soviet Union, having declared war on

^ B y m e s , Speaking Frankly, 209; Truman, Memoirs,
I, 1^28. See also, Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service,
626-27; Hillman (ed.), Mr. President, TS’EfI
-l-O^Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 1|05»
lO^Bymes, Speaking Frankly, 209-10; Arnold A. Rogow,
Victim of Duty: A Study or James fflorrestal (London: Rupert
Hart-DavTs, 1966*7, llj.^-ij.'ST Hereinafter cited as Rogow,
Victim of Duty. See also’
, Truman, Memoirs, I, J+28-29;
Buchanan, United States and World War II, II, 592-93; Stim
son and Bundy, On Aotive Service, 62?. Full text of the
"Byrnes Note" is printed in Herbert Feis, Contest Oyer
Japan (New York: W. W. Norton, 1967)* l62-6”3 ^ Hereinafter
cTted" as Feis, Contest Over Japan.
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Japan on August 8,

10f?

accepted the text of the Byrnes

Note after some half-hearted struggling with Ambassador
Harriman over the Soviet desire to share military control
of Japan with the United States.-1-0 ^

England and China

readily agreed to the text of the Byrnes Note which was
then forwarded to the Japanese by the Swiss Charge on
August 11, 19i|3>.10^

On the fourteenth, having received

Japan's acceptance of the Allied terms, the President told
a news conference:

"I deem this reply a full acceptance

of the Potsdam Declaration which specifies the undonditional surrender of Japan."

100

While Truman spoke, his

message ordering a cease fire was being transmitted to all
operational forces in the Pacific.

log
7

For the next two weeks, Truman remained preoccupied
with preparing for peace and beginning the complex demobi
lization process.

His very first act after announcing

105>Averill Harriman to Truman, August 9, 19if5>
quoted in Truman, Memoirs, I, lj.25-26; Item No. 9l\.t Press
Conference, August*™81TT9Zi5> Public Papers . . . Truman,
19lpjp, 200. The Russian declaration was effective as of the
following day, August 9.
^■°^Harriman to Truman, August 11, 19if-5>> quoted in
Truman, Memoirs, I, ij.30-31, If.32.
•^^Truman, Memoirs, I, ij.29-30, ij.32.
1 oft
Item No. 100, Press Conference, August llj., 19k$*
Public Papers . . . Truman, 19k$> 216. For text of Japa
nese surrender message, see ibid., 217-18. See also,
Truman, Memoirs, I, ij.35-37» Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, 210.
109Truman, Memoirs, I, i|38.
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Japanese acceptance of the surrender terms was to order
Selective Service to cut the draft call by 30,000 per month.
In the same message he promised to release up to five and
one-half million men from military duty within eighteen
months.

The pressure to accelerate troop demobilization

was one of the first of many postwar military problems
with political complications facing the Aministration.

110

The President ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
give maximum publicity to the surrender ceremonies, which,
with obvious personal pleasure, he directed take place
aboard the battleship, U.S.S. Missouri.^^^

Another obvious

choice for Truman, although one that would not remain a
constant source of pleasure, was the designation of General
Mac Arthur as Supreme Commander in Japan.

Through the terms

of the surrender document and the various directives
Truman caused to be issued to MacArthur, the General became
the virtual ruler of the Japanese nation, as well as
Supreme Commander of all American military forces in the
Par East.-1--1-2

H°Itera No. 101, Statement by the President
Announcing a Reduction in the Draft, August llj., 19J+5,
Public Papers . . . Truman,
218-19. See also,
Truman, Memoirs, I,
lllTruman to Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 13,
19lj5> quoted in Truman, Memoirs, I,
1-52.
112Marshall to MacArthur, August 13, 19lj.5j Marshall
to MacArthur (undated, apx. August lij., 19lj.5)» JCS to
MacArthur, September 6, 19lj.5, all quoted in ibid., li.38-39f
U53, 1|57.
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Late in August Truman released to the press the
Army and Navy fact-finding reports on the Pearl Harbor
attack.

The President told the press that "there is

nothing there that needs to be covered up. . .

but

it seems he also hoped to end widespread speculation on the
subject which was then c u r r e n t w h e n

Congress created

a Joint Committee to investigate Pearl Harbor, Truman
proved his sincerity by ordering the heads of the State,
War and Navy departments, the Joint Chiefs, and others
involved, to make full disclosure of information to the
committee

Conversely, Truman muzzled the same

military advisers concerning information on the atomic
bomb, telling them that nothing regarding the design,
production or use of nuclear weapons in warfare was to be

^•^Item No. 116, Press Conference, August 29, 191+5,
Public Papers . • . Truman, 191+5, 21+3-1+5*
lllj-Truman to Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal) ,
et. al., October 23, 19l|.5, A17-21+ (1), Historical Records
IJTvisTon, Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Yard, Washington,
D.C. Hereinafter cited as CNO, Navy Yard. Alben Barkley,
Chairman of the Joint Committee, finding many reluctant to
testify despite the President’s memorandum, asked the White
House for a more forceful statement.
Over Judge Rosenman's
objections, Truman will issue such a statement.
See
Barkley to Matthew J. Connelly, November 2, 191+5, Rosenman
Papers, Subject File, 191^-5, Pearl Harbor Investigation,
Truman Library; Rosenman to Truman, November 9, 191j.5,
ibid.; Truman to Joint Chiefs of Staff, et. al., November
7, l'9l+5» ibid.; summary, Presidential Actions in re Pearl
Harbor Hearings, Murphy Papers, White House Files, Presi
dential Powers folder, Truman Library.
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released without his specific authorization.

115
^

The Presi

dent defended this silencing directive by explaining that
Hiroshima and Nagasaki were "lesson enough" to him that
the world could not afford atomic warfare; and until
effective international control could be implemented, the
bomb secrets were to be p r e s e r v e d . B u t

a world hungry

for news of this "doomsday" weapon could not be completely
denied; Truman relented to the extent of allowing release
of "general interest" information which, in the opinion of
117
the War Department, would not endanger national security.
The full,.fateful days of August finally ended, and
September began with the formal surrender ceremonies held
•I t

Q

in Tokyo Harbor on the first.

The war was over, or at

least, the fighting had stopped; but a peace treaty with
Japan would wait another decade.

In order to retain

several of the war powers granted to the President as
Commander in Chief, Truman did not declare an official end

■^'’Directive, Truman to Secretary of War (Stimson),
e t . al., August 15, 19i|5, RG-107* Office of the Secretary of
War"n)SW), /4.7I •6--Atomic Bomb, 031.1, National Archives.
11 A
Truman, Memoirs, I, 52ij..
^Memorandum, Truman to Secretary of War (Stimson),
et. al., August 30, 1945> RG-107* OSW, 1+71 •6— Atomic Bomb,
TT31.T7 National Archives.
lift
September 2, Tokyo time, thirteen hours later
than Washington.
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to hostilities until December 31, 19^6.

119

Legal techni

calities to the side, peace had come by mid-August, 19k%»
The survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki might have
bitterly reflected that the peace they knew was like
that the Romans visited on the Britons as described by
IPO
Tacitus:
"They make a desert, they call it peace."
Columnist Walter Lippmann, writing shortly after
Roosevelt's death, said that "the genius of a good leader
is to leave behind him a situation which common sense,
without the grace of genius, can deal with successfully.

,,121

Truman, untouched by genius, but with a full measure of
common sense, had done precisely as Lippmann had hoped;
he managed to deal with the situation--total war—
successfully.

For Truman was not trully Commander in

■^Presidential Proclamation 271ij.* December 31*
191+6, Federal Register, XII, No. 1, (January 1, 19^4-7) • In
a speech to Congress on September 6, 19l|5, Truman had ex
plained the need for continuing the war powers granted to
the President. Basically, he said, they would facilitate
demobilization and reconversion. Item No. 128, Public
Papers . . . Truman, 19U5* 276-77. By the DeceraBerjHT
proclamation, Truman terminated fifty-three statutes
granting him various war powers. However, the declared
"state of military emergency" was not terminated, so he
retained numerous extraordinary powers. Col. Robert Wood
to all Army Commands, December 31* 19i+6, RGl6£, War Depart
ment, Plans and Operations, 387*k — (OH* Case 62), National
Archives.
120See "Agricola," Seot. 30.
^2^Walter Lippmann, "Roosevelt Has Gone," New York
Heral d-Tribune, April li+, 19k$»
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Chief during the final months of the war, but a steward
implementing a pre-determined program.

Not even employ

ment of the atomic bomb had been his choice, he merely
agreed to complete a process initiated by his predeces
sor. ^22

Truman expressed this view in a letter to the

Secretary of the Navy:

"I deserve no credit for the

victory except the little I contributed as United States
Senator.

It was already won when I became President and
123
all I had to do was carry out the program. . . . ”
In

his Memoirs, Truman said that September 6,

". . . i s

the date that symbolizes for me my assumption of the
office of President in my own right.
Whatever Truman’s role was in the closing scenes
of the Second World War, postwar nuclear weapons policy
was his alone to determine.

Three developments of the

postwar era in this field stand out as worthy of further
consideration.

First, as the only national leader with

control over atomic energy, Truman made a sincere effort

122wiiber Hoare, in his essay on Truman as Com
mander in Chief, would disagree:. ". . . i f the ghost of
FDR stood at Truman's elbow in Potsdam, at least no dead
hand drafted the order that sent the atomic bomb to
Hiroshima." See "Truman," 182.
^ ^Memorandum, Truman to Forrestal, September 7>
19l|£» Hillman (ed.), Mr. President, ij.9.

12i|-Truman, Memoirs, I, l|.8l. It was on September 6
that Truman sent Congress a message calling for the "Fair
Deal," a twenty-one point program of domestic reform
legislation.
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to turn over this control to the United Nations, but on
his terms.

Second, as the first Commander in Chief to

have control over atomic bombs, he denied to the military
services any direct authority over the very weapon that
became the bulwark of American military policy.

Last,

Truman ordered continued testing and development of
nuclear weapons and, when the Soviet Union detonated
their first test bomb, he ordered a massive program which
led to a device far more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb.
The possibilities and problems contemplated in
international control of atomic energy were first broached
to the President by Secretary of War Stimson in his dis12<
cuss ion with Truman on April 25, 191*5.
One of the
reasons for the creation of the Interim Committee (at this
meeting) was to advise the President on postwar atomic
control policy.

Truman says that the "frightful impli

cations" of Hiroshima made him aware ". . . that this
revolutionary scientific creation could destroy civiliza
tion unless put under control and placed at the service
of mankind."

In a statement on August 6, announcing

the Hiroshima attack and a radio address three days
later, the President made his first public appeals for
international control and Congressional cooperation.

In

^■^Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 635-36.
•^^Truman, Memoirs, I, 523•
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the August 6 statement Truman said that it was the usual
policy of the Government to release new scientific infor
mation to the public:
But under present circumstances it is not intended
to divulge the technical processes of production or
all the military applications, pending further examin
ation of possible methods of protecting us and the
rest of the world from the danger of sudden
destruction.
I shall recommend that the Congress of the United
States consider promptly the establishment of an
appropriate commission to control the production and
use of atomic power within the United States. I
shall . . . make further recommendations to the
Congress as to how atomic power can become a powerful
and forceful influence towards the maintenance of
world peace.^27
In his radio report on the Potsdam Conference
Truman told the nation that the new weapon was "too
dangerous to be loose in a lawless world," and because
of that, atomic technology would remain secret.

. . ,

. . . until means have been found to control the
bomb so as to protect ourselves and the rest of
the world from the danger of total destruction.
As far back as last May, Secretary of War Stimson
. . . appointed a committee . . . to prepare plans
for the future control of this bomb. I shall ask
the Congress to cooperate to the end that its pro
duction and use be controlled, and that its power
be made an overwhelming influence towards world
peace•
We must constitute ourselves trustees of this new
force--to prevent its misuse . . .
2
It is an awful responsibility which has come to us.

■^^Item No. 93, Statement by the President Announc
ing the Use of the A-Bomb at Hiroshima, August 6,
Public Papers . . . Truman, 19lj-5>, 199-200.
12®Item No. 97, Radio Report to the American People
on the Potsdam Conference, August 9, 19lj-j?» ibid., 212-13*
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The Secretary of War, charged with making recommen
dations to the President on future policy, spent a great
deal of time going over the Interim Committee reports and
reconsidering his own views toward atomic control.

The

problem was multi-faceted, but every recourse led back
to the Soviet Union, the reason being that all the other
major nations of the world either knew the secrets of
atomic fission, or were in no position to capitalize on
such information.

Great Britain, Canada and the United

States had cooperated in producing the weapon; France and
China were too fragmented by the war to organize the
massive effort needed to produce the weapon in the fore
seeable future; Germany and Japan were under Allied
military control and could be prevented from attempting
such experiments.

The Soviet Union was the only nation

with the resources, technological capability and the
opportunity to make immediate use of the information.

The

crux of the problem of international control then, as
Stimson viewed it, was whether the Russians could be
trusted and if they should be approached directly, or
through the offices of the United Nations, which was still
in the formative stages.

Stimson*s recommendations were

presented to President Truman in a memorandum dated
September 11, 19k$»
This memorandum began with an accurate anticipation
of Cold War developments.

The Secretary pointed out to
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the President that the bomb clearly gave the United States
an effective, temporary counter to Soviet influence and
expansionism.

However, the Russians realized this too,

and " . . . unless the Soviets are voluntarily invited
into the (nuclear) partnership upon a basis of co-opera
tion and trust," Stimson warned, they would certainly be
impelled to "feverish activity . . . toward the develop
ment of this bomb in what will in effect be a secret
armament race of a rather desperate c h a r a c t e r . T w o
pivotal passages in this lengthy document merit
quotation:
. . . I consider the problem of our satisfactory
relations with Russia as not mefrely connected with
but as virtually dominated by the problem of the
atomic bomb. . . . Those relations may be perhaps
irretrievably embittered by the way in which we
approach the solution of the bomb with Russia. For
if we fail to approach them now and merely continue
to negotiate with them, having this weapon rather
ostentatiously on our hip, their suspicions and
their distrust of our purposes and motives will
increase. . . .
I emphasize perhaps beyond all other considera
tions the importance of taking this action with
Russia as a proposal of the United States. . . .
Action of any international group of nations,
including many small nations who have not demon
strated their potential power or responsibility in
this war would not, in my opinion, be taken
seriously by the Soviets.130
Meeting with Truman on September 12, Stimson went over the

129por full text of Stimson*s memorandum to the
President, September 11, 19 1\£, see Stimson and Bundy, On
Active Service, 61^.2-lj.6.
13°Ibld., 61|4-if5.
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memorandum with him, line by line.

What he was

proposing, the Secretary explained, was direct negotiations
with the U.S.S.R. by the United States (with England's
assent) looking toward an agreement by which this nation
would impound its present weapons and agree to end further
development and ban their use in war, if the British and
Russians agreed to do l i k e w i s e . S t i m s o n did not propose
giving the Soviet Union the technological data necessary
for manufacturing the weapon, for the President had
already determined that this would not be done.

132

But he

did suggest that Truman offer to exchange knowledge with
the Russians leading to the further development of atomic
energy for peaceful applications.

Truman agreed with

Stimson's approach and asked the Secretary, who had already
resigned, to remain until the cabinet meeting on
September 21, at which his memorandum would be the sole
topic of discussion.

133

■^•^Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, ijl9»
l^Truman, Memoirs, I, 52l|.-25. See also, Item No.
161|., President's News Conference at Tiptonville, Tennessee,
October 8, 19hS> Public Papers • . . Truman, 19l+i?> 381-82.
133Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 2+19; Acheson,
Present at the Creation, 123. Stimson resigned for reasons
of (healtE“and- age. (Che last cabinet meeting he attended
was held on his seventy-eighth birthday. See Item No. 139*
Letter Accepting Resignation of Henry L. Stimson as Secre
tary of War, September 20, 19 k£> Public Papers . • . Truman,
19ljJ>, 329; Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 65>6-£7•
Truman will appoint Robert P. Tat ter son, the Under Secre
tary of War, to replace Stimson.
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The cabinet meeting began with Truman asking
Stimson to summarize the position stated in his memorandum.
In brief, he told them that maintenance of secrecy on the
basic principles of atomic energy was impossible.

He

advocated a scientific exchange and collaboration with the
Soviet Union looking toward development of atomic power
and a properly safeguarded mutual renunciation of atomic
weapons development.

The discussion that followed, to use

Dean Acheson's phrase, " . . .
ject.

was unworthy of the sub

Truman confessed to enjoying the heated

exchange but apparently got little from it, since he asked
those present to submit memoranda stating their views.

13*3

The memoranda to the President, while varying
widely in detail, generally favored either maintaining an
American monopoly on all facets of atomic energy or taking
an approach similar to Stimson’s.

The Joint Chiefs and

Robert Patterson, the new Secretary of War, along with
Acheson, who represented the State Department, advocated
following Stimson’s recommendations.

The only major

Presidential adviser on military policy to oppose this
proposition was Secretary of the Navy Forrestal.

The

Secretary of Treasury and Attorney General agreed with

- ^ A c h e s o n ,
Present at the Creation, 123. Acheson,
as Acting Secretary of State, represented Byrnes at this
meeting.

•^^Truman, Memoirs, I, £26-27.
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Forrestal, while the Postmaster General and Commerce
Secretary generally followed Stimson’s r e a s o n i n g . H o w 
ever, given the divisions and qualifications made, no clear
consensus emerged among the President’s advisers.

Truman

was only recognizing a simple truth when he told a
reporter a few days later that whatever decision was made
on the subject, he, alone, would make the decision.

137

In a special message to the Congress on October 3,
19 k£y th© President revealed his initial decision on
control.

He told the Congress that the fate of civiliza

tion might well be determined by the success or failure
of an international ban on the use and development of
atomic weapons.

Echoing Stimson's memorandum, Truman

said that, although there were great difficulties involved
in such a ban, the alternative was a disastrous arms race.
The President assured the Congress that the secrets of
the manufacturing process to produce bombs would not be
divulged.

His proposal was to initiate discussions,

136lbid., 526-28. See also, Rogow, Victim of Duty,
15>[|.-55; Acheson, Present at the Creation, l2i{.; hewle’ttr and
Anderson, The New WorldT Tl?0-£T; C. Joseph Bernardo and
Eugene H. Bacon, American Military Policy; Its Development
Since 1775 (2nd ed.; Harrisburg, PennsylvanTaT "The Stack-’
pole Company, 1961), lj.62• Hereinafter cited as Bernardo
and Bacon, American Military Policy. See also, Arthur
Krock, Memoirs: Sixty Years on the Firing Line (New York:
Funk and Wagnalls, 1968), 2l$F=L$.' Hereinafter cited as
Krock, Memoirs.
3-37Truman, Memoirs, I, 529*
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first with Canada and Great Britain, ” . . .

our associ

ates in this discovery . . . and then with other nations,
in an effort to effect agreement on the conditions under
which cooperation might replace rivalry in the field of
atomic power.
The initial step in atomic control discussions was
taken in November when Prime Minister Atlee and W. L.
Mackenzie King, the Canadian Prime Minister, met with
Truman in Washington.

Their talks concluded on November

15 with a joint statement from the White House.

The

sense of the statement was that the three nations
possessing the knowledge necessary to generate atomic
energy had decided that the most effective means of con
trolling atomic power so that it might not be used
destructively was through the United Nations Organization.
They recommended that a Commission be established on
Atomic Energy that would submit recommendations to the
United Nations on means to ban military use and facilitate
the exchange of scientific information on peaceful uses of
4
4
atomic
power. 1 3 9
-

On the following day, Truman asked his cabinet for

■^^Item No. 156, Special Message to the Congress on
Atomic Energy, October 3> 19k£> Public Papers . . . Truman,
19 k 5 i 362- 66 . See also, Acheson, Present at the Creation,
T25-25; Truman, Memoirs, I, 530-33J Bernardo and Bacon,
American Military Policy, I|.63 •
■^^Text of statement is in Truman, Memoirs, I, 542"^*
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their comments on the agreement.

Secretary Wallace

expressed some reservations about the effectiveness of a
commission.
"...

However, "All agreed," as Truman recalls,

that to refer the problem of atomic energy to the

United Nations would give that organization a chance to
prove i t s e l f . W h a t many of those present at this
meeting, including Truman, had apparently forgotten, was
that they had agreed to exactly the opposite approach less
than two months earlier.

Stimson had emphasized in his

memorandum "beyond all other considerations" that the
United States must approach Russia on the controls ques
tion singly and directly, not through the United Nations,
since such action would not be taken seriously by the
Soviet Government.

On January 2lj., 191+6, the United

Nations Atomic Energy Commission was created.
The President charged the State Department with
responsibility for drafting a plan for international
control of atomic energy.

Secretary Byrnes delegated the

task to a committee chaired by Under Secretary of State
Dean Acheson, which, assisted by a Board of Consultants
led by David Lilienthal, submitted a proposal to Byrnes
and Truman on March 16, 19ij.6.

This working-paper, since

^ I b i d . , I, 51|4*
■^^Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 6i|5;
Acheson, Present at the Creation, 12f?.
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known as the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, had, as the heart
of its recommendations, a proposal that an international
authority be created with a monopoly over all destructive
uses of atomic energy.1^2

On Byrnes' recommendation,

Truman appointed Bernard M. Baruch as American representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.

lk3

Following some controversy with Acheson and Truman, Baruch
received the latter's permission to revise the original
recommendations.

The President approved these changes and

gave the revision to Baruch as his official policy
directive on June
The American proposal for international control was
lkf>
submitted to the Commission by Baruch on June lij., 19lj.6.

^■ Acheson, Present at the Creation, l£2-£ij.. See
also, Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War,
19kf>~1966 (New York: John Wiley and Sons, l‘967)> 3^* Here
inafter cited as LaFeber, America, Russia and the Cold W a r .
^•^Baruch, then seventy-six years old, was a multi
millionaire and self-styled "adviser to Presidents." The
Senate confirmed his nomination on April £, 19lj.6.
■^^-Bernard m. Baruch, The Public Years (Vol. II of
My Own Story, 2 vols., New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
T W J V 366- 03 . Hereinafter cited as Baruch, Public Years.
For Acheson's version of his dispute with Baruch, see
Present at the Creation, 1
For Truman's account,
see his Memoirs, II, 7-10. See also, Byrnes, Speaking
Frankly, 270; Hewlett and Anderson, The New World,
55k-£o; LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 3k“35«
l ^ T e x t of this document can be found in U.S.,
Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, A Decade
of Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 19kl-19k9> Slslf dong.,
2nd Sess., 19^0,1079-87• Hereinafter cited as A Decade of
Foreign Policy. Abridged text of this document can be
found in Baruch, Public Years, 369-72.
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The chief points of the plan are fully summarized in the
following newspaper account:
As soon as a satisfactory international agency can be
set up; as soon as other powers have joined with us
to guarantee that agency and give it the scope and
authority it needs; as soon as we are assured that no
other nation will or can use atomic bombs against us,
the United States will cease the manufacture of atomic
weapons, will destroy the bombs now in its possession,
will give to the new agency, by stages as required, all
pertinent information, and finally will turn over to
this agency control of its own uranium and thorium
deposits, its own primary production plants and the
output of these plants.^-46
The plan, while sincere in its intent, contained
three provisions that proved unacceptable to the Soviet
Union:

Surrender of the veto power on all matters

respecting control of atomic energy; a thorough system of
inspection and control; and, by implication, a partial
subjugation of national sovereignty to an international
body.

12/7

The Soviet counter-proposal was submitted five

days later.

It agreed on banning the production and use

of atomic weapons, but called upon the United States first
to cease bomb production and destroy existing weapons
lk8
before any discussion of inspection and controls.
Truman found the Soviet proposals equally unacceptable.

•*~^ e w York Times, June 15, 1946.
■'■^Bernardo and Bacon, American Military Policy,
i+65.
^®LaPeber, America, Russia, and the Cold W a r , 35*
Editor’s Note, Koenig (ed.), Truman"Administration, 336.
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He told Baruch, "It is my opinion that we should stand pat
,.1*1-9
on our program."
During the years which followed, both the United
States and the Soviet Union "stood pat" on their basic
proposals, making only minor concessions to the other’s
views.

The welter of proposals, counter-proposals, and

rephrasings of essentially the same posture continued for
y e a r s . T r u m a n ’s belief that there must be effective
international inspection and control as a first step
remained unchanged.

He emphasized this in a campaign

speech in October of 19*1-8, at Milwaukee.

After restating

his position on controls, Truman went on to tell his
audience that the United States was willing to sacrifice
some of its national sovereignty and destroy its bombs
as originally proposed in the Baruch Plan.

"There has

been no change in the American position," Truman said.
"But the Soviet Union rejected such a plan as an intrusion
upon its national sovereignty."

151

And there the matter

l^Trtaman to Baruch, July 10, 19*1-6, quoted in
Baruch, Public Years, 37*1-•*£°An illustration of this can be seen in two sep
arate newspaper headlines in March, 191+75 "U.S. Stand on
Atom in U.N. Unchanged," New York Times, March 7# 19*1-7;
"U.S. Proposes Plan to Break Atom Deadlock," New York
Herald-Tribune, March 28, 19*+7- The commission (AEC)
adjourned sine die in May, 19*1-8# resumed hearings in
February of 19*1-$ and gave up again in July. Bernardo and
Bacon, American Military Policy, ij.66.
•*£-*Item No. 239, Address in Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
October 11+, 19*1-8, Public Papers . . . Truman, 19*4-8, 789.
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of international control has since stood, made more
complex and urgent by Soviet acquisition of atomic weapons
in 191^-9.1^2
One by-product of the early stages of weapons
control discussion was that it precipitated a conflict
within the Administration, centering around the policy
views of the Secretary of Commerce, Henry Wallace,

On

July 23» 19lj.6, Wallace had written a twelve-page single
spaced letter to Truman in which he condemned the military
build-up, atomic policy and the Administration’s attitude
toward international control.

Truman thanked Wallace for

the letter and promptly forgot it.

On September 12

Wallace spoke in New York, delivering "an all-out attack"
on American foreign policy, according to Truman, who
publicly disavowed the Secretary's statements.

Five days

later, convinced, evidently, that he would rather be
right than Secretary of Commerce, Wallace gave a copy of
153
his letter of July 23 to the newspapers.
The Wallace letter generated a great deal of
comment in the American and Internationa] press.

The

■^2At this writing, almost a quarter-century later,
no significant progress has been made, although strategic
arms limitation talks (SALT) are presently in progress.
^Wallace to Truman, July 23, 19i|6, and reply,
August 8, 19l|.6, Clifford Papers, Subject Pile, Unifica
tion (Pt. 3)> Truman Library.
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State Department received numerous queries from ambassadors
asking if the ex-Vice President’s statements represented a
change of policy.

Secretary of State Byrnes wired from a

Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris that
Wallace's comments were making his position difficult.
Truman's first reaction was to order the Secretaries of
War and Navy to write him a letter, which was immediately
released by the White House, repudiating Wallace's con
tentions about military policy.

In the letter, the

Secretaries denied that anyone in their departments was
advocating a preventive war against the Soviet Union
before they acquired the atomic bomb, as Wallace had
c h a r g e d . B a r u c h also joined the group besieging
Wallace with a lengthy memorandum to the President con
taining a detailed refutation of Wallace's statements
respecting the American position on atomic energy
156
controls.
Truman was left with no choice, a s he wrote
to his mother on September 20:

"Well I had to fire Henry

l5i|rruman, Memoirs, I, 559.
•^•^Patterson and Forrestal to Truman, September
18, 19i+6, RG107* OSA, RPP/White House, National Archives.
l ^ B a r u c h to Truman, September 2lj., 19i|6,
Papers, Atomic Energy folder, Truman Library.

Clifford
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today, and of course I hated to do it."

1^7

In Truman's message to the Congress of October 3,
19k-5, cited earlier, by which he called for international

control of atomic energy, the President also told the
Congress that there was need for legislation providing
for domestic control.

He asked the Congress to establish

an Atomic Energy Commission, its members appointed by the
President, with authority to regulate all activities
1
related to atomic energy.
The President's message did not detail the structure
and operational policy of the Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC) but merely suggested its functions in broad tenns.
However, shortly after the message was sent up, the leader
ship of both House and Senate acquired twenty-one page
drafts detailing the proposed legislation.

Unable to

determine the origin of these draft recommendations, the
159
New York Times ascribed them to "other sources."
The

l^Truman to Martha Truman, September 20, 19lf6,
quoted in Truman, Memoirs, I, 560. The original draft of
Truman's public statement of September 20, 19i|.6, firing
Wallace is in Clifford Papers, Subject Eile, "Wallace,
Henry," Truman Library. Wallace's account of these events
is quoted in Williams (ed.) Shaping of American Diplomacy,
997-99. See also, Phillips, Truman Tresidency, li4.o-51l.
1^8Item No. 156, Special Message to the Congress on
Atomic Energy, October 3, 19k$, Public Papers . . . Truman.
19)4-5, 361|.. See also, Truman, Memoirs*, I, 531.
l£9Quoted in Editor's Note, Koenig (ed.), Truman
Administration, 126.
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source was undoubtedly the Secretary of War.

A letter in

Patterson's files, addressed to the Speaker of the House,
dated the same day as Truman's message, reads in part:
There is inclosed herewith a draft of a bill "For
the development and control of atomic energy.” This
bill is offered pursuant to the President's message
to Congress today and is consistent with this
message and with the policies announced by the Presi
dent therein. The bill was prepared by the Interim
Committee appointed by the Secretary of War with the
approval of the President. . . .160
The following day, October ij., the May-Johns on bill
was introduced.

It received strong backing from the

Pentagon, with Secretary Patterson continually referring
to the proposed legislation as "representing the views of
the Administration as well as of the War Department.
While Truman knew that Patterson was submitting draft

i An

Patterson to the Speaker of the House of Repre
sentatives (Sam Rayburn), October 3, 19l|5> RG-107* OSW,
Ij.71.6— Atomic Bomb, National Archives. A copy of the
draft is not in the files, but it is outlined in the body
of the letter. An earlier letter to Truman's counsel,
Judge Rosenman, from the War Department reads:
"An interim
committee has completed the recommendations for (atomic
bomb) legislation which are now in Mr. Byrnes' hands
together with War Department comments." Col. H. M. Pasco
to Rosenman, September 1, 19i|.£, Rosenman Papers, Subject
File, 19ij.£» Truman Library. A memorandum to the President
from the Secretary of War notes that the Under Secretary of
War "worked with the House Military Affairs Committee" on
the May-Johnson Bill.
Patterson to Truman, December 27*
191*5, RG107, OSW, 1*.71.6— Atomic Bomb, National Archives.
•^■^Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, ij-38. Asked
about the May-Johnson Bill at a press conference on
October 18, 19ll5> Truman said it seemed "satisfactory," but
added, "I don't know, because I haven't studied it care
fully." Item No. 172, Public Papers . . . Truman, 191*5»

1*03.
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legislation, it is doubtful that he was aware of the
specific nature of these proposals until they emerged as
the May-Johnson bill.

He later described the bill as

having a military approach:

"Its aim was to set up a kind

of permanent ’Manhattan District 1 under military
control. "162

TJlQ president explained that his message to

Congress emphasized the peaceful use of the power of the
atom and that he was opposed to military control.

163

With the War Department earnestly urging adoption of a
bill to which Truman became increasingly opposed, a
struggle evolved between the Commander in Chief and the
nation’s military leadership over control of the most
powerful instrument of destruction ever known.
During October and November, Truman had become
aware of the deficiencies in the proposed AEC legislation
through memoranda received from several individuals in the
Administration and criticism from outside the government,
notably from nuclear scientists.'*'^'

He was also aware of

the military endorsement of May-Johnson, as he commented
in his Memoirs:

"The military services felt very strongly

l62Truman, Memoirs, II, 2.
l 63Ibid.
■*"^Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, i|_36-39.
See also, Diary Entries, October 5>, 30", "£9k£, Smith Papers,
Diary, copy in Truman Library of original in the Franklin
D. Roosevelt Library.
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that the control of atomic development should be under
their auspices, if not under their immediate jurisdiction,
and they were making strong representations to that effect
to the Congress .
The President wrote a memorandum to the Secretaries
of War and Navy late in November to indicate his dissatis
faction with their bill.

Truman told his military chiefs

that he had received numerous objections to the bill and
so had re-examined it in detail.

He found the bill had

several "undesirable features" and felt it would require
166
extensive amendment.
Truman then listed ten specific
amendments to the bill which he considered essential.
Among the ten were several having direct bearing on
Presidential authority over atomic energy policy.

Truman

also told the Secretaries that the specific provision of
the bill allowing members of the Commission or its
administrator to be military officers would have to be
eliminated before the bill would be acceptable to him.
Truman concluded by asking that the Interim Committee be
reconvened for their views on these "necessary amendments"
and that the May-Johnson Bill be recommitted in the House

■^^Truman, Memoirs, II, 3.
•^^Truman to Secretary of War (Patterson) and Secre
tary of the Navy (Porrestal), November 28, 19l+5> RG-107*
OSW, I4.71 .6— Atomic Bomb, National Archives.
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for the purpose of making these amendments.

'

The War Department did not reply to Truman’s memo
randum until late in December.

In the meantime, the

military continued to press for Congressional approval of
the May-Johnson Bill.

The President decided to air the

controversy in a White House meeting he called for
December if..

Among those present at this meeting were

Porrestal, Patterson and Groves, all of whom were publicly
on record as demanding military control of atomic energy,
1 /O
and Senator Brien McMahon of Connecticut.
Following
his usual practice on controversial questions, Truman
asked each man present to state his views.
gave his opinion, which was that " . . .

Then Truman

the entire program

and operation should be tinder civilian control.

..."

169

Senator McMahon, taking his cue from Truman’s
remarks, introduced legislation in the Senate December 20,

■*-67lbid. Truman dates this memorandum "November 30"
in his autobiography. But the copy in the Secretary of
W a r ’s files bears the date of November 28. Memoirs, II, 3»
■^^Steinberg, Man from Missouri, 270; Rogow, Victim
of Duty, li|.8 j Truman, jyfemoirs', II, 2-3* McMahon was chairman or the Senate Special Committee on Atomic Energy. He
had agreed to seek the amendments Truman desired in the
May-Johnson Bill. Apparently recognizing that the military
lobby was at cross-purposes to the President, he had sug
gested this meeting. In addition to Forrestal, Patterson,
and Groves, Admiral Leahy, Truman’s chief military adviser
also objected to the lack of military authority proposed in
the McMahon Bill. Diary Entry, February 13, 19lf6, in
Millis (ed.), Forrestal Diaries, 133»
169Truman, Memoirs, II, 3»
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incorporating the President’s concepts of total civilian
control.

A week later, the Secretary of War sent a long

memorandum to Truman that replied to his ten-point
critique, while ignoring the McMahon Bill.

In this memo,

Patterson rejected six of the ten Presidential proposals.
His strongest objections were, of course, to Truman’s
insistance that no member of the military could serve on
the Atomic Energy Commission.

"It is felt," Patterson

argued, "that in time of war or national emergency the
interest of the Armed Forces in the control and use of
170
atomic energy might be paramount. . . . "
The Secretary
further argued that preventing military men from holding
positions pivotal to determining the development, storage
and use of atomic weapons was " . . .

contrary to the

philosophy of unified military direction."*^

Patterson

closed by telling Truman that it would be difficult to get
May-Johnson recommitted and that it might be better to try
to amend the bill on the floor of the House or in the
a
4. ^
Senate.

^■^Patterson to Truman, December 27, 19i+5>, RG107,
OSW, Ij.71.6— Atomic Bomb, National Archives. A note of
transmittal attached to the memorandum indicates that it
was written by Under Secretary of War Kenneth Royall, with
the advice of Secretary Patterson, General Groves and some
members of the Interim Committee. See Royall to Patterson,
December 28, 19^5, ibid.

171ibia.

^Ibid.
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Truman terminated further Pentagon opposition to
civilian control of atomic weaponry on January 23, his
language leaving no doubt that he considered the matter
settled:
After careful consideration, it is my judgment
that the recommendations contained in my memorandum
of November 30th should be adhered to without modi
fication.
. . . I deem adherence to all the recommendations
in that memorandum to be essential.
The Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee of
the House and the leaders in the House should be
advised that the Administration desires recommitment
of the May-Johnson bill for purposes of amendment or,
failing this, that no steps be taken to alter the
present status of the bill in the House.
It is my wish, furthermore, that in appearing
before Congressional committees or in discussions
with Members of Congress relative to atomic energy
legislation officials of the Administration present
views not inconsistent with the points given in my
memorandum of November 30th and reaffirmed herein.
While the memorandum did end military advocacy of
the May-Johnson Bill, the concept of military control of
the atom had strong congressional support, as Senator
McMahon reported to the President.

To help encourage

support for McMahon's bill, Truman wrote the Senator a

^•^Truman to Secretaries of War and Navy, January
23, 191^.6, quoted in Truman, Memoirs, 3-i;» See also,
Hewlett and Anderson, The New WorTd, 489 . (As noted
earlier, Truman dates tEe prior memorandum "November 30,"
whereas the Secretary of W a r ’s copy was dated November 28.)
The importance of the last paragraph of this January 23
memorandum can be seen in that on the date it was written,
Navy Secretary Forrestal testified to the Senate Special
Committee on Atomic Energy in opposition to the Truman
proposal for a five-member AEC serving "at the pleasure of
the President." Rogow, Victim of Duty, lf?0.
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long letter of endorsement which was released to the
press, February 1, 1 9 ^ . 6 , With open White House support
the McMahon Bill began attracting more backers, but lost
one final skirmish to the supporters of military control.
In March 19^6 Senator Arthur Vandenberg introduced
an amendment to the McMahon Bill, calling for the estab
lishment of a Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic
Energy Commission, the committee to be made up of repre
sentatives of the War and Navy departments.

The committee

proposed by Vandenberg would be empowered to advise and
consult with the AEC on all military applications of atomic
energy.

The Military Liaison Committee would also be

able to appeal any action or proposal of the AEC directly
to the Secretaries of War and Navy, and if either agreed,
the matter would be referred to the President for a final
decision.

Vandenberg, who endorsed a civilian AEC, said

that the resolution was his alone, that he had not con172
suited with the military at all.
In his Memoirs, Truman attacked the Vandenberg
Amendment as being destructive of the civil supremacy
principle; he described it as representing a military veto

^T^Truman, Memoirs, II, Ij.-5«
Anderson, The New World, h90-91.

See also, Hewlett and

■^^Diary Entry, March llj., 19ij.6, in Vandenberg,
Private Papers, 256-57. Rogow asserts that Forrestal was
behind Vandenberg's amendment. See Victim of Duty, 152.
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of Atomic Energy Commission actions. '

Asked about the

proposal at a press conference following its introduction,
Truman invoked his role as Commander in Chief to argue
against the amendment:
I don't think there is a clear
understanding .. .
on what is meant by civilian control of that
board. . . . The idea is that the
military, of course,
has an important part to play and
should be con
sulted, but it is a mistake to believe that only the
military can guard the national security. . . . Now
the President is the Commander in Chief of the Armed
Forces of the United States, and the civilian board
under him would in no way hamper the military in
their proper function.1??
The McMahon Bill, after considerable give-and-take
in the Congress, became law as the Atomic Energy Act on
August 1, 191+6.

The result was a compromise; civilian

control predominated through the five-member Atomic
Energy Commission.

But the Vandenberg Amendment remained

in the final version without substantive changes, meaning
that the Military Liaison Committee remained in a strong
advisory position.

The act also established a Division

of Military Application within the commission, stipulating

^"^Truman, Memoirs, II, 7*
1??Item No. 61, President's Press Conference,
March ll+, 191+6. Public Papers . . . Truman, 191+6, 157;
Truman, Memoirs, II, 6-7.
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that its director must be a military officer
Despite Truman’s hyperbole and the concessions
finally made to military influence on the Atomic Energy
Commission, Truman had prevailed.

For what was perma-

mently established in the course of this struggle was the
principle that the authority over the most destructive
weapon of war still rested with civilians, acting under a
mandate from another civilian, the Commander in Chief.^79
The Atomic Energy Act not only excluded the Armed Services
from exercising direct control over nuclear weaponry, it
also strengthened the President's military powers at the
expense of the Congress.

As Dorothy James wrote in her

(S.1717) Public Law £85, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess.
See also, Brief of S.1717* Clifford Papers, Subject File,
Atomic Energy folder, Truman Library. For text of the
original draft of the McMahon Bill, see Hewlett and Ander
son, The New World, Appendix 1, 7l4“2 2 . See also, Rogow,
Victim of Duty, i£2-53; Truman, Memoirs, II, 15* 29lf-95»
^79wh,iie Truman had clearly established the
principle of civilian control of nuclear weaponry, he did
not provide a clear-cut policy as to whether the bomb would
ever be used and under what conditions such use would be
authorized. This will present an obvious difficulty to
military policy planners. One writer has said:
"The
services, it must be remembered, did not even have physical
possession of the weapon that bulked so large in their
disputes. It was in the hands of a civilian agency subject
to the authority of the President, but not the military,
and the only clear national policy was that, under proper
conditions, it would be given up." Warner R. Schilling,
"The Politics of National Defense: Fiscal 1950," in
Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond and Glenn H. Synder, Strategy,
Politics, and Defense Budgets (New York and London:
Columbia University Press, 1962), 173* Hereinafter cited
as Schilling, "Politics of National Defense."
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study of the modern presidency concerning the Atomic
Energy Actj "(it) . . . gives a dimension to the Presi
dent's function as Commander-in-Chief that it never had in
peacetime, providing a further means for erosion of
Congressional power in matters of defense.
The War Department did not give up its efforts to
secure direct authority over the bomb, the intermittent
struggles continued through the remainder of Truman's
administration.

He had, in fact, anticipated this.

The

President told the members of the Commission just prior
to their taking control that, "The Army will never give
up without a fight, and they will fight you on this from
here on out, and be working at it in all sorts of places.
But you can count on it, I am your advocate.
The Atomic Energy Act provided that the new
Commission would take complete control of all facets of
atomic energy on January 1, 19l|7-

Until that time,

responsibility for maintaining atomic secrecy for research
and development and for the first postwar testing of
nuclear weaponj rested with the War Department

James, Contemporary Presidency, 89Journal Entry, December 11, 19^6, Lilienthal,
Atomic Energy Years, 118.
^•®2(3iarifica-ti0n of those functions relative to
security and exercise of other atomic project powers was
discussed in messages from Secretary of War-Patterson to
the President: Patterson to Truman, February 27, 19i)-6,
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In a news conference just after the Japanese
surrender, a reporter asked the President what was to be
done with the Manhattan Project facilities since the war
was over.

Truman replied that, Congress willing, the

project would continue with experiments in the peaceful
use of the atom.'L®^

At another meeting with the press two

months later, a reporter asked the President if the United
States was still manufacturing atomic bombs.
replied affirmatively.

Truman

When asked why, he said they were

for "experimental purposes.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

had requested, and Truman had granted, authority to test
atomic bombs.

The Joint Chiefs told the President that

they needed the tests to determine the effect of a bomb
against naval vessels and to determine ". . . the conse
quence of this powerful aerial weapon with respect to the
size, composition and employment of the armed

RGij.07» The Adjutant General-(WDCSa ), lj-71.6— Atomic, National
Archives; Patterson to the President, September 23, 19^6,
Clifford Papers, Subject Pile, Atomic Energy folder, Truman
Library.
■^^Item No. 106, Press Conference, August 16, 19
Public Papers . . . Truman, 1 9 22ij..
■^^Item No. 193 » Press Conference, November 20,
19b$> ibid., Ij.95* Truman's statement apparently generated
a good deal of speculation in the press, for on December 7>
Patterson asked the President for permission to issue a
joint public statement with Forrestal to the effect that
tests were to be conducted. Patterson to Truman, December
7, 19k$> RG107, OSW, I4.71•6— Atomic Bomb (031.1), National
Arohives•
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In authorizing the first of these tests,

Truman launched a program of research, development, testing
and stockpiling of increasingly-powerful weapons which has
since continued.
The first of the Pacific bomb tests was performed
upon a fleet of seventy-three surplus ships off Bikini
Atoll on July 1, 19^6.

The bomb, dropped from a B-29,

sank only five ships and damaged fifty-four others.

A

second test, detonated underwater, proved more successful,
sinking twelve ships.

However, the bomb created a severe

problem with radioactivity:

"Five days after the bomb

exploded," according to one official report, "vessels near
the center of the target area were so hot with continuing

l8^The JCS request to the President is cited in a
memorandum informing Truman of progress made subsequent to
his approval of the tests. Kenneth G. Royall (Acting
Secretary of War) and Forrestal to the President, January
7, 19ij-6, RG107 1 OSW, ij.71.6, National Archives. See also,
Royall to Forrestal, January 7> 19i|6, ibid.
3-86Truman’s decision to begin the project was
probably influenced by intelligence estimates which held
that the Soviet Union had begun a crash program to produce
their own atomic weapons. He may also have been swayed by
the Soviet refusal to accept the American proposals for
banning atomic weapons. Acheson, Present jat the Creation,
125, 15£» Representative of the military viewpoint being
conveyed to Truman at the time is a statement by General
Thomas F. Farrell, Deputy Director of the Manhattan
Project, who said:
"There is no conceivable defense at
present against the atomic bomb, except to have more than
your enemy or to stop him from using them against you by
hitting him first." New York Times, September 21, 19i+5*
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radioactivity that even damage control parties were not
permitted to board them.

in May 19^4-8 the White House

announced that a second series of nuclear tests had been
performed on Eniwetok Atoll in mid-April.

Three different

devices of an improved design had been tested with
results, according to one press source, " . . .

that

transcended all other developments in nuclear energy since
the dawn of the atomic age."'*-®®
Another development of the atomic age followed in
the next year.

In February 191+9 Truman met with Lilienthal

on Atomic Energy Commission matters.

Lilienthal pro

jected for the President U.S. nuclear weapons capacity as
of January 1, 1951*

Whatever the figure was, Truman's

eyes widened and he said, "Boy, we could blow a hole
clean through the earth!"

189

The discussion continued in

a more serious vein about the terrible power of the bomb,
and the President assured Lilienthal that he would never

■^^William W. Carpenter (Chief, Office of Legisla
tive Services) to W. Stuart Symington (Asst. Secretary of
War for Air), August 2, 19i|.6, RG3ij.O, Secretary of the Air
Force, Office of Administrative Assistant, General Files,
Special Interest File i|A, National Archives.
^ ^New York Times, May 18, 19^8. See also, Truman
to Forrestal’,” May 17, l9l(.8, RGl|07, AG201.22, National
Archives; New York Herald-Tribune, May 18, 191+8; Journal
Entry, May 17, 19lf.8, Lilienthal, Atomic Energy Years,
3ij.0-4l.
■'■^Journal Entry, February llj., 19i+9, Lilienthal,
Atomic Energy Years, lf.73•
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order use of the bomb again if he could avoid it; "But I
know the Russians would use it on us if they had it."^90
Less than seven months later, on September 3, 19^9, an
Air Force B-29 collected a radioactive air sample over the
North Pacific.

Truman’s intelligence advisers, who had

been estimating a Soviet nuclear test no earlier than
19^2, now had to inform the President that an atomic
device had been exploded on the Asiatic mainland in the
last week of August.
The most significant result of the Russian atomic
test news was to accelerate hydrogen bomb research in the
United States, and to give a sense of urgency to the
decision on whether or not to proceed with a crash program
to speed development of the thermonuclear "super-bomb."
The question of beginning an intensive effort to produce a
hydrogen bomb was submitted to the General Advisory
Committee, the major scientific advisory body of the Atomic
Energy Commission.

The committee reported back to the AEC

on October 30, indicating unanimous opposition from a
scientific standpoint, but acknowledging that the question

19°Ibid., k73-7k^•^Truman, Memoirs, II, 306-307- See also, Lamont,
Day of Trinity, 287T! Truman used the occasion of publicly
announcing the Soviet bomb test to call again for a ". . .
trully effective enforceable international control of
atomic energy." Item No. 216, Statement by the President,
September 23, 19i|.9, Public Papers . . . Truman, 19ii9« Jj-85.
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involved decisions on foreign and defense policy not with
in their purview.

The Atomic Energy Commission reported

to the President on November 9 in substantially the same
vein; the question of a crash program could not be
decided ". . . without reference to political and military
as well as technical considerations."3-92
To resolve the question, on November 10, Truman
turned it over to a Special Committee composed of the
Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the
Atomic Energy C o m m i s s i o n . o n January 31 s 1950, the
Special Committee submitted the following recommendations
to President Truman:
(a)
That the President direct the Atomic Energy
Commission to proceed to determine the technical
feasibility of a thermonuclear weapon, the scale and
rate of effort to be determined jointly by the Atomic
Energy Commission and the Department of Defense; and
that the necessary ordnance developments and carrier

^ W a r n e r R. Schilling, "The H-Bomb Decision: How
to Decide Without Actually Choosing," Political Science
Quarterly, LXXVI, No. 1 (March, 196l)>"*29. Hereinafter
cited as Schilling, "H-Bomb Decision." This article is an
excellent, detailed analysis of the decision-making
process. For other effects of the Soviet atomic test on
American politico-military thinking, see Millis, Arms and
Men, 291; Robert Endicott Osgood, Limited W a r : The
Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1957 )» l'57-55• Hereinafter cited as Osgood,
Limited War. See also, Paul Y. Hammond, "NSC-68: Prologue
to Rearmament," in Warner Schilling, Hammond, and Glenn
H. Synder, Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets (New
York and London: Columbia University Press, 19o2), 285-86.
Hereinafter cited as Hammond, "NSC-68."
193Dean Acheson, Louis Johnson and David Lilienthal,
respectively.
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program be undertaken concurrently;
(b) That the President defer decision pending the
reexamination referred to in (c) as to whether
thermonuclear weapons should be produced beyond the
number required for a test of feasibility;
(c) That the President direct the Secretary of
State and the Secretary of Defense to undertake a
reexamination of our objectives in peace and war and
of the effect of these objectives on our strategic
plans, in the light of the probable fission bomb
capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability
of the Soviet Union.
(d) That the President indicate publicly the inten
tion of this Government to continue work to determine
the feasibility of a thermonuclear weapon, and that
no further official information on it be made public
without the approval of the President .19i|.
When Truman was handed these proposals of the
Special Committee, Lilienthal began a statement in which he
hoped to indicate to the President that he had serious
reservations about the recommendations made.

However,

^Lilienthal, Atomic Energy Years, 62l±. Lilienthal,
who was against the crash program, offersd a compelling
argument for his position, but ended up signing the recom
mendation to Truman for want of an alternative. Ibid.,
627-32. In March, 1969, Lilienthal said he had tcTTTght the
H-Bomb proposals in secret meetings because of security
regulations. He felt the decision should have been openly
and publicly debated, as the Nixon Administration’s
proposal for an anti-ballistic missle system was then being
publicly aired, ”. . . because it involved the fate of
practically every human being." Monroe Morning World,
March 17, 1969. Recommendation (clj was necessitated by
Senator Edwin C. Johnson (Democrat, Colo.), who revealed
on a television program that the United States was
developing a "super bomb" with one thousand times the
destructive power of the Nagasaki bomb. This disclosure
caused a great deal of public speculation.
Schwarz,
American Strategy, 76 ; Acheson, Present at the Creation,
• The Secretary of Defense objected to recommenda
tion (b), and with the backing of the Joint Chiefs, was
able to get Truman to direct the AEC to plan full hydrogen
bomb production. Truman, Memoirs, II, 311.
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Truman cut the AEG chairman off, saying that with all
the talk in Congress and the press about a "super-bomb, he
had no alternative but to approve the crash program.
There was, the President said, no time left for quiet
re-examination of the proposals.

At home that evening,

Lilienthal confided in his journal that it was his
impression that Truman was " . . .

clearly set on what he

was going to do before we set foot inside the door."^95
The whole meeting lasted about seven minutes.

Later in the

day, the White House released a Presidential statement to
the press:
It is part of my responsibility as Commander in Chief
of the Armed Forces to see to it that our country is
able to defend itself against any possible aggressor.
Accordingly, I have directed the Atomic Energy
Commission to continue its work on all forms of
atomic weapons, including the so-called hydrogen or

superbomb.•‘•96

The first hydrogen bomb was successfully tested on
November 1, 1952, just days before the election to determine
Truman’s successor.
As the first Commander in Chief to bear responsi
bility for nuclear weapons policy, Truman established

195Lilienthal, Atomic Energy Years, 632-33* See
also Acheson, Present at the Crearion, 3h8-U9; Schilling,
"H-Bomb Deci s ion," 36fT7

1962t;em
26 , Statement by the President on the
Hydrogen Bomb, January 31» 1950, Public Papers . . . Truman,
1950, 138. See also, Truman, Memoi'rsT~Jl> 309-10»
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precedents and policies whose eventual consequences cannot
yet be estimated.

As chief of the military, he directed

them to employ atomic bombs against strategic, nonmilitary targets; in form, if not quite in fact, he took
away from the military the control of the production and
use of these weapons; he made sincere, if uncompromising
attempts at achieving an international ban on nuclear
weaponry; and, failing in this, spent the remainder of
his administration stockpiling ever more strategic bombs
and super-bombs and developing an arsenal of new tactical
weapons employing nuclear warheads.
John Hersey once asked the President what books a
man should read to prepare himself for life in the Atomic
Age.
menI"

Truman replied,
197

"Nothing but the lives of great

The end result of Truman's nuclear policies may

well determine whether future generations spend their
hours reading of his greatness or learning to fashion
crude implements out of stone.

197Hersey, "Profiles," Pt. 1, I*.9.
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CHAPTER V

THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF AS REFORMER
You know, what we are trying to do— what I am
trying to do is set up an organization on the
experience that we have had in the greatest war in
history, so that organization will be ready to
operate in case of an emergency--which we hope will
never come. . .

In his struggle to create the Atomic Energy
Commission under complete civilian control, President
Truman had to contend with opposition from the War Depart
ment and a large bloc in the Congress.

His limited success

in establishing AEC was but one of several of Truman's
proposed reforms within the military and in the civilmilitary relationship.

Briefly stated, the reforms

attempted during Truman's tenure were:

(1) The establish

ment of a universal military training system, which
failed, leading to permanent peacetime conscription;
(2) A massive restructuring of military organizational and
command relationships to bring about unification of the
Armed Forces; (3) An end to racial segregation in the
military services.

As with civilian control of the AEC,

•^Item No. 86, President's Special Conference With
the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 18, 19
Public Papers . . . Truman, 1911-6, 207•

211
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these reform efforts were not clear-cut victories for the
Administration, nor did they bring about the best of all
possible military organizations.

However, it can be

reasonably argued that Truman’s reforms left the services
more efficient, less biased and more powerful than in all
their prior history.
Preceding the Second World War there were two basic
concepts for peacetime military organization:

a large

standing army, commanded by an elite class of professional
soldiers, its ranks stocked by ordinary citizens con
scripted for varying lengths of service; and secondly, a
minimal peacetime force of professional volunteers (in all
ranks) which depended upon the creation of massive armies
of citizen soldiers to meet any military emergency.

Non-

totalitarian governments, such as the United States,
depended upon the latter form of organization.
Toward the end of World War II, military planners,
anticipating the postwar period, envisioned a concept of
the "citizen army" that would require far less mobilization
and training in the event of war.

These planners were, of

course, anticipating a total war similar to the one the
nation was then engaged in fighting.

They neither could,

nor did, anticipate an American policy of containment of
Communist expansionism which necessitated fighting limited
wars by conventional means with small armies.

The

governing assumption in postwar planning was that Congress
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would enact legislation requiring that every young, ablebodied citizen receive military training and be made a
member of a ready reserve following such training.

The

War Department rationale behind this proposal for a massive
peacetime reserve force was that it was " . . .

merely a

proposal for perfecting a traditional national institution
to meet modern requirements which no longer permit

2
extemporization after the outbreak of war."

This concept

is commonly called universal military training.
When a "citizen soldier" entered the White House-in the person of Captain Harry, formerly of the 2nd
Missouri Field Artillery--the advocates of universal
military training had acquired a powerful ally.

Truman's

pride in his own service in World War I and in that of
his fellow Guardsmen rings clearly throughout the volumes
of his Memoirs.

In the first volume of that work Truman

said that ever since the First World War he believed the
only recourse to America's distaste for a large standing

^U.S., War Department, "General Principles of
National Military Policy to Govern Preparation of PostWar Plans: Extracts from Directives by General George C.
Marshall, Chief of Staff," Circular No. 3ij.7 (August 2f?,
19I4J4-)5 O'Connor, "Harry S. Truman: New Dimensions of
Power," 32. For an interesting historical background on
UMT, see Millis, Arms and Men, 271+-76.
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army was a trained soldier-citizenry.^

During his years in

the Senate Truman recalls supporting, in vain, a bill to
make permanent the Civilian Conservation Corps.

He hoped

that the CCC could eventually be converted into a universal
training program.^-

Truman's first Chief of Staff of the

Army was General George C. Marshall, the leading military
advocate of UMT and a man for whom the President had a
very deep respect.

Given these factors, it was natural

for Truman to publicly back such a training program from
the very outset of his Presidency.^
Truman's first public statement on universal
training occurred in a press conference on June 1, 19l|5.
The President told reporters that he had already con
ferred with members of the House and Senate, and that he
did not want to comment further on the subject.
he did add:

However,

"And I have got a few views on universal

military training of my own, which don't agree with the

^Truman, Memoirs, I, 510. Asked in 19^7 if he still
advocated universal military training, Truman replied:
"Yes, indeed. I have always been for it ever since 1905»
and that's a long time. I demonstrated that I was for it
because I immediately went into (National Guard) training
when I was 21 years old." Item No. 36, Press Conference,
February 20,
, Public Papers . . . Truman, 19^4-7» lk-7 •
^•Truman, Memoirs, I, 153*
^Ibid., 510. See also, Russell F. Weigley,
an American Army: Military Thought from Washington
Marshall (New ’York and London: Columbia University
1962), 2i|.7. Hereinafter cited as Weigley, Towards
American Army.

Towards
Iso
Press,
an
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Army, and don’t agree with the Navy, and don’t agree with
the House or Senate. . . ."
On June 1+ the House Postwar Military Policy
Committee began hearings on universal military training
legislation.

The military leadership was convinced that

their best hope for a satisfactory compulsory training
bill was to obtain passage prior to the end of the war.
They were fearful that postwar apathy would set in
quickly so they presented to the committee ". . . a
glittering array of military witnesses in favor of the

7
proposal."

The array which testified included Secretary

of War Stimson, Navy Secretary Forrestal, Admiral Ernest

Item No. 1+1+, Press Conference, June 1, 191+5 >
Public Papers . . . Truman, 191+5* 78. See also, Washing
ton Post, June 2, 191+5* One major difference between
Truman and the services was over the timing of the training
period. The President, in an unused plan developed in
June, 19l+5> hoped to split the year of active service into
several periods over a four year span, to be followed by
three years of inactive reserve service. The Army and
Navy, on the other hand, wanted the trainee for one
unbroken year of active service. Draft, "Plan for Univer
sal Military Training under Postwar Conditions," June 23,
191+5* Rosenman Papers, Subject File, 191+5> Universal
Military Training, Truman Library. See also, "The War and
Navy Department Views on Universal Military Training,"
(undated, 38 Pg« printed pamphlet; cover bears handwritten
notation:
"publd. about 10 May 191+5”)» copy in ibid.
^Washington Post, June 11, 191+5* No signs of public
apathy can be found in the Gallup polls taken on the
question in May and July. They recorded about seventy
percent in favor of UMT. See ibid., May 8, July 18, 191+5*
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O
J. King and General Marshall.

General Eisenhower and

Admirals Nimitz and Halsey, all of whom were unable to
attend the hearings, sent statements endorsing universal
military training.9

The gist of their statements, taken

collectively, was that the concept of a large standing
army was repugnant to American tradition and prevailing
public opinion, in addition to being very expensive.
Universal military training, they argued, was much less
expensive, would provide the nation with a deterrent to
possible aggressors, provide peace through strength and,
besides, would be "good for the boys."

In their report of

the hearings to the House, the Postwar Military Policy
Committee recommended immediate legislative action on
such a program of universal military training.

New York Times, June 16, 1914-5; New York HeraldTribune, June 1 6 , 19ll5; Baltimore Sun, June 16, 1914-5• See
also, 'Stirason and Bundy, On Active Service, 596-99. The
New York Times reported (October 28, 1914-5) that General
Marshall, 'Tr. 7 . has made a virtual crusade for UMT."
^Baltimore Sun, June 16, 191+5• Eisenhower's state
ment was contained in a letter to Clifton Woodrum, chair
man of the committee. Text of the letter appears in the
New York Times, June 16, 1914-5* A summary of the principal
arguments against UMT can be found in a memorandum, George
M. Elsey to James K. Vardaman, August 18, 19l4-5> Rosenman
Papers, Subject Pile, 1914-5, Universal Military Training,
Truman Library.
•^U.S., Congress, House, Universal Military Train
ing, Report No. 857 > 79 Cong., 1 Sess., July 5, 191+5.
Pull text of report is also printed in New York Times,
July 6, 1914-5• See also, Lauris Norstad to Commanding
General, Continental Air Forces, August 8, I9I4-5> RG18,
Army Air Force (AAF), AF353-UMT, 1914-5> National Archives.
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The Policy Committee report sparked increased
comment— both for and against compulsory postwar training—
in the news media during the next several m o n t h s . ^
Truman kept his own views on UMT planning to himself.
mid-August he told a reporter:

In

"I am going to make

recommendations to Congress on a universal military program
which is not peacetime conscription.
elaborate as to details and timing.

1P

He refused to

The President

presented a preliminary draft of his training plan to a
Cabinet meeting on August 31, and found their overall
response to be favorable.

He told the Cabinet that this

was the beginning of a "new military policy" that was
required if the United States was to continue international
13
leadership. J
One point in Truman’s twenty-one point message to
the Congress on September 6 called for legislation
extending conscription into the postwar period.

The

President explained that this was only a stopgap measure
for the immediate war-to-peace transitional period.

Con

versant with his statement to the cabinet a week earlier,

■^See, for example, Joseph Loftus, "Military Train
ing Issue Quiescent But Not Dead," New York Times, July 22,
1955; (by "militaris"), "Conscription or ^Enlistment?,"
The Nation, CLXI, No. 2 (July llj., 195-5), 32-35-.
■^Item No. 106, Press Conference, August 16, 195-5,
Public Papers . . . Truman, 195-5, 227. See also,
Washington Post, August 17, T91p.
•^Truman, Memoirs, I, 510.
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Truman told the Congress that he would soon send them
recommendations for ". . . a comprehensive and continuous
program of national security, including a universal
training program, unification of the armed forces, and the
use and control of atomic energy."^

The President had

already put his chief speechwriters, Judge Rosenman and
Clark Clifford, to work drafting an address on universal
training.

On October 9, Rosenman sent a memorandum to

the President in which he urged him to accept the Army
position on one continuous year of training, rather than
breaking the training into four periods totaling one
year, which Truman favored.

Rosenman also urged the

President to give the plan to Congress as soon as he
approved it:

"The longer we get away from the war • • .

the smaller are the chances of favorable reception in the

■^Item No. 128, Special Message to the Congress
Presenting a 21-Point Program for the Reconversion Period,
September 6 , 19k£t Public Papers . . . Truman, 19k5 3 12728. In a letter to the Secretary of War, Truman restated
the passage cited here and told the Secretary he wanted
the War Department to, " . . . make the necessary studies,
prepare material, assist in drafting, present testimony
to Congress, and in general, follow the progress of the
legislation in Congress." The Secretary was further
instructed to send progress reports to the White House on
the first and fifteenth of each month. Truman to Patterson,
October 1|, 19ij-5> RGi|.07» OSW, AG011 (!}. Oct. ’lj.5), National
Archives. According to Secretary of the Navy Forrestal,
in a Cabinet meeting on August 17 the majority of the
members told the President that there was little possi
bility that Congress would permit an extension of Selective
Service. Millis (ed.), Porrestal Diaries, 89-90.
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Congress.

Truman apparently accepted both suggestions.

The President presented his universal military
training plan to a joint session of Congress on October 23,
19^5.

In it, he outlined what he considered to be the

prime elements of a m o d e m military structure:
I recommend that we create a postwar military
organization which will contain the following basic
elements:
First— A comparatively small regular Army, Navy
and Marine Corps;
Second— A greatly strengthened National Guard and
Organized Reserve for the Army, Navy and Marine
Corps;
Third— A General Reserve composed of all the male
citizens of the United States who have received
training.
The General Reserve would be available for rapid
mobilization in time of emergency, but it would have
no obligation to serve . . . unless and until called
to the service by an Act of the Congress.
In order to provide this General Reserve, I
recommend to the Congress the adoption of a plan for
Universal Military Training.
In explaining the plan to Congress, Truman said
that critics erred in calling this type of training con
scription.

He defined conscription as compulsory member

ship in a branch of the armed forces, whereas those
involved in a UMT program would simply be civilians
receiving training.

The President emphasized this by

•^Rosenman to Truman, October 9, 19ij-5> Rosenman
Papers, Subject File,
Universal Military Training,
Truman Library.
•^Item No. 17kf Address Before a Joint Session of
the Congress on Universal Military Training, October 23,
19k$» Public Papers . . . Truman, 19\\6» I4-O7 • Text of
speech is also in Koenig (ed.), Truman Administration,

222-30 .
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saying that the program would not replace Selective Service,
which would continue in its function of furnishing re
placements for the services.^7

This part of the President’s

argument seems strained, since the training would be
compulsory and under the tutelage of the military.
The specifics of Truman’s proposal called for one
continuous year of training to be commenced at age
eighteen or upon completion of high school, whichever was
later.

All the normal Selective Service exemptions and

deferments, such as for dependents, occupations,
illiteracy and medical disabilities, aside from the most
grievous physical impairments, would be disallowed.

The

year of training would be followed by six years of General
Reserve membership, then transfer to a secondary reserve
status
The President acknowledged that the fundamental
reason for universal training was to provide full military
preparedness for any potential aggression against the
United States.

But he also believed that numerous

"useful by-products" of great benefit to the individual
could also be derived from his UMT proposal.

The training

would, he believed, lower the national illiteracy rate,

•^Item No. 17k* Address Before a Joint Session of
the Congress on Universal Military Training, October 23>
19ijSt Public Papers . . . Truman, 19iif>, ij.07-i|-08.
l 8Ibid., ij.O6-i4.O9 .
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improve the general physical condition and remove minor
medical disabilities.

Truman also assured Congress that

the trainees would receive ample opportunity for selfperfection, instruction in useful civilian skills and
proper care for their moral and spiritual

w e l l - b e i n g . ^

There were several bills regarding UMT in the
Congress at the time of Truman's speech, none of which
quite matched the Administration proposal.

Congress,

which was generally unsympathetic to the idea, took no
. ^ 20
action on Universal Military Training in 19q5«
Truman
reminded the Congress of its inactivity— on what he now
preferred to call "universal Training"— in his State of
. ✓ 21
the Union Message released January 21, 194
.0 .

In a con

ference with Budget Director Harold Smith on the material
to be included in this message to Congress, the President
had explained his preference for the phrase "universal

i^ibid., l|08. In his autobiography, Truman said he
sent the UMT' message up to Congress on the 22nd. See
Memoirs, I, J?10. However, the official edition of his public
papers says he delivered his UMT speech personally to a
Joint Session of Congress in the House chamber at 12:31
PM, October 23. See Public Papers . . . Truman, 191i5, 1|13«
See also, Sidney Shalett, 'New York Times, 'October 28,
Truman's plan did have the backing of the Secretary
of War and the Army Chief of Staff.
See, Patterson to
Truman, October 18, 19i|5» Rosenman Papers, Subject File,
1 9 Universal Military Training, Truman Library.
Of)

Bernardo and Bacon, American Military Policy,
Sidney Shalett, New York Times, October 28, 19L&1
O'!
Item No. 18, Message to the Congress on the State
of the Union and on the Budget for 19^7 > January 21, 19h&,
Public Papers . . . Truman, 19il6, 52.
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training."

He told Smith that he did not want a military

program as such, but one which emphasized physical and
educational improvement.

Truman said he chose the Army

to run the program simply because it alone had sufficient
resources.

He also believed that the program would

democratize the Army and "overthrow the West Point and
Annapolis cliques" of the services by "recruiting compp
missioned officers from the rank and file."
The Com
mander in Chief— who, as a young man, was rejected in his
application to West Point, and who, entering as a "rankand-filer," rose to a captaincy in World War I— may not
have been entirely motivated by pure, democratic consid
erations •
The one UMT proposal receiving Congressional
attention early in 19i|.6 was H.R. i | . 7 7 a bill "To Provide
for Military Training of Youths in Peacetime."

But the

Administration and the military would not support the bill
because it varied sharply in its particulars from their
proposals.

Secretary of War Patterson made this clear to

22Diary Entry, January ij., 19^4-6, Smith Papers, Diary
(April 18, 19l|-5-Ju*ie 19, 191+6), copy in the Harry S.
Truman Library of original in the Franklin D. Roosevelt
Library. Forrestal's diary entry for July 30, 1945> cor
roborates this recollection by Smith. Forrestal says
Truman had talked "a good deal" about citizen soldiers and
of destroying the "political cliques that run the Army and
Navy." In the same conversation Forrestal recalls Truman
describing West Point and Annapolis as "finishing schools."
Millis (ed.), Forrestal Diaries, 88-89.
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the chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee late
in February.

"This bill," Patterson wrote, "which is

not in accord with the President's message and War Depart
ment policy with reference to universal military training,
cannot be favorably looked upon by the War Department."23
A week later Truman told a reporter that he had done all
he could to get a UMT bill through Congress.2^- Except
for a brief reference in a speech in April,2£ Truman
seemed reconciled to letting universal training languish
in the Congress until later in the year.
On October 2, 19i+6, the War Department issued a
new

plan of universal military training.

The basic

principle remained unchanged— one continuous, compulsory
year of training for all male citizens, eighteen to twenty
years old.

The difference was an emphasis now placed on a

civilian board that would control the non-military phases
of the training program.^

in a memorandum to Patterson a

few days after the new UMT plan was made public, Truman
enclosed copies of two letters written by Thomas Jefferson,

23patterson to Andrew J. May, February 28, 19^6,
RGJ4.O7, AG353 (10 Dec. 19i+5>), National Archives.
2^-Itera
Public Papers

No. £3* Press Conference,March
. .. Truman, 19^6, lif-5.

8,19i+6,

25ltem
No. 76, President's ArmyDay speech
Chicago, April 6, 19&6, ibid., 187-88.

in

2^Bernardo and Bacon, American Military Policy,

14*8-1*9 .
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which spoke of a need for a prepared citizenry.

"It

seems to me," Truman wrote, "that these letters . . .
could be used effectively in our proposed campaign for
Universal Military Training, as these letters show
Jefferson was not quite the pacifist he was supposed to
be."27
One phase of the "proposed campaign" mentioned in
the note to Patterson was undoubtedly Truman’s announcement
on December 19 that he had created a nine-member,
"President’s Advisory Commission on Universal Training."
Although the group was obstensibly an impartial body

created to examine objectively the question of universal
military training, it was, in fact, composed of nine
persons presold on the UMT concept.

28

The suggestion that

such a committee be created had been made by Patterson to

^ T h e letters enclosed were Jefferson to Thaddeus
Kosciusko, February 26, 1810; Jefferson to James Madison,
June 18, 1813. Truman had inadvertently referred to the
program as Universal Military Training. He had come to
avoid the term, "military," ordinarily preferring to
speak of it as his "Universal Training" program. Truman
to the Secretary of War, October 9, 19if-6, RG107* OSW,
RPP/White House, National Archives.
28Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., The Civilian and the
Military: A History of the American AntimiTitarist~
Tradition (New York: Oxford Univers'ity Press, l9$b),
261. Hereinafter cited as Ekirch, Civilian and the
Military.
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the President in November, 1945*

po

Truman liked the idea

and told the Secretary of War to choose prospective
members, in conjunction with the Navy and Coast Guard.
Following his approval and the appointees’ acceptances,
Truman said he would announce the new commission from the
White House, thus drawing the attention of the country to
the civilian aspects of the program .-*0
The President brought the Advisory Commission to
the White House the day following the announcement of its
appointment.

In remarks to the commissioners, later

released to the press, Truman made it clear that he
conceived the true purpose of such training to be the
molding in young men of a sense of obligation to serve the
state.

He told the Commission Members that he did not

think of it as universal military training:

"I want that

word military left out.

The military phase is incidental
31
to what I have in mind."
While the President consist

ently held that there was no relationship between UMT and

^Patterson to the President, November 5, 19h£>
RGlj07, AG353> National Archives.
3°Truman to the Secretary of War, November 13 ,
19ij.5> Rosenman Papers, Subject File,
Universal
Military Training, Truman Library.
^ I t e m No. 268, Remarks to the President's Advisory
Commission on Universal Training, December 20, 19^6,
Public Papers . . . Truman, 19l|.o, £09; New York Times,
December 21, 19^6. See also, Ernest Lindley, Washington
Post, December 23, 19^-6J Truman, Memoirs, II, 53^.
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the draft, the War Department did not agree.

When queried

for reaction to the new Commission, a War Department
spokesman said that the Army would not request further
continuation of Selective Service, which was due to expire
in March, 191J-7, until congressional intentions on universal
training were clear.

The spokesman added that if the UMT

program was not forthcoming, then a continuation of the
32
draft would be inevitable.
The Advisory Commission on Universal Training did
not submit its recommendations to the President until the
end of May 192+7-

However, on March 3 Truman asked

Congress to allow Selective Service to lapse on March 31.
He said that after consulting with Secretaries Forrestal
and Patterson, he had decided to take the gamble on an
all-volunteer force.

He did not mention that Selective

Service Director Lewis Hershey and the Army’s Chief of
Personnel, General W. S. Paul, were adamantly opposed.33
Congress did allow the draft to expire, and the nation was
without peacetime conscription for fifteen months.

3 % e w York Herald-Tribune, December 21, 191+6.
^ L e w i s B. Hershey to Truman, December
192+65
Patterson to Truman, February 2+, 192+7i Marshall to Truman,
February 6, 192+7, all in Clifford Papers, Subject File,
National Military Establishment: Selective Service,
Truman Library. See also, New York Times, March 1+, 192+75
Washington Post, March If?, 191+7• Text of Truman's special
message to the Congress is in Public Papers . . . Truman,
1914-7, 163-61+.
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The report of Truman’s Advisory Commission, J4J4.5
pages long, was submitted May 29, 19)+7.-^

The report was

unique only in its length and the explicitness of its pro
cedural recommendations.

In general principles it

differed little from the Truman-War Department proposals.
Historian Arthur Ekirch has offered an intelligent critique
of the report and the philosophy governing the nature of
its recommendations:
. . . the idea of universal service to the state, which
the President urged his Advisory Commission to
recommend, was also a totalitarian concept that had
been much used by fascist and communist regimes. The
Advisory Commission in its report denied the charge
of totalitarianism and contended that universal
training was no more un-American, militaristic, or
compulsory than public education. But the commission’s
emphasis upon the responsibility of the individual to
the state, though fully in accord with European
practice, represented a relatively new idea in the
United States. Whatever the mutual obligations of the
citizen and his government, the American tradition had
always been one in which the state was considered
the servant, and not the master of the people. The
universal service advocated by the Presidential
Commission not only contradicted this tradition, but
it also envisaged a type of service that, no matter
how disguised, was basically for military purposes.35
The impact of the Advisory Commission report was
nugatory.

A Republican Congress was not receptive to an

Administration measure with an estimated cost of two
billion dollars annually which many described as

^ S u m m a r y of report is in New York Times, June 2,
191^7. See also, Bernardo and Bacon, American Military
Policy, j.9-50; Truman, Memoirs, II, 5>I|.-J?5•
35>Ekirch, Civilian and the Military, 281-82.
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militaristic and totalitarian.

Truman continued urging

UMT legislative action throughout 191+7* hut with only
occasional allusions to the stillborn report of his
Advisory Commission on Universal Training.^

The report

had at least one staunch advocate in James Forrestal,
then Secretary of Defense, who, in December of 191+7» sent
a memorandum to the Army, Navy and Air Force Secretaries
strongly endorsing the study.

Forrestal suggested that

every officer in the military should read the complete
report and have a thorough knowledge of its content, which
he should then disseminate to all Armed Services enlisted
'in

personnel. '
The President began 191+8 as he had begun the two
preceding years, offering up his— by now--traditional plea
to the Gongress for enactment of universal military

36]3ernardo and Bacon, American Military Policy, l+£0.
Truman pubicly urged UMT passage regularly. For example,
in his second "State of the Union" message, January 6,
191+7* see Public Papers . . . Truman, 191+7> 11-12.
In
June, speaking at Princeton’s Bicentennial, the President
made the need for universal training the subject of an
address which was not too warmly received, according to
Alfred Friendly in the Washington Post, June 18, 191+7*
For text of Truman’s Pr in ce ton Ad dr e ss , see New York
Herald-Tribune, June 18, 191+7* Ten days later, Truman told
reporters that UMT was essential for national security.
New York Times, June 27* 191+7* The same theme was repeated
by the 'President in statements made in August and October.
See New York Times, August 29. 191+7; Washington Post,
October - Z 5 T l W r r
------ --------37Forrestal to Secretary of the Air Force, et. al.,
December 18, 191+7> RG31+0, Office of the Secretary o? tEe
Air Force (SAF), AF381 (18 Dec. ’1+7)* National Archives.
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nO'
training.

Congress was now ready to consider such

legislation, motivated by a growing tension in inter
national affairs.

The House Armed Services Committee

favorably reported out a Universal Training Bill, desig
nated H.R. lj.278, which was in general accord with
Administration desires.

For three weeks in March the

Senate Armed Services Committee held extensive hearings
on UMT and Selective S e r v ice.^
On March 17, 19lj.8, the President spoke to a Joint
Session on the threat to world peace and the independence
of European states, caused by expansionist activities of
the Soviet Union.

Truman recommended to Congress three

measures which he felt were needed to improve the nation's
strength and maintain the free, democratic character of
the nations of Europe.

The three measures Truman

described were passage of the program for economic
assistance for Europe, enactment of universal training
legislation, and temporary re-enactment of selective

3®Item No. 5, Annual Budget Message to Congress,
Fiscal Year 191+9, January 12, 191+8, Public Papers . . .
Truman, 191+8, 26.
^ F o r r e s t a l to Walter Andrews, April 2, 191+8,
RG330, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD),
CD9-1-1{., National Archives.
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service legislation.^-0
The Administration's draft of a bill that would
have provided both renewal of Selective Service (Title I)
and establishment of UMT (Title II) was submitted to the
House by Secretary "Forrestal early in April.^

After much

struggle Congress passed the Selective Service Act in June,
providing for its termination in two years.
universal training proposal failed again.

However, the
It failed for

the same reasons it had in the past, and also, because
19l}.8 was an election year.

It may have failed as well

because many agreed with the editorialist who wrote: "UMT
as outlined by the Army’s own program is nothing but a

The JCS had advised the President that voluntary
enlistment had failed and that they considered restoration
of the draft essential. Millis (ed.), Forrestal Diaries,
393-91}., 397-98. See also, Paul Y. Hammond, "Super Carriers
and B -36 Bombers: Appropriations, Strategy and Politics,"
in Harold Stein (ed.), American Civil-Military Decisions:
A Book of Case Studies (University, Alabama: University of
Alabama Press, 1963), 1+73—76. Hereinafter cited as
Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers." For text of
Truman’s special message to the Congress, see Item No. 52,
Public Papers . . . Truman, 19l|-8, 182-86. Truman
emphasized the urgency of his requests in New York City
the same day (March 17) in an address before the Society
of the Friendly Sons of St. Patrick. Truman, Memoirs,
II, 224.2 —14.3 * Text of this address appears in New York
Herald-Tribune, March 18, 1948.
^Forrestal to Walter Andrews, April 2, 191+8,
RG330, OSD, CD9-1-1}., National Archives.
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J±2
gigantic boondoggle, a glorified CCC camp."^
Truman’s and the Pentagon’s faith in the value of
universal military training never flagged in the years
that followed.^

Efforts to obtain legislation eventually

ceased, only to be revived during the Korean War.

On

August 29, 1950, Truman found himself in the peculiar
position of asking the Congress not to take action creating
a UMT program.

His reason, as he explained in identical

letters to the Chairmen of the Senate and House Armed
Services Committees, was that the demands of the Korean
conflict would make it impossible for the military to
provide the installations and personnel necessary to
implement the program.

Truman asked that action on UMT

be deferred until 195>1.^

^ Indianpolis Star, March 18, 19l|8. See also,
Bernardo and Bacon, American Military Policy, i+50. Truman
signed the Selective Service Act into law on June 2lj., 19^8,
less than a day after passage. See New York Times,
June 25, 19i}-8.
^-3por example, in October of 19lj.8, Omar Bradley, then
Army Chief of Staff, was still strongly urging that the
services should try to obtain enabling legislation on UMT
in the next Congressional session. Bradley to Secretary
of the Army (Royall) , October I4., 19U8, RG330, OSD, 0D9-2-1].,
National Archives. Secretary of Defense Forrestal, while
believing in the UMT idea, had given up hope of getting
it through Congress by the summer of 19i+8- See, for
example, diary entries for April 2ij., 30, 19l|8, in Millis
(ed.), Forrestal Diaries, lj.25-28.
Wj-Item No. 225, Letter to Committee Chairmen on
Universal Military Training, August 29, 1950, Public
Papers . . . Truman, 1950, 601-602. See also, item No.
272, Remarks to members of the National Guard Association,
October 25, 1950, ibid., 687-89 .
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The Secretary of Defense, on January 17, 1951,
transmitted to Lyndon B. Johnson, then Chairman of the
Senate Armed Services Preparedness Subcommittee, a draft
of legislation authorizing "Universal Military Service
and Training."^*

The bill finally passed in altered form

on June 19, 1951, as an amendment redesignating the
Selective Service Act of 19i+8 as the "Universal Military
Training and Service Act."

As amended, the act extended

the life of the Selective Service System until 1955 and
authorized the establishment of a universal military
training system at some time in the future.

But UMT could

not be implemented until it received further specific
approval from the C o n g r e s s . S u c h approval has never
been forthcoming; the United States remains the only major
power without a system of UMT.

The Spartan concent of

universal military training and service has died.
There should be no mourners at the bier of UMT.
The concept is antithetical to democratic principles.
Truman's resort to peacetime conscription as a means of
replenishing the military, while not as undesirable, did

Jj-^Marshall to Johnson, January 17, 1951, RG3ij-0,
AP353, UMT, National Archives.
^Bernardo and Bacon, American Military Policy,
2+51J Robert Payne, The Marshall Story’: A Biography of
General George _C. Marshall* (New York: Prentice-Hall,
19^l), 314-10* Hereinafter cited as Payne, Marshall
Story.
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result in a disproportionate obligation for service
falling on certain socio-economic groups.

General

Marshall recognized this when he wrote that "in fairness
it must be stated that the Selective Service system has
imposed on too few the entire burden of military
service."^

Truman erred in his belief that universal

military training was the answer to the obvious inequali
ties in Selective Service.

He erred, not out of any

meanness of heart, but from an oversimplified view which
failed to recognize that a sense of dedication to public
service must come from within, as his had; it cannot be
compelled by governmental ordinances.
James Forrestal once confided to his diary a belief
that President Truman urged unification of the armed
services not so much for the greater economy and efficiency
that would result but more as a means of selling universal
military training to the Congress as part of the unifica
tion "package."^

The Navy Secretary compounded the slur

by adding that the President's thinking on both subjects
was clearly based on his World War I and National Guard

^"Recommendations of the Secretary of Defense of
Materials for Inclusion in the State of the Union Message,"
draft attached to a letter of transmittal, John G. Adams
to Charles A. Coolidge, November 26, 1951 » RG330, OSD,
031. 1, National Archives.
^•®Diary Entry, July 30>
Forrestal Diaries, 88.

Millis (ed.),
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experiences.

By way of a compliment, Forrestal added that

his impression was that Truman ". . . i s not close-minded
nor will he hold rigidly to his own views."^9

This account,

written in mid-19l+]?> serves as an apt paradigm of the
attitude encountered by Truman in his long struggle to
unify the military services.
Harry Truman was not the father of the unification
concept, but the present-day military command structure in
the United States is uniquely his progeny.

In the early

years of World War II Truman served as a member of the
Military Affairs and Appropriations Committees of the
Senate, as well as chairman of the Special Committee to
Investigate the National Defense Program.

These functions

afforded him a sweeping view of the waste, inefficiency
and duplication that redounded from having two separate
military departments
Truman became an active civilian proponent of
service unification when an article appeared under his
name in Collier1s in the midst of his vice-presidential
campaign.

The Senator wrote that he had not just lately

^9Ibid., 89.
^Truman, Memoirs, II, ij.6-lj.7; Truman, "Our Armed
Forces Must Be Unified,'" Collier^ CXIV ^August 26, 19iUf.) >
63 . Hereinafter cited as Truman, "Our Armed Forces Must
Be Unified." See also, Buchanan, United States and World
War II, II, 315 .
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embraced the issue, but had helped draft an American
Legion policy that had been advocating integration of
forces for years.

Truman’s basic thesis was that the

Pearl Harbor disaster and subsequent "bitter lessons" of
the war years had ". . . revealed the danger that lies in
a division of responsibilities."-^

The future commander

in chief felt that the services should be coordinated
under a single civilian secretary, administratively
assisted by three undersecretaries for the ground, sea
and air forces.

Truman’s plan as described in the

Collier’s article envisioned a General Staff replacing the
extant Joint Chiefs of Staff (which expended its energies
trying to conciliate independent commands).

His General

Staff would be concerned solely with tactical and
strategic control of all forces, rather than interservice
rivalries.^

Less than nine months after the publication

of this article,

its author found himself in a position

to implement his beliefs:

^-Truman, "Our Armed Forces Must Be Unified, " 16.
^2Ibid., 16, 63-61}.. See also, Hoare, "Truman,"
l8i}.-85« Truman’s own summation of his article appears in
his' Memoirs, II,
IJ.7-I4.8 . Questioned about this article in
a press conference (August 30, 1945) > the President admitted
his statements about a lack of cooperation between commands
at Pearl Harbor were incorrect, but that he still believed,
as he always had, in unity of command.
Item No. 118,
Public Papers . . . Truman, 19)4-5>
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One of the strongest convictions which I brought
to the office of President was that the antiquated
defense setup of the United States had to be
reorganized quickly as a step toward insuring our
future safety and preserving world peace. Prom the
beginning of my administration I began to push hard
for unification of the military establishment. . . .
It was my opinion that the Commander in Chief
ought to have a co-ordinated and co-operative
defense department that would work in peace and in
w a r .53
Just as American conduct of the Spanish-American
War had made obvious the need for the Root Reforms which
followed and World War One experience brought passage of
the National Defense Act of 1920, so, too, did the Second
World War reveal flaws in the military structure that
generated planning for a unified command structure.

This

planning had begun more than a year before Truman took
office.^

In April 191+14- the House Select Committee on

-^Truman, Memoirs, II, i+6—1+7• See also, Elmer E.
Cornwell, Jr., "The Truman Presidency," in Richard S. Kirkendall (ed.), The Truman Period as a. Research Field
(Columbia, Missouri: University oT Missouri Press, 1967),
221-22. Hereinafter cited as Cornwell, "The Truman
Presidency."
51+Por a description of the National Defense Act of
1920, which was a re-organization of the U.S. Army's command
system only, see American Military History, 1+07—1+09• While
there was some thought given to unification prior to the
Second World War, the results of such activity were incon
sequential. The Morrow Board (1925) and the Baker Board
(1931+)f while principally concerned with national aviation
policies, did comment on the feasibility of integration of
the armed services. The former concluded that unification
would create too complex and unwieldly a structure. The
latter made some passing allusions to a need for greater
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Postwar Military Policy opened hearings on a War Department plan of unification.

55

The Army proposed the

establishment of an Armed Forces Department administered
by a Secretary, who would be designated as the principal
adviser to the Congress and President on all defense
subjects relevant to politics and administration.

The

Joint Chiefs of Staff would advise the President on funds
56
allocation and other budgetary matters.-'
The Navy Department, represented by Secretary
Forrestal,-^ opposed the merger plans.

Forrestal argued

that such a unitary system might be too cumbersome for
efficient management and that duplication was not always
undesirable.

The Navy was also against the proposed

coordination between the armed services. Excerpts from
both the Morrow and Baker Board Reports can be found in
Walter Millis (ed.), American Military Thought (New York:
Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1966), 387-^17# passim. Hereinafter
cited as Millis (ed.), American Military Thought.
^Usually called the "McNarney Plan," after Lt.
General Joseph T. McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, who
presented the plan. Representatives from the House Naval
Affairs and Military Affairs Committees made up the member
ship of the Select Committee, chaired by Clifton Woodrum.
-^Rogow, Victim of Duty, 187-88• See also, U.S.
Congress, Senate, CommiTEee on Armed Services, National
Defense Establishment: Unification of the Armed“*Services,
Hearings on S. 75b, 8*0 Cong., 1 Sess.,“T ^ . 7 , P't. 1 , 7-ti.
Hereinafter cited as Hearings, National Defense Establish
ment .
57
When the hearings began Forrestal was Under Secre
tary of the Navy. But the Secretary, Frank Knox, resigned
in April, 19i|lj.> for reasons of health and FDR named
Forrestal to replace him.
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establishment of a separate Air Force and felt, in
general, that the time was not opportune for reorganiza
tion.

Forrestal felt that "further study" was necessary.

The Secretary also told the committee, in what became a
recurrent theme for him, that the job of administering
such an organization would be too much for any one man:
"There is no single human being capable, in my judgment,
of sitting on all that. . . . "

(Forrestal became the

first Secretary of Defense and the pressures of the job
apparently brought on a general breakdown in his mental
condition which caused him to leave the post .)'5

The

Select Committee report to the House (June 15>» 19i|ij-)
agreed with the Navy argument that the time was not right
for legislation and urged the armed forces to make further
studies into the means for implementing unification.'5^
In a meeting with the President, June 13» 1914-5,
Forrestal asked for his opinion on the proposals to con
solidate the War and Navy Departments.

Truman told him

that he had some definite views on the subject and
intended to work with his staff on a legislative proposal

-^Rogow, Victim of Duty, 188-89. Forrestal committed
suicide by defenestrat'ion shortly after resigning as
Secretary of Defense.
-^Hearings, National Defense Establishment, Pt. 1,
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as soon as he was finished with the Potsdam Conference .^0
Six days later Forrestal created a committee, headed by a
trusted adviser, Ferdinand Eberstadt, to consider the
various means of achieving interservice coordination and
to recommend the most effective postwar structure.
Forrestal intended that the Navy should have its own plan
for unification as a counter to the Army proposal as well
as Truman’s, apparently.

Forrestal was wary of what the

President's stand would be, since he knew his prePresidential views on unification and knew, too, that
Truman's latest comments had been similar to those being
advanced in the Army proposal.

62

The Eberstadt Committee submitted its report to the
Secretary of the Navy on September 25>, 19i|-5>»

The report

discounted the value of an Army-Navy merger and proposed
instead that there be three separate departments of War,
Navy and Air.

Each department would have a civilian

secretary with cabinet rank, aided by an under secretary
and an assistant secretary.

The three departments would

be coordinated by numerous interdepartmental committees
and agencies.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, then existing

^°Diary Entry, June 13» 19l|.5, Millis (ed.),
Forrestal Diaries, 62.
^Forrestal to Eberstadt, June 19, 1
ibid., 63 .

9

quoted in

62R 0gow, Victim of Duty, 191.
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only by executive order, would be made permanent on a
statutory basis and would have principal responsibility
for coordinating the activities of the three armed
services.

Recognizing the need for a closer conjunction

of military with foreign policy, the Eberstadt Report
recommended the establishment of a "National Security
Council."

This council was to be presided over by the

President as chairman with the membership comprised of
the Secretaries of State, War, Navy and Air, the Joint
Chiefs and the heads of the Central Intelligence Agency
/L O

and the National Security Resources Board.
Forrestal was pleased with Eberstadt*s efforts
since it emphasized coordination and cooperation rather
than unification, which the Navy saw as a threat to its
position.

The Senate Military Affairs Committee convoked

unification hearings beginning on October 17, 19 h£.
Forrestal immediately presented the Eberstadt Report-slightly modified— as the Navy plan for unification.

Not

to be outdone, General J. Lawton Collins presented

^ " E x c e r p t s
from the Eberstadt Report," in Henry
M. Jackson (ed.), The National Security Council: Jackson
Subcommittee Papers on Policy-Making at the Presidential
Level (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955)5 29l-94»
Hereinafter cited as Jackson (ed.), National Security
Council. See also, Bernardo and Bacon, American Military
Policy, 455; Rogow, Victim of Duty, 193-9U; Hearings,
National Defense Establishment, Pt. 1, 6 , d-Tl
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another, more detailed, War Department merger p l a n . ^
The widely-divergent proposals provided the casus
belli and the Senate hearings provided the arena for what
reporters were soon calling "The Battle of the Potomac."^
Secretary of War Patterson had opened the hearings on
October 17 by asserting his conviction that a single
department of armed forces would enhance future national
s e c u r i t y .

^6

General Marshall followed Patterson in the

hearings and went a step further in holding that without
•unification

. . there can be little hope that we will

be able to maintain through the years a military posture
67
that will secure for us a lasting peace."
The Army Air

61+St. Louis Post-Dispatch, October 22,
For
a summary of Forrestalrs testimony in favor of the
Eberstadt Plan and against the Army's proposals, see Rogow,
Victim of Duty, 193-91+. For the principal proposals of
the War Department, see Hearings, National Defense
Establisbment, Pt. 1, 6,~ 9 • A transcript of General
Coll ins 1 s’tatemen t to the committee is in Clifford Papers,
Subject File, Unification, Truman Library.
^Newsweek (November 19> 19h£)> quoted in
Bernardo and Bacon, American Military Policy,
^ % e w York Times, October 18, 19lj.5>« A transcript
of Patterson's testimony is in Rosenman Papers, Subject
File-19h5> Unification of the Armed Services, Truman
Library.
^Marshall's testimony, October 18, 19k$ (Trans
cript), Clifford Papers, Subject File, Unification, Truman
Library. General Eisenhower was in full agreement with
Marshall on all points. He warned the committee that
failure to unify would invite another Pearl Harbor. See
W. H. Lawrence, New York Times, November 17, 1945•
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Force (AAF) was particularly enthusiastic over the War
Department plan, since it proposed establishing the Air
Force as a separate military department.

General officers

of the AAF in the Pentagon were asked to write personal
letters to key field commanders, keeping them "briefed"
on the status of unification legislation.

The Generals

(Anderson, Norstad, Powers, Vandenburg) were even given
a model letter written by General Everest and also a list
of the commanders with whom they should correspond.
"individual touch" was emphasized,

The

". . . i n order to

prevent an inference that there is a concerted effort in
Hq AAF to force field commanders to hew to the party
line."^

The Air Force's "party line," as presented in

the hearings, endorsed the Army unification plan.

General

Arnold, in making his case, acknowledged that historically,
the armed services had confronted each crisis, 11. . . far
from effectively, efficiently or economically organized,"
and that unification could solve this problem.

W. Bowman to Hoyt S. Vandenberg, October 2,
1 9 RG18, AAF, 312.1— Operations— 191+$, National Archives.
See also, F. F. Everest to Nathan F. Twining, October 5,
19^5, ibid .; Hanson Baldwin, "The Military Move In,"
Harper1s Magazine, CXCV, No. 1171 (December, 19^7 )> It88 .
Hereinafter cited as Baldwin, "The Military Move In."
^statement by General of the Army H. H. Arnold
(Transcript), Rosenman Papers, Subject File-19U5> Unifi
cation of the Armed Services, Truman Library.
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The Navy was not reticent in opposition to the A m y
plan.

Admiral King, Chief of Naval Operations, told the

Senate Committee that the Army plan was revolutionary.
King also offered the observation that "any step that is
not good for the Navy is not good for the country."^

One

of the basic contentions of Admirals Sherman and Leahy in
their testimony was that there was no real need for unifi
cation since a unified command already existed under the
President, functioning as Commander in Chief.

71

Just as

the Air Force supported the Army for its own reasons, the
Marine Corps defended the Navy plan, fearful that any
subordination of the Navy would ultimately affect the
Corps.

Marine Commandant Alexander Vandergrift accused

the proponents of unification of having a "blind faith"
in something they did not understand .^2

Forrestal, who

knew he was fighting a delaying-action against u n i f i 
cation, wrote to the President and Secretary of War early
in November, suggesting further study of unification by a
presidential commission and an end to the "injurious

^Chicago Tribune, October 26, 19l|5i Rostow, United
States in the World Arena, 175*
7 1 "Unification of the Armed Services: Analytical
Digest of Testimony Before the Senate Military Affairs
Committee, 17 October to 17 December, 1
9
(no author,
no date, mimeographed), 105>. Copy in RG330, OSD, Office
of the Director of Administration, National Archives.
"^Baltimore Evening Sun, October 2 1 9 ^ 5 •
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acrimony" of the interservice

b i c k e r i n g .

73

Porrestal

described in his diary a meeting with Truman on November
21, in which the merger was discussed:

"I told the Presi

dent I had no brief in behalf of the Navy, that what I
wanted was the best answer for the cou n t r y ."7^1-

However,

since it was Porrestal who had also proposed "further Study"
of unification over a year and a half earlier to the Woodrum Committee, his self-proclaimed objectivity is suspect.
With each service adamantly holding to its original,
uncompromising position, the rhetoric became repetitious
and the dialogue embittered, throughout the fall of 19lj-5 *
A wise editorial writer suggested in late November that
it was time for this unseemly dispute to end:

The case for and against the proposed unification
of the armed services of the United States in a single
Department of National Defense, or National Security,
now has been largely presented to the Congress and to
the American people. The Secretaries of War and-Navy,
the Army and Air Force’s Chiefs of Staff, the Navy
Chief of Naval Operations and most of the high echelon
. . . have presented their views before the Senate
Military Affairs Committees. . . .
The principle of unity of command is sound. It has
been proven in war. No valid arguments have been pre
sented against it. It should be adopted
promptly. . . .75

73p0rrestal to Truman, November 8, 19i|5> RG107>
Office of the Secretary of the Army (OSA), Single Depart
ment-National Defense, National Archives. See also,
Porrestal to Patterson, November 9> 19l|.5> ibid.
7ijMillis (ed.), Forrestal Diaries, 115-16.
7 % e w York Times, November 20, 19i+5.
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Until mid-December Truman remained an interested
observer of the Army-Navy struggle, not interfering
publicly or privately, although by the end of October he
realized that Porrestal and the Navy had "double-crossed"
him on unification.^

The President was concerned, not

about the dispute, but about the timing of his own
message.

At a news conference on November 20 a reporter

asked if Truman had a view on military reorganization.
He replied, "Yes, the Commander in Chief has a point of
view, and he will express it at the proper time."*^
Earlier, the President had told Budget Director Smith
that he wanted to wait until early in 19i|i>, when the
Congress had cleared up other legislative matters.

He

planned, Truman told Smith, to tie in unification with
universal military training, which he had already
proposed.
Truman was compelled to change his timing on the
unification message by circumstances:

His UMT proposal

was not being well received in Congressj the struggle
between the services had reached extremes and was

"^Diary Entry, October 30, 19i|5» Smith Papers,
Diary, copy in Truman Library of original in Franklin D.
Roosevelt Library.
^^Item No. 193> Press Conference, November 20, 19i|£>
Public Papers . . . Truman, 1 9 k 5 » i+-96.
?®Diary Entry, October 30, 19k5> Smith Papers,
Diary, copy in Truman Library of original in Franklin D.
Roosevelt Library.
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generating unfavorable press commentary; and the Military
Affairs Committee adjourned December 17 with the Army and
Navy no closer to agreement.

It was at this juncture that

Truman recalls "seeing the need for presidential inter
vention. . . ."79
Truman's chief speechwriter, Samuel Rosenman, had
begun working on a tonification message in mid-November,
based on preliminary drafts submitted by the Army and the
fin
Bureau of the Budget.
After several revisions, Rosenman
followed the usual practice during Truman's administra
tion, of sending the proposed presidential message around
to all concerned agency and department heads, asking for
their suggestions and criticism.
probably wished he had not asked.

In this instance, he
For example, Admiral

Leahy, who was against the merger in the first place, told
Rosenman that he was particularly opposed to the proposed
Chief of Staff of the Department of National Defense:

"It

^Truman, Memoirs, II, I4.9• While there is no real
evidence, a suspicion 1 ingers that Truman deliberately
allowed the services to pick at each other in public.
Whether or not he did, the effect of their internecine
skirmishing was to strengthen the President's case for
unification of the services.
®^"I assume you wish to adopt the Army view," Rosen
man wrote to the President. Rosenman to Truman, November
13,
Rosenman Papers, Subject File-19ij.5# Unification
of the Armed Services, Truman Library. See also, Diary
Entry, December 13, 19k$> wherein the Budget Director
received the same impression, Smith Papers, Diary, copy in
Truman Library of the original in the Franklin D. Roosevelt
Library.
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is wrong and dangerous in that it effectively takes away
from the President his constitutional responsibility as
Q1
Commander in Chief.”
The War Department and the Air
Force expressed concern about the implications that the
Qp

Joint Chiefs of Staff were to be discontinued.

Although

the Budget Director disapproved, Truman insisted there be
a civilian secretary in control of each of the component
parts of the military establishment,®^
comments came from Secretary Forrestals

The frankest
". . . as the

President knows, I am so opposed to the fundamental concept
expressed in the message that I do not believe there is
any very helpful observation that I could make on the
draft you referred to me."®^

Forrestal did think that the

President should not send the message up to Congress and
that he should take no position on unification until more
hearings had been held.®£

®^Leahy to Rosenman, December 17 f 19l|5> Rosenman
Papers, Subject File-19lj.f>, Unification of the Armed Services,
Truman Library.
Ap

H.
H. Arnold to Rosenman, December 18, 19i|5>
ibid. See also, Howard C. Peterson to Rosenman, December
T87“ l9ll.5, ibid.
®^Rosenman to Harold Smith, December 17> 1914-5> ibid.
®^Rosenman to Forrestal, December 17> 19lj.f>» ibid.
See also, Forrestal to Rosenman, December 18, 19k$ >T 5 T d .
S^Forrestal to Rosenman, December 18, 19l+5» ibid.
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Despite Forrestal's advice, Truman sent the
military reorganization message to Congress on December
19, 19^5*

Truman laid down broad guidelines that he

hoped would be followed, detailed nine reasons why he
felt unification was necessary, stressing greater
efficiency and economy and a more effective civilian
control over the military.

His one major break with the

War Department proposals involved the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, which he suggested replacing with a Chief of Staff
for the Defense Department, who, along with the military
commanders of each service, would form an-advisory body to
the Secretary of Defense and the President.

He said that

the Joint Chiefs and the other agencies that sought to
coordinate the services during the war had not provided
the necessary unity of command and been just slightly
better than no coordination at all.

86

Upon delivery of the President’s message to
Congress, the conjecture over what his position on the
various aspects of reorganization would be ended for the
services.

They now had fixed points to rally around or

®^Full text is in Public Papers . . . Truman, 19
£ij.6-60. See also, Truman, Memoirs, it, J+9-50; Cornwell,
’’The Truman Presidency," 222-23. For a description of
the differences and areas of agreement between Truman's
proposal and the Navy (Forrestal) Plan, see Millis (ed.),
Forrestal Diaries, 119-20. For a summary of the Truman
Plan, see Hearings, National Defense Establishment, Pt. 1,

9-10 .
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to develop arguments against.

Truman also made it clear

to Porrestal that the Navy was still free to discuss and
attempt to amend the plan and that it was not his intention
to "muzzle" anyone.

The day following this conversation,

December 19, the Secretary called Clark Clifford at the
White House to get a clarification.

Clifford explained

that the President felt that civilian and naval personnel
of the Navy Department should no longer publicly attack
unification, since it was Administration policy.

However,

if called to testify before Congress, these individuals
should feel free to express their opinions, after first
explaining to the committee that they were expressing
personal views under leave to do so granted by the
Commander in Chief.®?

On the same day the Navy released

to the press a memorandum to all Navy and Marine officers
ordering them to refrain from all public criticism of
unification except when testifying before Congress.®®

At

a press conference on December 20 Truman had to explain
to reporters that it was not his intention to prevent
further discussion of unification, as long as those dis
cussing the subject made it clear they were expressing

®^Diary Entries, December 18, 19, 191+5, Millis
(ed.) Forrestal Diaries, 118-19.
®®Ibid.

See also, New York Mirror, December 20,
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only their personal

v i e w s .

With few exceptions, the public controversy
abated.In

the next few months, sincere efforts were

made to reconcile differences.

As an example, late in

January, 191+6, General Eisenhower, who had replaced
Marshall as Army Chief of Staff in November, 191+5,
reported to Patterson on the progress being made toward
coordination of activities with the Navy.

Eisenhower

said that he had discussed the reorganization of several
joint boards and committees with Forrestal on at least
two occasions.

91

In March 19i+6 the protagonists of the

interservice controversy, Forrestal and Patterson, met
together in another effort to reach an accommodation
consonant with Truman’s guidelines.

The Navy Secretary

said he would accept a Secretary of Defense with
authority to coordinate the services, but with no authority

®^Item No. 221, Press Conference, December 20,
19l+5> Public Papers . . . Truman, 19l+5« 565*
^ T h e President learned, for instance, that Admiral
Nimitz, who had replaced Admiral King as Chief of Naval
Operations in November 191+5 in comments at the British
Embassy had said he would fight UMT and unification "to
the last ditch." Truman said:
". . . 1 think it is
pretty bad business for an Admiral in his position."
Quoted in Diary Entry, February 28, 191+6, Smith Papers,
Diary, copy in Truman Library of the original in the
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
^Memorandum, Eisenhower to the Secretary of War
(Patterson), January 28, 191+6, Eisenhower Papers, Personal
File/Dwight D. Eisenhower (PF/DDE), Patterson folder,
Eisenhower Library.
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over administration, which was to reside exclusively in
the Army, Navy and Air secretaries .*^2

The Navy seemed

willing, apparently, to accept the form, while rejecting
the substance of unification.

In a subsequent meeting

with Eberstadt (Porrestal*s deputy) Patterson made it
clear that the Army would not accept the Navy's scheme.
Patterson personally favored a complete consolidation
into one military department, presided over by a single
secretary.*^
Porrestal had come around closer to Truman's view
in his new willingness to accept a "Super-Secretary,"
albeit one without administrative functions.

The polarity

of the Army-Navy views, which could be characterized as
consolidation versus coordination, was diminished somewhat
by Porrestal's concession in the direction of unification.
In the White House on March 18 Porrestal talked at length
with Truman about their differences.

The conversation

92Eberstadt, "Memorandum of Discussions Between
Judge Patterson, Mr. Porrestal, and Myself," March llj.,
1 9i{-6, RG107, OSA (Patterson), Single Department-Mi sc.,
National Archives. Porrestal made the same proposal to
Senator Elbert D. Thomas, chairman of a subcommittee to
draft a unification bill, in a telephone conversation on
March II4.• Porrestal found Thomas to be hostile and gained
the impression he was, " . . . acting under orders from the
President." Diary Entry, March lij., 19i|.6 , Millis (ed.),
Porrestal Diaries, Hj.7-48 .
^Eberstadt, "Memorandum of Discussions Between
Judge Patterson, Mr. Porrestal, and Myself, " March 1 if.,
I 9I4.0 , RG107 1 OSA (Patterson), Single Department-Misc.,
National Archives.
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revealed that they were not too far apart on many points.
Several of Eberstadt's original recommendations on the
method for civil-military coordination were attractive to
the President.

In this meeting, Porrestal records having

explained at length to Truman the Navy concept of the
duties of the Secretary of Defense, adding, rather
patronizingly,

". . . 1 think at the ^nd he began to grasp
o [i

what I was talking about." ^
Following the President’s message on unification in
December of 1945? the Senate Military Affairs Committee had
created a special subcommittee to draft legislation
Qd
responsive to Truman's message.
In the first three
months of 191+6 the subcommittee drafted eight separate
bills that were rejected.

Finally, on April 9> 191+6, the

subcommittee reported out a ninth bill, S. 20l|i+, the
Thomas-Hill-Austin bill, which received a favorable vote
in the Military Affairs Committee.

The Thomas bill was an

Administration measure, closely following Truman's recom
mendations.^^

Although most of those involved considered

the proposed legislation a compromise, the Navy did not.

^ D i a r y Entry, March 18, 1945* Millis (ed.),
Forrestal Diaries, 11+8—1+9.
^ T h e subcommittee consisted of Elbert D. Thomas
(Chairman, Utah)j Warren Austin (Vt.) and Lister Hill
(Ala.), see ibid., li+6 .
^Hearings, National Defense Establishment, Pt. 1,

6, 10.
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In the subsequent hearings on S. 20l\l±, all Navy witnesses
were unanimous in their opposition.

97

While Porrestal had come around to taking a much
more conciliatory tack, naval officers were still
adamantly opposed.

They were convinced that, given the

greater size of the Army and the greater glamour of the
Air Force, the Navy would be submerged and subordinated
in any reorganization such as that proposed in the Thomas
bill.

They sincerely believed that this unification would

mean loss of the Marine Corps to the Army and Naval
Aviation to the Air Force as a first step.

The admirals’

reactions to the Thomas bill caused a sharp counter
reaction from Truman at a press conference on April 11.
A reporter asked if the Navy was justified in still
fighting unification.

The President said he did not think

the Navy should continue to fight unification now that it
was his announced policy.

A follow-up question elicited a

much more explicit response:
Q. Mr. President, didn't you authorize Navy
officers to speak against that?
THE PRESIDENT.
I did not.
I authorized Navy
officers to express their honest opinions. They are
still authorized to express an honest opinion, but
when the President of the United States, the Commander
in Chief of the Army and Navy, sets out a policy, that
policy should be supported by the Army--and War
Department— and by the Navy Department. That doesn't

97Truman, Memoirs, II, 50.
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mean that individuals are muzzled on their honest
opinions. . . .
We are trying to get the facts as they are, and
facts are not in propaganda and lobbying, which has
been going on to a very vast extent.98
Truman called in the Secretary of the Navy on
April 17 for another conference on reorganization.

The

meeting was quite friendly, despite Truman’s chagrin at
the admirals.

In fact, both Porrestal and the President

agreed that all such activity should cease.99

jn the

course of his talk with Truman, Porrestal expanded on
his views of the single Secretary of Defense, seeing such
an officer as judging all moot questions, prescribing
procurement policies, planning the budget and ensuring
the coordination of all services on the military and
civilian levels.

Porrestal came away from the meeting

satisfied that Truman had not closed his mind to the Navy
plan and confided to his diary, ’’Speaking personally, I
am for unification.

porrestal believed he had moved

9®Item No. 78» Press Conference, April 11, 191+6,
Public Papers . . . Truman, 19U6, 194-95.
In another press
conference held on thfe"T7th, Truman repeated his charge
that the admirals were still actively lobbying and speaking
against unification.
Item No. 81+, ibid., 20l+,
99
^Forrestal recorded in his diary that he had
suggested that Truman order a halt to all such lobbying
and other activities in a meeting on March 18. Millis
(ed.), Forrestal Diaries, 11+9.
■^^Rogow, Victim of Duty, 197-98; Millis (ed.),
Porrestal Diaries, lj?l-1?2:«
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Truman closer to his position on unification, but
Eisenhower met with the President ten days later and came
away with the impression that Truman ". . . was not
weakening in the slightest degree in his stand on the
matter.

Truman, an accomplished poker player, was

clearly keeping his next move to himself.
On the day (May 13) that the Military Affairs
Committee favorably reported the Thomas bill out to the
Senate, Truman summoned Patterson and Forrestal to a
conference in the White House.

At this meeting the

President reminded the Secretaries of War and Navy of the
necessity for them to reconcile their areas of dispute on
unification.

The President told Patterson that the idea

for a single Chief of Staff recommended in the Army plan
was "dangerous" and that he had decided against it.

Truman

then asked the two Secretaries to meet together and— by
May 31— submit to him a list of the areas of agreement
and disagreement between t h e m . 2

■^■^Eisenhower to Patterson, April 27, 19^6, Eisen
hower Papers, PF/DDE, Patterson folder, Eisenhower Library.
^O^Truman, Memoirs, II, 50» See also, Rogow,
Victim of Duty, 201; Diary Entry, May 13» 194&* Millis
(ed.), Torrestal Diaries, 160-62. In an editorial note,
Millis (p. 162) holds that this meeting was a "decisive
victory" for Forrestal, since he had long argued against
a single chief of staff. This is probably true. However,
as Rogow has stated in Victim of Duty (p. 201), Millis
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Porrestal and Patterson worked studiously on unifi
cation, but were unable to report full agreement in their
letter submitted on the deadline, May, 31> 19i|6.^3

The

Secretaries were able to list eight major points of agree
ment:

(1) establishment of a Council of Common Defense

(eventually called the National Security Council);
(2) establishment of a National Security Resources Board;
(3) continuation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;

(ij.) no

Single Military Chief of Staff; (5) a Central Intelligence
Agency (under National Security Council);

(6) coordination

of military procurement and supply; (7) establishment of
an agency to coordinate scientific research and development
of the services; (8) establishment of an agency to review
and adjust all military education and training.
of disagreement were also listed:
department;

The areas

(1) single military

(2) three coordinate branches;

(3) aviation;

(I}.) future functions of Marine Corps.

goes much further, implying that the Army plan, unlike
Eberstadtfs, was not based on "careful study and analysis,"
nor could it stand the "test of time". In fact, neither
plan survived the decade intact.
103yor a detailed account of these deliberations,
see Millis (ed.), Forrestal Diaries, 163-66.
10^-Patterson and Porrestal to Truman, May 31 > 19ij.6,
Clifford Papers, Subject Pile, Unification: CorrespondenceGeneral, Truman Library. A copy is also in RG330, OSD,
Unification of the Armed Forces, National Archives. Text
is reprinted in Hearings, National Defense Establishment,
Pt. 1, 180-83.
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nI was deeply disappointed," Truman wrote in his
Memoirs, "that no substantial progress had been made
toward resolving this traditional conflict. . . . "

105

Although he may have been disappointed, Truman was not
surprised.

Nine days earlier he told the Budget Director

privately that he really did not expect Patterson and
Porrestal to come up with a satisfactory plan.

The Presi

dent agreed with Smith's observation that there was little
possibility of getting the unification measure through
in A
Congress before adjournment, in any event. u
Truman had
determined that whatever proposals the Army and Navy
submitted, he was not going to compromise very much with
the fundamentals of his own unification plan.

Since the

joint letter of May 31 acknowledged the impasse existing
between the military departments, Truman elected to
"settle personally" the differences between them.

107

105Truman, Memoirs, II, 5 0 .
lO^Diary Entry, May 22, 191^6, Smith Papers, Diary,
copy in Truman Library of original in the Franklin D. Rossevelt Library.
On May l5» Porrestal received a joint letter
from Senator David Walsh, Chairman of the Senate Naval
Affairs Committee and Representative Carl Vinson, Chairman
of the House Naval Affairs Committee, stating their belief
that any unification measure could get through Congress if
it proposed a single department of the armed forces. Walsh's
committee opened hearings on S.20ljlj. on April 30 and closed
them July 11, 19i|6. The bill was not reported out of com
mittee. Hearings, National Defense Establishment, Pt. 1,
6-7.
■^-^^Diary Entry, May 22, 19l|.6» Smith Papers, Diary,
copy in Truman Library of original in the Franklin D. Roose
velt Library.
See also, Truman, Memoirs,II, 50.
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Resolution of the interservice dispute came with the
announcement of the Commander in Chief's decisions, which
were contained in letters dated June l5> 19if-6, addressed
to Porrestal, Patterson, and the chairmen of the House and
Senate committees dealing with military and naval affairs.
Truman's identical letters to the Army and Navy secre
taries described his solutions to the four areas of
controversy:
1. Single Military Department.
There should be one Department of National Defense.
It would be under the control of a civilian who would
be a member of the cabinet. Each of the services
would be headed by a civilian with the title of
"Secretary.1 . . . They would not be members of the
cabinet. Each service would retain its autonomy,
subject of course to the authority and overall
control by the Secretary of National Defense. . . .
2. Three coordinated services.
There should be three coordinate services— the
Army, Navy and Air Force. The three services should
be on a parity. . . .
3. Aviation.
The Air Force shall have the responsibility for the
development, procurement, maintenance and operation of
the military air resources of the United States with
the following exceptions, in which responsibility must
be vested in the Navy:
(1) Ship, carrier and water-based aircraft
essential to Naval operations, and aircraft of the
United States Marine Corps.
(2) Land-type aircraft necessary for essential
internal administration and for air transport over
routes of sole interest to Naval forces. . . .
(3) Land-type aircraft necessary for the training
of personnel for the afore-mentioned purposes.
(if.) United States Marine Corps.
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There shall he maintained as a constituent part of
the Naval service a balanced Fleet Marine Force
including its supporting air component. . . .108
Prior to making his decisions, the President had
secured a solemn promise from Eisenhower, Patterson,
Nimitz and Forrestal that they would support these
decisions loyally before the Congress.

109

In his identical

letters to the key congressional chairmen on June 15,
Truman listed the twelve elements for a plan of unifi
cation that had his "unqualified endorsement."

The

twelve were made up, of course, from the eight areas of
agreement between the services and the four areas that:
Truman decided for them.

He concluded his message to the

Congressmen with a futile plea:

"It is my hope that the

Congress will pass legislation as soon as possible
effecting a unification based upon these twelve
principles.

(The Congress adjourned August 3* without

having taken action.)

108Truman to Patterson and Forrestal, June 15, 19lj.6,
RG330, OSD, Hoover Commission Report, Unification of the
Armed Forces, National Archives. Text is also printed in
Hearings, National Defense Establishment, Pt. 1, 183-85.
See also, Item No. 138 , Letter to Secretaries of War and
Navy on Unification of the Armed Forces, June 15> 19i|6,
Public Papers . . . Truman, 19ljG> 306-307.
109These Promises were made in a White House meeting
on June if., 19if-6. See Millis (ed.), Forrestal Diaries, 166.
110Truman to Andrew J. May, June l5> 19^4-6, Clifford
Papers, Subject File, Unification: Correspondence-General,
Truman Library. The President sent identical letters to
Senators Thomas and Walsh and Representative Vinson. Text
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With the basis of reorganization now defined,
Truman left the working out of the details mainly to
Porrestal, Patterson and their staffs.

The Secretary of

War had replied to Truman’s letter of June 15 immediately,
promising his wholehearted support, and that of the War
Department, toward implementation of the new military
command structure.

The President summoned Porrestal

on the nineteenth to inquire why he had not responded in
kind.

The Secretary explained that he was waiting to

discuss a response with Admiral Nimitz.

Porrestal and

Nimitz still had several pronounced reservations, a point
which the Secretary made clear in talking with the Presi
dent.

He also obliquely suggested to Truman that he was

ready to resign if it would facilitate unification.
Truman ignored the offer, but apparently insisted that
Porrestal reply to his letter before departing to observe
the atomic bomb tests at Bikini.

The letter to Truman was

dated June 24, the day of Porrestal's departure.

In it,

he accepted the President’s decisions of the fifteenth,

of the letter is printed as Item No. 137> Public Papers
. . . Truman, 1946# 303-305. A copy of the President's
letter also appears in RG330, OSD, Hoover Commission
Report, Unification of the Armed Forces, National Archives.
Senator Thomas amended S.2044 to conform with the recom
mendations in Truman’s letter. See, U.S., Congress,
Senate, S.2044# Committee Print (as amended), 79th Cong.,
2nd Sess., June 26, 1946.
■^^Patterson to Truman, June 17# 1946# RG407# 0SW,
AG381, National Archives.
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noting that there were difficulties ahead in drafting
legislation, but that he felt they were surmountable.

IIP

That there was little War Department faith in Forrestal's
reassurances is evidenced in a memorandum to Stuart
Symington, Assistant Secretary of War for Air, from a
legislative liaison officer in the Pentagon.

The note

indicates that the press commentary on the lack of a Navy
Department response to Truman's letter forced Forrestal
to reply.

But Forrestal's "carefully worded letter to the

President" left no doubt ". . . that he was still not
enthusiastic for the program."

Symington was also informed

that the War Department's publicity campaign for the
Thomas-Hill-Austin bill would continue throughout the
Congressional recess.'*''1'^
The War Department continued to campaign and so did
Forrestal.

On September 7 he wrote to Clark Clifford

describing a meeting he had with A m y Secretary Patterson
in late August for the purpose of implementing the unifi
cation agreements, as ordered by the President.

Forrestal

^■■^Forrestal to Truman, June 2l|., 191+6, RG 3I4.O, AF,
Special Interest File 1+A, National Archives.
■^-^William e . Carpenter to Sturart Symington,
August 2, 191+6, ibid. Symington was specifically charged
by the Secretary of- War with responsibility for all matters
relating to unifications. See Patterson to Symington,
April 11, 19l|-6, RG18, AF381, Unification, National
Archives.
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charged that the A m y still held to a single military
establishment headed by a secretary with total administra
tive control.

Despite Truman's orders, Porrestal believed

the A m y was still out to curtail the Marine Corps.
According to .Porrestal, the A m y felt that by drawing
charts that detailed straight lines of command authority
they could solve the problems of implementing unifica
tion.'^"*'^'

Truman talked with the unhappy Secretary of the

Navy on September 9.

Porrestal told the President that he

intended to introduce his own unification bill into the
new Congressional session.

The bill, Porrestal explained,

would create a Secretary of Common Defense with a small
executive staff.

The Secretary would act as the Commander

in Chief's deputy to the military departments.

The

functions of the President's deputy would be severely
delineated by the bill, allowing him coordinate authority,
while the three secretaries maintained administrative
autonomy within their military services.
doubt surprised.

Truman was no

Porrestal, ordinarily a meticulous

diarist, did not record the President's reaction.
Truman must have realized by now that his directive of

H^Porrestal to Clifford, September 7> 19^4-6,
Clifford Papers, Subject Pile, Unification: CorrespondenceGeneral, Truman Library.
ll^Millis (ed.), Porrestal Diaries, Editor's Note,
203.
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June 15 had not had the desired effect.

He ordered all of

his top-level military advisers to meet with him at the
White House the next day, September 10.
Truman opened the meeting by saying its purpose
was to consider what legislative proposals were to be
submitted to the upcoming session of Congress.

He told

those assembled that he was going to have Clark Clifford
and Admiral Leahy draft a new unification bill.

After

all of them had had a chance to mull over the new bill,
it would become administration doctrine and he would
expect complete support for it in Congress.

Truman then

followed his practice of asking everyone present to
express his views c a n d i d l y . P a t t e r s o n said he was in
full accord with the President's views.

Eisenhower was

generally noncommittal, repeating his belief that once
the Secretary of Defense concept was accepted in principle,
the details could be worked out later.

Porrestal repeated

his concept of this Secretary as he had expressed it to
Truman earlier.

He added that if a bill was introduced

contrary to those principles, rather than support it by
testimony before Congress, he would give the President his
resignation.

Truman said that he did not expect such a

H 6ln addition to Truman, present were Patterson,
Leahy, Porrestal, Eisenhower, Nimitz, and Clifford.
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necessity to arise.

117

1

The meeting adjourned and there

the matter rested, unresolved, until early in 19i+7•
With White House pressure clearly on them to agree,
Patterson and Porrestal finally produced a mutuallyacceptable formula for unification, which they transmitted
to the President on January 16, 191+7.

Truman replied to

them on the same date, expressing his pleasure at the
plan and his recognition that all services had made some
concessions to achieve this "thoroughly practical and
workable plan of unification. . . .

„ll8

The New York

Times headlined the White House announcement as, "A
Truman Victory— Patterson and Porrestal Compromise at
Last on Unification Idea.

It was less a victory than

■'■^■^Diary Entry, September 10, 191+6, Millis (ed.),
Forrestal Diaries, 203-205.
ll 8porrestal and Patterson to Truman, January 16,
19k7t Clifford Papers, Subject Pile, Unification (Part 2),
Truman Library. Text of this letter is reprinted in Hear
ings , National Defense Es tablishment, Pt. 1, 103 * Truman
to Patterson and Porrestal, January 16, 19i+7^ RG330, OSD,
Hoover Commission Report, Unification of the Armed Forces,
National Archives. Text of this letter is reprinted as
Item No. 10, Public Papers . . . Truman, 19lj-7» 99. Both
letters are printed Tn full in U.S., Congress, House,
Basic Elements of the Unification of the War and Navy
Departments, O O T o n g ., 1 Sess., t>oc. No 7 $6~~("January 20,
191+7) V
H ^ New York Times, January 17, 191+7; New York
Herald-Tribune, January 17, 1947* No attempt has been made
to describe the struggles between the War and Navy Depart
ments between the September meeting and this agreement,
since it would be largely repetitious. The participants
took the same stands detailed earlier and agreed only when
they had to. The New York Times article cited above
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it was a long-delayed step that Truman should have forced
through sooner; there was no reason to allow protracted
debate after his directive of June 15* 191+6,

But Truman

had no intention of delaying any longer; he released the
Secretaries’ joint letter and his reply immediately, and
the following day sent communications to the Speaker of
the House and the President of the Senate pro tempore.
The letter to the Congressional leaders transmitted
copies of the Forrestal-Patterson letter of January 16 and
Truman’s reply, by way of announcing that an agreement had
been reached.

Truman also assured the two Congressional

leaders that members of his staff and the military were
drafting the bill, which the President would submit to
Congress for consideration as soon as possible.

120

The military leadership, having taken almost a year
and a half to agree on the principles of unification,
now found it difficult to agree on the text of the unifica
tion bill.

The chairman of the Senate Armed Services

Committee wrote to Secretary Patterson on February 21
asking why the bill was not ready.

The Senator complained

recounts much of the substance of these meetings, as does
Admiral Forrest Sherman in his testimony on the bill.
See Hearings, National Defense Establishment, Pt. 1,
120Truman to Joseph W. Martin, January 17, 191+7,
printed in Basic Elements of the Unification of the War and
Navy Departments, 102. See also, Item No. 12, Public
Papers . . . Truman, 19l;7, 101-102.
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that he was being hounded daily by his colleagues and
reporters wanting to know why the Army and Navy could not
agree on a bill.

The Secretary of War was apparently not

the cause of the delay, since he forwarded Senator Gurney's
letter to Clark Clifford the same day, asking if he could
help in any way to expedite submission of the bill to the

121

Congres s .

Truman, tired of the bickering over details of the
bill, ordered Clifford to expedite it.

The following

memorandum from Clifford to the Secretaries of War and
Navy gives some indication of the President's mood:
Enclosed herewith find three copies of the 8th
draft of the bill entitled "National Security Act of
1947»n The President asks that you kindly initial
one copy indicating your approval and return the copy
to him.
Because of the urgency of this matter, it is hoped
that you will be able to approve this draft today.
If this is not feasible, you are requested to return
a copy at the very latest by noon t o m o r r o w . 122
Both Porrestal and Patterson sent pledges of their
full support of the draft on February 2

the President

transmitted the bill to Congress the following

121chan Gurney to Patterson, February 21, 1 9 I4.71
Clifford Papers, Subject File, Correapondence-Unification
Bill, Truman Library. See also, Patterson to Clifford,
February 21, 19lj.7> ibid. (The Armed Services Committee
was established by a congressional reorganization at the
end of 19if.6. It replaced the Military Affairs and Naval
Affairs Committees.)
■^^Clifford to Secretaries of the War and Navy,
February 21+, 19^7> Clifford Papers, Subject File, Correspondence-Unification Bill, Truman Library.
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day.

IP'i

J

Hearings on the unification bill, designated

S. 758, were held before the Senate Armed Services
Committee from March 18 to May 9, 19i|7 •

As anticipated,

in light of Truman's express order, the testimony given
by the hierarchy of the military departments was strong
in endorsement of the draft bill.^2^-

The Secretary of War

began his testimony by saying, "I give unqualified support
to the bill to unify the armed forces. . . ," and went on
at great length to explain why.^2^

Forrestal's testimony

was characterized by a cautious optimism.

He restated his

fear that the Secretary of Defense post was too much of a
job for any one man.

The Navy Secretary also warned the

Senators that, "If any single item were withdrawn or

-*-23patterson to Truman, February 25# 19^7# ibid.;
Forrestal to Truman, February 25# 19^4-7# ibid. The Presi
dent's letter of transmittal and the text of the draft
bill are published as U.S., Congress, House, National
Security Act of 19k7i Communication from the President
Transmitting a. Draft of a Proposed Bill Entitled National
Security Act of "l9l4-Y#~H0 Cong., 1 Sess./“(February 26,
19l+7) • The"'biTl' 'is fully summarized in Hearings, National
Defense Establishment, Pt. 1, 11-12. Text of bill^also
appears in full in New York Times, February 28 , 1914-7-

121f.»3 eforQ the bill was sent to Capital Hill • . .
Mr. Truman sent orders to members of the armed services to
support the measure." Washington Post, February 27# 19i|-7»
No such order has been located. The reference may be to
Truman's remark in the meeting of September 10, 19l|.6, that
once the bill went up to Congress he expected everyone to
support it.
•^^Hearings, National Defense Establishment, Pt. 1,
53ff.
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modified to the advantage of any one service the mutual
accommodation would be thrown out of balance.,r^2®

with

minor qualifications, those who followed— Generals Eisen
hower, Norstad, Vandenberg and Spaatz; Admirals Nimitz and
Sherman— gave their full support to the proposed bill.
Even ex-Secretary of War Henry Stimson sent a long letter
to Senator Gurney strongly supporting S. 758
After some small modifications in the Congress, the
National Security Act of 19lj-7 passed on July 25 and was
signed into law by Truman the next day.-1-2®

As finally

passed, the act established the Army, Navy and Air Force
as equal departments, each with its own civilian adminis
trator, under the supervision and control of a single,
civilian Secretary of Defense.

The act provided for a

major re-organization of the military, as well as for a
more effective coordination of all the agencies and

^2®Ibid., 22; Rogow, Victim of Duty, 20lf-205»
also, Washington Post, March" 19, i9ljT•

See

127stimson to Gurney, April 21, 19l|-7, printed in
Hearings, National Defense Establishment, Pt. 2, 1+57-60;
Pt. 3, 709-7lO. Among the few who took issue with the bill
were Marine Commandant Vandegrift, who wanted statutory
protection for the traditional functions of the Marine
Corps, and Admiral King, who opposed establishing the office
of Secretary of Defense. See ibid., Pt. 2, ij.12; Pt. 3,
561; New York Times, May 8 , 191^7.
128Public Law 253, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 191+7.
For a description of the several changes made in the act
by the House, see Clifford to Truman, July 22, 191+7,
Clifford Papers, Subject File, Correspondence-Unification
Bill, Truman Library.
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departments of the national government--both civilian
and military— that were concerned with national security.
Title I of the National Security Act established
three bodies divorced from the military establishment:
(1) The National Security Council;
Intelligence Agency;

(2) The Central

(3) The National Security Resources

Board.
The National Security Council (NSC) was composed
of the President, the Secretaries of Defense, State, Army,
Navy and Air Force, the Chairman of the National Security
Resources Board and other officers of the government as
the President might choose to designate.

The Council

was specifically charged with the function of advising
the President M. . . with respect to the integration of
domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the
130
national security.”
NSC was a lineal descendant of
the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) of
World War II.

The establishment of the National Security

Council was a statutory recognition that the foreign and
military policies of the nation are inextricably involved

-1h
.
Baumer, "National Security Organiza
tion," The Military Engineer, XL, No. 269 (March, 19lj.8)>
5. Hereinafter ci'ted as Baumer, "National Security
Organization."
130"Staff Report of the Subcommittee on National
Policy Machinery," December 12, I960, in Jackson (ed.),
National Security Council, 30.
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and must be coordinated.-^l

Although Marshall declared

that the Council is the most significant policy-making
body in the United States, the group has since served
only in an advisory capacity to the Commander in Chief,
who alone can make national policy, which, in turn, is
eventually subject to, ". . . the support and substantia132
tion of Congress and public opinion.”
In operation under Truman, the National Security
Council functioned, to use Forrestal's description,
". . . not as a place to make policies, but certainly as
a place to identify for the President those things upon

133

which policy needs to be made.”

Up until the time of

the Korean War, Truman did not attend NSC meetings

^••31xbid. See also, Cornwell, ”The Truman
Presidency,” 22lj.-25; Hoare, ’’Truman," 188-89; Ernest R.
May, "The Development of Political Military Consultation in
the United States," Political Science Quarterly, LXX,
No. 2, (June, 1955), 175* Hereinafter cited as May,
"Development of Political Military Consultation.” See
also, John Fischer, "Mr. Truman’s Politburo," Harper *s
Magazine, CCII, No. 1213 (June, 1951), 30. Hereinafter
clued as Fischer, "Mr. Truman’s Politburo."

132Hans on Baldwin, quoted in May, "Development of
Political Military Consultation," 180; Marshall testimony,
Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 5$^; Raymond P. Brandt, St.
Louis Post-bispatch, February 29, 19^8. John Fischer
wrote (In 1951), that Truman had delegated his authority
over national policy to the NSC "to the uttermost limit,"
relying heavily, "almost pathetically," on his expert
advisers.
"Mr. Truman's Politburo," 31•
\

L33Diary Entry, September 17, 19i^7, Millis (ed.),
Forrestal Diaries, 316.
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regularly, because his presence tended to inhibit debate.
When he did attend Council sessions, he followed his
customary practice of asking each person present to state
his views; Truman seldom offered his opinion or accepted
or rejected a recommendation during the course of a
meeting.
Title I of the National Security Act also
established the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) under
the National Security Council.

The Administrative

structure of this agency already existed as the "Central
Intelligence Group" which Truman had created by a
presidential directive in January, 1 9 4 6 . ^ ^

The CIA was

134lbid., 320; Cornwell, "The Truman Presidency,"
225. See also the testimony of Sidney Souers, Executive
Secretary, NSC, to Senate Subcommittee on National Policy
Machinery, May 10, I960, excerpted in Jackson (ed.),
National Security Council, 100, 108-109. For a fuller
description of 4ow Truman wanted the NSC to operate see a
draft memorandum, Truman to Souers, (undated), Clifford
Papers, Subject Pile, National Military Establishment—
Security Council, Truman Library.
-^Truman to Secretaries of State, War, and Navy,
January 22, 19i|.6, Clifford Papers, Subject Pile, National
Intelligence Authority, Truman Library. The text of this
directive is printed in Hearings, National Defense Estab
lishment , Pt. 3, 495* See also, Truman, Memoirs, I, 96-99,
226; li, 55-58? Acheson, Present at the Creation, 1^7-61.
The President was originally against 'changing the Central
Intelligence Group (CIG) into a full-fledged agency, but
was apparently persuaded to do so by Clark Clifford and
members of the CIG, who found it ineffective in operation.
Memorandum for file, George M. Elsey, July 17* 1946*
Clifford Papers, Subject Pile, National Intelligence
Authority, Truman Library.
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assigned the task of coordinating the intelligencegathering activities of numerous government departments,
evaluating the infomnation received and distributing this
material to government officials with a need to know.*-^
The director of the agency was normally the President's
first appointment each morning, briefing him on intelli
gence developments in the past twenty-four hours:

"This

centralization of the gathering and reporting of data
simplified the President's search for knowledge and added
significantly to his powers in directing foreign
policy.
The third coordination body established by the
National Security Act was the National Security Resources
Board (NSRB).

The Board was to be directed by a civilian

chairman, with the membership to come from various
departments and agencies of the federal government, as
designated by the President.

The NSRB was designed to

coordinate all civilian, military and industrial factors

■l-^Baumer, "National Security Organization," 5>
Bernardo and Bacon, American Military Policy, 1|59.
•*■370'Connor, "Harry S. Truman: New Dimensions of
Power," ij.6; Hillman (ed.), Mr. President, llj.; John Hersey,
"Profiles— Mr. President," Pt. 37 ^Forty-Eight Hours,"
The New Yorker (April 21, 1951) » 36. Hereinafter cited
as HerseyT Profiles," Pt. 3« For a critical view of the
disadvantages of the CIA to a President, see James,
Contemporary Presidency, 150-51•
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necessary for an emergency mobilization.^®
Title II, the other major section of the National
Security Act, created the National Military Establishment
(NME), headed by a civilian designated the Secretary of
Defense.

The new structure was to consist of the Depart

ments of the Army, Navy and Air Force, each headed by a
civilian secretary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), a
Joint Staff under the JCS, the War Council, Munitions
Board and the Research and Development Board.
Under the direction of the Commander in Chief, the
Secretary of Defense was charged by the bill with the
following duties:
(1) Establish general policies and programs for
the National Military Establishment and for all of the
departments and agencies therein;
(2) Exercise general direction, authority, and
control over such departments and agencies;
(3) Take appropriate steps to eliminate unnecessary
duplication or overlapping in the fields of procure
ment, supply, transportation, storage, health, and
research;
(if.) Supervise and coordinate the preparation of
the budget estimates of the departments and agencies -j^g
comprising the National Military Establishment. . . .

^ Charles Fairman, "The President as Commander-inChief," Journal of Politics, XI (February, 19if-9), 150.
Hereinafter ci^teT“as Fairman, "President as Commander-inChief." See also, Baumer, "National Security Organization,"
£; Cornwell, "The Truman Presidency," 22if.; St. Louis
Post-Dispatch, November Ilf., 191+7 •
-^Public Law 253, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., (61 Stat.
1+95) J Report, "Six Months of Unification," RG330, OSD,
D67-1-32, National Archives.
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The most important body under the new military
organization was the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

The

Joint Chiefs were made responsible for formulating
strategic plans and issuing military directives to the
field commanders.

Thus, the JCS both recommended military

policy— as advisers to the Secretary of Defense, National
Security Council and the President— and executed military
policy through its directives to the unified field
commands.

In operation under Truman, all JCS directives,

except for the most routine of matters, were cleared by
the Secretary of Defense and had to receive final approval
from the President before being dispatched to the field
commands.

The organizational structure of the NME removed

the Chiefs of Staff from direct contact with the
Commander in Chief, but Truman made it clear to all
members of the JCS that they were to have direct, individual
access to him, bypassing all the civilian hierarchal
structure above them, whenever they felt it necessary.
Truman was once asked if the existence of the Joint Chiefs
caused the Commander in Chief to rely less upon his own
judgment and more on the advice of his generals.

"Those

professional military men are supposed to know the military

l^OjPar East Hearings, Pt. 1, lj?0-5lJ Pt. 2, 90lj.,
12^6, li+75, 1606, 1622. See also, May (ed.), Ultimate
Decision, Intro., xii-xv; Fairman, "The President as
Commander-in-Chief," 151-52.
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situation as it is in the world," Truman replied, "and
they’re supposed to inform the President, so that he can
make up his mind on what he ought to do in case of an
emergency. !f l i^l l
On the day he signed the National Security Act into
law, July 26, 1947 > Truman also issued Executive Order
9877 » defining the specific functions of each branch of
the armed forces.

This was made necessary by the new

structure which separated the Air Force from the Army and
transferred certain powers to the Secretary of Defense.
The changes made in the military departments also
necessitated that Truman make several new appointments.
He asked Robert Patterson, then Secretary of War, to
become Secretary of Defense.

Patterson, explaining that

his strained financial condition would not permit his
staying in government, refused the post and insisted upon
resigning as Secretary of War (Army).

The President asked

l^P-Truman Speaks, 23 .
l^-2por text of order see Clifford Papers, Subject
File, Unification, Truman Library. Text is also in
RG3^0> Secretary of the Air Force (s/AF) , Special Interest
File 4A, National Archives.
See also, Item No. 159,
Public Papers . . . Truman, 1947 > 359-61; New York
Herald-Trlbune, July 27, 1947*
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Forrestal to take the post and he a c c e p t e d . T h u s

the

man who had consistently believed that the job was too
much of a burden for any man to bear, became Secretary of
Defense, his suicide two years later marking the tragic
end of a self-fulfilling prophecy.

With Forrestal's con

currence, Truman appointed Undersecretary of War Kenneth
C. Royall, Secretary of the Army; Assistant Secretary of
the Navy John L. Sullivan, Secretary of the Navy and
Assistant Secretary of War for Air, Stuart Symington, as
the first Secretary of the Air F o r c e . W i t h

the swear

ing-in of Forrestal as Secretary of Defense on September
17, 19i}-7, the new military establishment became operational
the following d a y . ^ ^
The organization which Truman had created through
patience, persistance and compromise eventually revealed

l^-3Forrestal to Truman, July 28, 19lj.7, Truman
Papers, Official File (OF), 1285, Truman Library. Patter
son's determination to resign and Royall's endorsement of
Forrestal as Secretary of Defense is in a memorandum of a
telephone conversation, Clifford (to Royall), July 2
19k7> Clifford Papers, Subject File, Unification, Truman
Library. See also, Millis (ed.), Forrestal Diaries,
295-96, 298-99; Washington Post, July 19* 191+7•
•^^Ttem No. 182, Press Conference, August 21, 191+7,
Public Papers . • . Truman, 19lf7, k^.0, A month earlier,
Hanson Baldwin had correctly picked each one of these
appointments, including Forrestal's, in the New York
Times, July 20, 191^7*
•^^Washington Post, September 19, 192+7J New York
Times, September 18, 192+7•
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major flaws that required reform legislation.

But since

it did centralize, streamline and clarify some of the
command system, it served to aid the President in formu
lating military policy and getting that policy implemented.
Truman was usually sure of what he wanted to do in a
given situation; the NME told him how best to accomplish
his objective.

The new agencies established, particularly

the National Security Council, performed a valuable
function in recognizing that the formulation of military
and foreign policies had to be considered as an integral
process, particularly in the ,fCold War" environment of the
postwar period.

The removal of the Joint Chiefs from

direct access to the President, while not practical during
time of war, provided a desirable dilution of strictly
military viewpoints before they reached the Commander in
Chief's desk.

The National Security Act also, as one

writer said, " . . .

sharpened the weapons at the Presi

dent's disposal and added a new dimension to his command
of American foreign policy.
Pull unification was not achieved in 19^-7-

This is

true largely because of compromises and accommodations
made to zealots concerned more with preserving the
traditional powers of a particular service than with the

Connor, "Harry S. Truman: New Dimensions of
Power," lj.7-1+8.
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requirements of an effective national defense structure.
As one critical Republican newspaper put it:
President Truman has produced what he calls a
merger plan for the army and navy. It is not a
merger plan, it is in most respects a sham, and in
some respects will contribute to the disintegration
rather than the integration of our defense forces.
The question of unification of the forces is a
difficult one. It requires the most serious consid
eration. . . . Instead of a solution, Mr. Truman
offers an evasion. . . .
The attempt to relieve the President of the
responsibility for conduct of national defense, by
creating a secretary charged with that task . . . is
futile because the President constitutionally is the
commander in chief of the army and navy. He can
delegate authority but he cannot delegate ultimate
responsibility.ll+f
While the editorial cited wrongly assumed that
Truman intended to divest himself of decision-making
responsibility, it correctly identified the act as some
thing less than what the President said it was.

For

example, the Administration had often emphasized the
economy that would be realized by unification when, in
fact, the merger act was not designed to save money, nor
did it, if mounting defense expenditures are a valid
measure.
Millis)

Also, in its aim (as summarized by Walter
”. . . t o provide the United States with a

coherent and self-consistent system of military-political
direction, fully informed by the best intelligence

1^-7Chicago Tribune, January 29, 191+7•
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available," the unification act failed.
The Office of Secretary of Defense proved to be
too weak under the 19ij.7 statute.

Although the Defense

Secretary was nominally the immediate superior of the
three departmental secretaries, all four served equally
on the National Security Council.

In addition, the

three secretaries were permitted to bypass their superior
and bring their concerns directly to the President.

As

constituted, the office of Defense Secretary suffered
from divided responsibility and a severe lack of
authority.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, while obliged to

advise the Secretary of Defense, were not controlled by
him to any appreciable

e x t e n t . 1 ^

The National Security Council was too vaguely
defined to be effective.

The NSC was supposed to advise

the President on the coordination of all factors
affecting the security of the nation, but it was not
made clear whether the Council should initiate the con
sideration of policies or deliberate only when told to

■^^Millis, Arms and Men, 280.
l^-9iphe Hoover Commission Report on Organization of
the Executlve' Branch of the Government' TNew York: McGrawHill Book Company, 19"W)"» l87> 190-91’. Hereinafter cited
as Hoover Commission Report. See also, Rostow, United
States in the World Arena, 176. Hanson Baldwin ifelt that
the JoinE Staff under the JCS was a "potentially dangerous"
body, resembling the Greater German General Staff idea.
"The Military Move In," ij.87-88.
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consider a subject by the President.

The NSC would be

of value in working out long-range policy recommendations,
but proved of little worth for the resolution of emergency
situations.

Also, a disproportionate number of NSC

members (four), although civilians themselves, represented
military departments.

In operation under Truman, a repre

sentative of the JCS also attended each meeting and was
heard, so that five of the seven or eight usually present
at Security Council meetings approached each problem with
1^0
a military orientation. ^
That the Navy-Forrestal struggle against unification
was justified is a moot question.

The editor of Forrestal’s

papers, Walter Millis, thinks it was.

Millis also holds

that all the key participants were equally responsible and
maintains that their actions M. . . delayed the nation
for a year or two in grappling with the already dire state
1^1
of world affairs."
The military leadership of the
country spent over two years absorbed in what was often
petty haggling over bureaucratic politics.

In the end,

Truman had accepted a poor structure that was not at all
consonant with his own ideas on unification, primarily

1*>0 'Connor, "Harry S. Truman: New Dimensions of
Power," I1.7-I4.8 j Baldwin, "The Military Move In," J4.8I4.; Hammond,
"NSC-68, 273-75, 277-79.
■®-5lMillis (ed.), Forrestal Diaries, Editor’s Note,
153.
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because the struggle had intensified to a point where
imposition of a thorough unification would have been
destructive of military morale and politically
explosive.

152

In the final analysis, Forrestal had prevailed.

The

National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency and
National Resources Board were all originally proposed in
the plan that Eberstadt's committee had drafted for
Forrestal.

He had lost out with the establishment of the

Air Force as a co-equal to the Army and Navy Departments.
But Forrestal succeeded in blocking the Army proposal for
a single Chief of Staff for all the services.

He had

preserved the Marine Corps intact and kept most of Naval
Aviation against the wishes of War Department planners.
Most important of all, from Forrestal's point of view, he
had managed to have the authority of the Secretary of
Defense limited to coordination and an over-all, generally
powerless supervision of the three service departments.
The irony, of course, is that Forrestal, the first Secre
tary of Defense, had unknowingly performed an act of
self-emasculation.
As Forrestal attempted to make a functioning office
from the rigid statutory edifice he had fashioned, he
became increasingly aware that changes would be necessary;

■^^Rostow, United States in the World Arena, 175*
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hence the Secretary asked for major revisions in both the
National Security Act and the accompanying executive order
defining the roles and missions of the services.

Forrestal

took action on the executive order first, in January 1948
by asking the service secretaries and the JCS to send him
recommendations on a redraft of the order.

The Defense

Secretary received the service secretaries' recommendations
and finding them so diverse as to make coordination
impossible, postponed any immediate proposal to the
President.

154

Late in February 1948 Forrestal told the President
that he had not yet been able to get any agreement from
the Joint Chiefs on the definition of functions of the
services, but had instructed them to inform him on March 8
on the areas of disagreement between them, on which he
would then make his own decisions.

The problem required

decision because Forrestal had to have a definition of the
specific roles and missions of each service before he could

^-^Forrestal to Secretaries of Army, Navy, Air
Force, and Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 20, 1948,
RG330, OSD, D70-l-£, National Archives.
l54Forrestal to Secretaries of Army, Navy, Air
Force, February 3» 1948, RG34°> S/aF, Reorganization of
NME, Special File i^A, DG520A53-307, National Archives.
See
also, Leahy to Forrestal, February 6, 1948» Clifford
Papers, Subject File, National Military Establishment—
Misc., Truman Library.
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make budgetary allocations for carrying them out. ^
Whether the participants appreciated it at the time is
unknown, but Forrestal was precisely in the same position
he and Patterson had placed the President in May of 19l|-6,
of pressuring his subordinates for an agreement by
threatening to decide the matter arbitrarily.
The Joint Chiefs reported their disagreements over
service functions to the Secretary of Defense on March 8.
To settle the matter, Forrestal assembled a conference
with the JCS at Key West, Florida, from the eleventh to
the fourteenth.

The agreement finally reached was that

each service would be assigned both primary and collateral
functions.

The primary functions were those for which a

service would have clear-cut responsibility.

Collateral

functions were defined as instances where a service force
acted to support or supplement another service in carrying
out a primary function.

196

The Secretary of Defense sub

mitted the new draft of armed services functions to the

15>5>Forrestal to Truman, February 27 , 19i+8, RG330,
OSD, D70-1-5* National Archives. See also, Truman,
Memoirs, II, j?2.
1 9 % M E Press Release No. 38-ij-8* OSD, "Secretary
Forrestal Announces Results of Key West Conference,"
March 26, 19i|8, Clifford Papers, Subject File, National
Military Establishment— Misc., Truman Library. See also,
Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-3& Bombers," If.7^-75*
Present at Key West were Admirals Leahy and Denfield,
Generals Bradley and Spaatz, their aides, and Secretary
Forrestal.
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President, asking that it be approved and requesting that
Executive Order 9877 be recinded.^-^
Truman turned the draft over to Clark Clifford for
study.

Clifford recommended to him after consultation

with Admiral Leahy, General Vaughan, the Bureau of the
Budget, and others, that Forrestal1s proposals be approved,
subject to the addition of a phrase making it clear that
Forrestal was issuing the statement "by direction of the
198
President."
On April 21, 191+8, the President revoked
Executive Order 9877 and informed the Secretary of Defense
of his approval of the new statement on roles and missions
of the s e r v i c e s . O n

the same day Forrestal issued the

■^^Forrestal to Truman, March 27, 19i|8, RG330, OSD,
D70-1-5, National Archives.

ci if ford to Truman, April 13 , 19i|-8, Truman
Papers, OF, 1289, Truman Library. Clifford sent a memo
randum to the Secretary of Defense, informing him that the
President approved, but wanted the phrase, "by direction
of the President" added. Forrestal replied that such a
phrase would have appeared in the original draft statement,
". . . but for the fact that we wished to refrain from
using the President's name in the document prior to the
time you and he had an opportunity to go over it." See
Clifford to Forrestal, April 19, 191+8, Clifford Papers,
Subject File, National Military Establishment— Misc.,
Truman L i b rary j Forrestal to Clifford, April 16, 191+8,
RG330, OSD, D70-1-9, National Archives.
l59Truman to Forrestal, April 21, 191+8, RG330, OSD,
D70-1-9, National Archives.
See also, Executive Order
9990, April 21, 19l;8 (13 P.R. 2191), which revoked the
previous order. Truman incorrectly dates this order,
"March 2711 in his Memoirs, II, 9^«
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new statement to the Joint Chiefs and the service secre
taries, formally completing the first revisions in the
military reorganization of 19^7.

160

During the first year of operation of the National
Military Establishment it became apparent to me that
the Secretary of defense needed additional authority
to meet his responsibilities.
It was clear that the
act should be amended to define and strengthen the
authority of the Secretary; to authorize an Under
Secretary of Defense; to provide the Joint Chiefs of
Staff with a chairman; to remove the service Secre
taries from the National Security Council, leaving
the Secretary of Defense the sole representative of
the military; and to correct numerous administrative
,
inefficiencies that a y e a r ’s experience had revealed.
What was clear to President Truman was also clear
to Secretary Forrestal; the National Security Act had to

be amended.

In June 191+8 Forrestal had ordered all of the

leadership within the National Military Establishment to
cooperate with the Committee of the Hoover Commission that
was studying the organizational problems of the NME.

1 62

Forrestal to Symington, April 21, 19i+8, RG3ij.O,
S/AF, Special Interest File IjA, Reorganization of NME,
National Archives. Text of statement of service functions
is in ibid. See also, Joint Army and Air Force Bulletin,
No. 13, May 13, 19lj.8. For text of original' draft, see
New York Times, March 28, I9I4.8 .
l^Truman, Memoirs, II, 5>2-53.
l62Eberstadt to Forrestal, May 3 1 » 19^8, RG3ij.O,
S/AF, Special File 1]JB, Hoover Commission— Reorganiz at ion of
the NME, National Archives. Forrestal to Secretary of the
Air Force, et. al., June 2, 19lf.8, ibid. The Commission on
Organization o f T h e Executive Branch of the Government,
directed by Herbert Hoover, was established by Congress at
Truman's request, in December, 19^5* Forrestal's old
friend and associate, Ferdinand Eberstadt, was chairman of
the Committee on the National Security Organization of the
Hoover Commission. Truman, Memoirs, I, if.86.
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The Defense Secretary also sought recommendations from the
departmental secretaries and the military chiefs, asking
that they report to him by September 1 . ^ ^
The reports submitted to Forrestal showed the usual
divergence of views existing between the services.

For

example, Secretary of the Navy Sullivan advised "that no
amendments to the National Security Act of '19i+7 be made
at this time."^^'

An opposite view was expressed by Air

Force Secretary Symington.

He proposed strengthening the

Office of Secretary of Defense by changing the language
of the unification act to eliminate divided responsibility
and centralize authority with the Defense Secretary.
Symington also proposed the appointment of an Under Secre
tary to assist Forrestal along with a single Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces, responsible only to the Secretary of
Defense.

He also recommended that the law be changed to

eliminate the Secretaries of Army, Navy and Air Force from
membership in the National Security Council, leaving the
Secretary of Defense as the sole representative of the

■^^Forrestal to Secretaries of Army, Navy, Air
Force, August 1^., 19i4-8, RG330, OSD, D70-1-5, National
Archives.
1 ^Sullivan to Forrestal, September 1,
RG330, OSD, D70-1-5, National Archives.
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National Military Establishment.

165

Symington’s views,

which were consonant with those held by both Forrestal and
Truman, eventually became part of the amended act.
Forrestal, as he received these reports, was also
cognizant of a report to the President on the status of
national preparedness made by the National Security
Council.

The report informed Truman that the country was

not internally secure nor was it ready in the event of a
conflict with other large nations, a declaration of war
by or upon this nation, or a normal or unconventional
l66
surprise attack.
It was with these several reports on
his mind that Forrestal drafted a long memorandum to
Truman on September 16, 19l|8.

The Secretary reviewed the

subject of national defense , which was his immediate
responsibility under the President, and urged upon Truman
his conviction that little could be done until the
authority and responsibility were centralized in one
office of the government.
16 v
sympathetic audience.

Forrestal had in Truman a

The Secretary of Defense sent his first draft of

l6f?Symington to Forrestal, September llj., 19^8,
RG 3J4.O, S/AF, Special File 1+B, Hoover Commission—
Reorganization of the NME, National Archives.
1 66
The Security Council advisory is quoted in a
memorandum, Forrestal to Truman, September 16, 19l]-8,
RG330, OSD, CD22-1-5, National Archives.
•^^Ibid.

See also, Rogow, Victim of Duty, 270.
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revisions in the National Security Act to the White House
early in December.

l68

Truman apparently asked Forrestal

to revise his recommendations in cooperation with the
Budget Director and his White House Counsel, for two sub
sequent draft proposals— January 2J4. and February 10,
19ij.9--bear the signatures of Frank Pace, Jr. and Clark
Clifford.

169

The President could derive some satisfaction

from these recommendations, since, to a quite appreciable
extent, they proposed the kind of unification that Truman
had asked for in his original message to Congress of
December 19, 19
The President sent a special message to Congress on
March 5, 19lf-9, requesting changes in the National Military
Establishment.

He based his request on the experience

gained under the National Security Act and on the Hoover
Commission Report on the National Security Organization,
which had recently been submitted to the Congress.

The

message followed very closely the recommendations made in

l68Marx Leva to Clifford, December 3, 191+8, Clifford
Papers, Subject File, National Military Establishment:
Security Council, Truman Library.

169^0 draft memorandum, dated January 21+, 19i+9,
is in Clifford Papers, Subject File, Unification:
Amendment of National Security Act, 191+9, Truman Library.
The draft of February 10, 19^9 can be found in Eisenhower
Papers, PF/DDE, Truman folder (2), Eisenhower Library.
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the February 10 memorandum from Forrestal, Pace and
Clifford .170
After following the normal legislative process,
without the interservice struggles that characterized the
original reorganization, save for a continued opposition
from the Navy Department, Truman’s proposals became law on
August 10, as the National Security Act Amendments of
19^4-9-

At the bill-signing ceremony, Truman said that he

was pleased that the act had passed embodying most of the
recommendations he had made, as well as several suggestions
made by the Hoover Commission:

"These provisions afford

sound basis for further progress toward the unification of
our Armed Forces and the unified management of our military
affairs,

IfOltem No. 5>0, Special Message to Congress or
Reorganization of the National Military Establishment,
March 5, 19lj.9> Public Papers . . . Truman, 19hS» 163-66.
See also, Forrestal, et. a l ., to Truman, February 10, 19ll9,
RG3/l;0, S/AF, AF381, National Archives. A Defense Depart
ment staff paper comparing the Truman and Eberstadt
recommendations is "Tab C" to a memorandum, Marx Leva to
Forrestal, April 7, 19i+9, RG330, OSD, D70-1-5, National
Archives. For the recommendations made by the Hoover
Commission, see "Recommendations of Hoover Commission
Report on National Security Organization," Clifford Papers,
Subject File, National Military Establishment, Security
Resources Board, Truman Library. See also the exerpted
version of the Eberstadt Commission Report in Hoover
Commission Report, 192-97• ^ I t e m No. 177 1 Statement by the President Upon
Signing the National Security Act Amendments of 191+9,
August 10, 1949, Public Papers . . . Truman, 19il9, Ip.7-

Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibitedwithout permission.

Under the terms of the act, the National Military
Establishment became the Department of Defense, an execu
tive department of the government.

The Army, Navy and Air

Force became military departments within the Defense
Department, rather than executive departments.

The powers

of the Secretary of Defense were significantly expanded
giving him a far more effective control over the entire
military.

He was also provided with an Under Secretary

of Defense and three Assistant Secretaries, all civilians.
The Chiefs of Staff lost their individual influence with
the Commander in Chief, but the JCS gained a chairman who,
as military adviser to the Secretary of Defense and the
President, represented the views of the military to these
officials and in the National Security Council.

The post

of Chief of Staff to the President was abolished, although
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in practice,
would function in approximately the same capacity.

A

fourth title was amended into the National Security Act
providing for uniform budgetary and fiscal procedures and
the appointment of comptrollers for the Department of
Defense as well as the Army, Navy and Air Force.
James Forrestal never enjoyed the newly-obtained

■^^Public Law 216, 81 Cong., 1 Sess., (63 Stat.
578)• See also, Bernardo and Bacon, American MilTtary
Policy, 14.60—61 ; Hoare, "Truman," 187-88; Rogow," Victim of
Duty, 270-71.
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powers and prestige of the office.

For reasons both

personal and political, Truman forced Forrestal to resign.
In a "Dear Jim" letter dated March 2 and made public the
next day, Truman wrote of his reluctance to accept the
resignation made necessary by ". . . those urgent
personal considerations about which you have spoken to me
so many times."

The President indicated he was reassured

to know that Forrestal would be ". . . standing by to give
advice and counsel as we go forward in the work of
enhancing the national security."

Forrestal would not

be "standing by" very long; he was dead before the
amendments passed.
There can be little doubt that Truman was right in
urging unification.

The reorganization brought many

173porrestal to Truman, March 2, 191+9, Truman Papers,
OF, 1285, Truman Library.
Item No. 1+6, Letter Acoepting
Resignation of James Forrestal as Secretary of Defense,
March 3, 191+9, Public Papers . . . Truman, 191+9, 160.
Forrestal was apprently suffering from severe mental strain.
In late 191+8 and early 191+9 he became increasingly inde
cisive and forgetful. He began to act quite erratically
and paranoidal, convinced he was constantly being followed
and that his telephone was tapped. Correspondents, with
Drew Pearson taking the lead, had been attacking him and
suggesting that Truman wanted him out of the Cabinet. See,
for example, Pearson's column in the Washington Post,
June 10, 191+8* Forrestal had remained aloof f r o m ’'the 191+8
presidential campaign, while the man chosen as his
successor, Louis Johnson, had been the chief fund-raiser
for the Democrats. Rogow claims that the Secret Service
reported to Truman "late in 191+8 or early in 191+9>11 that
Forrestal was suffering from "a total psychotic breakdown
. . . characterized by suicidal features." Victim of Duty,
271-73, 277-80, 306. See also, Millis (ed.), Forrestal
Diaries, 518-19, 51+1+-1+7, 550-53 1 Hammond, "Super Carriers
and B -36 Bombers," 1+92; Krock, Memoirs, 252-27.
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desirable changes and ended much of the duplication and
interservice bickering that was undesirable.

Truman

established a modern military structure capable of immed
iate and effective response to any threat to the security
of the nation.

However, in their unity the military

services found greater strength in making budgetary
requests, in obtaining desired legislation in Congress
and in determining the foreign policy of the United States.
Military strength grew so much following unification that
Truman's successor, the most honored military officer of
this century, took the occasion of his departure from the
presidency to warn the nation against the dangers implicit
in the power of the "military-industrial" complex.
Although recognizing that he had not obtained the
full, "true" unification desired, Truman was proud of what
had been accomplished in that direction:

"To me, the

passage of the National Security Act and its strengthening

17^-Time, XCIII (April 11, 1969), 22.

The same issue
also quotes retired Marine Commandant General David Shoup
as charging that the officer corps' romanticizing of war,
along with the influence of the ''defense community," had
led to the United States becoming a "militaristic and
aggressive nation." See ibid., 20-21. The effort to pro
vide an efficient military organization has-obviously-not
been an unalloyed triumph.
In mid-1970, a "Blue Ribbon
Panel" reported the results of a year's study of the Defense
Department to the President. The panel reported on
numerous examples of gross inefficiency and recommended
major reforms. Gilbert Pitzhugh, who headed the study,
described the Pentagon as, ". . . just an amorphous lump
with nobody in charge of anything.
See ibid., XCVI
(August 10, 1970), off.

Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibitedwithout permission.

293
amendments represented one of the outstanding achievements
of my administration. "^7%

Some time after his presidency,

Truman was asked if the unification process should continue
so that there could be an even-tighter amalgamation of the
armed forces.

He replied:

There isn’t a doubt in the world but that the
whole thing ought to be tightened up so that the
President, as commander-in-chief, could deal through
a Secretary of Defense who should have direct control
of the defenses of the nation. . . . We need to get
the idea over that the Defense Department of the
Government of the United States is of vital
importance and must not be tampered with by conflict
ing forces. It ought to operate under direct control
of a man who knows where he's going and why. He
should be the Secretary of Defense in complete
control of all the services, ground, sea and air,
under the direction of the Commander-in-Chief-~the
President of the United States.

The prevailing racial attitudes in the United
States were traditionally mirrored by the military
services.

Until the manpower demands of World War II

made necessary the calling of men regardless of color,
the services had enlisted a limited number of Negroes.
Those that were accepted were assigned to the more menial
ratings and found themselves segregated from Caucasian
servicemen.

According to a War Department public statement

in October 191^-0, separation of the races had proven

175>Truman, Memoirs , II, £3*
•^^Truman, Mr. Citizen, lij.5-1^6.
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"satisfactory over a long period of years"; any change
might hamper national defense preparations and be detri
mental to morale.-*-7?

The Navy Department was blunter:

"The policy of not enlisting men of the colored race for
any branch of the naval service but the messman’s branch
was adopted to meet the best interests of general ship
efficiency."1^®

During the war, although the number of

black persons in all of the services increased, they were
normally assigned to all-Negro units.

These units were

often given insignificant duties or ignored altogether.
An example of this attitude was the experience of several
Negro air units which were in training for well over a
year; they were not considered for combat service until

w. Kenworthy, "Taps for Jim Crow in the
Services," New York Times Magazine (June 11, 19$0), 12.
Hereinafter cited as Kenworthy, ^ a p s for Jim Crow in the
Services." Kenworthy served as executive secretary on the
President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Oppor
tunity in the Armed Forces. See also, Richard M. Dalfiume,
Desegregation of the U.S.Armed Forces: Fighting on Two
Fronts, 1939-1^3 (CoTumbia, Missouri: University of
Missouri Press, 1969), 38-39. Hereinafter cited as
Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces. For a
thorough, but generally uncriticaT study of the1 Negro
soldier in World War II, see Ulysses Lee, The Employment
of Negro Troops, in Stetson Conn (genl. ed.), United
Spates Army in World War II (Washington, 1966).
^fytenworthy, "Taps for Jim Crow in the Services,"
12. See also, Jean Byers, "A Study of the Negro in
Military Service," (263-page, mimeographed, restricted
document, "reproduced for departmental use," January,
1950), 1. Copy in RG340, S/AF, Special Interest File,
19l}.8—19ip9, National Archives. Hereinafter cited as Byers,
"A Study of the Negro in Military Serivce."
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black Congressmen began to apply pressure.

At the request

of the War Department, General MacArthur " . . .

agreed to

take a composite group of two medium bombardment and one
P-lj.7 fighter squadron, provided we assure him it is
properly trained, and well organized and led.

. . ."179

Improvement in the postwar period was slight.

The

Navy had begun integrating Negroes into numerous branches
and departments during the war and in February 19^6
lifted all racial restrictions as to the assignments of
Negro personnel.

But the implementation of this non-

discriminatory policy was very slow.

The great majority

of enlisted blacks continued to serve as messmen, and there
were only two Negro officers in the entire Navy in April
of 192+6.

In early 19if7 the Marines gave every enlisted

Negro the option of transferring to the steward's branch
or being discharged from the Corps.

Army integration in

the postwar period existed almost exclusively as a
recommendation on paper.'1'®®
On December 5* 19lf-6, by Executive Order 9808,
Truman created the President’s Committee on Civil Rights
with instructions to investigate and make recommendations

179jra Eaker to Joseph T. McNarney, June 2, 1945*
RG118, AAF, 312.1 - Operations ltrs. - 19i+5 (v. 3) >
National Archives.
l80Byers, "A Study of the Negro in Military Service,"
262-63. Copy in RG3lj.O, S/AF, Special Interest File,
192+8—19i+9 i N at i onal Ar chi ve s .

Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibitedwithout permission.

296

to him on all areas of religious and racial discrimination
in the United States.
at his word.

1 ftl

The committee took the President

The report to Truman, entitled ”To Secure

These Rights" was submitted in October, 1947*

The report

was a stinging condemnation of bias in America; it made
numerous recommendations with regard to voting rights,
anti-lynch laws, fair employment practices for federal
employees, naturalization procedures and discrimination
in the armed forces.
report, " . . .

One writer has called the committee's

one of the great documents in the tradition

. x.
M18 2
of our free society.

To implement the report, the President sent a special
message to Congress, February 2, 191^8.

In it, Truman

went right down the line in asking for legislation
suggested in the committee’s ten basic recommendations.
He also announced that he had already taken steps (for
which he did not need legislative sanction):

He had

created the Civil Rights Division within the Department of
Justice, ordering the FBI to closely assist the new

l8lTruman, Memoirs, II, 180. See also, Item No. 9,
Remarks to Members of the President’s Committee on Civil
Rights, January 15, 1947, Public Papers . . . Truman, 1947,
98-99.
^®^John P. Roche, The Quest for the Dream: The
Development of Civil Rights and Human Relations in Modern
America (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968), 238 . See also,
Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U..S. Armed Forces, 155-56;
Truman, Memoirs, II, lBl. For Truman's message praising
the report see Item No. 215, Public Papers . . . Truman,
1947, 479-80.
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division.
"...

Truman also informed the Congress that he had

instructed the Secretary of Defense to take steps

to have the remaining instances of discrimination in the
armed services eliminated as rapidly as possible."'1'®^

As

he might have expected, the Congress took no action.
Political controversy clouded the civil rights
question.

In May 191+8 Truman’s request for Selective

Service legislation faced opposition from southern Demo
crats because of his order to Forrestal to eliminate
discrimination in the military forces.

But Truman told

reporters that his order to the Secretary of Defense
remained u n c h a n g e d . P o l i t i c a l

considerations did

cause Truman to postpone executive action to end racial
discrimination in federal agencies and in the military
departments.

A Washington correspondent reported that on

the advice of J. Howard McGrath, Chairman of the Demo
cratic National Committee, Truman had decided to delay
any action until after he had received the presidential

1®3jtem No. 20, Special Message to the Congress on
Civil Rights, February 2, 191+8, Public Papers . . . Truman,
191+8, 121-26.
181+New York Times, May 28, 191+8. Forrestal, who
believed completely in the idea, had begun work upon
receipt of the President’s orders.
See, for example, his
interim progress report in a memorandum, Forrestal to
Truman, February 29, 3-91+8, RG330, OSD, CD25-1-11,
National Archives .
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nomination of his party.

l8£

Ten days after winning the nomination, Truman
issued two Presidential decrees.

The first, Executive

Order 9980, established fair employment policies for all
departments of the executive branch of the national govern
ment.

The second, Executive Order 9981, was the pivotal

step in reforming the racial policies of the American
military.

The major provisions of the order are quoted

below:
WHEREAS it is essential that there be maintained
in the armed services of the United States the highest
standards of democracy, with equality of treatment and
opportunity for all those who serve in our country’s
defense:
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in
me as President of the United States . . . and as
Commander in Chief of the armed services, it is hereby
ordered as follows:
1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the
President that there shall be equality of treament
and opportunity for all persons in the armed services
without regard to race, color, religion or national
origin. This policy shall be put into effect as
rapidly as possible, having due regard to the time
required to effectuate any necessary changes without
impairing efficiency or morals.
2. There shall be created in the National Military
Establishment an advisory committee to be known as the
President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and
Opportunity in the Armed Services, which shall be
composed of seven members to be designated by the
President.
3. The Committee is authorized on behalf of the
President to examine into the rules, procedures, and

iQ^James

a

. Wechsler, New York Post, June 6, 1948.
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practices of the armed services in order to determine
in what respect such rules, procedures and practices
may be altered or improved with a view to carrying
out the policy of this order.^°°
Prodded by the Secretary of Defense and the Presi
dent's Committee, the military departments began to
initiate new policies designed to end discrimination.
The Army and Navy were relatively slow in implementing
these policies, while the Air Force set the pace under the
leadership of Stuart Symington.

The relative slowness of

change in the Navy Department would appear to come from
an inherent traditionalism which was slow to accept
change, rather than any general desire to subvert Truman's
orders.

The Army, however, was not encouraged to move

toward desegregation by the attitude of Secretary Royall.
In April 191+8 Forrestal had assembled a conference of
fifteen Negro leaders to get their views on how best to

l86ji;Xecutive Order 9981, July 26, 19i+8 (13 F.R.,
1+311+). Text of both orders is in Joint Army and ATr Force
Bulletin, No. 32 (August 2, 191+8) • See also, Richard J.
Stillman, Integration of the Negro in the U.S. Armed Forces
(New York: Frederick a . PraegerJ l9"^ET)7 1+1—1+2*. Hereinafter
cited as Stillman, Integration of the Negro in the U.jS.
Armed Forces. Original draft is in Clifford Papers, Sub
ject File, Segregation in the Armed Forces, Truman Library.
The original idea for the committee was Clark Clifford's:
"I would suggest . . . a defense establishment board . . .
charged with the development of a uniform racial policy in
the Services consistent with the President's two goals of
equal opportunity and non-discrimination." Clifford to
Truman, May 11, 19lj-8, Clifford Papers, Subject 'File, Segre
gation in the Armed Forces, Truman Library.
Clifford
repeated this proposal in a memorandum to Secretary
Forrestal, May 13, 19lj-8, Clifford Papers, Subject File,
Unification: Secretary of Defense, Truman Library.
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improve race relations in the military.

During the

meeting Royall held firm to the Army policy of keeping
black soldiers in segregated units.

Royall told the

conferees that this segregation did not represent discrimi
nation.'1'®^

In a bitter memorandum to the Secretary of

Defense several months later, Royall complained that the
Army was taking an unfair "rap" from ". . . the Negro and
the liberal press in the matter of race relations."

The

Army Secretary recognized that the attacks stemmed from
his remarks at the April meeting, but he told Forrestal
that since neither the President nor the Secretary of
Defense had disapproved of the Army policy, Forrestal
should now publicly endorse it.

If not, Royall continued,

he would feel it necessary to make public " . . .

the facts

showing the tacit approval of the Army’s position and
demonstrating the fact that our own treatment of the Negro
is equal to that of the Air Force and superior to that of
the Navy."188

l87New York Times, April 27, 19i+8j Baltimore Sun,
April 27, 19^8. See also, Dalfiume, Desegregation o t the
U.S. Armed Forces, 165-6&; Stillman, Integration of~T;he
Negro in the U.S. Armed Forces, 2+0i Barton J. Bernstein,
^The' AmEiguous Legacy: The Truman Administration and Civil
Rights," in Bernstein (ed.), Politics and Policies of the
Truman Administration (Chicago! Quandrangle Books, T^YOTT
256-87. Hereinafter cited as Bernstein, "The Ambiguous
Legacy."
l88Royall to Forrestal, September 22, 19^8, RG330,
OSD, CD30-1-2, National Archives.
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Despite Royall*s comments, it seems clear that the
Air Force had adopted a much more enlightened policy.

In

January 1949 Symington approved an Air Force policy that,
except for allowing the continuation of a few all-Negro
units, proposed a complete end to any racial reference as
a factor in determining personnel p o l i c i e s . O n e

other

qualification was made in a memorandum to commanding
officers describing implementation of the order:

"Care

should be taken to insure that a reasonably small number
of Negro personnel is assigned to any individual white
organization."190

Symington was clearly in earnest when

he told the Secretary of Defense and later the President
that he planned ". . . to completely eliminate segregation
in the Air Force. "193.
Louis Johnson, who replaced Forrestal as Secretary

l89Eugene M. fcuckert to Symington, January 12,
1949, RG3J+0, S/AF, Special Interest File, 35-Staff,
National Archives. The original draft of Symington's
order to all commanding officers is in RG340* S/AF, Special
Interest File (35) > Negro Affairs— 1949* National Archives.
1^°R. E. Nugent to Symington, et. al., January 3,
1949* RG340, S/AF, Special Interest FlTe,""35-Staff,
Nat ional Archi ve s .
"Meeting of the President and the Four Service
Secretaries with the President's Committee on Equality of
Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, 12:15
P.M., 12 January, 1949* Cabinet Room, White House," in
RG330, OSD, D54“l~l6, National Archives. See also,
Symington to Forrestal, January 6, 1949* RG330, OSD,
CD30-1-2, National Archives.
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of Defense at the end of March, issued a directive to
the service secretaries in early April, 1949, establishing
"supplemental policies" to Truman's Executive Order 9981.
Johnson insisted that there must be uniform application
of the racial equality policy throughout the armed
services.^92

subatance and some of the language of

the Johnson directive were quite similar to the statement
of policy that Symington had proposed for the Air Force
in January.
The final report of the President's Committee on
Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed
Services, entitled "Freedom to Serve," was submitted to
Truman on May 22, 1950.

The Committee was able to report

that significant strides had been made.

The Navy had

eliminated all vestiges of segregation and opened all
jobs, ratings and technical schools without regard to
race.

The Marine Corps had eliminated segregation in

basic training, but still assigned some black Marines to
all-Negro units.

The Air Force had established its

•^92Johnson to Secretaries of Army, Navy, Air Force
and Chairman, Personnel Policy Board, April 6, 1949,
RG330, OSD, SD291.2— Negroes, National Archives. For the
Secretary of Defense's explanation of the need for his
servicewide directive of April 6, see letter, Louis
Johnson to Lyndon B. Johnson, July 8, 1949, RG330, OSD,
D54-1-6, National Archives. Secretary of the Army Royall
resigned effective April 27. See Truman to Royall,
April 21, 1949, Truman Papers, OF, 1285-B, Department of
the Army (1949), Truman Library.
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policy of equality in the spring of 19lf9 and at the time
of the report was proceeding with the phasing-out of the
few segregated units remaining.

By January 1950 the

Army had removed racial restrictions from all jobs and
technical schools and discontinued the practice of
assigning Negroes to overhead (housekeeping) units.

An

Army policy change of March 27, 1950, ended the ten per
cent limit on Negro strength in the Army and the racial
quotas on enlistments were

d i s c o n t i n u e d .

^93

The Korean

War began soon after the report was submitted to Truman.
During the course of the Korean emergency, the military
services, particularly the Army, were able to eliminate
the majority of segregated units and discriminatory

193Excerpts from the key portions of the report
are, Item No. 121, Freedom to Serve: Report of the
President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and
Opportunity in the Armed Services, in Leslie H. Fishel,
Jr. and Benjamin Quarles (eds.), The Black American: A
Brief Documentary History (Glenview, Illinois: Scott,
Foresman and!Company, 1970), 312-11).. See also, Dalfiume,
Desegregation of the U.J3. Armed Forces, 198-200;
Kenworthy, "Taps for Tim Crow in the Services, ,f 21)..
There is some evidence that Truman had to intervene
directly with Gordon Gray, then Secretary of the Army,
to have the racial quotas dropped. See Gray to Truman.
March 1, 1950, Truman Papers, OF, 1285B, Department of
the Army, Truman Library. Gray to Truman, March 11, 1950,
ibid. Truman to Gray, March 27, 1950, RG335, Office of
the Secretary of theArmy (0SA), 291.2, National
Archives.
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practices
Although Truman was frustrated by the Congress in
his efforts to guarantee the civil rights of all American
citizens, his success in eliminating racial bias in the
military service has earned him a permanent status among
the courageous few who championed civil rights when it was
not yet a popular cause.

The example set by the military

establishment in eliminating jde jure and de facto bias
gave an immeasurable, but undoubtedly strong, impetus to
the civil rights movement in the civilian community.

If

America can one day stand free at last of racial bigotry
it can well reflect that Harry Truman's desegregation of
the armed forces was an important early step on the road
to that utopia.

^ F o r example, in July, 19^1 » General Marshall,
then Secretary of Defense, was able to tell two Senators
who inquired that racially-segregated units had been
almost totally eliminated in the Far Eastern Command
(Korea and Japan) and that progress was being made in
other areas,
. . to carry forward the principle of
integration in a planned and orderly manner." Marshall to
Herbert H. Lehman and Hubert H. Humphrey, July 20, 19$1,
RG330, OSD, SD291.2, National Archives. General Matthew
B. Ridgway recommended and was very active in bringing
about the integration of the units in his Far Eastern
Command. See Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting
Front in Stetson Conn (genl. e d ) , UnTted States Army in
the Korean War (Washington, 1966), lOlf.-lO'^ See also,
Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces, 210-11;
Bernstein, "The Ambiguous Legacy,** 297-96.
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CHAPTER VI

THE COLD WAR YEARS
We must not at any time falter in maintaining
our strong position, no matter what it costs,
since we are the principal discouraging force to
Communist imperialism--and to war.l

The most immediate military problem facing Truman
at the end of the Second World War was demobilization.
At war's end the United States faced the problem of an
orderly disassemblage of the mightiest war machine the
world had ever known.

There were over twelve million men

and women in uniform in mid-19ij-5 and over seven million
O
were stationed outside of the United States.
Planning
for the eventual release of these personnel began during
the war, and, in September 19ijij. the War Department
announced that releases would be by a point system on an
individual basis.

A serviceman accumulated points for

length of service, number of children, overseas service

^Truman, Mr. Citizen, 20lj..
^R. Alton Lee, "The Army ’Mutiny’ of 1 9k&* " Journal
of American History, LIII, No. 3 (December 196b), 55T«
Hereinafter cited as Lee, "The Army ’Mutiny’ of 19ij.6.i” See
also, Rostow, United States in the World Arena, 265 .
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and combat experience, as well as a set scale of points
3
for various military decorations.
Military planning, which had the President's
approval, provided for an orderly, gradual demobilization
of forces.

The postwar Array strength was set at one and

a half million; the Navy expected a six hundred thousand
man force; and the Army Air Force was hopeful of becoming
a separate service with about four hundred thousand
m e m b e r s T r u m a n and the military planners were to find
that their orderly demobilization schedules would become
irrelevant in the face of concerted pressure for the
immediate release of all servicemen.

As Truman recalled,

"With the end of hostilities in the Pacific, the public
demand for the discharge of the millions of men in the
service became insistent."^

Truman told an August 23

press conference that talks with his military leaders had
led him to the conclusion that the armed services were
doing all that they possibly could to expedite the
demobilization process.^
In his special message to Congress on September 6,

-^Truman, Memoirs, I, 506; Lee, "The Army 'Mutiny'
of 191^6," 556.
^American Military History, 530.
-’Truman, Memoirs, I, 506.
^Item No. 107* Press Conference, August 23* 19i|5*
Public Papers . . . Truman, 19l;5* 233.
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191+5# the President asked Congress to continue conscrip
tion, since enlistments would not fill the anticipated gap
created by discharging those who served during the war.
Truman told Congress that to suspend inductions now would
be "an unforgivable discrimination . . . requiring
continued sacrifice from those who have already done their
part."

7

The President already knew that retention of some

veterans was inevitable.

He gave some indication of that

in his message, since he asked for continuation of the war
powers granted to the executive branch and he asked the
Congress not to pass a resolution declaring that the war
had ended.

The war statute declared that those inducted

could not be retained beyond six months of the w a r ’s
8
termination.
What Truman was trying to make clear in his several
statements on demobilization was that the postwar military

^Item No. 128, Special Message to the Congress
Presenting a 21-Point Program for the Reconversion Period,
September 6, 191+5# Public Papers . . . Truman, 191+5# 288.
8Ibid., 277-78, 288-89. In a letter on August 23,
191+5# to Senator Elbert Thomas, Chairman of the Military
Affairs Committee, Truman said that the necessary force
levels could not be attained by enlistments and induction
alone and that some World War II veterans would have to be
retained in the service. Quoted in Lee, "The Army ’Mutiny’
of 191+6," 557* The portion of Truman’s message to Congress
dealing with selective service and retention of veterans,
as well as the letter to Senator Thomas, were drafted by
General Marshall, then Army Chief of Staff. See Marshall
to Truman, August 23, 191+5# Rosenman Papers, Subject Eile,
Message to Congress, Truman Library.
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posture of the United States was to be far different from
our past experience.

The President envisioned a new

military and foreign policy that rejected traditional
isolationism and projected the United States into the role
of defender of the peace.

"We are committed now," Truman

told Congress, "to an armed occupation of the lands of
our defeated enemies. . . .

To meet these . . . obligations

will require the maintenance for some time of a real

9
measure of our present land, sea, and air power. "

Much

of what Truman said with regard to the postwar military
reflected the views of General Marshall.

For example,

in the biennial report which Marshall had made to the
President in June of 1

9

he had written:

We finish each bloody war with a feeling of acute
revulsion against this savage form of human behavior,
and yet on each occasion we confuse military pre
paredness with the causes of war and then drift
almost deliberately into another catastrophe. . . .
We have ignored the hard realities of world affairs.
We have been purely idealistic.
. . . until . . . a solution is found to prevent
wars, a rich nation which lays down its arms as we
have done after every war in our history, will court
disaster. The existence of the complex and fearful
instruments of destruction now available make this a
simple truth which is, in my opinion, undebatable .10

% t e m No. 128, Special Message to the Congress Pre
senting a 21-Point Program for the Reconversion Period,
September 6, 19i|5>, Public Papers . . . Truman, 19k $» 288.
lOttpor the Common Defense: Biennial Report of the
Chief of Staff, July 1, 19^4-3 to June 30, 194£»" quoted in
Millis (ed.), American Military Thought, 436-37»
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Global military policy did not concern the service
men who, having fought the good fight, wanted to return to
their homes and families.

Neither they nor their relatives

and congressmen could understand why the mustering-out
process should take so long.

As the clamor rose, Truman

tried to stem it with a statement issued on September 19*
telling the nation that the Army assured him they would
have two million out before Christmas and that there was
no "padding” of the size of the postwar forces.

The

country would maintain only those numbers necessary to
meet "national commitments"; he had ordered that all other
military personnel be discharged as rapidly as possible.^
The original form of protest to the pace of
demobilization was a letter-writing campaign directed
at Congress by parents and wives of servicemen, and,
eventually, letters from the servicemen themselves.

The

letters were followed by petitions and cables to the
President and the Congress.

The Army responded by reducing

the total points required for discharge eligibility some
five times in the closing months of 19l}-5.

This rapid

reduction in requirements overtaxed the available trans
port, which the Navy tried partially to offset by

■^Item No. 138, Statement by the President Concern
ing Demobilization of the Armed Forces, September 19, 19lj-£,
Public Papers . . . Truman, 19l|5, 327-28; Truman, Memoirs,
I, £07-508":
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temporarily converting over forty cruisers, battleships
and carriers into troop transports.

Demobilization

succeeded to the extent that a War Department announcement
in early 1914-6 stated that inductions were not high enough
to meet overseas troop requirements, so that the one and
a half million servicemen then eligible for discharge
would be released gradually over a six-month period,
rather than the planned three month span.

12

The resentment and frustration which had been
accumulating among troops idled by victory six months and
more was ignited by the War Department announcement.

The

protests now took the form of non-violent mass marches
and demonstrations, the first by 20,000 soldiers in Manila
on January 6 .

Similar protests occurred in France,

England, Guam, China, Japan, Germany, Hawaii, Austria,
India and the United Stat e s . ^

Two days after the initial

mass demonstration at Manila, the White House released a
Presidential statement on demobilization.

In the message

Truman said that in consideration of the shipping involved,
as well as the clerical mountains that had to be moved,
the processing was going as fast as possible.

About

•^Lee, "The Army 'Mutiny' of 19ij.6," 558-61;
American Military History, 530.
■^Lee, "The Array 'Mutiny' of 19ij.6," 562-63;
American Military History, 530.
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eight and one-half million had been separated from the
service in the months since the fighting ended in Europe.
Already the critical need for troops overseas has
begun to slow down the Army’s rate of demobilization.
This is not an arbitrary action on the part of the
Army. . . .
To satisfy myself that demobilization is being
carried out with all possible speed, I have reviewed
once more the Army and Navy procedures.
I am con
vinced, as every other American who examines the
record must be, that the services are carrying out
demobilization with commendable efficiency and with
justice to all concerned .li|
Patterson and Forrestal had met with Truman on
October 26, 19 k $ } and warned him that the continuous
acceleration of the demobilization process was endangering
the strategic military posture of the United States in
its world-wide commitments.

Truman was of a like mind:

"I agreed entirely with this view and stated at that
meeting that . . . the program we were following was no
longer demobilization— it was disintegration of our armed
forces." ^

Thus while privately recognizing that the

system was chaotic, Truman allowed it to continue because
of political pressure and publicly praised demobilization’s

■^Item No. 8 , Statement by the President on Demobi
lization, January 8 , 19^6 > Public Papers . . . Truman, 19l;6,
15.
^Truman, Memoirs, I, £09. There is ample evidence
that both the President and the military agreed as to the
dire effects of the program. For example, Eisenhower could
write to the President about the "demoralization” of the
"entire Army" that was brought about by the "drastic demobi
lization program." Letter, Eisenhower to Truman, January
30, 19U6, RGij.07, OSW, AG370.01, National Archives.
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"commendable efficiency."

It is upon such rocks that the

credibility of presidential statements run aground.
The demobilization process— which, combining
Truman's public and private utterances, could be styled
"efficient disintegration"— continued throughout 19ij-6 and
into 19i+7•

By June 30, 19l)-7, there were just over a

million and a half under arms .

The Army ground forces

numbered just under seven hundred thousand.

For this

same date, the Army had projected a two million-man force,
but the pressure for accelerated demobilization, budget
cuts by Truman and further cuts by Congress, had altered
these plans.

By July, 19i+6, Army Chief of Staff Eisen

hower was vainly hopeful of getting a ceiling of 1 ,070,000
officers and men.

16

An Army spokesman said that of these

numbers, only about two and one-third divisions were
available for immediate deployment in a national security
emergency.

By mid-19l+7» the American Army ranked sixth

in size among the nations of the world.

17

Numerous factors were converging in the early post
war period, and these in their own mass and momentum
changed American strategic thinking.

The rapid demobili

zation, combined with a traditional American distaste for

^Letter, Eisenhower to Matthew J. Connelly,
July 27, 19i|.6, Eisenhower Papers, PF/DDE, Truman folder
(1), Eisenhower Library.
■^Osgood, Limited W a r , l£4*
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a large standing armed force, the defeat of Truman’s
universal training proposal and the forced budgetary
economies sharply reduced the size of the military estab
lishment.

Roughly half of the forces-in-being were

employed as policemen, i.e., enforcing occupation policies
in Germany, Japan and Korea.

With the portents of war

with the Soviet Union an increasingly insistent theme of
the early Cold War years, the United States was impelled
to prepare for war in time of peace for the first time in
its history.

The final factor in the evolving equation

was the existence of nuclear weapons.
These imperatives brought to the forefront a growing
reliance on a strategic air force armed with atomic
bombs.

The concept of employing conventional, ready

forces as a deterrent to aggression received lip-service,
but was gradually losing out to the "air-atomic reaction"
school of thought.

This type of planning did not prepare

the United States for the conventional, limited warfare
that it eventually became involved with in Korea and
IndoChina.

•^ I b i d . See also. O'Connor, "Harry S. Truman:
New Dimensions of Power," 30-31; Millis, Arms and Men,
273; American Military History, $l\.0; David S. McLellan and
John W. Reuss,” "Foreign and Military Policies," in Richard
S. Kirkendall (ed.), The Truman Period as a Research
Field (Columbia, MissouriT University of mTs sour i £ress,
W ,
76-77* Hereinafter cited as McLellan and Reuss,
"Foreign and Military Policies." It is well to note here,
that while the armed services were reduced to levels well
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Truman came to the presidency convinced from his
Truman Committee experience that the military services
had " . . .
dollars."^

unquestionably squandered billions of
In planning for the 19i}.6 budget during the

closing days of World War II, Truman developed a "remainder
method" of determining military allocations; he would
continue to employ this standard until the advent of the
Korean War.

The method involved subtracting all antici

pated expenditures of the civilian government from
anticipated revenues, the remainder determining the
dollar ceiling on military appropriations.

20

The Navy fought hardest against the cancellation
of shipbuilding contracts and the reduced spending levels
in the postwar budget.

Truman had cut back on all ship

construction that was less than fifty percent completed.
Forrestal .struggled with the President, in the first of

below those desired by Truman and the military, this still
left the United States with the largest peacetime military
establishment in its history. By 19l|-7* one-third of the
total national budget was being appropriated to the
military. Ekirch, Civilian and the Military, 273•
^ Q u o t e d in a diary entry, June 5, 19k5> Smith
Papers, Diary, copy in the Truman Library of the original in
the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
In a similar vein,
Truman wrote:
"I knew . . . that Army and Navy profes
sionals seldom had any idea of the value of money. They did
not seem to care what the cost was. . . . "
Memoirs, I, 88 .
20American Military History, 530-31. The Eightieth
Congress, which convened in January, 19i|.7, with both houses
dominated by the Republicans, will force much greater
economies on the military than Truman ever had.
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several appropriations fights, to reinstate five heavy
cruisers to the Navy.

21

The Navy, as well as the other

services, found that Truman was very difficult to move on
budget questions.

He told the Budget Director in Feb

ruary 19^ 6 , in the midst of a naval personnel dispute,
that his instructions were to hold the budget line.

22

Forrestal told the President in August that it would
jeopardize the security of the nation to meet the budget
reductions he had ordered for the Navy.

23

In a very

crisp reply, the President instructed the Secretary of
the Navy to reduce naval expenditures to the levels
called for.

He also informed Forrestal that in the

future he wanted a monthly report submitted to him through
the Bureau of the Budget, detailing actual and projected
expenditures of the Navy Department.2^- Truman wrote in
his Memoirs that he found that the military always made
excessive budgetary demands,

"...

but the Navy was the

pi
Forrestal to Truman, November 2, 1945* Historical
Records Division, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO),
(SC)Al|-l (11), Navy Yard.
22Diary Entries, September 13, 19^5>> February 18,
191^6, Smith Papers, Diary, copy in the Truman Library of
the original in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
^Forrestal to Truman, August 21, 19I+6, Historical
Records Division, CNO, (SC) Ll-1, Navy Yard.
^ T r u m a n to Forrestal, October 9, 19l|6, ibid.
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worst offender."

25>

However, the most extensive and

acrimonious dispute over the military budget arose out of
the Air Force1s demand for seventy air groups.
Because of rapid developments in civilian and
military aviation which dated most aviation policy and
procedures, Truman appointed a temporary "Air Policy
Commission" in July 19^7*

He charged the commission,

chaired by Thomas K. Finletter, with the task of making
an objective analysis of national aviation problems and
submitting recommendations to him on an integrated
of.
national aviation policy.
At the same time a similar
review was being carried out by the Joint Congressional
Aviation Policy Board.

Upon completion, the studies were

found to be in agreement on one important military recom
mendation:

the establishment of seventy regular air groups

^Truman, Memoirs, II, 3b* ln Chapter 3 (Vol. II),
from which this citation is taken, Truman presents a
detailed explanation of his budgetary methods and
philosophy.
2^Item No. IJ4.8 , Letter Appointing Members of Air
Policy Committee, July 18, 19^7 > Public Papers . . . Truman,
19U7 i
An "air group," as defined by General
Vandenberg, was structured similarly to an Army division.
There were groups of fighter aircraft (seventy-five per
group), and of light, medium, and heavy (or, long-range)
bombers, with fifty, thirty-six, and thirty planes per
group, respectively. Vandenberg testimony, Far .
East
Hearings, Pt. 2, IZ4.27-
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within the Air Force.

27

1

However, in his budget message to

Congress on January 12, 19lj.8, the President said, "The
plans for the Air Force contemplate operation of

groups. . . . "

28

55 combat

Although Truman had received the Fin-

letter Commission report twelve days earlier, he released
it on the 13th, the day after the budget message was
transmitted to Congress recommending 55 air groups.

29

The Air Force had apparently set a seventy air group
goal for itself late in 19^5*

How they arrived at that

precise figure has never been made clear.

Walter Millis

has made the credible suggestion that it was probably
based " . . .

more on a deduction as to what the taxpayer

would stand for and the air industry could reasonably
supply than on a calculation of the probable military
requirements.

por the next four years and more the

Air Force's spokesmen would argue that the seventy air
groups they were proposing represented an irreducible ,

27

Bernardo and
k73i Rogow, Victim of
Aviation Policy Board
Board), submitted its

Bacon, American Military Policy,
Duty, 2'5lj.~. The Congressional
(known also as the Brewster-Hinshaw
report to Congress on March 1, 19i|.8.

po

Item No. 5> Annual Budget Message to the Congress,
Fiscal Year 191+9, January 12, 19ij.8, Public Papers . . .
Truman. 19^8, 27-28.

29

Item No. 7 t Statement by the President Upon
Making Public the Report of the Air Policy Commission,
January 13 » 19i|8, ibid., 61.
■^Millis, Arms and Men, 277.
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minimum.

As Air Secretary Symington wrote in December,

191+7* "The Air Force has consistently advocated its 70
Group Program as the minimum force adequate to the
requirements imposed by the position of the United States
31
in the modern world."
But with the fluid military
situation in the period 191+5--1950 and the technological
advancements in nuclear weaponry and jet propulsion, the
consistent advocacy of seventy groups had more of a
symbolic than specific meaning.
Secretary Symington, who saw the budget message
before it was sent to Congress, informed Forrestal and
White House aide Clifford that he was going to protest
over the Secretary of Defense’s head.

He did so in a

letter to James Webb, Director of the Bureau of the
Budget, on December 16, 191+7•

Symington warned of the

grave implications that would result from not meeting the
Air Force seventy group proposal.

33

While the Secretary

of the Air Force was really attacking the budget that
Truman wanted and had approved, he ended up in a public

^Symington to James E. Webb, December 16, 191+7*
Clifford Papers, Subject File, National Military Establish
ment: Air Force, Truman Library.
32Haramond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," 1+71?
Millis, Arms and M e n , 276-77.
33symington to Forrestal, Symington to Clifford,
Symington to Webb, (all) December 16, 191+7* Clifford
Papers, Subject File, National Military Establishment:
Air Force, Truman Library.
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fight with Forrestal, who, while opposed to the low
ceilings himself, was obliged to defend them as Secretary
of Defense.
The issue came to a head late in March 19lf.8 with
Forrestal's testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee in support of supplemental appropriations
necessary for the rearmament requested by Truman in a
special message on March 17.

The Secretary, who was

cognizant of Congressional sympathy for the seventygroup Air Force, expressed agreement in principle with
the concept of a powerful air arm.

But, Forrestal said,

Air Force requirements had to be obtained within the
framework of a balanced military force.

As a compromise,

Forrestal proposed a small supplemental appropriation of
$775 million for aircraft procurement and research.

He

also asked for additional funds for increasing the size
of the Army and Marine Corps.

In all, his requests would

add $3 billion to the President’s budget proposal of $11
billion for defense in fiscal year 19l}-9.-^

A few days

^ F o r r e s t a l ’s requests to the Armed Services
Committee were based on figures worked out with Truman
earlier and confirmed in a letter, Truman to Forrestal,
March 26, 19lj.8> Truman Papers, OF, 1285, Truman Library.
See also, Millis (ed.), Forrestal Diaries, 1j.00-1j.01j
Millis, Arms and M e n , 286 j Rogow, Victim of Duty, 256-57;
Schilling! "Politics of National Defense,T7LjO-ij.l.
Truman’s March 17 message to Congress (noted earlier)
emphasized a need for rearmament and aid to European
nations, such as Finland, Greece, and Italy, threatened by
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later, on April 2, Forrestal wrote a letter to Senator
Gurney, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee,
clarifying the remarks he had made in his testimony on the
25th of March.

He explained to the Senator in convincing

detail that the Air Force program, if approved and
balanced out by concomitant increases in land, sea and
merchant marine elements, would mean an increase of over
■3

Cf

$18 million in the total military budget a n n u a l l y . T o
bolster his position that such an increase would be
necessary if the seventy-group program were initiated,
Forrestal ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff to study and
report the probable costs of a military establishment
balanced around such an increment in the strength of the
Air Force.3^
While the crossfire continued in the press and

Communist takeover. Czechoslovakia had already fallen to
Communist pressure in February. Text of Truman’s message
is in Item No. 52, Public Papers . . . Truman, 19l|8,
182-86 .
.
3£porrestal to Chan Gurney, April 2, 19ij.8, RG3i|-0,
S/AF, Reorganization of the National Military Establish
ment, Special File i|A, Roles and Missions— Correspondence,
National Archives. In a Pentagon press release (OSD No.
Forrestal made his letter to Gurney public.
Copy
in Clifford Papers, Subject File, National Military
Establishment: Air Force, Truman Library.
3^Forrestal to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 27,
19^8, RG3i|.0, S/AF, Reorganization of the National Military
Establishment, Special File I4A, Roles and Missions—
Correspondence, National Archives.
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congressional hearings, the President kept silent.
Forrestal was carrying the burden of defending a budget
that was not his in any sense, but Truman's.

Most of the

fuel for the attacks was coming from Symington, who, like
Forrestal, was obliged to support Truman's budget, but
refused to do so.

Symington told the Senate Armed

Services Committee that expansion to seventy air groups
had been his position for years and he did not propose to
change it now.

General Spaatz, Air Force Chief of Staff,

added his testimony to Symington?s; together they con
stituted a refutation of their nominal superior's
testimony.

37

By this time, Forrestal must have been

fully aware of his great, error during the unification
struggle in insisting that the Secretary of Defense be a
powerless "coordinator" rather than a true executive
officer.
Truman was unable to stifle Air Force resistance
to the proposed budget and ended up making a deal.

The

JCS, which had reported to Forrestal that their review
showed that a military establishment "balanced" against
a seventy group Air Force would cost an additional nine
billion dollars annually, agreed to back a $3»5 billion
supplement instead.

The Air Force agreed to support the

request, since they would get sixty-six air groups and

3?Rogow, Victim of D u t y , 258-59.
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oQ
most of the additional appropriation.
With Truman's approval Forrestal went back to
Congress on April 21 with the compromise.

Forrestal

emphasized the unanimity of the President, the JCS and
the Service Secretaries on this revised proposal.

39

However, Truman made a review of the supplemental
request by the Bureau of the Budget a condition of his
approval.
The President had apparently had his fill of
opposition from his own military leadership to the Admin
istration's budget.

Shortly after Budget Director Webb

and he agreed on the limits, Truman called for a White
House session (May 13# 19i+8) with the Secretary of
Defense, the Service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.

He began the meeting by reading to them a ten-

page statement in which he explained that the Budget
Bureau review was completed.

The study had recommended a

cut from the April compromise figure of $3*1+8 billion to
$3*17 billion.

Truman said he was willing to submit a

request for $3*19 billion, a figure suggested by

3®Schilling, "Politics of National Defense," 1+3-lUl-J
Millis, Arms and Men, 287*
-^ N e w York Times, April 22, 191+8. An excellent
analysis of the controversy and an accurate prediction of
the outcome are contained in an article by Hanson Baldwin,
"Defense Plan Debate Reveals Sharp Conflict," ibid.,
April 25, 19h8.
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Forrestal, provided the Armed Forces did not try to spend
it all.

His reasons for this rather unique solution were

described as "the uncertainty of world conditions" and
"other factors."

Truman also set a ceiling of $15 billion

for the defense budget for fiscal years 19^9 and 1950,
explaining that to exceed it would drive the total
national budget several billion dollars above anticipated
revenues.

He concluded with an emphatic warning to all

presents
Therefore, as Commander in Chief, I am issuing in
writing instructions as outlined in the memoranda
delivered to you today.
I expect these orders to be
carried out wholeheartedly, in good spirit, and
without mental reservation.
If anyone present has any questions or misgivings
concerning the program I have outlined, make your
views known now— for once this program goes forward
officially, it will be the Administration program—
and I expect every member of the Administration to
support it fully, both in public and in private,.
The statement I have just read will form part of
my record of this meeting.
This paper will be on
file for your examination.M-O
On the same date, Truman also sent a lengthy
memorandum to Forrestal, reiterating much of What he had
said in his s t a t e m e n t . ^

His troubles, of course, were not

^ " S t a t e m e n t by the President to the Secretary of
Defense, the Secretaries of the Three Departments, and the
Three Chiefs of Staff," May 13, 191+8, Papers of James E.
Webb, "President" folder, Truman Library. Hereinafter
cited as Webb Papers.
See also, Schilling, "Politics of
National Defense," l5lj.-55j Millis (ed.), Forrestal Diaries,
1+35-39.
^ T r u m a n to Forrestal, May 13, 191+8, Clifford
Papers, Subject File, National Military Establishment—
Miscellaneous, Truman Library.
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with Forrestal.

In fact, the statement Truman had read

to the meeting had been drafted in the Pentagon by William
McNeil, Forrestal's assistant, according to specifications
provided by the President.^

But Truman sent identical

memoranda, attaching copies of his letter to Forrestal,
to the Air Force, Army and Navy secretaries, the Army and
Air Force Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of Naval Opera
tions.

In these memoranda, Truman informed the military

leaders that he was sending them copies of his letter to
the Secretary of Defense in order to eliminate any mis
understanding as to the policies he had approved:
This means that everyone must make a conscious effort
to subordinate personal and service preferences to
the broader interests of the national program. Our
several conferences have indicated that there are
still some of you who are thinking more of representing
the interests and objectives of your individual
service than of interpreting the broad national
program and its requirements to your subordinates
and to the Congress.^3
As the bill finally passed in April, it provided
for a total defense budget for fiscal 19i+9 of $13.8
billion.

Against the express wishes of Truman and

Forrestal, the Congress voted an extra $822 million
appropriation to bring the Air Force up to a full seventy
air groups.

The vote for the budget supplements in

^Millis

(ed.), Forrestal Diaries, k35»

^ T r u m a n to Air Force Chief of Staff, «*t. a l .,
May 13, 19l|8, Truman Papers, OF, 128£, Truman Library.
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Congress— which was understood to he an affirmation of
the seventy group concept— was an overwhelming 3I4.3 - 3
in the House and 7i+ - 2 in the S e n a t e . ^

The Air Force

had clearly won out over the Secretary of Defense and the
Commander in Chief.

But it was a hollow victory.

Truman

signed the supplemental appropriation act, but, as
promised, refused to spend the extra funds voted by
Congress.

The Air Force was allowed only fifty-nine air

groups by Truman for fiscal year 1 9 ^ 9 . ^

Most of the

Congress and a majority of the public were convinced
that "the next war would be fought in the air," but the
Commander in Chief seemed more inclined to Forrestal’s
"balanced forces" concept, although more for fiscal than
strategic reasons.

Truman later discussed the controversy

with journalist Arthur Krock:
He explained that his reasons for limiting the
new air-combat groups below the point desired by . . .
Symington and the Air Force generals was "we are on
the verge of an aviation discovery that will make

^•Schilling, "Politics of National Defense," liJLj.—i+6.
See also, Rogow, Victim of Duty, 265.
^ N e w York Times, May 22, 19ij-8. See also, Item
No. 106, Statement by the President Upon Signing Bill
Providing Funds for Military Aircraft, May 21, 19i]-8,
Public Papers . . . Truman, 19U8, 272j Millis, Arms and
M e n , 287; Schilling, "Politics of National Defense," ij.647. In a letter dated June 3> 19l|8, the President set the
maximum troop strengths for all services and stipulated the
active aircraft inventory for the Navy and Air Force at
6000 and 92k0, respectively. See Truman to Forrestal,
June 3, 19ij.o, RG330, OSD, CD9-2-1*., National Archives.
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obsolete everything now being manufactured."
(Evidently, new big bombers.) His plan, as he
described it, was also to maintain flexibility in
aviation production so that it could be stepped up
when desired, and planning altered, "as we did
during the Second World W a r . " 4 °
The President’s decision to freeze appropriated
Air Force funds was repeated in the next budg e t . ^
Truman’s action represented a new dimension of the com
mander in chief function.

The Congress,

which exercises

a constitutional check on the executive powers through
its annual appropriations for the budget, now found that
it could not force the President to increase the size of
the military establishment against his will.

And the

ability of Congress to argue against any requested
increase was hampered by a lack of information and
military intelligence which, by the terms of the National
Security Act (19U7) they were not privy to, except at
the discretion of the President.
One more serious struggle erupted within the
Defense Department which eventually required presidential
intervention.

The Navy had received authorization in the

^Krock, Memoirs, 2ijl.
^Discussing the budget for fiscal year 19^0 in a
press conference, Truman said of the Air Force:
"You
never can satisfy them. I have to put my foot down and
tell them what they can have. If you didn’t do that they
would take all the money in the budget." Item No. 7»
Press Conference on the Budget, January 8, 19i}-9, Public
Papers . . . Truman, 19l;9, 3l+.
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fiscal 1949 budget to construct a prototype, flush-deck
aircraft carrier, on condition that it halt construction
on thirteen smaller vessels then under construction.
While this was a heavy price to pay, the Navy agreed,
since such a carrier would be capable of participating in
strategic atomic warfare.

At the time, the Air Force

objected strenuously, but to no avail, since Forrestal
considered the project sound.

However, Louis Johnson,

Forrestal's successor as Secretary of Defense, was
determined to cut defense spending.^"®
On April 23, 1949, five days after the keel of the
carrier had been laid, Johnson ordered the construction
to halt.

In his decision the Secretary of Defense was

backed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Admiral Denfield,
dissenting) and the President.

Ii9

John L. Sullivan,

Secretary of the Navy, who had not been consulted on this
decision and was in Texas when Johnson made his announce
ment, immediately informed Johnson that under provision
of Section 202 of the National Security Act of 1947, he
was exercising his right to appeal the decision directly
90
to the Commander in Chief.
However, Truman decided

^Hammond,
JLf.70—71 •

"Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers,"

^ L o u i s Johnson to Sullivan, April 23, 1949,
RG330, OSD, D16-2-44, National Archives.
^Sullivan to Johnson, April 24, 1949, ibid.
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against Sullivan.
The Navy Secretary resigned on April 26, but not
before delivering a bitter attack on the Secretary of
Defense.

In a letter to Johnson, Sullivan accused the

Secretary of killing the one weapon upon which the Navy
placed the highest priority without even the courtesy of
consulting with the Chief of Naval Operations or the
Secretary of the Navy.

Sullivan was "very deeply dis

turbed" by this -unprecedented action blocking the
development of a new, powerful weapon, he told Johnson.
He also added his conviction that " . . .

this will result

in a renewed effort to abolish the Marine Corps and to

cjl
transfer all Naval and Marine Aviation elsewhere.

. . ."

The Navy Secretary talked with Truman on April 25 and the
President agreed to make Sullivan's letter to the Secre
tary of Defense public.

Sullivan apparently felt no ill

will toward the President over cancellation of the
carrier, since his letter of resignation was quite

E>2
friendly, as was Truman's acceptance.
Secretary Sullivan's fears for the future of the

^Sullivan to Johnson, April 26, 19^9» Truman
Papers, OP, 1285C, Truman Library.
^Sullivan to Truman,
Truman to Sullivan, July 26,
Hammond, "Super Carriers and
and Bacon, American Military
Memoirs, II, 53.

July 26, 191+9, ibid.;
191+9, ibid. See also,
B-36 BomSers," 1+95; Bernardo
Policy, 1+71? Truman,
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Marine Corps and Naval Aviation were a surface indication
of deep-seated interservice bickering that had not ended
with unification.

The Navy was particularly resentful

of the growing power of the Air Force.

Not only had the

romantic and heroic legend of the grizzled seadog been
replaced in the public mind by the glamorous image of a
dashing jet pilot, but the Navy's prestigious role as the
first line of the nation's defense had also been lost to
the continent-spanning, nuclear weapons delivery vehicle,
the B -36 bomber.

Soon after cancelling the Navy's super

carrier, Secretary of Defense Johnson, who was emerging
as a strong advocate of strategic air power, allowed the
Air Force to order seventy-five additional B- 36 's.

The

result was a rebellion within the Navy Department called
the "Revolt of the Admirals."^
Charging corruption and favoritism in the B -36
contract awards, a Representative from Pennsylvania,
James E. VanZandt, demanded an investigation. 5k
^

The

resulting Congressional hearings before the House Armed

I4.73 .

^Bernardo and Bacon, American Military Policy,
See also, Feis, Between War an? Peace,' 29T, 337«

summation of the charges made by Van Zandt
and Symington's seventy-nine page rebuttal statement are
both attached to a memorandum, Glenn ¥. Martin to
Clifford, July 22, 19^9, Clifford Papers, Subject File,
National Military Establishment— B -36 Investigation,
Truman Library. The source of Van Zandt's generally un
substantiated charges was an anonymous civilian employee
in the Navy Department.
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Services Committee constituted a complete examination of
the national military posture, for it broadened into an
inquiry on unification, military strategy, the B-36 and
other matters.

During the course of the hearings, a host

of high-ranking Navy and Marine officers attacked the
prevailing Air Force policy of long-distance, nuclear air
borne retaliation as dangerous, deceptive and not based
on sound military principles.

One of the charges made

by the admirals was that massive nuclear retaliation was
immoral and that the Navy was better able to deliver
massive air strikes against the heartland of Russia.
Admiral Louis E. Denfeld, Chief of Naval Operations,
summarized the Navy’s position in an attack leveled
principally at the Secretary of Defense.

Denfeld accused

Johnson of violating the spirit of unification, criticized
him for canceling the super-carrier and said that "unin
formed and arbitrary decisions" had greviously weakened
the Navy.

The chief rebuttal witnesses were Air Secre

tary Symington and General Omar Bradley, then Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Generals Eisenhower and

Marshall, Secretary Johnson and ex-President Hoover also
testified, generally asking for unity and cooperation and
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an end to interservice politicing.

One thing that

clearly emerged from the contentious testimony was that
the integrated strategic viewpoint which unification
promised had not been achieved.
Secretary of the Navy Francis P. Matthews,
Sullivan’s successor, wrote to Truman saying that " . . .
for the good of the country, I respectfully request you
as President and Commander in Chief to authorize the
transfer of Admiral Denfeld to other important
96
duties. . . .
Matthews had the support of the Secre
tary of Defense in asking Truman to remove Denfeld as
Chief of Naval Operations.

Following some deliberation in

the White House over the extent of the Commander in Chief’s
authority to remove Denfeld, who had just been confirmed
by the Senate for re-appointment for another two-year
term as CNO, Truman ordered his removal on October 21.

57

^ A m o n g the naval officers who attacked the pre
vailing policies during the controversy were Captain John
G. Crommelin and Admirals William Halsey, Ernest King,
Gerald Bogan, Arthur Radford, Thomas Kincaid, William
Blandy, Ralph Ofstie, Chester Nimitz, Raymond Spruance,
and General Vernon Magee of the Marine Corps. Bernardo
and Bacon, American Military Policy, ij.73-76; Hammond,
" N s c - 6 8 ," z m - w j r . ---------------------

^Matthews to Truman, October 21, 19i+9, Clifford
Papers, Subject File, National Military Establishment—
Navy, Truman Library.
^ I n a memorandum to Johnson’s aide, an Assistant
General Counsel in the Pentagon discussed the power of the
President to remove the Chief of Naval Operations from
office. He offered numerous legal precedents justifying
such an action and added that it was "self-evident" that
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Other officers were eventually transferred to ’’less
sensitive" assignments or they retired, ending the "Revolt
of the Admirals."
The revolt had revealed not only a fundamental
failing of unification, it also had pointed up a lack of a
fixed over-all military strategy.

The President and the

Bureau of the Budget still held— in principle— to the
balanced-force concept of national defense, to which the
military leadership paid at least a grudging lip-service.
However, Truman's hard-money policy of fixing a $15 billion
ceiling on the military budget in an inflationary period
dictated, as Paul Hammond has written,

"...

increasing

reliance solely on the most 'efficient' weapons system,
strategic air atomic retaliation, which was a military
capability designed for a showdown war with the Soviet

the President, in his "constitutional power as Commander
in Chief," had the unquestioned right to change the duty
assignment of any subordinate officer as he pleased.
Nathaniel Goodrich to Marx Leva, October 26, 191+9, Clifford
Papers, Subject Pile, National Military Establishment—
Navy, Truman Library. Truman's authorization of the
removal is contained in a memorandum, Truman to the Secre
tary of the Navy, October 27, 191+9, ibid. For a published
text of this message, see Item No. 2l+l, Memorandum on the
Transfer of Admiral Denfeld Prom the Post of Chief of
Naval Operations, October 27, 191+9, Public Papers . . .
Truman, 191+9, 535>-36. See also, Truman, iMemoirs, II, 53?
Louis Johnson testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 1+, 2681.
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Ctfj
Union.”-3

The value of this controversy was that it led

to a study by the National Security Council of national
military strategy.

Their recommendations, contained in a

very important policy paper submitted to Truman (dis
cussed below) was implemented during the Korean War.

In

the interim between the Second World War and Korea,
despite the inefficiencies and the lack of a coherent
strategic policy, the American military establishment was
adequate to the demands made upon it by the events of the
Cold War.

It takes no more than an elemental knowledge of
geography to comprehend the intense concern of the Soviet
Union with the Dardanelles Straits.

The straits are a

direct warm-water gateway to Soviet commerce with the
oil-rich Middle East.

Premier Stalin had received at

Potsdam the concurrence of the United States and Great
Britain to a revision of the Montreaux Convention of 1936,
which was an international agreement regarding control of
the Straits.
agreement.

The Soviet Union desired a more favorable
The United States, although not a signatory to

^Hammond, "NSC-68," 281. Robert Osgood feels
that Truman placed an ". . . overwhelming reliance on
nuclear retaliation as the military means of containing
Communism," because of a preoccupation with the threat of
a third world war and a fascination with the "vast and
strange power of the atomic bomb." Limited W a r , lf>l.
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the original convention, indicated it would be a willing
party to any new international agreement for controlling
the use of the Dardanelles.-^
On August J, 19k&*

Soviet Union sent a

diplomatic note to Turkey insisting, among other things,
in replacing the Montreaux Convention with a bilateral
agreement which would eliminate British influence in
Turkey and provide for joint Russo-Turkish control and
the establishment of Russian military bases along the
Straits.

Dean Acheson, then Under Secretary of State,

considered the Soviet proposal merely a euphemism for the
occupation of Turkey.

6*1

Acheson was ordered by Truman to

prepare recommendations for him in consultation with the
Secretaries of War and Navy and the Joint Chiefs.
The Committee had its report ready on August 1$
and they met with Truman in the White House.

Acheson told

the President that the Committee was recommending that a

^Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, 301; Alexander DeConde,
A History of American Foreign Policy (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1963)” 66'7. Hereinafter cited as DeConde,
History of American Foreign Policy. Truman had been
willing to go much further at Potsdam. Then he had urged
the internationalization of the Rhine, Danube and
Dardenelles, because, he claimed, all the wars of the pre
ceding two centuries had originated in Central Europe.
Neumann, After Victory, 173-7^*
^°DeConde, History of American Foreign Policy, 667;
Phillips, Truman Presidency, 170.
k-*-Acheson, Present at the'Creation, 195*
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strong diplomatic note be sent to the Soviet government,
acknowledging the need for a revision of the Treaty of
Montreaux, but insisting that there be no interference
with the exclusive rights of Turkey to defend the Straits.
To impress the Russians that the United States was in
"deadly earnest" on the matter, Truman's advisers also
felt that a strong naval force should be sent to the area.
They recommended that the battleship Missouri, already
at Istanbul on an unrelated mission, be held there and
joined by the Mediterranean fleet, led by the newlycommissioned aircraft carrier, Franklin D. Roosevelt.
Truman immediately approved the recommendations and asked
ZLp

that the diplomatic notes and orders be drafted at once. ^
General Eisenhower, who was present at the meeting as
Army Chief of Staff, apparently taken aback by the abrupt
ness of the President's decision, asked if Truman was
cognizant of all the implications; the recommended course
could lead to war with the Soviet Union.

Acheson has

recorded Truman's response:
The President took from a drawer of his desk a large
map of the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean and
asked us to gather around behind him. He then gave
us a brief lecture on the strategic importance of the
area and the extent to which we must be prepared to

^ I b i d ., 195-96; Phillips, Truman Presidency, 171.
See also, LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War,
28-29.

Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Furtherreproduction prohibitedwithout permission.

336
go to keep it free from Soviet domination. When he
finished, none of us doubted he understood fully all
the implications of our recommendations#°3
The American fleet moved into Turkish waters as
soon as it was assembled.

This naval presence was

sufficient enough to cause the Soviet Union to ease its
pressure on Turkey.

The Turkish government felt it nec

essary to continue a full mobilization of its armed
forces, a constant strain on the economy that sapped the
government’s resources.

The Soviet Union switched its

offensive pressures to the Balkan peninsula in hope of
toppling the monarchical government of Greece.
Following the German withdrawal in late 19i|if»
Greek Governraent-in-exile returned to power.

The Greek

leadership was soon confronted by a Communist-inspired
guerilla revolt against its authority.

As a result of

this struggle, the United States urged an international
commission to supervise an election in Greece to determine
majority will.

The electorate, voting in March, 19i|-6,

chose the monarchical party of King George II.

The Greek

Communists, united under the banner of the National Liber
ation Front, resumed guerrilla warfare following their
electroal defeat.

The Greek insurrectionaries received

substantial military equipment and supplies from the
bordering Communist nations of Yugoslavia, Albania and

^Acheson, Present at the Creation, 196.
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Bulgaria.

The Greek conservative leaders, or "raonarcho-

fascists," as the Soviet press styled them, were sustained
in their struggles by the presence of British troops and a
great deal of economic assistance from Great B r i t a i n . ^
The British, facing grievous financial conditions
at home, informed the United States in February 191+7 that
their financial and military support of Greece (and
financial assistance to Turkey as well) would have to
cease by March 31•

Th© British expressed hope that the

United States would be able to assume the burden of sus
taining Greece and Turkey.

The message from England

underscored what American envoys in the field had been
reporting:

Because of inflation, corruption in the right-

wing government, strikes and the effectiveness of the
guerrilla forces, Greece was near collapse even with
British aid.

Without it, a Communist takeover was

inevitable, unless the United States, the only nation then
capable of such large-scale largesse, was willing to
intervene.

^LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold W a r , ijjj..
See also, Byrnes, S peaking Frankly,'"^99~‘3^>
'Q; t)eConde,
History of American ForeigrT Policv, 668-69; Major Problems
of Unite^Stat'es' Foreign' Fol'icy, 19£l-195>2 (Washington:
TEe Brookings Institution", 19>L),' 36£-66, Hereinafter
cited as Major Problems of Uni ted States Foreign Policy.
69
Acheson, Present at the Creation, 2 1 7 ; Truman,
Memoirs, II, 9 9 -1 0 0 .
See also, Fleming, The Cold W a r , I,
lj.3 8 -3 9 ; DeConde, History of American Foreign Policy, 6 6 9 ;
Steinberg, Man from Missouri, 2 9 3 ; Sidney Warren, The
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The Secretary of State, Goerge Marshall, was away
on a speaking engagement when the British note arrived on
February 21, so Under Secretary Acheson informed the
President of its substance.

Truman ordered Acheson to

convene the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee for
preparation of a detailed policy memorandum.

Acheson

reported to Truman on the Committee’s progress as of the
twenty-fourth.

The basic recommendation was that Greece

should receive whatever funds and military equipment the
President could provide under existing legislative authority
as soon as possible.

Truman approved.

On February 25

Truman met with the Congressional leadership.

Truman,

flustered by the glaring, but accidental ommission of
Senator Robert Taft from the list of those invited, allowed
Dean Acheson to brief the Congressmen on the situation
and urge their support of an American aid program for
Greece and Turkey.
tation of the case.

Acheson made a very effective presen
None of the Congressional leadership

present saw fit to question the propriety of the nation
extending a protective shield over Greece and Turkey.

66

President as World Leader (Philadelphia and New York: J.
B. LippincoEt, 1961;), 3I0 -II. Hereinafter cited as
Warren, President as World Leader.

^Acheson, Present at the Creation, 218-19; Fleming,
The Cold W a r , I, If39-IfO. In a subsequent meeting with the
congressional leadership (including Senator Taft, this time),
on March 10, Acheson felt the atmosphere was somewhat
cooler. While Vandenberg was favorably disposed, no
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The executive and legislative leadership were agreed then,
at least in principle, that the United States should
assume the historical British role of containing Russian
expansionism in the eastern Mediterranean.
Secretary Marshall, accompanied by Acheson, brought
Truman the policy recommendations on February 26.

Their

report carried the endorsement of the Coordination
Committee, the Secretaries of War and Navy and the Joint
Chiefs.

Greece needed immediate and substantial

assistance, the report stated, aid which only the United
States was capable of providing.

Turkey, while not in

danger of immediate collapse from Russian pressure, could
not long sustain its full mobilization without economic
disaster.

If either nation fell, the other would be

seriously endangered.

The choice was to abandon both to

Communist ambition, or intervene directly and immediately.
The report recommended the latter course to Truman and
urged him to request an appropriation from Congress for
67
economic and military aid for Greece and Turkey.
The
President approved and ordered the State Department to

legislator was willing to commit himself to the message
proposals. Acheson, Present at the Creation, 222. Truman,
discussing the same session, cfescribed "it differently:
"There was no opposition to what had to be done." Memoirs,
II, 10 $. See also, Vandenberg, Private Papers, 3l±3~bfa..
^Truman, Memoirs, II, 100; Acheson, Present a.t
the Creation, 219.

Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Furtherreproduction prohibitedwithout permission.

34-0
draft an address to Congress.
When Truman finally received a satisfactory draft
of his message, he arranged to appear before a Joint
Session of the Congress on March 12, 1947*

President

knew that what he was going to ask of the nation
represented a dramatic reversal of traditional American
peacetime isolationalism.

He knew, he said, that the

names of Washington and Clay and " . . .

the other patron

saints of isolationists" would be invoked against his
stand.

But he was thoroughly convinced that this action

was essential to continued free world Is adership by the
United States.^*®
Truman began his speech by telling the Congress
that a grave situation had arisen that involved the foreign
policy and the national security of the United States.
Truman then reviewed the desperate condition of Greece,
repeatedly referring to Greece!s democratic government,
but acknowledging that that government had made some mis
takes.
support.

He briefly summarized Turkey’s need for financial
The President then said that a primary objective

of the foreign policy of the United States was to establish
conditions whereby other nations " . . .

will be able to

work out a way of life free from coercion."

Free people

Truman, Memoirs, II, 102. See also, McLellan and
Reuss, "Foreign and Military Policies," $7 •
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could not maintain free institutions and national integrity
against totalitarian aggressors unless other nations are
willing to help them.

”1 believe,” Truman said, "that it

must be the policy of the United States to support free
peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed
minorities or by outside pressures."^

This was the

essential statement of what has come to be known as the
Truman Doctrine.

It represented a significant alteration

of American policy, since it proposed that the United
States stand as guarantor and protector, not just of
Greece and Turkey, but of all "free, democratic nations"
which were confronted by internal or external threats to
the existing regime.

While emphasizing that ". . . our

help should be primarily through economic and financial
aid. . .

Truman did not preclude direct American
70
military intervention.
It might well have been called
the Truman Corollary, since it proposed a revival of the
principles of Monroe's defunct doctrine and an expansion
of the paternalistic protection of that doctrine to the

^ I t e m No. 56, President's Message to Congress on
Greece and Turkey, March 12, 19lj.7, Public Papers . . .
Truman, 19li7, 178-79. The speech is excerpted "in Truman,
Memoirs, 11,' 106-108; Bernstein and Matusow (eds.), The
Truman' Administration, 251-56.
^°Item No. 56, Public Papers . . . Truman, 191-1-7,
178-79. It was this vagueness and universality of 'the
doctrine which brought objections from George P. Kennan,
director of the Policy Planning Board of the State Depart
ment. See his Memoirs, 319-22.
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Eastern, as well as the Western Hemisphere.

71

Specifically, Truman asked the Congress for $1|00
million for assistance to Greece and Turkey in the present
fiscal year.

He also requested permission to send civilian

and military personnel as financial, political and military
advisers, with the latter also serving as instructors in
the use of American weapons.

In addition, the President

asked Congress to provide him with the authority to
implement this assistance in the fastest and most efficient
manner p o s s i b l e . I m p l i c i t throughout the message was the
identification of the Soviet Union as the malefactor and
the recognition that the United Nations Organization was
too weak to perform its primal function.
News media reaction to the address was mixed, but
all seemed to recognize that the implications of Truman’s
proposal went well beyond simply aiding Greece and Turkey.
The New York Times endorsed the speech as signalling an
end to the era of "isolation and occasional intervention"

"^Journalist Arthur Krock, writing on March 22,
1947* compared the Truman and Monroe Doctrines:
"...
both are founded on the fear that our freedom is threatened
by ambitious European powers, and both were precipitated
by Russian policy." See Krock, In the Nation: 1932-1966
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), 175* Hereinafter cited as Krock, In the Nation.
179.

?2Item No. £6, Public Papers . . .Truman, 19lj-7»
See also, Fleming, The Cold War, I, I4J4.3 •
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and the beginning of "an epoch of American responsibil
ity."^

The Baltimore Sun editorial writer lamented the

shift in thinking with respect to the Russians reflected
in this address,

"...

from the possibility, and the

necessity, of finding a formula for living together to
emphasis on the differences which divide u s . " ^

The

Philadelphia Inquirer called the assistance program,
task we must not shirk. "7£

"a

The Miami Herald headlined,

"Truman Doctrine Means U.S. Takes Road to Bankruptcy."7^
A New York writer urged the use of American troops if
necessary, because ". . . to rule out any possibility of
military support in advance removes any possibility of
success.

We would in that case merely be throwing our

money a w a y . " ^

The Chicago Tribune felt that "the outcome

will inevitably be war.

...

We are to have the

'commander in chief' back with us again."7®

"He was

asking America to be Atlas," according to a Washington
Post editorial,

"offering to lead his country in that

73n o w York Times, March 12, 19l|7•
7^-Baltimore Sun, March 13» 191|7»

7^Philadelphia Inquirer, March 13 > 19ij-7 •
7^Miami Herald, April 13, 1 9 k 7 •
77George P. Eliot, New York Herald-Tribune,
March 18, 19lj-7«
78chicago Tribune, March 13 , 19^7•
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tremendous role, yet his flat voice carried no signifi
cance of his fateful r e c o m m e n d a t i o n . Izvestia
described the Truman Doctrine as

. .a

fresh intrusion

of the U.S.A. into the affairs of other states," which
was designed to place Turkey and Greece under American
control
A Gallup poll on the Truman Doctrine proposal found
the people, like the newspapers,
favoring assistance.

divided, with a majority

For example, eighty-three percent

were in favor of sending civilian advisers to Greece, but
only fifty-six percent approved of financial aid.

The

same questions with respect to Turkey found seventy-seven
percent endorsing civilian advisers, but only forty-nine
percent backing the financial assistance.

Only thirty

percent of those surveyed felt that lending the money to
both nations would lead the United States into war, but
less than one-third supported the sending of military
advisers to either country.

There was some inconsistency

in these views however, for sixty-eight percent agreed
that if another nation found itself in a situation similar
O’!
to Greece's, the United States would have to take action.

^ W a s h i n g t o n Post, March 13 » 191+7-

,

^ I z v e s t i a , March 1 3 1947* quoted in Williams
(ed.), Shaping of American Diplomacy, 1003-1005.
^ P h i l a d e l p h i a Bulletin, March 29> 19l|7.

Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibitedwithout permission.

31*5
The President had hoped that Congress would act on
his proposals before March 31, 191*7, the deadline Great
Britain had set for the cut-off of their assistance to
Turkey and Greece.

But the public hearings on the bill

and the floor debate continued through March and late
into April.

Finally the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill passed

the Senate by a vote of 67 to 23 and the House, 287 to
On

107.

In signing ceremonies on-May 22, Truman called the

Aid Bill ". . . a n important step in the building of the
peace."

He also said that the "overwhelming majorities"

it received in both Houses of Congress was ". . . proof
that the United States earnestly desires peace and is
willing to make a vigorous effort to help create conditions
of peace.

On May 22 Truman also issued Executive Order

9857, which contained the regulations for carrying out the

®^As enacted, the bill is Public Law 75* 80 Cong.,
1 Sess., (61 Stat. 103). See also, Truman, Memoirs, II,
108; Phillips, Truman Presidency, 176; Steinberg, Man
from Missouri, £ 94; LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold
War, 1*5-1*6; beConde, History of American Foreign Policy,
670. One writer uses the Greelc-Turkish aid bill as an
example for his contention that the President, because of
his international stature and the worldwide distribution
of his remarks on almost any subject, can commit the
nation to a particular course, leaving the Congress little
choice save to acquiesce when he comes to that body for
approval. Crabb, American Foreign Policy, 59•
®^Item No. 100, Statement by the President Upon
Signing Bill Endorsing the Truman Doctrine, May 22,
191*7, Public Papers . . . Truman, 191*7, 251*-55•

Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibitedwithout permission.

31+6
provisions of the b i l l . ^

The order delegated the

authority conferred on the President by the act to the
Secretary of State, George Marshall.

It also allowed

Marshall to subdelegate his authority to "Chiefs of
Mission" for Greece and Turkey.

Marshall actually wrote

the order for the President which facilitated his carrying
out the task of Greek-Turkish aid Truman had entrusted to
him.8^
The Communist-led Greek rebels intensified their
attacks after Truman announced his intention to aid the
government of Greece in opposing them.

Their success,

particularly in northern Greece, led the American embassy
to report on June 9 that there was a "marked deteriora
tion" in the government’s position.

A week later, the

Greek government sent an urgent appeal for an acceleration
in the delivery of critical materials and for a greater
portion of American aid to be allocated to weapons and
other military supplies.

86

Secretary Marshall, agreeing

with the first part of their message, asked Truman to
indicate to the agencies involved the urgent necessity of

^Executive Order 9857* March 2 2 , 19i+7 (3 C.•?•*!•>
19U3-19^8 Comp., 6J+6) .
8^Marshall to Patterson, April 30* 191+7> RGl6£,
USA, 092-Plans and Operations, Case No. 96, National
Archives.
8^Truman, Memoirs, II, 108.

Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibitedwithout permission.

3b7
their hastening the procurement and shipment of materials
destined for G r e e c e . T r u m a n complied with Marshall’s
request, asking the Secretary of War, for example, to
spare no effort in employing the full power and facilities
of his office in expediting, as efficiently as possible,
OD
the Greek aid program.
Eventually, by the fall of
191+9 > the American aid and advisers brought about a shift
in the balance of power that led to the triumph of the
government over the guerrillas.

This was accomplished

with some difficulty because the Greek leadership con
tinually attempted to use all American aid for military
purposes, to suppress opposition, rather than to stabilize
the economy and broaden their base of popular support.
Turkey, not facing a massive internal revolt, was a far
less serious problem.

U.S. financial aid was sufficient

to continue the Turkish mobilization without endangering
the economy.®^

®?Marshall to Truman, June 27 > 19J+7> RGl+07, AG091.3*
National Archives.
®®Truman to Royall, August 30, 191+7> ibid.
®% a 3 o r Problems of United States Foreign Policy,
261+-65; Truman, Memoirs ,~Tl, 109. Some observers have
noted a curious lack of uniformity in U.S. policy towards
Greece and China. In the same period of time that the
United States was providing the werewithal to suppress
Communist insurgents in Greece, the American government
provided some military, economic and technical aid to the
Nationalist Chinese, but encouraged them to form a coali
tion government with the Communists. See Osgood, Limited
War, 162.
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Truman considered the decision to take over Bri
tain’s commitment to aid Greece and Turkey one of the most
important of his acts, because it set an entirely new patQQ
tern in foreign policy.
However, he later said that it
was incorrect to call this decision the ’'Truman Doctrine’*
since he had obtained the consent of the leaders in Con91
gress before implementing this policy .7
The idea that the United States should shore up the
endangered economies and political structures of Greece
and Turkey led to the proposition that other nations should
get the same aid before they collapsed from Communist pres
sure.

With this in mind, and with Truman’s endorsement,

Dean Acheson made a speech at Cleveland, Mississippi, in
May 19ll-7.

92

He told his audience that many nations needed

outside aid in recovery or their people would seek desper
ate remedies.9^

Increased appropriations were needed, he

said, as well as power to allocate commodities that were
9k
in short supply.7^

The speech had little impact in the

99
U.S. press, but received thorough;coverage in Europe. ^

90Phillips, ‘'Truman at 75," 107.
9^Truman Spe aks, 70.

9^Acheson, Present at the Creation, 226-28.
93
^Acheson’s speech, May 8 , 1914-7, is printed in
Williams (ed«), Shaping of American Diplomacy, 1006.
9^Ibid .; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 229.

9^Steinberg, Man from Missouri, 295.
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Soon after, Secretary Marshall agreed to speak at
Harvard's commencement on June f?.

Truman participated in

drafting the proposals Marshall made at Harvard and he was
the first to call it the "Marshall Plan."^

Marshall

spoke of the demoralizing effect of economic deprivation
in Europe, and the chance that severe disturbances might
arise out of the desperation the people endured.

He said

that America was the logical nation to provide assistance.

97

Marshall then called upon European nations to come to
gether and agree among themselves as to their needs and as
to what each country could do to help itself and its neigh
bors.

The United States would then assume the burden of

assistance to the limits of its available resources.

98

The European response to the Marshall address was
immediate and enthusiastic.

Sixteen nations of Western

Europe banded together as the Organization for European
Economic Cooperation.

They made detailed studies of the

long-term needs of their region and, in mid-August, sub
mitted a request for American financial assistance in

^ T r u m a n ,

Memoirs, II, III4..

^ M a r s h a l l ’s address, June $, 19i|-7, is printed in
Lawrence S. Kaplan fed.), NATO and the Policy of Contain
ment (Lexington, Massachusetts:D.'C. Heath ancT*Company,
1968), 8 . Hereinafter cited as Kaplan (ed.), NATO and the
Policy of Containment.
9®lbid., 8-9. See also, Rees, Age of Containment,
22; LaPeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, l4.8-ij.9;
. Tinman, Memoirs, II, 113-l£ 0
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the amount of $30 billion over a four-year period.

The

proposed total was reduced to a more manageable $17 billion
in Truman’s request for the appropriation from Congress on
December 19* 19i|-7•

Describing his plans for the European

Recovery Program (Marshall Plan) in this message, Truman
tied the recovery of Europe to American security:
". • . I am proposing that this Nation contribute to world
peace and to its own security by assisting in the recovery
of sixteen countries which . . • are devoted to the preser
vation of free institutions and enduring peace among
nations.n<^

But the European Recovery Act did not pass

until April, 19lj.8, subsequent to a Communist coup d'etat
in Czechoslovakia and more prodding of Congress by Truman
in another message on March 17.

When the European

Recovery Program ended in 1951* actual appropriations to
the European Cooperative Administration, counterpart to
the OEEC in America, totalled $12.5 billion.^00
The Marshall Plan, working on the "belly reform"

^ I t e m No. 238, Special Message to Congress on the
Marshall Plan, December 19, 19^7, Public Papers • . .
Truman, 1 3 K L - 528. See also, Truman, Memoirs, II, 117-19*
lOOcrabb, American Foreign Policy, 226-28; American
Military History, 537-181 Warren, President as World Leader,
315-16; Rees, Age of Containment, 2^-25; laP'eEer, America.
Russia, and the Cold War, 6k. 5he European Recovery Pro
gram (Marshall Plan) was later merged with the military
assistance program into an administrative structure known
as the Mutual Security Administration. Truman, Memoirs,
II, 119.

Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibitedwithout permission.

351
premise that Communism appeals only to hungry and
desperate people, went a long way toward restoring
European prosperity and equalizing trade inbalances.

The

motivation of the United States in pursuing this recovery
program was justified by the Truman Administration in
terms of economic and humanitarian reasons.

However,

beyond these considerations was the growing East-West
schism that caused a high strategic importance to be
placed on bolstering the economies of nations that might
otherwise fall into the Soviet camp.
The commitment of the United States to the
political status quo in the Balkans and western Europe
was more than an economic tie; it carried with it the
strong implication that America would resort to military
intervention to sustain these governments and its own
substantial investments.

However, the United States did

not have sufficient forces-in-being to back up this
implied commitment.

For while the services argued for a

build-up of their force levels to meet any challenges on
the European continent, they generally faced budgetary
cutbacks in the late Forties.

The Marshall Plan and

Greek-Turkish Aid were "measures short of war," designed
to prevent the spread of the Communist philosophy of
government.

They have succeeded to the extent that the

nations involved remained more-or-less democratic in their
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governmental organization.'^'1’ The Marshall Plan was a
natural outgrowth of the Truman Doctrine.

At the same

time, however, the Truman Doctrine was hardening into a
policy called containment.

102

The thinking underlying the attitude toward
communism in the containment policy is similar to that of
the Republicans toward slavery in the pre-Civil War
period.

Although they would have been happiest if slavery

were to disappear, they were at least determined that this
pernicious institution be prevented from expanding beyond
the boundaries of the region where it already existed.
So, too, with the advocates of containment, who maintained
that:
. . . the main element of any United States policy
toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term,
patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian
expansive tendencies. . . . the Soviet pressure
against the free institutions of the Western world is
something that can be contained by the adroit and

Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-3& Bombers,"
ij.72-73. See also, Phillips, Truman Presidency, 19^4-Robert Osgood says that Gr eek-Thrki'sh aid reflected a view
in the White House and mong the foreign and military
advisers to the President, that the Middle East and the
Mediterranean regions formed a strategic unity, no part of
which could be allowed to fall to Russian imperialism if
the United States were to preserve the geopolitical basis
of its security. Yet, Osgood notes, it was not in these
terms that the decision was presented to Congress and the
general public. See Limited W a r , llj.6-lj.7 •

28 .

■^^Malor Problems of United States Foreign Policy,
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vigilant application of counter-force at a aeries
of constantly shifting geographical and political
points. . . .1°3
George Frost Kennan, Director of the Policy Planning
Staff of the State Department in 19lj.7> is the putative
"father of the containment doctrine."

Although he has

since denied paternity,^^ the first known outlines of
such a policy appear in a cable Kennan sent to the State
Department on February 22, 19l}.6, while he was still charge
105
d 1affaires in Moscow.
Secretary of the Navy Forrestal
was greatly impressed with the cable and had Kennan write
a paper for him elaborating on these views.

Finally, at

Forrestal's insistence, Kennan*s paper received wide
publicity when it was anonymously published in Foreign
Affairs, an influential quarterly, in July, 19ii7«'1‘0^
The quotation (above) from the article contains the gist

^Quoted from George F. Kennan*s article (under the
pseudonym, "Mr. X"), "Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign
Affairs (July, 19I(.7) > as reprinted in Williams (ed.’),
Shaping of American Diplomacy, 996. The article is sum
marized Tn "KiiiTipsT, Truman Presidency, 259- 62 .
10^See, for example, Kennan*s disclaimer in his
Memoirs, 358-67.
•^^Kennan's cable is quoted verbatim in Bernstein
and Matusow (eds.), Truman Administration, 198-212. For a
summation and analysis of the Kennan cable, see Millis
(ed.), Forrestal Diaries, Editor's Note, 135-^0*
See
also, Rogow, Victim of Duty, 177-80.
10 ft

uoForrestal *s role in having the containment paper
published is described in Rogow, Victim of Duty, 180-81.
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of the fundamental policy-line of the contaiment doctrine.
Truman has said that it is a mistake to call his
foreign policy a policy of containment:
true.

Our purpose was much broader.

"This is not

We were working for

a united, free, and prosperous w o r l d . E u p h e m i s m s
aside, the application of American policy has fit the
pattern called containment.

Since 191+7 the United States

has become party to regional military alliances having the
effect of encirclement of the Communist-bloc nations; has
met the threat of Soviet force with the threat of counter
force; and has met Communist aggression in Korea and
IndoChina with Military intervention.
Truman believed that the Marshall Plan, promising
hope and assistance to the peoples of Europe, seriously
upset Soviet attempts at gaining hegemony over all of
Europe.

Soviet reaction to the Marshall Plan, according

to Truman, precipitated a serious military confrontation
with the United States in 191+8.

As he explained:

Russia was caught off guard by the Marshall Plan.
Moscow quickly realized that when the Marshall Plan
began to function, the opportunity to communize
western Europe by exploiting her economic miseries
would be lost. Failing to prevent Allied co-operation
for European recovery, Russia sought to retaliate by
two moves.
The first move was to set up a counterpart
of a Marshall Plan under Russian auspices for her
satellites. . . .
The second and even more provocative move was to

•^^Truman, Memoirs, II, 290.
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risk a military incident in Berlin designated to
test our firmness and patience.30°
The Allied "Big Three" conferences at Teheran,
Yalta and Potsdam had defined the status of postwar
Germany.

The city of Berlin, deep within the Russian

zone of Germany, was divided into zones of occupation
itself, just as the German nation had been.

For the

immediate postwar period, Germany wa3 to be governed by
an Allied Control Council, sitting at Berlin, whose
membership was to be made up of the Allied military
commanders in chief.

In practice, these military leaders

acted as a supreme authority for Germany, but they
operated under a regrettable rule which required unanimity
for action.

The general principles that guided their

deliberations had been established at Potsdam and provided
that, in most matters, Germany was to be regarded as an
entity, with uniform treatment for all citizens, and to
whatever extent feasible, freedom of the press, speech
and religion were to be restored.

Further, Germany was to

be treated as a single economic unit, with common opera
tional policies established on such matters as trade,
industrial production, agriculture, currency and banking,

lo8Ibid., 120.
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transportation, communications, wages, prices and
rationing.^09
What had been

agreed to in principle with respect

to Germany, did not often pertain in actual practice.

In

the American zone, steps were taken to implement the
Potsdam Agreement, with Eisenhower moving rapidly to turn
governmental administration over to civilian authority.
As the

General wrote

to Truman in November of 19k5'-

"...

separation of occupational and governmental

responsibility is sound . . .

if for no other reason than

because of its conformity to the American principle of

,,110

keeping the Army as such out of the civil government."

The Russians, however, began to intensify control over
their zone and eliminate contacts with other parts of
Germany.

It became increasingly difficult to treat Germany

as a single economic unit because of Soviet policy.
Eventually, the British and American governments, later
joined by the French, created machinery to deal with their
combined zones as a unit, to the exclusion of the Soviet
zone of occupation.

However, the access of the western

Phillips Davison, The Berlin Blockade; A Study
in Cold War Politics (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1958)* 3-6. Hereinafter cited as Davison,
Berlin Blockade. See also, Truman, Memoirs, II, 120.
110Eisenhower to Truman, October 26, 19i+5> Eisen
hower Papers, PF/DDE, Truman folder (1), Eisenhower Library.
See also, Truman to Eisenhower, November 2, 19lj.5* ibid.
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powers to their zones of occupation in Berlin was by
narrow corridors through the Soviet-controlled zone.

111

The access corridors through the Soviet Zone of
Germany were not guaranteed by any written agreement.
The Western Powers had agreed that Germany should be
governed from Berlin, deep in the Soviet sector, but their
right of access to their respective enclaves in Berlin
was not formally stipulated.

The Soviet governor for

Germany, Marshall Zhukov, had orally assured General
Lucius Clay, Eisenhower's deputy, that the simple presence
of American and other forces in Berlin presumed the right
of access.

The Russians initially provided ample access

by a railroad line, highway and an air corridor.

112

The

absence of a bilaterally-guaranteed permanent access
route to Berlin became a serious issue in 19lj.8 when the
Soviets chose to block the land corridors.
Arthur Krock wrote, " . . .
because there is no book.

As journalist

we can't throw the book at them,
3

On March 5, 19^8, a few days after the communist

•^Davison, Berlin Blockade, 8-9J Truman, Memoirs,
II, 120.
•^%)avi son, Berlin Blockade, }±; Steinberg, Man from
Missouri, 258. Steinberg says that Truman blames Eisen
hower 'for the lack of a written agreement, but offers no
evidence.
^-^•^Krock, "Background to the Berlin Blockade," New
York Times, July 7» 19U8, reprinted in Krock, In the
NsTETon, 178-79.
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coup in Czechoslovakia, General Clay, military governor
of the U.S. zone, dispatched a message to the Army’s
director of Intelligence:
For many months, based on logical analysis, I have
felt and held that war was unlikely for at least ten
years. Within the last few weeks, I have felt a
subtle change in Soviet attitude which I cannot define
but which now gives me a feeling that it may come with
dramatic suddenness. I cannot support this change in
my own thinking with any data or outward evidence in
relationships other than to describe it as a feeling
of a new tenseness in every Soviet individual with
whom we have official relations.
I am unable to sub
mit any official report in the absence of supporting
data but my feeling is real. You may advise the
Chief of Staff of this for whatever it may be worth
if you feel it advisable .11*+
Walter Millis says that Clay’s cable had a
"cataclysmic" effect on the Pentagon and the White House.
The Central Intelligence Agency was set to work studying
the possibility of war.

On March 16 they reported to

Truman that " . . . major war was not probable within sixty
days."-*-^

The following day, the President spoke to a

liveable is quoted in Millis (ed.), Forrestal
Diaries, 387* See also, Millis, Arms and M e n , 2B5;
Davison, Berlin Blockade, 73; Hammond, "Super Carriers and
B-36 Bombers, h If.73 •
H^Millis, Arms and Men, 2j?5>. During the Berlin
Crisis, members of Forrestal rs staff prepared a report for
the Secretary of Defense on the power of the President to
declare a state of national emergency. Forrestal was
informed that the Commander in Chief could declare a state
of limited or unlimited national emergency upon his own
discretion and that the consent of Congress, while
desirable, was not necessary. Memorandum (unsigned) to
Forrestal, March 29, 19i|.8, RG330, OSD, President, 19i|.719l;9, National Archives.

Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibitedwithout permission.

359
Joint Session of Congress on "The Threat to the Freedom of
Europe.”

He directly attacked the Soviet Union for

obstructionism in the United Nations and the destruction
of ". . . the independence and democratic character of a
whole series of nations in Eastern and Central Europe.
He spoke of the "ruthless course" and "growing menace" of
Soviet imperialism and summed up with a call for additional
action, saying that "there are times in world history when
it is far wiser to act than to hesitate.

Considering

the tone of his speech, Truman's requests were relatively
mild.

He asked for passage of two stalled programs:

universal military trining and the Marshall Plan, as well
n3
as the temporary reinstitution of selective service.
General Clay was notified by the Russians on
March 31 > 191^.8, that they intended henceforth to check
the identification papers of all American military personnel
and check all freight shipments traveling through the .
Soviet zone.

Clay informed the Pentagon that he proposed

to order his troop trains to continue their normal runs
and to ". . . prevent the Russians from coming aboard and

•^^Item No. 52, Special Message to Congress on the
Threat to the Freedom of Europe, March 1 7 » 19i|-8, Public
Papers . . . Truman, 191^8, 183.
H 7lbid., 181#..
11®Ibid., 185.

Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibitedwithout permission.

360

shoot if necessary."

119

Forrestal met immediately with

the service secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They recommended an order to Clay, which Truman subse
quently approved, telling the General that his troops
were not to open fire, except in self-defense.

The trains

went through to the East German border, where they were
stopped.

When the Americans refused to allow a search by

Soviet personnel, the trains were turned back.
no shooting.

There was

Had fighting begun, the United States Army

could have bolstered the occupation forces by only one
division (approximately l£,000 troops) without reverting
.
r*
•
. .
120
to
mobilization.

Throughout April, May and June, the Soviet military
authorities made it increasingly difficult to get into or
out of Berlin.

On June 18, 19^8, Britain, France and the

United States, in a move to halt an inflationary spiral,
announced that they were to immediately establish a new
type of currency for the three western zones of Germany.
The Soviets opposed this change, according to Truman,
". . . because it exposed the basic unsoundness of their
own currency."

That the Russians considered this important

H9j)avison, Berlin Blockade, 73; Millis (ed.),
Forrestal Diaries, Ij.08; 'Truman, Memoirs, II, 122.
120Millis (ed.), Forrestal Diaries, i|07; Truman,
Memoirs, II, 122.
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is illustrated by Truman’s statement that "They offered
to reopen the approaches to the city of Berlin if the
Western powers would call off the currency change-over."

121

The three nations refused the Soviet offer, although this
meant violation of that part of the original agreement
which provided for a single economic and financial policy
for all of Germany.

The Soviet Union, of course, had

violated both the spirit and letter of the agreement on
numerous occasions.
As an apparent reaction to the announced currency
reforms, all rail traffic to the three western zones of
Berlin was cut off completely by Soviet officials on
June 21.

At six o ’clock on the morning of the twenty-

fourth, all highway, river and canal traffic was also
halted.

U.S. Air Force C-i|7 transport planes, on orders

of General Clay, had begun a small-scale airlift of foodstuffs into Berlin on the 21st.

But the western

sectors of Berlin with two million residents became an
island, totally devoid of any surface contact outside their

12lTruman, Memoirs, II, 122.
•^^LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold W a r , 70j
Rees, Age of Containment, 28. See alscT, "Berlin Airlift,"
A report in RG330, OSD, D70-1-5j National Archives.
It
seems evident that the "technical difficulties" the Soviet
Union used to explain the full blockade of the 2lf.th were,
in reality, the currency reforms. The exchange of old for
new currency was to begin on the 25th. Davison, Berlin
Blockade, 105-106.
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boundaries*

The only way left to enter or leave Berlin

was by air.

A written agreement existed, dated November

30, 19ij.£, establishing three twenty mile-wide air
corridors over the Soviet zone.12^
Despite the three months of increasing pressure and
restrictions on access to Berlin, there was, apparently,
no contingency plan in force at the time the blockade was
established.

The planners in Washington would have to

improvise a solution.

The basic decision the President

had to make involved three alternatives:

Order American

forces to abandon the city, postpone any positive measures
or force a military confrontation by sending an armed
column down the blockaded highway to Berlin, as General
Clay had suggested.

Truman decided to defer any

irrevocable decision until the situation was clarified.
A meeting of the President with the Secretary of Defense,
Secretary of the Army and Under Secretary of State Lovett
on June 25 was inconclusive, dealing only with the legality
of the American position in Berlin.

On June 26 Truman

ordered that Clay's improvised airlift be continued and
stepped up to meet the immediate needs of the Berliners,

■^^Davison, Berlin Blockade, 33-3^*
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as well as those of American military personnel
Truman’s order of June 26 to continue the airlift
did not anticipate that the planes were to be anything
more than a stopgap measure, a way to temporize until
diplomatic means could be found to settle the Berlin
Crisis.

The following day, General Curtis LeMay, Air

Force Commander at Wiesbaden, European headquarters of the
U.S. Air Force, cabled Washington a request for forty-five
C-5>i|. heavy transport planes.

The C-ljJ’s available to

LeMay had only a three-ton load capacity, whereas the
12£
newer and larger C-5^ could lift ten tons.
To meet
the need for transports in Germany, a total of fifty-four
C-fJlj. aircraft were eventually moved from bases in Alaska,
126
Hawaii, the Caribbean and the United States.
General
Hoyt Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff, protested to
Truman that this concentration of aircraft in one region
seriously endangered national security, but the President
overruled him.'1,2^

12i|rruman, Memoirs, II, 123. See also, Millis,
Arms and M e n , 288; Millis (ed.), Forrestal Diaries, ij.5l-f>2;
IJavTson, Berlin Blockade, 75* 106-107, 13l; Jotun Lukacs,
A History of ihe Cold War (Rev. ed.; Garden Citv, New
York: Double day and' Company, Incorporated, 1962), 70.
Hereinafter cited as Lukacs, History of the Cold W a r .
"Berlin Airlift," RG330, OSD, D70-1-5, National
Archives.
126Ibid.
■^^Truman, Memoirs. II, 125*
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Secretary of Defense Forrestal met with top Pentagon
officials on Sunday, June 27 , 191+8, to discuss what
recommendations they should make to the President the
following day on Berlin.

Those present were agreed

that the existing supplies in Berlin, plus additional
material that could be brought in by air, would allow
approximately sixty days before the logistical situation
became critical.

The group spent considerable time on the

alternatives of abandonment, the difficulty of remaining
under extant circumstances and the odds of war if they
opted to force their way into Berlin.

According to

Forrestal*s diary record of the meeting, there was no
consideration given to the possibility that the airlift
provided another choice.

The planners may have been

influenced by General Clay's initial estimate that the
airlift could bring in a maximum of 5>00 to 700 tons a
day, whereas the food requirements for West Berlin were
estimated at 1,100 tons a d a y . ^ 9

The meeting adjourned

after deciding that Forrestal, Lovett and Royall should
meet with the President the following day, apprise him of
the alternatives and the arguments for and against each.

*i p Q

In addition to Forrestal, among those present
at the June 27 meeting were Under Secretary Lovett, Secre
taries Royall and Sullivan of the Army and Navy,
respectively, and Generals Bradley and Norstad.
•^•^^Davison, Berlin Blockade, 105, 112, l£0-5l. See
also, Millis (ed.), Forrestal' Diaries,
New York
Times, July 5, 191+8.
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They were also to discuss sending two squadrons of B-29
bombers to Germany or England.

The advantage of
(

negotiating with nuclear weapon carriers within striking
distance of the Soviet Union could not be ignored.
Secretary Lovett began the meeting with the Presi
dent on June 28 by reciting the options derived from the
Pentagon meeting the previous day.

Truman interrupted

him to say that there was no discussion necessary on
staying in Berlin; he had no intention of pulling out.

131

This major decision represents one of the infrequent
instances of Truman making a command decision without
benefit of considerable deliberation and recommendations
by his staff of military advisers.

The latter were still

busily trying to decide jif the United States should
132
attempt to remain in Berlin.
The President made two other command decisions in
the meeting on the twenty-eighth, in addition to the
pivotal decision to stay in Berlin.

He agreed to the

sending of additional B-29 bombers to Germany, a decision

13°Millis (ed.), Forrestal Diaries, ij.53-5^*
•^•^Ibid.s
j.. See also, LaFeber, America, Russia,
and the Cold War, 70; Millis, Arms and Men, 2tib.
132q »Connor, "Harry S. Truman: New Dimensions of
Power," I|.2—lf-3• O ’Connor claims, but without adequate
substantiation, that the JCS had to overcome Truman's
"predisposition" to break the blockade by means of an
armed convoy.
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with which Clay heartily concurred, since he did not have
enough of a conventional land force in Germany to confront
the Russians.

(Nor was he to obtain such a force.

On the

basis of existing Army manpower and global requirements,
no additional troops could be made available for Germany.)
Truman also instructed the National Military Establishment
to take whatever steps were necessary to make the airlift
sufficient to the immediate needs of West

B e r l i n .

Truman has recalled the reasoning behind these decisions
in his Memoirs:
The Russians were obviously determined to force us
out of Berlin.
They had suffered setbacks recently
in Italy, in France, and in Finland.
Their strongest
satellite, Yugoslavia, had suddenly developed a taste
for independent action, and the European Recovery
Program was beginning to succeed. The blockade of
Berlin was international Communism's counterattack. .
. . Our position in Berlin was precarious. If we
wished to remain there, we would have to make a show
of strength. But there was always the risk that
Russian reaction might lead to war. We had to face
the possibility that Russia might deliberately choose
to make Berlin the pretext for war. . . .13h The actions and decisions of the Commander in Chief
during the early days of the Berlin Crisis are both
unusual and revealing.

What seems most obvious is that

he bypassed the very institutional framework he had worked
to create.

One of the prime purposes of the Armed Forces

■*-33Millis (ed.), Forrestal Diaries,
See
also, O'Connor, "Harry S. Truman: New Dimensions of
Power," I4.2—14.3 5 Davison, Berlin Blockade, 110-11.
■^^Truman, Memoirs, II, 123-2ij..
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unification that Truman had brought into being was to
establish an efficient, clear line of communication in the
command system.

The National Security Council recommenda

tions to the President were not yet before him when he
acted.

The Central Intelligence Agency had failed to antic

ipate the Soviet move.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were

still debating alternatives, but were at least certain
that the airlift Truman endorsed could not work for any
extended period.

The War Council of the National Military

Establishment seems to have been moribund during this
crisis period.

In the normal, institutionalized process

Truman had established, policy recommendations would have
come up to the Commander in Chief from the military ad
visers represented in these bodies.

In this instance,

Truman decided on a course of action--to stay in Berlin
and supply the city by air-~and he then convinced his
military advisers that it would work.

In the hectic days

of the Korean decision the President would again bypass
part of the staff process which he otherwise placed great
faith in.133

1 3 5 m an editorial note, Walter Millis cites many
of the same factors mentioned here. He sees the June 27
Pentagon session as an ac[ hoc response which bypassed
". . . the formal machinery of the Security Act to take
large (if rather vague) politico-strategic decisions."
Forrestal Diaries, k5k' LaFeber, in America, Russia, and
the Cold War (p. 70) writes:
"Without consulting anyone
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By early July the airlift, which someone in the
Air Force with a singular lack of imagination had codenamed "Operation Vittles," was beginning to show signs
that it could succeed against all odds.

Much of the

burden had been eased by the arrival in late June of the
four-engine C-5i| Skymaster transports, which had triple
the capacity of the smaller C—1^7Ts .-^-36

r^e British Royal

Air Force soon joined in the airlift, taking up approxi
mately one-third of the burden.

To make the operation

more efficient, the British and American air elements were
joined in October, 19i|-8, into the Combined Airlift Task
Force.137

jn the 32lj. days of the airlift, well over a

quarter million flights were made, delivering a total of
over two million tons of food and other supplies necessary
■j

to the survival of the people of Berlin.
The National Security Council had studied at length
the proposal to send B-29 atomic bombers to bases in Great
Britain, which the British were willing to accept, although,
supposedly, they would be armed with nuclear weapons.

In

but a few Cabinet advisors, Truman decided. . . . "
This
is not accurate and it conveys a false impression that
Truman had acted intemperately. See also, O'Connor,
"Harry S. Truman: New Dimensions of Power," if.3.
136"Berlin Airlift," RG330, OSD, D70-1-5, National
Archives.
^•^Davison, Berlin Blockade, 195*
U^ees,

Age of Containment, 28.
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a report to Truman, July 15, 19ij.8, the NSC recommended,
and the President approved, this move.

They reasoned

that it would underscore the seriousness of the current
crisis to the public, provide experience for the Air
Force and accustom the British people to having the
atomic bombers around as a permanent

f i x t u r e

.^9

The atomic bombers stationed in Germany and now in
England were obviously designed to intimidate the Russians.
At the same time the Berlin crisis provided the perfect
cover for a permanent long-range decision to extend the
atomic perimeter around the Soviet Union.

The first

American Strategic Air Command base in Great Britain was
established as a direct result of the Berlin blockade.
However, it is not at all certain that these planes were
carrying atomic bombs.

Whether they were or not remains

a military secret,^®
Beginning in the spring of 19lj.8, as the Berlin
crisis developed, Secretary of Defense Forrestal tried to
get the President to formulate a specific atomic policy as
to whether or not the U.S. would ever use the bomb again
in war,and, if so, under what circumstances.

The Secre

tary also wanted Truman to transfer custody of the atomic

■^^illis (ed.), Forrestal Diaries,
Berlin Blockade, 129-30.

Davison,

^+°Millis, Arms and Men, 289*
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bombs from the Atomic Energy Commission to the Air Force,
arguing that those responsible for using the weapon when
ordered to do so, should possess it.'*'^

In the next few

months Truman displayed an •unusual reluctance to decide
the issues on nuclear policy that Forrestal had raised.
In a meeting on July 15>> 19^4-8, the Defense Secretary in
formally raised the subject of atom bomb custody again.
The President told Forrestal that he wanted to keep the
decision on use of the bomb "in his own hands."

According

to Forrestal's diary entry for this date, Truman said that
he did not intend " . . .

to have some dashing lieutenant

colonel decide when would be the proper time to drop
one.

Six days later, the NME formally requested an

executive order transferring bomb custody from the
the Military Establishment.

a EC

to

Truman reserved decision on

the transfer, but commented that since the responsibility
was his, he proposed to keep that power intact.

Two days

later, June 23, he privately told Forrestal he was going
to reject the proposed transfer of bomb custody to the
military.

Forrestal claimed the President admitted that

his decision was politically-inspired, but that after the
presidential race was over he would be willing to reconsider

^-^-Rogow, Victim of Duty, 183-8^? Millis
Forrestal Diaries, IjjjB.

(ed.),

^•^Millis (ed.), Forrestal Diaries, lj.£8.
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his position.'1' ^

In fact, the issue of civilian or

military custody— presuming proper fail-safe systems— is
of only passing importance, since only a civilian, the
Commander in Chief, can order their employment.

Of far

greater significance is the question of whether they
should be used.

And on this, Truman clearly wanted to

keep his options open.
The President’s reluctance to fix conditions under
which he would approve nuclear warfare, while under
standable, created serious problems for military
contingency planners.

This was particularly true in the

bellicose atmosphere of 191^.8 when available conventional
forces were at their lowest levels.

The reduction in

military appropriations, except for strategic bombers,
indicated a reliance on massive nuclear retaliation in
the even of total war.

A conventional military response

in a limited conflict could not be planned for, since, in
lieu of a stipulated nuclear policy, the guiding
assumption prescribed that the American response to
attack would be strategic atom-bombing of the aggressor.
The atom bombers went to European stations without
an established policy as to the use of the weapons which

lU3ibid., lj.60-6l. Forrestal records Truman
repeating these political considerations with General
Marshall present on September 16. See ibid., lj.90.
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were— theoretically at least--nestled in their bellies.
The B-29's were atomic guns pointed at the Soviet heart
land.

Soviet intelligence was reasonably sure Truman

would not pull the nuclear trigger over Berlin.

However,

neither they, nor Truman's military advisers, really knew.
Forrestal discussed this policy vacuum with the President
several times in July and August, without receiving a
conclusive response.'1' ^

The Defense Secretary persisted

in pressing Truman for a nuclear-use policy and was
rewarded with an answer, of sorts, on September 13:
". . . the President prayed that he would never have to
make such a decision, but that if it became necessary, no
one need have a misgiving but what he should do so.’1^ ^
The Secretary must have considered the answer satisfactory
for, as Millis noted editorially, "Forrestal never again
felt it necessary to raise the matter with the Presi
dent."'1' ^
Whether or not they carried atomic bombs, with or
without a clearly-defined policy, the B-29's Truman ordered
to Europe changed the military and diplomatic policies of

■^•^•Davison, Berlin Blockade, l£6.

^Ibid.
U+^Millis (ed.), Forrestal Diaries, I4.87 .
1^7lbid.; Schilling, "Politics of National Defense,"
173-7^.
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the

United States.

In a brilliant passage from his Arms

and

M e n , Walter Millis has

analyzed the effect on policy

of the B-29’s :
. . . when at last they roared off across the Atlantic,
they were bringing the nuclear weapons for the first
time directly into the system of diplomacy and
violence by which the affairs of peoples were thence
forth to be regulated. . . . The Berlin crisis itself
was successfully met by . . . essentially nonmilitary
means, and the fact that they succeeded may have con
tributed to the continued American inattention to the
military foundations of the new world order which was
developing. There was no real review of the military
problem. . . .
Yet in another sense, 19l;8 represents a major
divide in American military thought. The atomic
bombers had gone to Britain. . . . The bombs exploded
over Hiroshima and Nagasaki had represented a oneshot, last-ditch effort, so to speak, to bring to an
end a war which already had taken its toll of
millionsJ and the first impulse in the aftermath had
been to insure that such things would never be used
in war again. By 19i+8 the impulse had died; it was
plain that the atomic arsenal had entered American
thought as an appropriate instrument of policy for bhe
future.
It was still a back-door, largely unacknowledged
entrance. The supposed atomic monopoly lay somewhere
behind nearly every policy decision in the military,,g
field, but outwardly things went on much as before. ^
The Secretaries of State and Defense met with the
President on July 19 to review the Berlin situation.
General Marshall emphasized to Truman that if he did not
hold to a "firm policy" there, then the remainder of
American European policy would also fail.

Secretary

Forrestal added a note of caution, telling the President
that the United States had just slightly more than two

3-^-®Millis,

Arms and Men, 288-90.
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Array divisions in reserve, only one of which could be in
Europe quickly.

Truman concluded the discussion by

saying, in Forrestal's words, " . . .
remain fixed . . .

our policy would

we would stay in Berlin until all

diplomatic means had been exhausted in order to come to
some kind of an accommodation to avoid war."1^

On first

reading, Truman seems to have made a firm statement, but
much depends on what he meant by "until all diplomatic
means had been exhausted."

As one writer points out,

"Diplomatic means would be exhausted if the Soviets simply
said 'no' consistently over a period of time.
It is quite possible that Eorrestal misunderstood
Truman or that the President's language was not precise
enough.

Writing a diary-type note to himself the evening

of the meeting with the Secretary, Truman clearly stated
that the United States would stay in Berlin, whatever
happened.

The strain of these days on the President is

evident in the note:
July 19, 19^8
Have quite a day. See some politicos. A meeting
with General Marshall and Jim Forrestal on Berlin
and the Russian situation. Marshall states the facts
and the condition with whioh we are faced. I made the
decision ten days ago to stay in Berlin. Jim wants to
hedge. . . . I insist we will stay in Berlin— come

■^^Millis (ed.), Forrestal Diaries, 459.
-^Davison, Berlin Blockade, 157*
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what may.
Royall, Draper and Jim Forrestal came in later. I
have to listen to a rehash of what I know already and
reiterate my "Stay in Berlin" decision. I do not pass
the buck, nor do I alibi out of any decision I make.
Went to Pershing's funeral in the marble
amphitheatre. An impressive ceremony. . . .
Bess and Margaret went to Missouri at 7:30 EDT
6:30 God's time. I sure hated to see them go. Came
back and read the papers, some history and then wrote
this. It is hot and humid and lonely. . . .3-51
Truman apparently felt a need to talk to his field
commander face to face about Berlin.

He ordered General

Clay and Robert Murphy, State Department adviser to Clay,
to return to Washington for consultation.

The President

invited the General to attend the National Security
Council meeting on July 22 with him, so that Clay might
brief them on the German situation.

Clay told the NSC

that the airlift was working well, averaging 2500 tons of
goods per day, but that additional aircraft would be
required to bring in the coal necessary for the coming
winter.

He said the morale of the German people was high

and they were determined to wait out the Soviet blockade.
Clay then returned to the possibility of sending an armored
convoy up the highway to Berlin.

It was his opinion that

it would be met by armed Soviet resistance .3-52

gu ^

General was not quite consistent, for he had dined with
Forrestal the previous evening and told him that he

3-53-Hillman (ed.), Mr. President, II4.O.
l52Qirumanj Memoirs, II,
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believed that three weeks earlier he could have put
through an armored convoy without difficulty and that he
still believed it could be done.^^

Clay had, on July 10,

cabled Washington a request for authority to force his
way through the blockade, convinced that the Russians
would not forecefully resist such a passage.
The Air Force Chief, General Vandenberg, objected
in the National Security Council meeting of July 22 to
any further concentration of forces in Germany.

Truman

asked the General if he thought it better to send an armed
force down the highway, thus precipitating World War III.
Without giving Vandenberg a chance to answer, Truman said
that the airlift was working and involved less risk than
a convoy.

He ordered the Air Force to ". . . furnish the

fullest support possible to the problem of supplying
Berlin."1^
By September the Berlin airlift had expanded to the
point where it could provide foodstuffs and most other

•^^Millis (ed.), Forrestal Diaries,

•

l^Davison, Berlin Blockade, 126. Robert Murphy,
a State Department representative who accompanied General
Clay back from Germany, is quoted in Time magazine (June 1,
1970) as having said he regretted that he had not resigned
at the time of the blockade as a' protest. Murphy felt
that the United States should have challenged the Soviet
blockade "more vigorously."
l£5>Truman, Memoirs, II, 125-26.

Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Furtherreproduction prohibitedwithout permission.

377
necessities of life without difficulty.

However, bulk

commodities, like coal, which would be needed in great
quantities in the coming winter, would require additional
aircraft.

A review on Berlin in the National Security

Council on September 9 disclosed that the diplomatic
negotiations to end the blockade had broken down because
of Soviet intransigence on all key points.

In addition,

the Russians announced they planned to hold ground and
aerial training maneuvers in an area of East Germany that
included the airlift corridors.

156

A meeting with the

Secretary of Defense and other Pentagon leaders four days
later left Truman despondent:

"Berlin is a mess," he

confided in a diary note that evening (September 13).
"I have a terrible feeling . . . that we are very close
to war.

I hope n o t .
Truman's somber estimates of the threat of war may

have been colored by his own political problems; he was in
the midst of a campaign for re-election which few thought
he had a chance of winning.

In any event, the Russians

continued to make hostile gestures, but they always stopped
short of actual armed contact.
The success of the airlift was an ever-increasing
embarrassment to the Soviet government.

The airlift

1^ 6Ibid., 128 .
■^^Hillman (ed.), Mr. President, lij.1.
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project, Clay reported to the NSC, was no longer an
experiment, but a success which could be continued
indefinitely.

On October 22 General Clay received the

authorization of the National Security Council and the
Commander in Chief to add sixty-six more C-51| transports
158
to his airlift.
Truman and the Security Council also
approved appropriations to the Air Force for expansion of
maintenance facilities and the procurement of new aircraft
to offset the attrition caused by the airlift.

159

Early in 19U9 the Soviet Union began sending out
diplomatic signals indicating a willingness to discuss an
end to the Berlin blockade.

Talks began between Philip

Jessup and Jacob Malik, the American and Soviet represen
tatives to the United Nations, in March of 19^9.

The end

result was an agreement made public on May ii, announcing
that the blockade would end as of May 1 2 . ^ 0

The detente

had been made possible by Truman’s resort to the only
peaceful and honorable course left open to him, the
dramatic and amazingly effective airlift.

The Air Force

could well boast, as Secretary Symington did, that "The

•^^Davison, Berlin Blockade, 250; Truman, Memoirs,
II, 129.
•^^Symington to Forrestal, November 2ip, 191^8,
RG3i|.0, S/AF, Vittles, folder (1), National Archives.
3-60l'i’uman, Memoirs, II, 130-31.
Berlin Blockade, 270-71«

See also, Davison,
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Berlin airlift is one of the great transportation
achievements of all time.
Truman’s conduct in the Berlin blockade crisis
showed him at his best; resolute but restrained.

He

rejected the direct military solution of testing the
blockade with an armed convoy in favor of the airlift,
which, for a time, only he seemed to believe could work.
While Berlin, like Greece and Turkey and other lesser
confrontations with the Soviet Union could be counted as
victories for Truman’s containment doctrine; it should be
noted that all were achieved while the United States
162
enjoyed a monopoly on nuclear weapons.
This monopoly
ended four months after the Berlin blockade.
to gainsay what Truman accomplished:

Which is not

he had taken a

peaceful path and obtained his objective without appreciable
compromise.

That West Berlin still stands as a republican

enclave in the center of a Soviet satellite is due largely
to the firm leadership of Harry Truman.

That Berlin still

stands unnaturally divided is a mocking reminder in

^-Symington to Forrestal, November 20, 19k&,
RG3i|.0, S/AF, 031.1, National Archives.
l^D(enna) F)rank) Fleming, "America's Responsi
bility," in Brian Tierney, Donald Kagan, and L. Pearce
Williams (eds.), The Cold War— Who Is To Blame? (New York:
Random House, 1967)* 1J|-15* Hereinafter cited as Fleming,
"America's Responsibility." See also, Glenn D. Paige,
The Korean Decision, June 2U-30 * 1950 (New York: The Free
Press, i 960;,
iiereinarter cited as Paige, Korean
Decision.
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microcosm of the politico-military dichotomy of the world
which began with Truman and his Soviet counterpart.
The Berlin blockade offers an excellent illustration
of the great power inherent in the accepted modern concept
of the commander in chief.

At no time during the days of

decision in the Berlin crisis, nor in the long months of
tense confrontation with the Soviet Union, did the Presi
dent consult with the legislative leaders.

Not once did

he ask authority from Congress to take action, nor request
that they give legislative sanction to decisions he had
m a d e . T r u m a n was virtually without check.

He could

just as easily have ordered General Clay to send an armed
convoy to Berlin and to meet force with force.

The

resulting bloodshed would have confronted the nation with
a state of war, albeit undeclared.

The exclusive power of

the Congress to declare war is a largely-illusory consti
tutional check on the sweeping military power of the modern
presidency.

In March 19ij-8 Great Britain, Prance, the Nether
lands, Belgium and Luxembourg signed a collective selfdefense treaty, called the Brussels Pact.

This was a

purely military agreement predicated on the principle that

163 q !Connor,
Power, " ij.3•

"Harry S. Truman: New Dimensions of
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an attack on one was an attack on all.

The reasons for

it, of course, were the events of the Cold War in Europe
in 19l|-7 and early 19lf-8, particularly the Soviet-sponsored
Communist takeover of the governments of Hungary and
Czechoslovakia.

Finland was under extreme pressure to

enter irifco a "pact of friendship" with the Soviet Union.
A general malaise existed in Western Europe occasioned by
Communist pressure on the "free nations" which led
directly to the formation of the Brussels Pact.'1' ^
Speaking to Congress at the time of the pact's
signing, Truman called it ". . . a notable step in the
direction of unity in Europe for the protection and
preservation of its civilization."1^

The President told

the Congress that the Brussels Pact deserved the full
support of the United States.

Then, in what was probably

a trial balloon regarding American association with the
pact, Truman said:

"I am sure that the determination of

the free countries of Europe to protect themselves will be

l6^John W. Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since
World War II (2nd rev. ed.j New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
• Hereinafter cited as Spanier, American For
eign Policy. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Govern
ment aTToperations, Subcommittee on National Security and
International Operations, The Atlantic Alliance— Basic
Issues: A Study, Committee Print, 89 Cong., 2 Bess'., 1966.
rfereTnafTTer cited as Atlantic Alliance— Basic Issues. See
also, Truman, Memoirs, II, 2173;' Steinberg, Man From
Missouri, 359.
^•^item No. 52, Special Message to the Congress on
the Threat to the Freedom of Europe, March 17, 19lj.8,
Public Papers . . . Truman, 19ijB, I 8I4..
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matched by an equal determination on our part to help

166

them to protect themselves.”

The President was aware

that the military alliance between Prance, Britain and the
Benelux nations did not constitute any genuine deterrent
to Soviet ambition.

Any effective military alliance for

Europe was only possible with American participation.
But here Truman was wary of American tradition:

”. . . 1

always kept in mind the les.son of Wilson’s failure in
1920.

16*7

I meant to have legislative co-operation.”

What Truman hoped to do was to enlarge the Brussels
Alliance by the inclusion of the United States and the
nations of western Europe who were not yet members.
This meant, of course, that he would eventually have to
ask a generally-hostile Republican Senate to ratify
American participation in an international military
alliance.

He was fortunate in that Arthur Vandenberg, a

staunch believer in bipartisan foreign policy, was then
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Vandenberg, with the encouragement of Under Secretary of
State Robert Lovett, agreed to try to obtain the prior

l66Ibid.
•L^Truman, Memoirs, II, 2l±3-
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consent of the Senate to the principle of such an
alliance
The result of Vandenberg's efforts, Senate Resolu
tion 239, was artfully led through the legislative process
by the Senator to passage on a final roll call vote in
which only four votes were recorded against it.

Thus, on

June 11, 19i|-8, the Senate went on record as endorsing the
participation of the United States in a regional collective
security arrangement.

The significant provisions of the

resolution are noted below:
(3) Association of the United States, by constitu
tional process, with such regional and other collective
arrangement as are based oncontinuous and effective
self-help and mutual aid, and as effect its national
security.
(If.) Contributing to the maintenance of peace by
making clear its determination to exercise the right
of individual or collective self-defense . . . should
any armed attack occur affecting its national
security.169
With the resolution as security, Truman then
initiated talks with other nations, that resulted, on

^ Ib id * *
Acheson T e s tim o n y , U . S . , C ongress,
S e n a te , C om m ittee on Government O p e r a tio n s , Subcom m ittee
on N a t io n a l S e c u r it y and I n t e r n a t i o n a l O p e r a tio n s , H e a rin g s ,
The A t l a n t i c A l l i a n c e , 89 C o n g ., 2 S e s s . , (7 P a r t s ; A p r i l
27 - August 15, 1966), P t . 1, 9. H e r e in a f t e r c it e d as
A t l a n t i c A l l i a n c e H e a r in g s .

■^^Text of Vandenberg Resolution is in Bernstein
and Matusow (eds^, Truman Administration, 27k-75>* Watson,
United States in the Contemporary World, 82-83 . See also,
Henry M. Jackson (e d .), The Atlantic Alliance: Jackson
Subcommittee Hearings and Findings (New York: Frederick A.
"Praeger, 1967), 8. Hereinafter cited as Jackson (ed.),
The Atlantic Alliance.
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April !{., 19l;9, in a pact establishing the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO)

The President submitted

the treaty to the Senate for approval on April 12,
reminding them that the document was in accord with their
resolution of the previous June and re-hashing the

venerable argument that the way to lasting peace was through
military m i g h t . L e n g t h y hearings and floor debate
followed.

The most persistent question dealt with the

power of the Commander in Chief to send troops abroad
without congressional sanction in compliance with a
military alliance.

Administration leaders blocked an

attempt by the Senate to stipulate on the matter.

172

The

ratification vote came on July 21 with the treaty passing

170The signatory nations were Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Prance, Great Britain, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United States.
Spanier, American Foreign Policy, 50 J Phillips, Truman
Presidency, 266-67. For a “de t'ailed account of the negotia
tions that led to the NATO Treaty, see Truman, Memoirs, II,

21^- 50.
•^^Item No. 75 j Special Message to the Senate Trans
mitting the North Atlantic Treaty, April 12, 19l|9, Public
Papers . . . Truman, 191-1-9> 206-207.
172o»Connor, "Harry S. Truman: New Dimensions of
Power,." 58. Senatorial efforts to check the Commander in
Chief with respect to the NATO agreement are described in
Powers of the President to Send the Armed Forces Outside the
United Spates. The problem is also "discussed in a column
by Arthur Krock, "The Power of Congress to Declare War,"
New York Times, February Ij., 19i|9, reprinted in Krock, In
the Nation, I 6I- 63 . See also, Robert Taft, "A Conservative
Opposes the Treaty," in Kaplan (ed.), NATO and the Policy
of Containment, 18-22.
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82-13*

The ratification process was completed on August

2ij., 19i}-9> and NATO began its formal existence.
The American commitment to a peacetime military
alliance was a unique and significant departure from
established practice.

It was an obvious extension and

militarization of the Truman Doctrine.

However, its

value, particularly in the first years of its operation,
was largely symbolic since it lacked sufficient aims,
forces and coordination.^^

As Urs Schwarz has said,

what the establishment of NATO recognized was ”. . .
the truth that military power had become a permanent
corollary of foreign

p o l i c y . "•*•

75

Standing alone, the North Atlantic Treaty was, in
Richard Leopold's words, ". . . a diplomatic gesture rather
than a military bulwark. "176

nations of Europe

■l-73Truman, Memoirs, II, 2f>l; Spanier, American
Foreign Policy. The text of the North Atlantic Treaty is
officially published in U.S. Statutes at Large (63 Stat.
22l|l). The text is reprinted in Jaclcson (ed.), The
Atlantic Alliance, 2S1-83J Kaplan (ed.) NATO and t!he Policy
of Containment, 12-lk; Watson (ed«), United Stages in the
'Contemporary World, 83-87 .
1 ^"Leopold, "United States in World Affairs," 233*
See also, Major Problems of United States Foreign Policy,
15>6-i>7» McLelian and Reuss, "Foreign and Military
Policies," 61, 66-68; American Military History, 5^3*
■^-’Schwarz, American Strategy, 135*
176RiChard W. Leopold, The Growth of American
Foreign Policy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), 6^8. Here
inafter cited as Leopold, Growth of American Foreign Policy.
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involved could act as little more than a tripwire in the
face of an all-out Soviet movement westward.

These

nations could not meet even a conventional probe by
Communist forces without significant military assistance
from the United States.

A program of military aid was an

essential concomitant if NATO were to be anything more
than a wall of paper.
The National Security Council recommended to the
President that the request for military assistance
appropriations for the NATO nations be combined with
similar existing aid programs into one package for
presentation to the Congress.

The programs already in

operation provided for the military equipment and trooptraining assistance for Iran, Greece, Turkey, the
Philippines, China, Korea, and several Latin American
republics.

177

There was an obvious efficiency to

combining all military aid into a unified program, but
the administration was also concerned about the resistance
in Congress to military aid to the NATO bloc.

Accord

ingly, the tactic was to divorce the request for military
assistance from the NATO treaty and tie it to a unified
military aid

r e q u e s t

Pour days after the Senate advised favorably on the

•^^American Military History, 543*
•*-7®McLellan and Reuss, "Foreign and Military
Policies," 62; Hammond, "NSC-68," 283 .
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NATO Pact, Truman sent to Congress a request for a Mutual
Defense Assistance Program (MDAGP) .

The principal purpose

of the bill was to provide the requisite military imple
mentation of the NATO alliance.

The President asked the

Congress for $l.lj.5 billion.

The bulk of his request,
179
$1.09 billion, was intended for Western Europe.
In his
special message to Congress asking for MDAP, Truman said
it was intended to provide compact, mobile defensive
forces for nations whose security was vital to the
national security of the United States.

He acknowledged

that the foreign forces envisioned by his program would
provide the nations involved only with sufficient arms
and equipment to resist internal disorder and " . . .
l80
resisting the initial phases of external aggression.11
Truman recognized that the only genuine "deterrent to
aggression" was still the military might of the United
States, and said that no nation need fear that he would
■I O - j

not use this power to prevent their being overrun.

The

President told the Congress that the requirements for
military aid had been unified under one program so that
the distribution of American arms and equipment could be

■*-79phillips , Truman Presidency, 269-70 .

100

Item No. 163, Special Message to the Congress on
the Need for a Military Aid Program, July 25, 19il9,
Public Papers . . . Truman, 19k.9j 398.
l8lIbid.
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adapted to U.S. foreign policy and changing conditions
Many members of the Congress, appalled uy the amount
of the MDAP request,

joined with the neo-isolationists,

led by Senator Taft, in opposition to the President's
request.

One of Taft's strongest allies was Senator

Vandenberg, a key figure in making NATO a reality.
Vandenberg believed, as did Taft, that the bill was too
costly and that it was " . . .

almost unbelievable in its

grant of unlimited power to the Chief Executive."'1' ^

The

President assigned to Dean Acheson, who had replaced
Marshall as Secretary of State in January, the task of
steering the MDAP bill through Congress.'1"®^'

The Congress

battled over the bill the rest of the summer months and
well into September; it seemed clear that Truman would
have to accept major amendments in the amount and con
ditions for military aid in order to secure passage.

But

Truman's program and Acheson's task were both simplified
by the Soviet Union.

On September 23, 19i|9, the President

made public the information that the U.S.S.R. had

251-53.

•*-®^Ibid., 399.
• ^ ^ V a n d e n b e r g

See also, Truman, Memoirs, II,
is

quoted in Acheson, Present at the

Creation, 309.
18^-Ibid., 309ff. provides a thorough, if slightly
slanted account of the struggle to get the bill through
Congress.
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successfully tested a nuclear device.'*'®^

Impelled by the

loss of the nuclear monopoly, solid majorities in both
legislative houses approved the bill in less than a week,
cutting the original request by only $100 million.

T RA

The President signed the Mutual Defense Assistance
Act of 1 9 ^ 9 ^ ^ on October 6, describing it as " . . .

a

notable contribution to the collective security of the

188

free nations of the world.”

In an obvious reference

to the Soviet atomic explosion, Truman also said at the
bill-signing:

"Recent developments in the field of

armaments have strengthened the free nations in their
adherence to the principle of a common defense . . . that
underlies this act.”^®^

Truman made implementation of the

l8^Item No. 216, Statement by the President on
Announcing the First Atomic Explosion in the U.S.S.R.,
September 23* 192+9» Public Papers . . . Truman, 19ll9* lf-85.
l86phiiiipS , Truman Presidency, 270. See also,
Steinberg, Man from Missouri", 380; Acheson, Present at
the Creation, 313 •

l87The act is Public Law 329 (63 St at. 712+) . A
description of the principles involved in the act as
passed and as amended in 1950* can be found in Major
Problems of United States Foreign Policy, 121, 17^-73•
^■88Item No. 22£* Statement by the President Upon
Signing the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, October 6,
191+9* Public Papers . . . Truman, 191+9* 500.
l89Ibid.
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act the responsibility of the Secretary of

S t a t e .

-*-90

However, the Department of the Army was given the duty of
administering the Mutual Defense Program.

In operation,

each country that received MDAP-authorized arms and
equipment had an American "Military Assistance Advisory
Group" assigned to it.

Each group was composed of Army,

Air Force and Navy sections.

The functions assigned to

these groups have been described in the Army’s official
history:

"...

each advisory group assisted its host

government in determining the amount and type of aid
needed and helped train the armed forces . . .

in the use

and tactical employment of material received from the
United States.”191
It took more than a year for the NATO countries to
come to agreement on the precise implementation of the
principles they had approved in the North Atlantic Treaty.
The difficulties centered around reaching accord on each
nation’s contribution to the common effort, the partici
pation of West Germany in the alliance, and the

190rpruraan £0 Acheson, November 23, 19ij.9, RG165,
USA, Plans and Operations 092, Case 66/5, National Archives.
The Secretary of State’s authority and the terms of ad
ministering the act were formalized by Truman in Executive
Order 10099, January 27, 1950 (3 C.F.R., 19*1.9-1953 Comp.,
295)* See also, Item No. 22, Statement by the President
Upon Issuing Executive Order for Administering Mutual
Defense Act, January 27, 1950, Public Papers . . . Truman,
1950, 131-32.
-1-91 American Military History, 5^4-3•
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amalgamation of national forces into a common "balanced
force" for mutual defense.

The outbreak of the Korean War

impressed upon the NATO signatories the need of a function
ing body to prevent a similar attack in Europe.

A general

agreement was finally hammered out by Secretary Acheson
and the allied representatives on September 26, 1950,
which established SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied
Powers Europe) .^92

one understanding reached by the NATO

countries was that the supreme commander of the NATO
forces was to be an American.

And Truman knew just the

American he wanted for the job.
To a note for General Eisenhower on October 19,
1950, Truman had added a handwritten postscript:
time y o u ’re in town I wish you'd come see me.

"First

If I send

for you we'll start the 'speculators' to work."'*'^
Eisenhower saw the President on October 28.

Truman asked

him to take supreme command of the NATO armies.

The

General accepted, Truman recalled, because he felt that
bringing the nations of Europe together " . . .

was a job

•^^Truman has described the difficult negotiations
leading to this agreement in his Memoirs, II, 252-57*
See
also, William T. R. Fox and Annette B. Fox, NaTO- and the
Range of American Choice (New York and London! Columbia
University Press, T W 7 7 7 11+-15* Hereinafter cited as Fox
and Fox, NATO and the Range of American Choice.
193Truman to Eisenhower, October 19, 1950, Eisen
hower Papers, PF/DDE, Truman folder (2), Eisenhower Library.
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that very badly needed to be done."^9^

Elsenhower's

formal appointment was made by the President on December
19, 1950.

The order gave the General full operational

command of all American Army, Air T?orce and Naval Forces
in the European theater, as well as designating him as
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

"You are undertaking

a tremendous responsibility,” Truman concluded in his
order to Eisenhower.

"As President and Commander-in-Chief

of the Armed Forces of the United States, I know that our
entire country is wholeheartedly behind y o u . " ^ ^

Truman

might have thought twice about this prestigious appoint
ment had he any way of knowing that in less than two
years Eisenhower would be the Republican nominee, publicly
damning the Korean military policies of his former
commander in chief.
Six years after he left office, Truman told cun
interviewer that the conclusion of the NATO treaty gave
him the greatest sense of personal satisfaction.^-9^

The

ex-President wrote in his Memoirs that western Europe was

19i^prUjnan, Memoirs, II, 257• See also, Fox and
Fox, NATO and the Range of American Choice, 15. Officially,
Eisenhowerfs title will "He Supreme Allied Commander,
Europe (SACEUR).
195Truman to Eisenhower, December 19, 1950,
Eisenhower Papers, PF/DDE, Truman Folder (2), Eisenhower
Library•
196Phillips, "Truman at 75*" 107.
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secure largely because the United States was able to
break with tradition during his administration and join a
peacetime military alliance .^97

Subsequent events did not

serve to shake his conviction that NATO is an important
deterrent shield:
Student: Mr. President, you said that during your
admin is tra tion the country moved from isolationism to
internationalism. I would imagine that one of the
ways you did this was by joining NATO. . . . Do you
have any regrets about moving this nation quite so
quickly into an organization like NATO?
President Truman: I have not. NATO has been a
very successful organization.
It was one of the
things that kept us out of a third world war. • . •
It's working, and itSs going to continue to work.
When It quits working, we'll be in the third world
war.
Just keep that in mind.198
The test detonation of an atomic device by the
Soviet Union had encouraged the Congress to pass the Mutual
Defense Assistance Act substantially in the form Truman
had requested.

The Soviet test had also been a major

factor in Truman's decision to authorize a crash program
to develop the thermonuclear (hydrogen) bomb.

There was

another major development directly attributable to the
successful Russian experiment:

The drafting of a policy

197Truman, Memoirs, II, 260-61.
Speaks, ll|.-lfj. In 1966, in a letter to
Senate Sub-conraTttee on National Security, Truman wrote:
"It seems to me that there is continued need for NATO to
guard against the use of force to resolve issues which
remain 20 years after the war." Truman to Henry M.
Jackson, July 26, 1966, quoted in Atlantic Alliance
Hearings, Pt. 7# 227.
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3924paper for Truman that would come to have a major influence
on the military and foreign policy thinking of the
American government.

The paper had its beginning in a

report dated January 31, 1950, dealing with recommendations
to the President in light of the end of the American atomic
monopoly.

199

One of the recommendations made then was

that the President order the State and Defense departments
to make a detailed examination of American objectives in
both war and peace.

They should also assess the effect

that those objectives have on strategic planning now that
the Soviet Union had a ". . . probable fission bomb capa
bility and possible thermonuclear bomb capability. • • .
The President accepted this recommendation and when he
signed the directive ordering the acceleration of the
hydrogen bomb program on January 30, 1950, he appended
to it a letter ordering the Secretaries of State and
Defense to make this reassessment of defense and foreign
policy.

199The recommendations to Truman have been discussed
at length in Chapter IV, supra.
200Lilienthal, Atomic Energy Years, 621^.
^^•Hammond, "NSC-68,” 290-92.
See also, Phillips,
Truman Presidency. 305-306; Paige, Korean Decision, $8}
American Military History, 5iilt; Rostow, United gltates in
the World Arena,' 22U.-2&; Schwarz, American strategy, 1*35.
Another- factor leading to this assessment was the loss of
mainland China to the Communist forces late in 19l|9. How
ever, the prime motive appears to have been the Soviet
atomic bomb. See O ’Connor, ’’Harry S. Trumans New
Dimensions of Power," 32.
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The staff studies that followed eventually produced
a "white paper" titled NSC-68 (National Security Council
Policy Paper No, 68),

The paper began by recognizing that

events since World War II had brought about a basic
realignment among nations, with the United States and the
Soviet Union forming the terminals of an international
polarization.

NSC-68 discounted the existence of a

Communist "master plan," but did conclude that the Soviet
government had three major objectives:
(1) to preserve the internal power position of the
regime and develop the U.S.S.R. as the base for that
power;
(2) to consolidate control over the Soviet
satellites and add them as support for that base;
(3) to weaken any opposing centers of power and
aspire to world hegemony.202
American objectives of individual freedom and
self-determination constituted a threat to the three
objectives of the Soviet Union.

There existed a basic

incompatibility between the two systems of government.
The assumption was then made that a continuous assault
upon the United States and other democratic nations was in
prospect, since force was an accepted means of obtaining
Communist political objectives.

America must be willing

to preserve its avowed principles both at home and abroad,
no matter what the cost.

This should be accomplished by

peaceful means, but should these means fail, the nation

202Reumond, "NSC-68," 304-305•
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should be willing and prepared to wage war to preserve
those conditions under which this form of government can
survive and prosper.203
The paper next analyzed the relative military capa
bilities of both nations and their respective allies in
the event of war.

The Russians would have sufficient

atomic weapons and an adequate delivery system by 1 9 ^ «
The effect of this would be to negate the deterrant value
of American atomic weapons, bringing about an atomic
stalemate.

In a recourse to conventional warfare, the

Soviet Union had substantial superiority.

The United

States and its Western allies were inadequately prepared
for limited warfare because of low troop levels, weakness
in the military and economic structure of western
European nations and a lack of strength in the Western
alliance system.*20^The document described for the President four
possible courses of actions

(1) a continuation of the

present policy course of limited defense budgets with the
same commitments and military capabilities! (2) a pre
ventive war against the Soviet Union; (3) withdrawal from
international commitments and acceptance of the "fortress
America" strategy; (ij.) development of the conventional war

203phillips, Truman Presidency, 306.
^^Hamraond, "NSC-68," 306.
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deterrent potentional of the free world by a massive
buildup of the American military forces as well as those
of the allied nations to the point where they were capable
of responding to each new Communist challenge quickly and
decisively.2®^

The NSC-68 drafters, who obviously

endorsed the fourth option, deliberately avoided making
any cost estimates in the paper itself, but in their dis
cussions estimates had ranged from $3 to $35 billion over
Truman's current ceiling of $15 billion.

But the paper

did indicate a belief that even in time of peace a
military budget totalling up to twenty percent of the
gross national product was possible without bringing about
national bankruptcy.2®^*
The Secretaries of Defense and State signed the
document and submitted it to Truman on April 7# 1950.
Five days later, the President sent the policy paper to
the National Security Council (where it acquired the
designation "NSC-68").

The President instructed the

Council to work out a program based on the fourth option
and present him with cost estimates for its implementation.
Truman had not approved NSC-68 as the new national military

20^Ibid., 306-307; Phillips. Truman Presidency,
307.
2®^Paige, Korean Decision, 59; Hammond#”NSG-68,"
306. For a general outline of the document, which is still
classified as a state secret, see Acheson, Present at the
Creation, 37i}.-76.
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policy, he simply committed it to his staff for further
study.Before

the difficult task

of translating the

generalized principles of NSC-68 were completed, war
broke out in Korea.
The value of NSC-68 was that it provided a frame
work within which the build-up of strength to meet the
demands of the Korean conflict were considered.

It pro

vided the rationale which rejected the strategy of those
who urged total war in Korea.

NSC-68 was an important

milestone for overall military defense planning because
it established, in Paul Hammond's phrase " . . .

some kind

of order of priority and magnitude between economy and
security, domestic and foreign commitments, economic and
military means, American and allied strength, and short
and long-run national interests."

208

But, while it did

clarify the policies employed infighting that war,
NSC-68fs warning that the nation must be prepared to
fight limited, conventional wars came too late to prevent
the initial military defeat suffered by the United States
in the opening months of the Korean War.

207Hammond, "NSC-68," 330. Cabell Phillips would
appear to be in error when he says that Truman approved
the paper in April, 1950, and it then became "official
government policy." Truman Presidency, 308.
20®Haramond, "NSC-68," 363 . See also, Rostow, United
States in the World Arena, 22ij.; O'Connor, "Harry S.
Truman: New Dimensions of Power," 32.
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CHAPTER VII

THE DECISION TO INTERVENE IN KOREA
This is the Greece of the Far East. If we are
tough enough now, there won*t be any next step.l

Korea, destined to become the arena of a serious
East-West conflict, is a mountainous peninsula jutting out
from the land mass of Asia.

The Sea of Japan to the

east, the Yellow Sea to the west and the Korea Strait to
the south wash against its more than 5,lj.00 miles of
coast line.

To the north, the Yalu and Tumen Rivers form

the natural common boundaries shared with China (£00
miles) and Russia (only eleven miles).

The Korean

peninsula, encompassing some 85,000 square miles, varies
from 90 to 200 miles in width and from £25 to 600 miles
in length.2

•^Truman, quoted in Beverly Smith, "Why We Went to
War in Korea," Saturday Evening Post. CCXXIV (November 10,
1951)# 80. Hereinafter cited as Smith, "Why We Went to
War in Korea."
2Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong. North to
the Yalu. June-November.1956. in Stetson Conn (genl. ecT.),
United States Army in Vhe Korean War (Washington, 1961),
TI Sereinafter 'cited as Appleman, South to the Naktong.
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The first American military assistance to Korea
arrived in 1888, in the form of U.S. Army personnel sent
to train the Korean forces.^

This aid was a result of a

"treaty of friendship” signed at Tientsin in 1882 between
the United States and Korea, then under the suzerain!ty of
China.

The peninsula was a focal point in power struggles

between Russia, Japan and China throughout the next
quarter-century which culminated with Japan establishing
dominion over Korea by 1905»^

"We can not possibly inter

fere for the Koreans against Japan,” President Theodore
Roosevelt said in January 1905*
one blow in their own defense."

"They couldn’t strike
The Taft-Katsura "agreed

memorandum" of July 27, 1905, put the United States on
record as accepting Japanese suzerainity over Korea.

When

Japan formally annexed Korea in August, 1910, the United
States offered no objection.^

3walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front,
in Stetson Conn (genl. e d .7, tfnited Stat'es_ArBiy In^the
Korean War (Washington, 1966), 3. Hereinafter cTfTed as
Kernes, frruoe Tent and Fighting Front.
^William L. Langer (ed.), An Encyclopedia of World
History (Bostons Houghton MlfflinTTompany,
,““886-07.
Hereinafter cited as Langer (ed.), Encyclopedia of World
History. See also, Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean TTar
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 196 /)V 5-6.
Hereinafter cited as Ridgway, Korean W a r .
^Quoted in Leopold, Growth of American Foreign
Policy, 271.
^Ibid.; Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 3 .
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From 1910 until 1945 Japan retained its control
over Korea.

That control was imperiled by the Cairo

Declaration of December 1943* in which China, The United
States and the United Kingdom pledged that "in due course”
Korea would become a free, independent nation.

A reaffir

mation of this promise was made in the Potsdam Declaratidn, issued on July 26, 1945*

When the Soviet Union

declared war on Japan on August 8, it became a party to
this guarantee.

7

The atomic-bombings on the sixth and

the ninth, coupled with the entry of Russia into the war,
forced Japan to sue for peace.

While the negotiations

were being carried out, armies of the Soviet Union prepared to enter the Korean peninsula.

8

The President received a good deal of encouragement
from numerous sources, urging him to order American forces
into all of Korea to accept the surrender of the Japanese
Army and to act as an occupation force.
ment urged this action on Truman.

The State Depart

He also received

separate cables from Ambassadors Averell Harriman and
Edwin 0. Pauley advising him to block Soviet intentions by

^U.S., Department of State, United States Policy in
the Korean Crisis, State Dept. Public at ion No. 3922, $ar
Eastern Series 34 (Washington, 1950 )» Intro., ix. Herein
after cited as United States Policy in the Korean Crisis.
See also, Ridgway, Korean W a r , Y ; Hermes, Truioe -Tent and
Fighting Front, 4; Warren, President as World Leader, j}35.
Q
°Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 4»
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having the United States Army occupy as much of Korea and
Manchuria as possible*
dictated otherwise.

9

However, physical conditions

The Soviet forces were already in

Manchuria and nearing the Korean border which they would
cross on August 12.

There were no American forces in

Korea, the closest units being on Okinawa, with very little
shipping available to transport them to the peninsula.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the President that any
attempt to race the Russian Army for territory in Korea
was doomed from the outset by the logistics of the
situation.-1-0

The War Department recommended that an

arbitrary dividing line, the thirty-eighth parallel of
north latitude, should be suggested to the Soviet Union
as an operational and occupational division between the
Russian and American forces.

The Army planners reasoned

that acceptance of this line would operate to the
advantage of the United States.

The Russians were in a

position to take all of Korea if they chose to, since the
XXIV Corps assigned to occupy Korea was at Okinawa, 600

? M a r tin L ic h te rm a n , "To th e Y a lu and B a c k ," in
H a r o ld S t e in ( e d . ) , A m erican C i v i l - M i l i t a r y D e c is io n s : A
Book o f Case S tu d ie s ( U n i v e r s i t y , Alabam a: U n iv e r s i t y o f ”
Alabam a P r e s s , 1 9 6 3 ) , 5 7 6 . H e r e in a f t e r c i t e d as L ic h te rm a n ,
"To th e Y a lu and B a c k ."
See a ls o , Truman, M em o irs« I I ,
317; Trumbull Higgins, Korea and the Fall of riacArthur; A
Precis in Limited War (Mew tfork: 'Oxford University Press,
i 960), £ 7 “ Hereinafter cited as Higgins, Korea and the
Fall of MacArthur.

^Lichterman,

"To the Yalu and Back," 576.
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miles away.

On August li|. the Joint Chiefs accepted this

recommendation, as did the State Department, and it was
forwarded to the President, who also approved.

11

While the status of Korea remained questionable,
the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) began
drafting a directive on August 11 for General Douglas
MacArthur, prescribing the procedures to be followed in
accepting the surrender of all Japanese forces in the Par
East.

MacArthur, who was Commander in Chief, U.S. Army

Forces, Pacific, had been designated by Truman as Supreme
Commander, Allied Powers, Japan (SCAP), a selection
endorsed on August 12 by all the Allied powers.

12

By

August 1$ SWNCC had completed the drafting of the orders to
MacArthur and they had received the President’s approval.
The orders included the proposal to establish the

^Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front. k”5>»
Lichterman, "To the Yalu and teaok,
Truman, Memoirs,
•I,
II, 317. Por the background of events which led
to the selection of the thirty-eighth parallel as a
dividing line, see Appleman, South to the Naktong, 2-3.
•^Because of Soviet intransigence in the European
settlements, Truman had decided that he- "would not allow
the Russians any part in the control of Japan." On the way
back from Potsdam he decided to give complete control of
Japan to MacArthur. Truman, Memoirs, I, ij.12, lj.32-33* See
also, Item No. 100, Press Conference, August llj., 19l|.5>>
Public Papers • . . Truman, 19ij£, 216. Frazier Hunt,
eulogistic biographer of General MacArthur, claims that
Truman chose the General because he had "not yet"
succumbed to the envy and hatred of MacArthur nurtured by
certain "leftist groups" in the White House, State Depart
ment and Pentagon. See Untold Story of MacArthur, 399.

(.•
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thirty-eighth parallel as a line of

d e m a r c a t i o n . * ^

The directive to MacArthur, known officially as
General Order No. 1, was transmitted to him on August 15.
The text of General Order No. 1 was also submitted to
Premier Stalin for his approval on the 15th.

The follow

ing day, August 16, the Soviet leader cabled his approval,
without taking exception to the provisions regarding
K o r e a . T h e s e provisions stipulated that the Japanese
troops in Korea north of the thirty-eighth parallel should
surrender to the Soviet Army and those south of that line
to the American A m y .

The United States did not intend to

create fixed zones of occupation, as in Germany, by asking
that the thirty-eighth parallel be used as a divider.

The

line was considered temporary; a military expedient made
1^
necessary by extant conditions. ^
General MacArthur caused General Order No. 1 to be
promulgated on September 2, 19^5*

Six days later, the

XXIV Corps arrived in Korea and the following day Japanese
forces south of the parallel formally surrendered to Lt.

^ L i c hterman,

"To the Yalu and Back," 576.

*^Ibid.; He m e s , Truce Tent and Fighting Front, J4.—5•
The full text of General Order No. 1 is printed in Feis,
Contest over Japan, Appendix 5» 165-66.
•^United States Policy in the Korean Crisis, Intro.,
ix. See alao, Truman, MemoIrs, I, I4I4J4.; Appleman, South
to the Naktong, 3; Higgins, Korea and the Fall of
MacArthur, 5.
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General John R. Hodge, commander of the XXIV, who was
designated as U.S. Commander for (South) Korea.

The

Soviet Army, which had advanced beyond the thirty-eighth

parallel, occupying the cities of Seoul and Inchon, retired
to the dividing line without incident.

16

line quickly became a permanent border.

The demarcation
General Hodge and

his Russian counterpart became de facto military rulers of
their respective halves of the peninsula.

Hodge started

off on the wrong foot with the Korean people by announcing
on September 9 that the Japanese civilian officials con
trolling the government would be temporarily retained in
their posts.

The clamor in the United States and Korea

was strong and immediate.

Truman had to order the JCS to

send Hodge a countermanding directive and issued a public
statement assuring that the "Japanese warlords are being
removed,” but cautioning that full independence for Korea
would require "time and patience.

"To the Yalu and Back," 5 7 6 - 7 7 *
Dr*
Syngman Rhee, long a Korean nationalist leader, and soon
to be president of his country, had wired Truman on
August 22, imploring h im to intervene rapidly in order to
insure a, ". • . united, democratic, independent Korea."
Telegram, Rhee to Truman, August 22, 19l|5* Truman Papers,
OP, 571 Misc., Truman Library.
•^Lichterman,

•^Item No. 136, Statement by the President of the
« Liberation of Korea, September 18, 1955 * Public Papers • • •
Truman, 1955, 325-2$. Trum a n ’s statement was actually
written by Dean Acheson, then Acting Secretary of State.
See Acheson to Truman, September 15* 1955* Truman Papers,
OP, lf.71 (1955-58)* Truman Library.
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A growing resentment of the United States arose
among the Koreans during the latter months of 191+5.

The

Korean people were beginning to realize that the dividing
line was a permanent partition of their land, for which
l8
they blamed the United States*
Soviet authorities
vigorously patrolled the thirty-eighth parallel, severely
restricting passage between the zones.

Hodge was

frustrated in his persistent efforts to negotiate with
his Russian counterpart on arrangements for reestablishing
Korean unity.

The General sent a message to the Joint

Chiefs in December which was forwarded to Truman, reporting
on the first three months in his command.

Hodge said that

the dual occupation of Korea "imposed an impossible
condition" on any sincere efforts at achieving the assigned
missions of stabilizing the economy and preparing Korea
for full independence.

Hodge recommended that the Allied

governments reiterate their promise of complete inde
pendence for Korea and demonstrate sincerity by removing
the barrier imposed by the thirty-eighth parallel.

As an

alternative, Hodge suggested that the United States and the
Soviet Union remove their forces simultaneously, " . . .
and leave Korea to its own devices and an inevitable

l®Truman, MemoirB, I, 521-22; II, 317-18.
also, Lichterman, **To the Yalu and Back," 577.

See
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internal upheaval for its self-purification.”"^
As an alternative to Hodge’s recommendations, the
President instructed Secretary of State Byrnes to take up
the independence of Korea in a meeting of the Foreign
Ministers of the United Kingdom, the United States and the
Soviet Union, held at Moscow in December, 19lj5.

Out of

these negotiations came the Moscow Agreement which pro
vided that the American and Soviet commands in Korea
should establish a Joint Commission.

This body was to be

charged with making recommendations for the establishment
of a provisional government for all of Korea, following
consultation with the leadership of the various political
parties and social organizations.
was never put into effect.

The Moscow Agreement

The United States and the

Soviet Union were unable or unwilling to make mutuallyacceptable accommodations that would have made the re20
unification and full independence of Korea possible. w
The result of this impasse was that an artificial and
illogical line became a permanent international boundary,

Truman, Memoirs, II, 317-18. General Hodge
reported in February, 19i|6, that he was convinced that the
Soviet Union had no intention of pulling out until U.S.
forces left. He also complained that the State Department
was not considering the information and recommendations
he sent in. See diary entry, February If?, 19^6* Millis
(ed.), Forrestal Diaries, 135«
^ U n i t e d States Policy in the Korean Crisis,
Intro., x; Truman, Memoirs, II, 3TB^2TTZ
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cruelly dividing a racially and ethnically homogeneous
people into separate, hostile nations.
The political stalemate regarding Korea continued
throughout 19i|6.

In June of that year, the President

received an informative report from Ambassador Pauley,
who as Truman's personal representative, was one of the
few Americans allowed to visit North Korea by Soviet
officials.

Pauley reported that the Soviet armies dis

played no immediate intention of pulling out of North
Korea.

The Soviets were, in the Ambassador's view,

clearly stalling on creating a provisional government for
a united Korea, while at the same time engaging in an
intensive propaganda campaign extolling the Soviet form
of government and promoting the interests of the Korean
Communist Party.

Pauley recommended to Truman that the

United States resort to similar tactics, propagandizing
"to sell democracy and the four freedoms."

He also

recommended that the United States publicly condemn the
Soviet Union for its failure to implement the Moscow
Agreement and take the question to the United Nations or
a Big Pour summit conference.

21

In responding to Pauley's letter, Truman outlined

^ P a u l e y to the President, June 22, 19lf6, RG107,
OSA, 091 Korea (19if.6—19l|-7) * National Archives. Text of
this letter is partially reprinted in Truman, Memoirs, II,

320-22.
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his basic thinking on post-war Korean policy:
I have given further consideration to your informa
tive letter of June 22, 19^6, on the Korean situation.
I agree with you that Korea is, as you so aptly phrase
it, "an ideological battleground upon which our entire
success in Asia may depend." Korea has been for many
decades the focus of international rivalries and I
consider one of the principal objectives of our policy
there to be to prevent Korea from again becoming the
source of future conflict.
. . . I believe that the most effective way to meet
the situation in Korea is to intensify and persevere
in our present efforts to build up a self-governing
and democratic Korea, neither subservient to nor
menacing any power.
. . . We intend to carry on an informational and edu
cational campaign to sell to the Koreans our form of
democracy. . • •
Our commitments for the establishment of an
independent Korea require that we stay in Korea long
enough to see the job through and that we have adequate
personnel and sufficient funds to do a good job. I
am, therefore, requesting the agencies concerned to
see that means are found to insure that General Hodge
has the men and funds he needs to attain our
objectives.22
Truman's letter to Pauley caused the War Department
to plan a program of increased military assistance to
Korea, designed to implement the policies suggested by the
President.

On August 12 Truman wrote to Secretary of War

Patterson to indicate his "particular interest" in the aid
program.

Truman assured Patterson that if the plan

required additional funds, the Secretary could count on
his support.

The President also informed Patterson that he

22Truman to Pauley, July 16, 19lf6, RG107, OSA,
091 Korea (192+6—192+7), National Archives.
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had asked the State and Navy departments to assist in the
accomplishment of this program.

Truman repeated the belief

expressed in his letter to Pauley:

"I am convinced that

we may be required to stay in Korea a considerable length
of time in order to fulfill our pledge to aid in the
23
establishment of a free and independent government.”
In his reply, Patterson assured the President that the War
Department would do its utmost in working toward the
attainment of American objectives in the Far East.2^By June, 1950, the United States had provided the Republic
of Korea over $57 million in military equipment.

Total

economic assistance in the period between the end of
World War II and the inception of the Korean War amounted
QCf
to over $lj.95 million.
Early in 1914-7 it became apparent that the issue of
Korean unification was completely stalemated by the failure
of the United States and the Soviet Union to find a common

2^Truman to the Secretary of War (Patterson),
August 12, 19^6, RG107, OSA (Patterson), 091 Korea,
National Archives.
2^Patterson to Truman, August 29, 19^6, ibid.
25'»pacts on Korean Military Aid Debunking the ’$200
charge’." (Unsigned Study), Files of David D. Lloyd,
Truman Papers, Speech on Korean War Situation, Sept. 1,
1950, Truman Library. LaFeber’s charge that military
assistance "had scarcely begun" by June, 1950, is contra
dicted by the above document, which cites information
received from the Senate Armed Services Committee. America,
Russia, and the Cold War, 95*
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ground for agreement.410

General Hodge was concerned

enough about the attitude of the Russians to warn Washing
ton that he ". . . might be faced with a serious military
27
situation at any time."
The General had already warned
Truman, in January and again in February, 19i|.7* that a
civil war between North and South Korea was in the offing
28
if the two occupying powers could not find a solution.
On the basis of Hodge’s warnings the Joint Chiefs of Staff
decided to warn MacArthur, the Far East Coramaner, that he
faced ". . . a possible critical military situation in
Korea. "2<^

Late in May the United States made a final

attempt to achieve a diplomatic accord through the RussoAmerican Joint Commission.

These negotiations continued

for several months, but they proved fruitless.^

^Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," 577•
^Benjamin P. Taylor, May 13, 19i|-7 (Memorandum for
Record), RG165, USA, 091^Korea, National Archives.
2®Truman, Memoirs, II, 322. Truman met with his
field commander for the first time in a conference at the
White House in February, arranged by Secretary of War
Patterson. See Patterson to Truman, February 19* 1914-7>
Truman Papers, OF, I4.7I (19lj.5-lj.8)» Truman Library.
^Benjamin F. Taylor, May 13, 1914-7 (Memorandum for
Record), RG165, USA, 091-Korea, National Archives.
^Truman, Memoirs, II, 323~2lj.. See also, Steinberg,
Man from Missouri, 37lu In a move towards self-government
(and in response to Korean criticism), the U.S. Military
Government established the South Korean Interim Government
on May 17* 19U7* See Far East Hearings, Pt. 5, 3362.
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In May 19l|.7 Secretary of War Patterson, concerned
over the severe cutbacks in personnel necessitated by
budgetary limitations on military spending, recommended to
Secretary of State Marshall that his department consider
the advisability of withdrawing all American forces from
Korea.

Marshall and Truman were not ready to take such a

step in May, but with the failure of diplomatic efforts
in the Joint Commission meetings in September, the Presi
dent ordered the Joint Chiefs to study and make recommenda
tions on the withdrawal question.-^1
submitted on September 25, 19^7*
that, " . . .

The JCS study was

It was their opinion

from the standpoint of military security, the

United States had little strategic interest in maintaining

32
the present troops and bases in Korea. . . . ”

The Joint

Chiefs defended this conclusion by saying that the lj.5>,000
men in Korea were a military liability:

They could not

resist an attack without heavy reinforcements; an American
offensive operation in Asia would bypass the Korean
peninsula; the Korean force was expensive to maintain, yet
contributed little of lasting value to American security;
given current military manpower shortages, the forces

^ A d m i r a l s Leahy and Nimitz and Generals Eisenhower
and Spaatz comprised the membership of the JCS at the time.

32porrestal to Marshall, September 26, 19l|7»
Truman Papers, OP, 1285 (Feb. 1952-1953)* Truman Library.
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could be used more profitably elsewhere.33
agreed with this estimate.

MacArthur

In fact, he believed that any

one who advocated fighting a land war in Asia was
demented.^

General Albert C. Wedemeyer, who had been

sent to study the Par Eastern situation by the President
in the summer of 19lf-7> reported substantially the same
conclusions as the Joint Chiefs reached.

However, he

also recommended that the United States endeavor to
strengthen the Korean military forces prior to withdrawal,
since they would surely fall to the far superior North
Korean A m y otherwise ^
The failure of the Joint Commission to reach agree
ment on Korean unification and independence, particularly
the Soviet rejection of a seven-point proposal submitted
by the United States in late August, led Truman to con
clude that it would be futile to continue direct negotia
tions with the Soviet Union.

Therefore he directed the

Secretary of State to place the question of Korean

•^ I b i d . see also, Truman, Memoirs, II, 32£-26;
Lichterman,' v,To the Yalu and B a c k H i g g i n s , Korea
and the Fall of MacArthur, 7—6 J John W. Spanier, TKe
Iffruman-MacArtEur Controversy and the Korean War (New York:
W. W. Norton and Company, 1965), 15-1V. Hereinafter cited
as Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy.
•^Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 17;
Steinberg, Man from Missouri,
^Higgins, Korea and the Fall of MacArthur, 7«
See also, Lichterman, "To the' Yalu and Back,” 5>7?*
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independence before the General Assembly of the United
N a t i o n s . M a r s h a l l addressed the General Assembly on
Septem ber 17» 19i|-7.

He acknowledged t h a t th e R u s s ia n and

American representatives in the Joint Commission had been
unable to agree on the means of implementing a process
leading to the independence promised to Korea at Cairo in
1943 •

After summarizing the vain efforts to achieve

agreement, the Secretary said:

"It appears evident that

further attempts to solve the Korean problem by means of
bilateral negotiations will only serve to delay the estab37
llshment of an independent, united Korea."
Marshall
proposed that the occupying forces hold elections in their
respective zones of Korea.

The elections should be super

vised by a United Nations Commission, which would also
assist in the formation of the central government thus
elected.

Following this, Marshall suggested, the new

government should arrange for the prompt withdrawal of the
American and Soviet forces.^®

36/pruman, Memoirs, II, 324* See also, Korea, 1945
to 1948: A Reporir'on Political Developments and' Economic
Resources with Selected Documents (New York: (Greenwood
Press', 1'965J,' 47-4&» Hereinafter cited as Korea, 1945
to 1948.
^Marshall, Address to the General Assembly on the
Problem of Korean Independence, September 17» 1947*
excerpted in Korea, 1945 to 1948* 1*.7—14-8 •

3®Leopold, Growth of American Foreign Policy, 678.
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Through the Joint Commission, the Russians offered
a substitute proposal which called for the withdrawal of
all foreign military forces from Korea very early in 1948*
The Koreans were to be left to their own devices in
structuring a unified government.

However, Truman was

aware from Wedemeyer’s report and other intelligence infor
mation, that the North Korean Army had been very wellequipped and trained by the Soviet Union and that the
constabulary forces of the South Koreans would be no match
for them.

Although it was this fear that South Korea

would be at the mercy of North Korea which motivated
rejection of the Soviet proposal on October 18, the State
Department informed the Russians that the United States
could not enter into a bilateral agreement on troop with
drawal while the larger question of Korean independence
39
was before the United Nations.
With the Soviet bloc
objecting and abstaining, on November 14* 1947* the UN
General Assembly voted 43 to 0 to hold legislative
elections in all of Korea for a National Assembly which
would then form a national government for Korea.

The

General Assembly resolution, which followed closely the
recommendations made by the United States, provided that
the elections should be held no later than March 31 * 1948*

^Korea. I9li£ to 19k8. 6-7. See also, Truman,
Memoirs
iory of American IForeign
Policy, 703-704*
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S u p e r v is io n o f th e e le c t io n s was to be c a r r ie d o u t by a
n i n e - n a t i o n , U n ite d N a tio n s Tem porary Commission on
K o re a .

"Upon th e e s ta b lis h m e n t o f a N a t io n a l G o v e rn m e n t,"

th e G e n e ra l Assembly r e s o lu t io n r e a d ,
s h o u ld .

.

" t h a t G overnm ent

. a rra n g e w it h th e o ccu p yin g powers f o r th e

com plete w ith d r a w a l fro m K o re a o f t h e i r armed f o r c e s
soon as p r a c t i c a b l e

as

and, i f p o s s ib le , w i t h i n 90 d a y s . " ^

S h o r t ly a f t e r th e v o t e , L o u is e K im , K orean P eo p les
Assembly R e p r e s e n ta tiv e to th e U n ite d N a t io n s , w ro te to
th e P r e s id e n t e x p re s s in g

.

. th e h e a r t f e l t th a n k s o f

th e K orean p e o p le f o r y o u r g o ve rn m e n t’ s s u c c e s s fu l e f f o r t s
on b e h a lf o f K orea a t th e U n it e d N a t i o n s . " ^
The UN Tem porary Commission was r e fu s e d access to
N o rth K o re a by th e Red A m y .

I t had to c o n te n t i t s e l f

w i t h s u p e r v is in g e le c t io n s h e ld in th e A m erican zone in
May 19i|-8.
s e a ts .

Syngman R h ee’ s p a r t y c a p tu re d a m a j o r i t y o f th e

On June 2 5 th e Tem porary Commission on K o re a

c e r tifie d

to th e U n ite d N a tio n s t h a t th e e l e c t i o n had been

"a v a l i d e x p re s s io n o f th e f r e e w i l l o f th e e l e c t o r a t e . " ^
On J u ly 17 K o rea ado pted a c o n s t i t u t i o n , and on J u ly 20

^°Text of the main provision of the resolution is
quoted in Korea. 19k5> to 1 9 k 8 , 9 .
See also, Leopold,
Growth of Amer 1 can Foreign Policy, 678.
OP, k71

^"Kira t o Trum an, November 1 8 , 19k7> Truman P a p e rs ,
(19k5**k8)» Truman L i b r a r y .

^ F a r E a s t H e a rin g s , P t . 5* 3 3 6 2 . See a ls o ,
L ic h te r m a n , "To ‘ttie Y a lu and B a c k ," 5 7 7 -7 8 .
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Syngman Rhee became President.

Rhee informed General Hodge

on August 11 that his government was prepared to take
control, and the General, responding on the same date,
told him that the American Military Government was prepared
to transfer all responsibility to the new r e g i m e . ^

In a

statement issued through the State Department on August 1 2 ,
Truman recognized the Rhee Government as the "Government
of Korea" and named John J. Muccio as his Special Repre
sentative, with the personal rank of Ambassador.^- The
State Department release implied that the new government
was the government for all Korea, but neither the President
nor the State Department could have seriously believed
Rhee would govern above the thirty-eighth parallel.

In

fact, in a warm letter of congratulations to General
Hodge on August 15, Truman wrote of the "constitutional
government of southern K o r e a . T h e

formal transfer of

^ R h e e to Hodge and reply, August 1 1 , 1948* printed
in K orea, 1945
1 9 4 8 , Annex 2 1 , 2 2 , 98—1 0 0 .
See also,
Leopold, Growth of American foreign Policy, 6 7 8 ; Truman,
Memoirs, II,

W gorea, 1 9 4 5 to 1 9 4 8 , 1 9 -2 0 , 1 0 0 -1 0 1 ; Truman,
Memoirs, II,- 3 2 7 -2 o # “Hueclo began an exemplary period of
service as U.S. representative to Korea with this appoint
ment. President Rhee was quite pleased with him. Less
than a month after the appointment, Rhee will tell Truman
that, "Muccio has already proved himself a genuine friend
of Korea. . . . "
Rhee to Truman, September 8 , 1 9 4 8 ,
Truman Papers, OP, 471 (1945-48)* Truman Library.
^ T r u m a n to Hodge, August 15* 1948* Truman Papers,
OP, 471* Truman Library.
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authority was completed in a ceremony on August l£
creating the "Republic of

K o r e a .

American military

authority ended with this transfer of power.
In the spring of 19^8, during the formative period
of the new Republic of Korea, the National Security Council
was studying the future military relationship of the
United States to that nation for the President.

The

Council informed Truman that several courses of action
were open:

Abandonment of Korea; continuation of

American political and military responsibility; extension
of U.S. military training, equipment and assistance to
Korea’s security forces, as well as extensive economic
aid to the burgeoning nation.

The Security Council

recommended the latter option to the President, which he
approved.^-®

Thus, when Korea became an independent nation

in August, it was the avowed policy of the United States
to militarily and economically assist the new Republic,

^Truman, Memoirs, II, 328. In a counter-move, the
Soviet officials ordered an election on August 25* On
September 9, the "Democratic People’s Republic of Korea"
was established with Kim II Sung as President. This
government, which was immediately recognised by the Soviet
Union, claimed it had jurisdiction over all of Korea.
Thus, there were two governments on the Korean peninsula,
both claiming thev spoke for all of Korea. As Richard
Leopold wrote:
'". . . the outlook for peaceful coexistence
was dim." Growth of American Foreign Policy, 678. See
also, Appleman, Souffli to the"lTaktong7
^Truman, Memoirs, II, 328.
^-®Ridgway, Korean War, 7»
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but to consider it outside of the U.S. defensive shield.
The American Embassy in Moscow received a diplo
matic note from the Soviet Foreign Office on September 19,
1948> with the information that Red Army forces would be
completely withdrawn from Korea by the end of December,
1948*^

The Soviet Union would meet this timetable.

The

U.S. Army had withdrawn about 29,000 soldiers from Korea
by December, 1948*

However, the State Department and

President Rhee opposed any further rapid withdrawal.
Their reasons were simply that the South Korean Army was
not ready to perform its primary functions of preserving
internal security and preventing external (Communist)
aggression.

So it was that at the end of 1948* while all

Soviet Army personnel had left North Korea, 16,000 Ameri50
can troops were still stationed in South Korea.
On New Years' Day, 1949, the White House announced
that the United States was now according full diplomatic
recognition to the Republic of Korea.

The statement was

a legal technicality, necessary to officially terminate
the military occupation and relieve the Army of responsi
bility for administering economic assistance programs for

^ K o r e a . 1945 to 1948, 22.
^ H e rm e s , T ruce T e n t and F ig h t in g F r o n t , 8 .
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K o r e a .^

On M arch 2 2 , 1 9 4 9 , th e N a t io n a l S e c u r it y C o u n c il

r e p o r t e d to Truman on a r e v ie w o f th e K orean m i l i t a r y
s itu a tio n .

Based on t h is

s tu d y , Truman is s u e d o rd e rs th e

n e x t d a y , d i r e c t i n g t h a t a l l U .S . fo r c e s re m a in in g in
K o re a be w i t h d r a w n . T h e

P r e s id e n t had a lr e a d y ag reed

t h a t th e U n ite d S ta te s w o u ld p r o v id e s u p p o rt f o r a 6$, 0 0 0 man army i n South K o re a .

When th e w ith d r a w a l o f Am erican

fo r c e s was c o m p le te d , June 2 9 » 1949* a 5>00-man r e g im e n ta l
combat team rem ained b e h in d to s u p e rv is e th e t r a i n i n g o f
th e K orean a r m y . ^

The P r e s id e n t h a d a c te d on th e

unanimous a d v ic e o f th e J o in t C h ie fs o f S t a f f and th e
N a t io n a l S e c u r it y C o u n c il i n
K o re a .

rem oving a l l fo r c e s from

G e n e ra l M a c A rth u r*s o p in io n had a ls o been

s o lic ite d ,

and he had a g re e d t h a t w ith d r a w a l was a d v is a b le .

In 195>1, during the hearings on his dismissal,
General MacArthur charged that the withdrawal of American
forces from Korea in 1949 was a grievous error.

The

^ I t e m No. 1, White House Statement Announcing
Recognition of the Government of Korea, January 1, 1949*
Public Papers • . . Truman, 1949, 1« See also, Ray T .
Maddocks t o Chief of Staff l&radley), December 2 3 , 1948*
RG165>, USA, 091 Korea, National Archives.
^2Applem an, S outh to th e N a k to n g , £ ; Trum an,
M e m o irs , I I , 3 2 9 .

^ H e r m e s , Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 8 . See
also, Appleman, South to the Waktong, 5l Roatow, United
States in the World Arena, 23hi biggins, Korea and the “frail
of MacArthur, 8-9 J Far 'East Hearings, Pt. "3’,™ "2o^ 8 , 511215 ; Pt7 4T 2576, 25357 T F T * , " 3'5“ '3571.
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heated controversy over MacArthur’s firing obscured the
fact that he had endorsed this action.

In February of

191*9 Secretary of the Army Royall reported to Truman that
in a conversation with the General he had urged a prompt
removal of troops from K o r e a . ^

In the report requested

by the Joint Chiefs in March, MacArthur had again approved
withdrawal, adding that ” . . .

the training and combat

readiness of the new security forces of the Korean Republic
had reached such a level that complete withdrawal • . .
was justified and would not adversely effect our position
in Korea.

Meeting in Tokyo with junketing Congressmen

on September 5, MacArthur told them, "South Korea is in
no danger of being overrun by North K o r e a . T h e

citation

below is from MacArthur!s testimony taken during the dis
missal hearings, wherein he attempted to disassociate
himself from any connection with the removal decision:
S e n a to r S m ith .
. . . p r i o r to th e o u tb re a k o f the
w ar i n K o re a , you d id n o t have g e n e ra l j u r i s d i c t i o n
o v e r K orea i n any w ay.
G e n e ra l M a c A rth u r. No, s i r ; I had no j u r i s d i c t i o n
w h a ts o e v e r o v e r K o re a . . . . I had n o th in g w h a ts o e v e r
to do w it h th e p o l i c i e s , th e a d m in is t r a t io n , o r th e
command r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i n K o re a u n t i l th e w ar b ro k e
o u t.

^ •T ru m an , M em o irs, I I ,

329.

^ Ib id .
See a ls o , P a r E a s t H e a r in g s , P t . 3 , 2 1 1 3 ;
H ig g in s , K o rea and th e F a l l o f frla c A rth u r, 9 .

^ A l l e n Moreland to Deputy Chief of Staff
(Greunther), September £, 191*9 (Memorandum of Conversa
tion), RGl6£, USA, 091 China, Case 35* National Archives.
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Senator Smith, Did you have anything to do with
the policy that withdrew your troops or our troops
from Korea prior to the outbreak of the war?
General MacArthur. That decision was made in
Washington.
Senator Smith. That decision was made in Washing
ton; it had nothing to do with you or your command
there?
General MacArthur. The troops were a part of my
command at the time; they were the Twenty-fourth
Corps.57
Later in his testimony, General MacArthur responded as
follows to questions on troop withdrawal:
Senator Morse.
. . . Did you join in any
recommendation to withdraw those troops from South
Korea?
General MacArthur.
I concurred in it.
Senator Morse. Do you think that was a mistake?
I don’t mean to give you a hindsight question.
General MacArthur.
In the aftermath and hindsight,
I should say it was a very grave mistake.
•

•

•

•

Senator Morse.
. . . you concurred in the decision
to withdraw, were you asked for a recommendation?
General MacArthur. I d o n ’t recall. I think that
the thing reached me in the form of a suggested
action, and that suggested action was the withdrawal;
and I concurred; but I do not recollect, Senator. I
would have to look back in the files.58
The decision of the Truman Administration to with
draw from Korea left that nation vulnerable to attack.

In

the cold light of power politics and the planning for

^7par East Hearings, Pt. 1, 37.
^®Ibid., 242-43. Senator Wayne Morse (Repub.,
Oregon) was the questioner.
In the several thousand pages
of testimony Morse emerges as the one Senator who remained
entirely objective and was also the only one to be con
sistently and fully prepared to intelligently examine the
issues raised.
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global, not limited, war, Korea was of no strategic
importance to the United States.

While efforts were

sincerely made to bolster the Republic of Korea(ROK)
armed forces, Truman had difficulty in obtaining funds
from Congress in 191*9-1950.

The President also went along

with his advisers in not supplying the ROK forces with
offensive weapons, such as aircraft, tanks and heavy
artillery.

President Rhee had often threatened to attack

North Korea, so there was an obvious reluctance to provide
him with the means of doing so.

59

In his memoirs,

MacArthur described the State Department decision to
lightly-equip the ROK Army, precluding their use in
offensive operations as "curiously myopic reasoning."^®
The Mutual Defense Assistance Act, which Truman had
signed on October 6, 191*9, provided for $10.2 million in
military aid for South Korea, but these aid items were
just beginning to arrive when the fighting broke o u t . ^
Secretary of State Dean Acheson defined the

59

Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 20; Truman,
Memoirs, II, 329. See also. Ridgway, Korean war, 10-11.
Two weeks prior to the attack on South Korea, Ambassador
Muccio informed the State Department that the North Korean
forces had a great superiority in aircraft, heavy
artillery, and tanks, which would " . . . provide North
Korea with a margin of victory in the event of a fullscale invasion of the Republic." Muccio's report is
quoted in T*ar East Hearings, Pt. 2, 1052-53*
6°MacArthur, Reminiscences, 328-30.

^Paige, Korean Decision, 70.

Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibitedwithout permission.

k2k
strategic military thinking of the Truman Administration
with regard to the Par East in a celebrated and contro
versial speech to the National Press Club in Washington on
January 12, 1950.

Acheson described the defensive

perimeter of the United States in the Pacific by tracing
an imaginary line from the Aleutians through Japan and the
Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands.

Within the boundaries

of this strategic perimeter the United States had the
resources and assumed the responsibility for reacting
immediately against any aggressor.

6?

The line Acheson

described was not drawn by him, but by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, with the concurrence of the National Security
Council and the President.

In fact, in an interview in

Tokyo on March 1, 19l|-9, General MacArthur had described
exactly the same line of defense.^
The omission of Korea and Formosa, the latter by
then the home of Nationalist China, from the perimeter
defined by Acheson, made the speech controversial,
particularly since the attack on South Korea occurred
six months later.

With respect to nations beyond the

pale, Acheson said that ” . . . n o person can guarantee

^2Acheson, Present at the Creation, 356-57* Major
excerpts from the speech are printed in Bernstein and
Matusow, (eds.), Truman Administration, lj.30-37*
^Acheson, Present at the Creation, 357*
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these areas against military attack, . . • should such an
attack occur • . • the initial reliance must be on the
people attacked to resist it and then upon the • • .
United N a t i o n s . W h a t

the Secretary said was not new.

It was a reiteration of an official policy of American
military disengagement from the Asian mainland, Formosa
and Korea that was plainly evident.

Acheson was saying

that any nation attacked outside the American perimeter
would have to defend itself.

Should it prove unable to

contain the aggressor, then the United Nations would come
to that nation’s aid.

The United States would not

automatically regard an act of aggression outside the
perimeter as a cause for war, but would act in concert
with the United N a t i o n s . ^

Some critics have said that

the Acheson speech ". . • could have been interpreted by
the Communists as a green light."

66

The criticism seems

strained, since the reverse of the proposition would have
it that the North Korean attack would not have taken place
had the Secretary of State not made this speech.

^Ibid.

See also, Paige, Korean Decision. 67.

^Acheson, Present at the Creation, 35>6-5>7J Spanier,
Truman -MacArthur Controversy,
Paige, Korean Decision,
67-68; Lichterman, "To the Xalu and Back, " i??8.
^^Warren, President as World Leader, 337* "For
similar opinions,- see Higgins, Korea""and the Fall of
MacArthur, 11^1$; Paige, Korean Decision, 333-jM.; 1?ees,
A^e o f C o n ta in m e n t, 38; L u k a c s , H is t o r y o f th e C o ld W ar,
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. . • the critics . . . assume that if the Secretaryhad not publicly broadcast the outlines of the
Pacific defense perimeter, the Soviets would have
remained completely unaware of our decimated army,
our pre-occupation with total war, and inflexible
military strategy; that they would not have learned
of the Joint Chiefs' reluctance to commit their
troops on the Asian continent, of the few troops
at their command, and their emphasis upon stationing
these troops in areas considered more vital...to
American security in ah all-out war than Korea. . . .
it was not American words but American policy that
probably encouraged the Communists to believe that
the United States would not defend South Korea.67
The animosity between the two Koreas increased by
early 1950 to the point where military conflict seemed
more and more of a possibility.

The North Koreans con

tinuously probed the 38th parallel with hit-and-run raids
and sent bands of guerrillas into South Korea to foment
internal disorder.

The chief source of military

intelligence on Korea for Truman was MacArthur's head
quarters in Tokyo.

The reports coming in in the spring

of 1950 told of a rapid build-up of North Korean forces.
The Central Intelligence Agency informed the Commander
in Chief that the North Koreans were capable of a fullscale attack at any time they should choose.

A weekly

^Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 21. Dip
lomatic historian Richard W. Leopold would agree that
Acheson's speech was not a factor in the attack on Korea.
See "United States in World Affairs," 235. For Acheson's
own testimony in defense of his Press Club speech, see Far
East Hearings, Pt. 3, 1681, 17^0-ip., 1816-18, 2019-20.
Acheson again had to defend his "perimeter speech" against
an attack made by Eisenhower in the presidential campaign
of 1952. Present at the Creation, 691.
^®Truraan, Memoirs, II, 331*

Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibitedwithout permission.

1*27
intelligence cable from G-2 (Intelligence Section) of
MacArthur's headquarters, dated March 10, 1950, contained
a lin e

r e a d in g ,

"R e p o rt r e c e iv e d t h a t P e o p le 's Army w i l l
69
invade South Korea in June 1950."
But attached to this

report was a commentary that clearly stated that G-2 did
not anticipate that such an attack would occur.

"It is

believed," read a March 25 cable from the Par East Command
Intelligence Section, "that there will be no civil war in
Korea this spring or summer."^®

A MacArthur aide, Major

General Courtney Whitney, has claimed that "the record
shows" that the Par East Command had warned Washington of
an impending North Korean attack 1,500 times in the period
between June 191*5 and the actual attack in June 1950,
among them the warning of March 1

0

MacArthur has also

written of these warnings:
In vain were my efforts to expose the growing
Communist threat in the Par East. Prom June 191*9 to
June 1950, constant intelligence reports of increasing
urgency were submitted to Washington, advising of a
possible North Korean thrust. But little impression
was made against the general apathy. • • . One of
these reports even suggested that June 1950 would be
the likely time for North Korea to cross the 38th
parallel.72

6 9 p a r E a s t H e a r in g s , P t . 3, 1991.
7 0 jb id .
M a c A rth u r, 15.

See a l s o , H ig g in s , K orea and th e F a l l o f

C o u rtn e y W h itn e y , M a c A rth u r: H is Rendezvous w i t h
H is t o r y (New Y o rk : A l f r e d A . K n o p f, 1 9 5 M , 3 2 0 .
H e r e in 
a f t e r c i t e d as W h itn e y , M a c A rth u r.
"^ M a c A rth u r, R e m in is c e n c e s , 321*.
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The intelligence data from Korea did indicate the
possibility of armed conflict.

The problem faced by the

President was that the daily intelligence summary he

received from the CIA also informed him, as he put it,
". . , that there were any number of other spots in the

world where the Russians ’possessed the capability' to
attack."”^

At the time of the attack on South Korea,

there were abundant rumors of war, but they were not at
all confined to the Korean peninsula.

7k

It would have

been impossible for Truman to take immediate, remedial
steps as each of these warnings was received.

He would be

especially disinclined to react to a warning from
MacArthur's G-2, since that unit had sounded the tocsin
more than 1,500 times.

In addition, since it was the

President's policy not to become unilaterally involved in
conflict outside the Pacific defensive perimeter, it is
difficult to imagine what action could have been taken on
these reports warning that the "possibility” of attack
existed.
President Truman was back in his home state of

"^Truman, Memoirs, II, 331. Admiral Roscoe H.
Hillenkoetter, Director of the CIA, told a Senate committee
the day after the attack that his agency had been report
ing North Korean troop movements for months and could not
understand why the "receiving agencies" had failed to
properly evaluate them. New York Times, June 27, 1950.

?^Far East Hearings, Pt. 3, 2113.
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Missouri on June 9, 1950, to give the commencement
address and receive an honorary degree at the University
of Missouri.

He spoke with pride of the path of inter

national cooperation the nation had followed since 19^5 ,
rejecting the "dangerous futility of isolationism."

He

had praise for American support of the United Nations,
the economic recovery of Europe, ratification of the NATO
pact and ". . . our military assistance to the common
defense of free nations . • . part of our strong, positive
program to achieve a just and lasting p e a c e . T h e
President remained in St. Louis to join his comrades of
the 3f?th Division in their annual reunion, highlighted by
a parade on June 10 which Truman led on foot:

"...

the

President cut a jaunty figure as he marched proudly with
his old World War I division, and especially with Battery
D, 129th Pield Artillery, of which he was captain.
Two weeks later, Truman returned to Missouri, this time to
spend a quiet weekend at home in Independence.

A telephone

call from the Secretary of State informed "Captain Harry"

of a new call to arms.

77

^Itera No. 159, Commencement Address at the Univer
sity of Missouri, June 9, 1950, Public Papers . • . Truman,
1950, ij-65. Pull text of this speech also appears in the
few York Times, June 10, 1950.
7% e w York Times, June 11, 1950•
7?Albert L. Warner, "How the Korea Decision Was
Made," Harper*s Magazine, CCII, No. 1213 (June, 1951 )» 99•
Hereinafter c'i’ted as Warner, "How Korea Decision Was Made."

Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibitedwithout permission.

430
A cable from Ambassador Muccio in Seoul had
arrived at the State Department at 9:26 P.M., Saturday,
June 2k» 19f?0.
decoded.

Shortly after ten o ’clock the message was

Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary for Par Eastern

Affairs, called Secretary of State Acheson at his Maryland
farm to inform him of Muccio*s note.

Acheson immediately

called the President at his home in Independence to relay
the message, which read, in part:

”, . . North Korean

Forces invaded Republic of Korea territory at several
points this morning. . . .

It would appear . • . that it

constitutes an all-out offensive against the Republic of
K o r e a . T r u m a n gave tentative approval to Acheson's
suggestion that the matter be brought before the United
Nations Security Council.

He accepted Acheson*s advice

that he remain in Independence at least until morning,
when the situation would be clearer.

79

7 8 d o c . No. 1, Cable, Muccio to State Department,
June 2f>, 195»0, United States Policy in the Korean Crisis,
11. The cable is reprinted in Paige, Korean~"De ci si on, 90 1
Truman, Memoirs, II, 3 3 3 - 3 4 * See also. Appleman, &outh to
the Naktong, 3 6 - 3 7 ; Ridgway, Korean War, 23. Seoul and
Washington are separated by seven thousand miles and the
International Date Line. Korean time was fourteen hours
ahead of Washington. Thus, Muccio*s cable arrived in Wash
ington at 9:26 PM, June 24, but it was then late morning of
June 2f> in Seoul. For a more detailed explanation of the
time differential, see Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back,"
571* Korean or Washington time will be indicated where
it is not clear and is relevant.

"^Truman, Memoirs, II, 331-32. See also, Paige,
Korean Decision, 93-94Y Warner, "How Korea Decision Was
Made," 100; Smith, "Why We Went to War in Korea," 23.
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During the night, reports continued coming in from
the wire services, Ambassador Muccio, and Par Eastern
Command Headquarters in Tokyo, all confirming that the
attack constituted an all-out invasion, not just another
border probe.

Acheson called the President again, two

hours after the first call.

The Secretary told Truman that

the fighting in Korea was serious.

Acheson said that the

State Department had drafted a resolution which charged
the North Koreans with breaching the peace by an act of
aggression.

Truman gave his final approval for Acheson

to request an emergency session of the UN Security
fin
Council.
At 3:00 A.M. Trygve Lie, UN Secretary General,
was asked to convoke a meeting of the Security Council as
fix
soon as possible.OA

The Security Council of the United Nations met at

®®Paige, Korean Decision, 101-102; Warner, "How
Korea Decision Was Made7" lOl.
®^Doc. No. 2, Deputy Representative of the United
States to the United Nations (Ernest A. Gross) to the
Secretary-General (Lie), June 25, 1950, United States
Policy in the Korean Crisis, 11-12. See also, Warner,
"How Korea Decision Was Made," 100; Glenn D. Paige (ed.),
1950! Truman!s Decision, The United States Enters the
Korean"War (New York: Chelsea House, 197^)* 55~5&« Hereinafter cited as Paige, 1950: T r u m a n ^ Decision. Truman
wrote an interesting note to Acheson about a month later.
In part, it reads:
"Your initiative in immediately calling
the Security Council of the U.N. on Saturday night and
notifying me was the key to what followed afterwards. Had
you not acted promptly in that direction we would have had
to go into Korea alone." Truman to Acbeson, July 19,'
T95o7 quoted in Acheson, Present at the Creation, ijJL5>.
Emphasis supplied.
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2:00 P.M., June 25 in response to the American request.
By this time, the ON Commission in Korea had filed a report
with the Secretariat, describing the conflict as "fullscale war" endangering international peace.

The Com

mission recommended that the matter be brought before the
Op
Security Council.
In the Security Council Session the
United States Deputy Representative, Ernest A. Gross,
reviewed developments in Korea since 194£ an(* offered a
draft resolution calling upon North Korea to end hostile
QO

actions and withdraw beyond the thirty-eighth parallel.
After some minor revisions, the Security Council adopted
the United States’ draft resolution by a vote of nine to
zero, Yugoslavia abstaining and the Soviet Union unrep
resented.®^-

® % o c . No. 3, United Nations Commission on Korea
to Secretary-General, June 25, 1950, United States Policy
in the Korean Crisis, 12. See also, Paige (ed.), 1956:
Truman 1s De'cision, 56-58. Among American scholars, D7 P.
Pleming seems alone in suggesting the possibility that the
fighting was a North Korean reprisal for a South Korean
attack. The Cold War, II, 598-600. On June 26, the Com
munis t-orTente'3"I)any Worker (N.Y.) had made the same charge.
See New York Times, June 27, 1950. A Soviet diplomatic
note to the United States on the 29th took the same posi
tion. See Doc. No. 95* United States Policy in the
Korean Crisis, 61+,
®3d o c . No. 4» Statement by U.S. Deputy Representa
tive to the Security Council, June 25, 1950, United States
Policy in the Korean Crisis, 13-15* Text of statement also
a p p e arsTn Far feast Hearings , Pt. 5» 3365-68; Paige (ed.),
1950: Truman* s' decision, 58-64.
®4uew York Times, June 26, 1950; United States
Policy in~"the Korean Crisis, 1-2, 16. See also, Smith,
""Why We”vTent to War in Korea," 76; Warner, "How Korea
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The President received a call from Acheson as he
was sitting down to Sunday dinner.

The Secretary told him

that the UN Security Council would meet in emergency
session that afternoon and would undoubtedly approve the
cease-fire resolution.

It was Acheson’s opinion that the

North Koreans would ignore the resolution, in which case
it would be necessary for the President to decide what the
United States should do to assist the Republic of Korea.
Truman told Acheson that he was leaving for Washington at
once.

In the meantime, he instructed the Secretary to

meet with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service
Secretaries and begin working out recommendations for a
meeting to be held upon his return. ^
On the three-hour flight back to Washington, Truman
remained alone in his compartment.

He later recalled that

he spent the time considering the Korean situation in

Decision Was Made," 101; U.S., Department of State, United
States Policy in the Korean Conflict: July, 195>0-February,
1951« PublicatTon No. 42637 Par Eastern Series 44 (Washing
ton, 1951 )> 46* Hereinafter cited as United St&tes Policy
in the Korean Conflict. The UN resolution of June 25 is
printed in Par feast hearings, Pt. 5» 3368-69.
The intent
of the resolution i s "discuss ed at some length in ibid.
See, for example, Pt. 1, 360-61; Pt. 3 , 1720-21, 201£,
2020. See also, Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," 579.
®^Truman, Memoirs, II, 332. See also, Warner,
"How Korea Decision Was" Made," 101. As he departed for
Washington from the Kansas City airport, Truman told
reporters:
"Don’t make it alarmist. It could be a
dangerous situation, but I hope it isn't." Anthony
Leviero, New York Times, June 26, 1950*
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light of the "lessons of history."

Truman believed firmly

that the proper principles to guide the decisions he
would now have to make were to be found in past exper
ience.®^

Truman's recollection of the flight back was

recorded in his Memoirs:
I had time to think aboard the plane. In my genera
tion, this was not the first occasion when the strong
had attacked the weak. I recalled some earlier
instances: Manchuria, Ethiopia, Austria. I
remembered how each time that the democracies failed
to act it had encouraged the aggressors to keep going
ahead. Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler,
Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen,
and twenty years earlier. . . . If the Communists
were permitted to force their way into the Republic
of Korea without opposition from the free world, no
small nation would have the courage to resist threats
and aggression by stronger Communist neighbors. If
this was allowed to go unchallenged it would mean a
third world war, just as similar incidents had
brought on the second world war. . . .87
The President's plane landed in Washington at 7:15
on the evening of June 25?.

He was met by Acheson and

Defense Secretary Louis Johnson.

Acheson was able to

inform Truman that the Security Council had adopted the
American resolution.

fifl

During the ride in from the air

port, the President gave the impression that he was
determined to take firm action, but, as usual, he was not

®®Paige interviewed Truman in July, 1957 *
Korean Decision, llZj..

See

^ T r u m a n , Memoirs, II, 332-33*

®8smith, "Why We Went to War in Korea," 76. See
also, Phillips, Truman Presidency, 29If.; Truman, Memoirs.
II, 333.
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ready to specify any steps until hearing from all his
a

d

v

i

s

e

r

s

h 6 was to meet with those advisers at Blair

House, the temporary presidential residence, immediately
upon hi s arrival•
Truman opened the Blair House meeting with a brief
statement to the effect that he was maintaining an "open
mind" as to possible actions.

He wanted to hear fully

from all his advisers, but planned to make no major
decisions that night.90

Truman then asked Acheson to

summarize the latest developments in Korea and present
the recommendations that the State and Defense Departments
had prepared during the day.

The Secretary of State read

the various reports received from Muccio and described
the emergency session of the Security Council.

He also

sketched in the military situation which saw the North
Koreans advancing along a broad front.

In Acheson's

®9warner, "How Korea Decision Was Made," 101.
90paige, Korean Decision, 126. The conferees were.
Secretary Acheson, Under Secretary James Webb, Deputy
Under Secretary Dean Rusk, Assistant Under Secretary John
Hickerson and Ambassador-at-Large Phillip Jessup from the
State Department. Defense was represented by Secretary
Johnson, Secretary of the Army Prank Pace, Secretary of
the Navy Francis Matthews, Secretary of the Air Force
Thomas Finletter, and, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Generals Omar Bradley, J. Lawton Collins, Hoyt Vandenberg
and Admiral Forrest Sherman.
See Truman, Memoirs, II,
333S Far East Hearings, Pt. 2, 10if.9; Jay Walz, tiew York
Times, June 25, 19^07
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words:

91

"I gave a darkening report of great confusion.”

The Secretary of State then presented the recommen
dations prepared for the President's consideration:

(1)

that American nationals, particularly dependents of the
military and diplomatic missions to Korea, be evacuated;
(2) that the U.S. Air Force be commanded to protect this
evacuation by force, if necessary to keep the requisite
ports and airfields open; (3) that General MacArthur be
instructed to provide the Republic of Korea forces with
arms and ammunition over and above current allocations;
(ij.) that the Seventh Fleet be ordered into the Formosa
Strait to prevent a Chinese Communist invasion of Formosa
or vice versa;

(5) that consideration of additional

assistance for South Korea should be given, based on the
Security Council resolution, or supplementary resolutions;
92
(6) that military aid to Indochina be increased.
Following his long-established routine in this type
of meeting, the President then went around the table,
asking each adviser in turn to state his opinion of these
recommendations and soliciting any additional views they
might have.

The general consensus supported the

^Acheson, Present at the Creation, lj.06. See also,
Truman, Memoirs, II, 333-3^7 Paige, Korean Decision,
126-27.
*
^Acheson, Present at the Creation, 2+.06. See also,
Truman, Memoirs, II, 33l*; Taige, Korean Decision, 127.
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recommendations made by Acheson, with varying degress of
enthusiasm for particular p o i n t s . ^

Truman's questions to

the Joint Chiefs were quite extensive, leaving Defense
Secretary Johnson with the impression that the Commander
in Chief had a thorough knowledge of troop dispositions
9k
and the existing military situation. ^

The military men

told Truman that they did not believe the Soviet Union
would use the Korean situation as a pretext for a general
war.

The Air Force and Navy chiefs, Vandenberg and Sher

man, told the President that their services would probably
be able to provide enough assistance to the ROK Army, if
ordered, to enable them to stem the tide of the North
Korean advance.

The military men were not disposed to

using ground forces in Korea because of the terrain and
the uncertain conditions.^
As the first Blair House conference ended (about
11:00 P.M.), Truman began to make his decisions.

He

approved the use of military aircraft and ships for the
evacuation of American nationals.

He also authorized the

use of naval and air units in combat if needed to protect

93Acheson, Present at the Creation, 1+.06.
^ L o u i s Johnson testimony, Far East Hearings,
Pt. Ij., 2£80.
^Truman, Memoirs, II, 335>J Acheson, Present at the
Creation, 1*06. For a detailed description of the 'first
Blair House meeting, see Paige, Korean Decision, 12^-lfl.
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the evacuation area (Inchon-Kimpo-Seoul) from falling into
the hands of the North Korean forces.

In no case were

these operations to be conducted above the thirty-eighth
p a r a l l e l . M a c A r t h u r was to be ordered to provide as
much ammunition and military equipment as he deemed
necessary to South Korea.

The Seventh Fleet— the carrier

Valley Forge, the Rochester, a heavy cruiser, eight
destroyers and some twelve lesser craft— was ordered to
sail North to the Formosa Strait at once.

Truman

stipulated that no further orders to the fleet were to be
transmitted until they arrived on station.^

Reflecting

his belief that the invasion might be a Soviet ruse,
Truman instructed Acheson to survey all areas of the world
where the Russians might strike.

Before midnight, cables

were being transmitted from the State Department to all
diplomatic and military missions in the world, requesting
an intelligence recheck of Soviet intentions.^®

At about

9®Bradley testimony, Far East Hearings. Pt. 2,
933; Vandenberg testimony, ibid., 1II75; Johnson testimony,
ibid., Pt. i|., 2573; Appendix K, ibid., Pt. 5* 3192. See
also, Truman, Memoirs, II, 33^4-—35; Phillips, Truman
Presidency. 295^
97Truman, Memoirs, II, 33^4-; Acheson, Present at the
Creation, lj.06; New YoirlT^Times, June 26, 1950. See aTso,
Paige, Korean Decision, 135; Warner, "How Korea Decision
Was Made,ir l02; Smith, "Why We Went to War in Korea," 78*
9®Acheson, Present at the Creation, lj.06. See also,
Paige, Korean Decision, 13HT Phillips, Truman Presidency,
295.
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the same time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were transmitting
orders to MacArthur based on Truman's decisions. 99
These first decisions by the Commander in Chief were
tentative.

They did not represent a positive commitment

to the defense of South Korea.

Truman had made minimal

decisions, not out of any fear to act, but because he
wanted to wait until his military and diplomatic intelli
gence clarified the situation.

However, there is every

reason to believe that he was already resolved to take
whatever action was required to defend South Korea.
Truman has written that one strong impression he had from
the Blair House meeting was " . . .

the complete, almost

unspoken acceptance on the part of everyone that whatever
had to be done to meet this aggression had to be
done. . . • This was the test of all the talk of the last
five years of collective s e c u r i t y . T h e

President and

all of his major counselors were of one mind on the need

99t. r. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study in
Unpreparedness (New York: Macmillan, T96377 05-81• Here
inafter cited as Fehrenbach, This Kind of W a r . See also,
Higgins, Korea and t ^ Fall of MacArthur, ”23-26; Paige,
Korean Decisi onTTljT H 2 ; AppTeman, South to the Naktong,
35; Lichterman, "To Jie Yalu and Bank,,r 579-50; Whitney,
MacArthur, 323; J« Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The
History and Lessons of Korea (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
19&9) > l'J5. Hereinafter cited as Collins, War in Peacetime.
lOOTruman, Memoirs, II, 33k* See also, Acheson,
Present at the Creation, t.06; Spanier, Truman-MacArthur
ControversyT301 Phillips, Truman Presidency, 29£-9&.
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for action to defend the Korean Republic, with the degree
of American involvement apparently to be determined chiefly
by the ability of the South Korean forces to resist the
attack,

"Once this decision had been made, the progressive

commitment of forces and the enlargement of their scope of
action was only a reflection of increasingly clear intel
ligence reports from the battlefield."^^
The White House issued a press release on Monday,
June 26, 1950, in which Truman acknowledged that he had
conferred with the leadership of the State and Defense
Departments Sunday evening.

He avoided mentioning any

decisions reached, except to state that the "type" of aid
being furnished Korea under the Mutual Defense Assistance
Program was being augmented and expedited.

The President

had praise for the Security Council resolution and words
of warning to the aggressors:

"Willful disregard of the

obligation to keep the peace cannot be tolerated by
nations that support the United Nations Charter."

102

The President was subject to numerous pressures
for action on Monday.

He had begun the day— as was his

101Hoare, "Truman," 192.
102preas Release No. 2i|l|i|, Statement by the Presi
dent, June 26, 1950, copy in Tannenwald Papers, Chronology,
Public Statements, MacArthur Hearings, Truman Library.
Statement is published as Item No. 172, Public Papers . . .
Truman, 1950 » if.91-92; Doc. No. 6, United States Policy in
the Korean Crisis, 16-17; Paige (ed.T, 1950: ^Truman*s
Decision, 90«
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custom— by reading four major newspapers (New York Times,
New York Herald Tribune, Baltimore Sun and Washington
Post) after breakfast.

Two of the papers, the Times and

the Sun, called for firm and decisive action.

103
^

As the

day wore on, he received several appeals directly from
Korea.

A cable from the Korean National Christian Council

was received from Seoul at the White House at 8:If.6 A.M.
saying, "Large invading forces are pressing around us,
begging your immediate help."^^-

The Korean National

Assembly appealed to the United States for immediate
a s s i s t a n c e . T r u m a n also received a message from Presi
dent Rhee bearing the same urgent plea for assistance
At 3:50 P.M. Truman received the Korean Ambassador, John
M. Chang, who delivered the messages from Rhee and the
National Assembly.

Truman recalled Chang looking so

depressed that he tried to encourage him:

"I told him to •

103paige, Korean Decision, lZj.j?-ij.6.
Smith, "Why We Went to War in Korea," 80.

See also,

10^-H. Nam Kung to the President, June 26, 1950,
Truman Papers, OF, lj.71 Misc. (19^8-53) > Truman Library.
■l-O^United States Policy in the Korean Crisis,
2, 17. See also, Paige ted.), 1 9 5 6 :' Truman's~Decision,
100; Paige, Korean Decision, 156-57*
106Truman, Memoirs, II, 336.

Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibitedwithout permission.

1 *2
hold fast— that help was on the way."

107

Early on the evening of June 26 Dean Acheson called
the President to inform him that conditions in South
Korea had seriously deteriorated during the day.

The

Secretary suggested that another full scale conference
was necessary so that Truman could hear these reports
directly and issue further instructions.

The President

told Acheson to assemble his advisers at Blair House for
a meeting at 9:00 P.M.

The group which assembled was

essentially the same although Francis Matthews, Secretary
^a Q
of the Navy, was absent.
Truman first heard the military situation reports.
He learned that the South Korean government had abandoned
Seoul in the face of a rapidly-advancing North Korean
armored column.

General Vandenberg told the President

that American fighter planes had been in combat over the
South Korean capital and that at least one North Korean
aircraft had been destroyed.’*-®^

General Bradley then read

Truman the latest communique from MacArthur:

10^Ibid., 336-37* See also, Acheson, Present at
the Creation, i|07* Paige, Korean Decision, 157-5b; New
York' Clines, June 27, 1950.
•*-°®Acheson, Present at the Creation, i+07» Truman,
Memoirs, II, 3375 Anthony Leviero, New York Times, June
28, 1950. See also, Bradley testimony," Far teasl;
Hearings, Pt. 2, 933*
*^°^Smith, "Why We Went to War in Korea," 80; New
York Times, June 27, 1950.
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Piecemeal entry into action vicinity Seoul by South
Korean Third and Fifth Divisions has not succeeded
in stopping the penetration recognized as the enemy
main effort for the past 2 days with intent to seize
the capital city of Seoul. Tanks entering suburbs
of S e ou l. . . .
South Korean units unable to resist determined
Northern offensive. Contributory factor exclusive
enemy possession of tanks and fighter planes.
South
Korean casualties as an index to fighting have not
shown adequate resistance capabilities or the will
to fight and our estimate is that a complete collapse
is imminent.110
At the President's request, Acheson led off the
discussion of further American action by making a number
of recommendations.

The Secretary of State felt that a

new resolution should be presented to the United Nations,
asking the member states to furnish South Korea with all
aid necessary to repel the invasion and restore peace.
Acheson also urged that the Seventh Fleet be instructed
to block any Chinese Communist attack on Formosa and any
Nationalist Chinese thrust at the mainland.

The most

significant of his recommendations, however, was that the
Air Force and Navy should be allowed to provide full
tactical'support for South Korean forces, but that their
military activities should not extend to areas above the
thirty-eighth parallel

•^^Quoted in Truman, Memoirs, II, 337*
Paige, Korean Decision, 162.

See also,

^•■^Acheson, Present at the Creation, ij.07-ij.08.
See also, Johnson testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. ij.,
25>8l; Warner, "How the Korea Decision Was Made," 103?
Smith, "Why We Went to War in Korea,” 80.
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WiAll the advisers present were asked to comment on
AchesonTs recommendations by Truman, who had already made
it clear that he considered Korea a test of American
HP
resolve, like Berlin, that had to be met.
Secretary of
Defense Johnson had no recommendations of his own to
o f f e r . General Bradley and Collins of the Army doubted

that air and naval support could stem the momentum of the
invasion.

They also told the President that if American

ground forces were needed, it would probably require at
least a partial mobilization.

Johnson objected to using

ground troops in Korea, but Truman asked the Joint Chiefs
to give immediate consideration to that possibility.

Al

though the conferees discussed whether the Soviet Union
might take the use of American air and navy as sufficient
cause for intervention or expansion of the conflict into
other areas, these possibilities were considered remote.
None of the advisers present told the President that the
United States should not use the Air Force and Navy in the

u p

Truman, Memoirs, II, 337*

113
^It is Johnson’s recollection that neither he nor
anyone else from the Defense Department specifically
approved or disapproved of military involvement in Korea
during the meeting. See his testimony, Far East Hearings,
Pt. ij., 2581, 258Ij.. Acheson has said that‘,'~',TEh.e~recommendations met with general favor, including Louis
Johnson’s. . • . ” Present at the Creation, J4.O8 .
H^-Paige, Korean Decision, 165-66, 173 ! Acheson,
Present at the Creation, U 08 .
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defense of South Korea.

11^

tions presented by Acheson.

Truman approved the recommenda
He ordered Secretary Johnson

to contact General MacArthur and directly inform him of
the decisions which had been made.
up at 9:lj-0 P.M.

116

The conference broke

As Truman left the meeting room he

remarked, "Everything I have done in the last five years
has been to try to avoid making a decision such as I had
to make tonight.
The directive transmitted to MacArthur assigned to
him operational control of all military and naval forces
in and around Korea.

It also made clear that there was to

be no military action against North Korean territory.

A

paraphrased excerpt from MacArthur's orders read:
In order to clear South Korea of North Korean
military forces, all military targets south of the
thirty-eighth parallel were cleared for attack by the
Air Force. Similarly naval forces were authorized to
operate against forces engaged in aggression against

^Paige, Korean Decision, 173-7i|-* See also, Smith,
"Why We Went to War in Korea," 80; Warner, "How the Korea
Decision Was Made," 103*
ll^Truman, Memoirs, II, 337J Far East Hearings,
Pt. 2,
MacArthur 1s "official" biographer said the
General paused in amazement to reflect on how, without
consulting Congress or the field commander: "Step by
hesitant step," Truman, Acheson and Bradley, "agreed among
themselves to enter the Korean War." Whitney, MacArthur,
3 21+. See also, MacArthur, Reminiscences, 33180.

^■^Quoted in Smith, "Why We Went to War in Korea, "
See also, Phillips, Truman Presidency, 299.
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South Korea without restriction in coastal waters
and sea approaches south of the thirty-eighth
parallel.118

At 10:00 P.M., shortly after leaving the meeting
with his military advisers, Truman placed a call to Charles
S. Murphy, Special Counsel to the President.

Truman gave

Murphy a list of congressional leaders he wished to have
attend a conference in his office at 11:30 the following
morning, June 27

During the session with his advisers,

the President had apparently broached the subject of
asking Congress for a joint resolution supporting his
decisions, but had been dissuaded by Acheson on the grounds
that it would precipitate attacks on him by hostile
Republicans and generate lengthy discussions of the eventual
effect and financial expenditures involved in this intervention.

1 Pfi

Truman then decided on this meeting with the

legislative leadership to simply inform them of what had

•^®Marshall testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 1,
f?35>» See also, Appleman, South"To the Naktong, 38 ,
Paige, Korean Decision.
^ ^ T h e following persons were on the list: Vice
President Alben Barkley, Speaker Sam Rayburn, Senators
Scott Lucas, Tom Connally, Alexander Wiley, Alexander Smith,
Walter George, Elbert Thomas, Millard Tydings, Styles
Bridges and Congressmen John McCormack, John Kee, Charles
Easton, Carl Vinson, Dewey Short. See Murphy to Matthew
Connelly, June 27, 19^0, Truman Papers, Lloyd Files, Korea
folder, Truman Library. Mike Mansfield, who was not on the
list, apparently did attend. Barkely and George, who were
out of town, did not. See Truman, Memoirs, II, 338;
Acheson, Present at the Creation, J4-OB; Smith, ’’Why We Went
to War in Korea, ”H?2; I*aige, Korean Decision, 187 .
120paige, Korean Decision, 187*
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occurred and the decisions he had made.

121

The meeting between the President and the congres
sional leaders was held in the Cabinet Room of the White
House at 11:30 A.M., Tuesday, June 27.

With Truman were

the Secretaries of State and Defense and most of the other
officials who had participated in the two conferences at
Blair House.

Acheson summarized all that had transpired

since Saturday evening, stressing the desperate situation
being faced by the South Korean forces and the Administra
tion’s belief that a failure to respond to this invasion
would inevitably lead to World War III.

The President then

spoke at some length, emphasizing that the United States
was not acting unilaterally, but through the United
Nations which he believed would suffer the fate of the
League of Nations if it failed to act in this instance.
Truman told those present of his effort to get the Soviet
Union to intercede with North Korea.

He read the text of

a statement he planned to release following the meeting
which would make public the actions he had taken.

Truman

then asked for questions and a general discussion of the
American role in the crisis followed.

122

121jrumanj Memoirs, II, 338; Acheson, Present at
the Creation, lj.08.
122«prUman, Memoirs , II, 338. See also, Acheson,
Present at the Creation, k09* Paige, Korean Decision,
10B-8^j Smith7 "Why We Went to War in Korea, " 02. A dip
lomatic note to the Soviet Union, dated June 27, 1950,
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The Senators and Representatives posed several
questions as to military dispositions.

They were assured

by the Joint Chiefs that no American ground forces were
being employed in Korea nor were there any plans for such
a commitment.

Senator Millard Tydings, Chairman of the

Armed Services Committee, informed Truman that his com
mittee had that morning favorably reported out bills
allowing the President to call up the National Guard and
to extend the Selective Service Act of 19^ 8 .

Truman

personally assured the Congressmen present that his actions
were in full accord with the principles and policies of
the United N a t i o n s . T h e r e

is clear-cut agreement in

the recollections of the participants that no one present
disputed Truman’s decisions.

They were agreed that the

Administration’s course was the proper response to the

asked that the Kremlin disavow any responsibility for the
North Korean invasion and also that it use its influence
to convince the North Koreans to withdraw their forces
immediately. The USSR responded on the 29th, saying that
the fighting was brought on by South Korean border raids,
so the responsibility rested with them, " . . . and upon
those who stand behind their back." The Soviet Union re
fused to intercede, since this, they said, would constitute
interference in the internal afYairs of Korea and such an
act would not be consonant with Soviet principles. See
Docs. No. 9l|, 95, United States Policy in the Korean Crisis,
63— 6I4.J New York Times, June 2b', 1956.
l^Acheson, Present at the Creation, lj.09. See
also, Paige, Korean Decision, l9'6-9i; Par East Hearings,
Pt. 3 , 1779; Pt. 4 , 2609.
^2^-Acheson, Present at the Creation, I4.O9 •
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situation.However,

two of the participants, Secretary

Johnson and Senator Alexander Smith, later recalled that
Senator Smith and, perhaps, Senator Tom Connally as well,
wanted to know why Truman had not consulted Congress
before making the decision to intervene militarily.

There

is no evidence to indicate that the subject was discussed
at this meeting, but it was at a subsequent meeting of
Truman with these same conferees on June 30> three days
later.

126

In any event, while Truman had entertained

thoughts of obtaining a joint resolution from Congress,
he believed he was acting within the scope of his powers
as commander in chief in ordering naval and air inter127
vention without congressional sanction.
Testifying a
year later before Congress, Acheson supported this con
clusion.

The Secretary of State was asked by Senator

Harry Byrd how he could justify the President's action
without the prior approval of Congress.

Acheson replied:

"Those orders were issued by the President in exercise of
his authority as President and Commander in Chief.

,,128

12^Truman, Memoirs, II, 338; Acheson, Present at the
Creation, lj.09. See also, Paige, Korean Decision, lb9-ffi);
Far EasTT Hearings, Pt. 3> 1779.
■^^Smith, "Why We Went to War in Korea," 82. See
also, Far East Hearings, Pt. 3# 1779-80, 2021; Pt. ij., 2^92.

12?Hoare, "Truman," 191-92.
^2^Far East Hearings, Pt. 3> 201ij., 1£.
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As the meeting with the Congressmen ended, the
White House released to the press the President's state
ment on the American response to the Korean crisis.

In

part, it read:
In Korea the Government forces, which were armed
to prevent border raids and to preserve internal
security, were attacked by invading forces from North
Korea, The Security Council of the United Nations
called upon the invading troops to cease hostilities
and to withdraw to the 38t;h parallel. This they have
not done, but on the contrary have pressed the
attack. The Security Council called upon all members
of the United Nations to render every assistance to
the United Nations inthe execution of this resolu
tion. In these circumstances I have ordered United
States air and sea forces to give the Korean Govern
ment troops cover and support.
. . . I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent
any attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action
I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa
to cease all air and sea operations against the main
land. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is
done. . . .
I have also directed that United States Forces in
the Philippines be strengthened and that military
assistance to the Philippine Government be
accelerated.
I have similarly directed acceleration in the
furnishing of military assistance to the forces of
France and the Associated States in Indo China and
the dispatch of a military mission to provide close
working relations with those forces. • • .129

129a copy of theoriginal press release, dated June
27, 1950, is in Tannenwald Papers, Subject File, Chronol
ogy, Public Statements, MacArthur Hearings, Truman Library.
This statement by Truman has been reprinted in numerous
places. See,for example, Item No. 173, Public Papers • • .
Truman, 19j>0, ij-92; Truman, Memoirs, II, 338-39 » Doc. No.
9, United States Policy in the Korean Crisis, 18; Far
East Hearings, Pt. 5, 33^9‘;*~^ew York Times, June 28, 1950J
Paige (e d .)I 19f>0: Truman's Decision,~l03-10^»
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An editorial in the New York Times, commenting on

Truman’s statement, said that his decision was " . . . a
130
momentous and courageous act."
In the same paper,
correspondent James Reston wrote that Truman’s decision

had " . . .

produced a transformation in the spirit of the

United States Government."

Reston added that differences

of opinion as to what reaction the United States should
take ". . . have apparently been swept away by the general
conviction that the dangers of inaction were greater than
the dangers of the bold action taken by the President."

131

The New York Herald Tribune, in a fron t page editorial,
declared:

"The President has acted— and spoken— with a

magnificent courage and terse decision. . . .
to draw a line. • . ."^32

It was time

scores of telegrams came to the

White House, endorsing Truman’s action by a margin of
ten-to-one.1^

One of the telegrams was from Thomas E.

•*~-^ N e w York Times, June 28, 1950.
131Ibid.
■^■•^Quoted in Eric P. Goldman, The Crucial Decade—
And A f t e r : America, 1945-1960 (New York: Random House,
l9597> 1*59. Hereinafter- cited as Goldman, Crucial Decade.

133(j0i<3rilanj In ibid. (p. 159), said that the letters
and telegrams were ten to one in favor of the President's
action. An internal White House memorandum was not as
generous. It noted that letters were running approximately
ten to one in favor, but a combined total of letters and
telegrams showed that 775 approved, 278 were opposed, and
125 were described as "miscellaneous in nature," for an
average of approximately three to one favoring Truman's
decision.
"W. J. H." (William J. Hopkins, White House
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Dewey, the Republican nominee in 19l|4 and 19I4.8 s

"I

wholeheartedly agree with and support the difficult
decision you have made today. • .

Columnist Arthur

Krock noted that Truman had been determined ". . • from
the outset to adopt the forceful policy which was announced
this morning."

135

Joseph C. Harsch, writing in the

Christian Science Monitor, said Truman's announcement was
received in Washington with a sense of relief and a strong
1 oi
expression of unity and satisfaction.
The decision to use the Navy and Air Force was
greeted by a general approval and enthusiasm which
few people— after all the war's trouble and controversy— now remember. Practically every major newspaper
in the country approved, with the exception of the
Chicago Tribune and its affiliate, the Washington
Time s-Heraid.137
Truman's statement was read to the House on the
afternoon of the 27th by Democratic TPloor Leader John
McCormack.

As he concluded, the members rose as a body

to cheer and applaud.

Before the afternoon had ended

they had rushed to passage extension of the Selective

Executive Clerk) to Charles Ross (Press Secretary), June
29, 1950, Truman Papers, OF, lj.71-B, Korean Emergency,
Truman Library.
•^^-Quoted in New York Times, June 28, 1950.
Governor Dewey's telegram and tfruman's reply are printed
as Item No. 175* Exchange of Messages with Governor Dewey,
June 27 1 19^0, Public Papers . . • Truman, 1950 » i|96.
^ N e w York Times, June 28, 1950.
136christian Science Monitor, June 29» 1950.
137smith, "Why We Went to War in Korea," 82.
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Service Act by a 315 to

vote.

Truman was accorded

unprecedented peacetime powers as Commander in Chief by
this act, particularly in the provisions authorizing him
to call up the National Guard and reserves for up to
twenty-one months active d u t y T h e

only dissonant

note struck in the House came from Vito Marcantonio, an
American Labor party Representative from New York.
charged that Truman " . . .

He

had usuiyed the powers of

Congress by declaring war against North Korea.
The Senate reaction to the reading of the President’s
statement was much more reserved, but reflected a general
bipartisan endorsement of the decision to intervene.
Republicans such as Willian Knowland (California),
Leverett Saltonstall (Massachusetts) and Wayne Morse
(Oregon), endorsed the President’s statement as did Henry
Cabot Lodge, Jr., (Massachusetts), who went further than
his fellow Republicans in expressing the hope that Truman
would use ground forces in Korea if the military fejt
they were needed.

These Senators were joined in their

expressions of approval of the Korean decision by Demo
cratic leaders like Herbert Lehman (New York), Estes

•^®New York Times, June 28, 1950*
•^^Harold B. Hinton, New York Times, June 28, 1950.
See also, Goldman, Crucial Decade, 158-59i Paige, Korean
Decision, 198; Warner, "How Korea Decision Was Made,'* lOif..
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Kefauver (Tennessee) and Hubert Humphrey (Minnesota).
While no senator voiced open opposition to the announced
decisions, Arthur Watkins (Utah) and James Kem (Missouri),
both Republicans, challenged the President’s decision not
to obtain congressional approval.

Kem, noting the

passages in the statement ordering the Seventh Fleet to
isolate Formosa and prevent attack, asked:

"Does that

mean he has arrogated to himself the authority of declaring
w a r ? B y
that,

way of rebuttal, Senator Scott Lucas told Kem

. . on 126-occasions in the past a President. . . ,

acting in his capacity as Commander in Chief of the
nation’s armed forces, had deployed these forces . . •
without asking a declaration of war of Congress.
The most significant challenge to the President’s
authority to send American forces into foreign combat
without the approval of Congress came from Senator Robert
A. Taft, an Ohio Republican.

Taft delivered a lengthy

major speech on the floor of the Senate, Wednesday after
noon, June 28.

The Senator blamed the Korean crisis on the

"outrageous, aggressive attitude" of the Soviet Union and
the "bungling and inconsistent foreign policy of the

■^^Paige, Korean Decision, 196; Hinton, New York
Times, June 28, 1950 • See also, Warner, "How Korea
Decision Was Made," 10l|.
i^P-New York Times, June 28, 1950.
Paige, Korean Decision, 196.

See also,
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administration.

But Taft pointed out that Truman had

not attempted to consult with Congress or request a reso
lution approving the action taken.

Truman's actions,

Taft charged, created a de facto condition of war between
the United States and North Korea, without the constitu
tionally-required approval of the Congress

It was the

Senator's opinion that these actions represented usurpa
tion of power by the Commander in Chief.

Taft believed

that if the Senate did not protest ". . . w e would have
finally terminated for all time the right of Congress to
declare war. . .

The bulk of Taft's address damned

the Far Eastern policy of the Administration since World
War II.

Taft saw Truman's decisions as representing a

change of policy in the Ear East, which he endorsed, but
with some concern over whether the crisis in Korea was the
right time or place for such a change to take place.

Taft

may have weakened his argument somewhat by acknowledging
during the course of his speech that should a joint reso
lution be offered asking the Congress to authorize the use
of American military forces in Korea, he would vote in favor

^ P a r East Hearings, Pt. 5, 3211. For the original
text of the Senator's speech, see Congressional Record,
Vol. 96, Pt. 7, June 28, 1950, 93192T7
^^ F a r East Hearings, Pt. 5, 3216.
^ I b i d . , 3217.
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of the measure. ^

The Administration reacted quickly to Taft’s
challenge, even though the Senator seemed to have little
support for his position.

Less than a week later,

Congressmen received copies of a lengthy memorandum,
dated July 3# 1950, "on the authority of the President to
repel the attack in Korea.

The memorandum cited

volumes of historical and legal precedents to justify the
President's decision to use force in Korea.

It offered as

further justification, the membership of the United States
in the United Nations and the resolutions of the Security
Council, June 25 and 27*

The North Korean aggression had

to be met, the memorandum argued, because it constituted
a threat not only to international peace, but to the peace
and security of the United States and the security of
United States forces in the Pacific area.

Concluding,

^ I b i d .j 3211. Taft’s speech and a rebuttal by
Senator Paul ft. Douglas (Democrat, Illinois), are ex
cerpted in Doc. No. 28, Senate Debate of the Commander in
Chief’s Authority,” John P. Roche and Leonard W. Levy
(eds.), The Presidency (New York: Harcourt, Brace and
World, 15blj.) #
Hereinafter cited as Roche and
Levy (eds.), The Presidency. For other commentary and
analysis of Tsift’s speech, see New York Times, June 29#
1950J Paige, Korean Decision, 2X6-21} Warren, President as
World Leader," 3X7-38 1 Acheson, Present at the CroationT
IjlO; Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 52-6k# LaFeber,
America, Russia, 'tuncl the ColcTWar, 99«
■^^Text of the memorandum appears twice in the Far
East Hearings, Pt.
3198-3201;, 3373-81. It is also puHlUshecTin Background Information on the U3e of United
States Armed Forces in Fbrelgn Countries, Appendix I,
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the memorandum reads:
These interests of the United States are interests
which the President as Commander in Chief can protect
by the employment of the Armed Forces of the United
States without a declaration of war. It was they
which the President’s order of June 27 did protect.
This order was within his authority as Commander in
Chief.147
The military situation continued to worsen.
Virtually unimpeded, a column of North Korean tanks
entered Seoul on June 26 (Washington time).

A spokesman

for Rhee's Government, which had to flee the city, said
that the Korean President " . . .

is greatly disappointed

with American aid; coming as late as it has it is very
difficult to save anything. We have nothing to stop those
1)0
tanks."
On June 27, MacArthur’s headquarters announced
that American combat aircraft were engaged in bombing and
strafing missions south of the thirty-eighth parallel in
support of South Korean ground forces.

U.S. naval forces

were also engaged in limited action below the parallel.
During the day, four Russian-built, North Korean (YAK)
fighters were shot down over Seoul by American aircraft.

l47par East Hearings, Pt. 5, 3381•
^^ N e w York Times, June 29, 1950. The Korean A r m y less than 160,000 strong— had no combat aircraft, tanks,
or heavy artillery and few anti-tank weapons. The ROK
Navy was a farcial flotilla, consisting mainly of light
patrol craft of World War II vintage. Hanson W. Baldwin,
New York Times, June 27, 1950.
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The North Korean advance was temporarily stalled.
conclusion emerges from these combat reports:

lli9

One

Truman

ordered U.S. forces into combat in support of the South
Korean armies prior to the passage of the Security
Council resolution requesting member nations to intervene
militarily.

That resolution was not passed until late in

the evening of the twenty-seventh.
Warren Austin, the U.S. representative at the United
Nations, addressed the Security Council on Tuesday after
noon, June 27.

Austin told the other delegates that North

Korea's failure to accept their resolution of June 25
constituted an attack upon the United Nations itself.

He

informed the Council that the United States stood ready to
provide military aid to South Korea.

Austin then offered

a resolution asking member nations to provide South Korea
with the forces necessary to repel the a t t a c k . A f t e r
long delays while the Indian and Egyptian delegates vainly
attempted to receive voting instructions from their
governments, at 10:lj.5 P.M. the Security Council adopted
the American-sponsored resolution seven to one, with two

^^Lindesay Parrott, ibid., June 28, 1950.
■^•^Doc. No. l $ t Statement, Austin to the Security
Council, June 27, 1950, United States Policy in the Korean
Crisis, 23-21j.. The text of Austin's statemenTf"may also be
found in the New York Times, June 28, 1950; Far East
Hearings. Pt. 5, 3370-7i; Paige (e d .) , 1950: ‘fruman1s
Decision, 105-107•
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abstentions.

The operative line of the document recom

mended " . . .

that the Members of the United Nations

furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be
necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area."

151

That Truman sent American forces into combat before
the sanctifying resolution was even proposed, thus pre
senting the Security Council with a fait accompli, is true,
but of little consequence.

The State Department had every

assurance that the resolution would be approved that day.
Additionally, a very braod interpretation of the June 25
resolution might be taken as justification for military
152
intervention by U.N. members.
It would certainly seem
an overdrawn statement to assert, as one writer has:

"The

Truman Administration had been stampeded, and it in turn

i^lDoc. No. 16, Security Council Resolution, June
27, 1950, United States Policy in the Korean Crisis, 2lj.,
Text is also printed in Far EasIT*Hearings . Pt. 2, 986;
Pt. 5, 3371: New York Times, June 2b, 1950* Allen Guttman
(ed.), Korea and theTheory of Limited War (Boston: D.C.
Heath and Company, 1967) * 2-jT7 “hereinafter cited as
Guttman (ed.), Korea and the Theory of Limited W a r . In the
voting, Yugoslavia cast’ the dissenting vote and India and
Egypt abstained. India approved two days later. The
Soviet Union was absent as it had been since a boycott
begun in January, 195>0. Warner, "How Korea Decision Was
Made," 104.
^•^Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," 580-81.
See also, Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 36;
Fleming, The Cold W a r , II, 60£.
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stampeded the United Nations."
In the 1951 hearings on MacArthur's dismissal,
General Bradley told Senator Byrd that the United States
entered the fighting following the resolution of June 27.
Byrd retorted by reading part of a paraphrase of the JCS
orders to MacArthur:

"Instructions furnished CINCPE . . .

26 June 1950 provided for the employment of United States
naval and air forces against North Korean units south of
1 5k
the thirty-eighth parallel."
Bradley then acknowledged
that some forces were in combat prior to the resolution,
but only to cover the evacuation of American nationals.
With a little more candor, Acheson has acknowledged in his
memoirs that military action had been ordered, "and
l£6
possibly taken," prior to the June 27 resolution.
The combat reports received in Washington on
Wednesday gave little cause for optimism.

The South

Korean forces driven from Seoul on Tuesday, had continued
a "demoralized retreat" during the night.

Early on

June 28 (Washington time) the Korean forces were reportedly

Stone, The Hidden History of the K orean
War (New York: Monthly Review tress, 19 *?2), 7$ • S*ere inafter cited as Stone, Hidden History of Korean W a r .
•*~^ a r East Hearings, Pt. 2, 992. CINCPE is a
military acronymTTor one of MacArthur's titles,
"Commander in Chief, Par East."
^Ibid.,

992-93.

•^■^Acheson, Present at the Creation, ij.08.
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holding the enemy advance in check at the Han River, south
of the capital.

One report reaching Washington indicated

that two of the seven understrength ROK divisions had
"disintegrated."

U.S. B-29 bombers attacked Kimpo airfield

(near Seoul) while jet fighters were seeing action against
North Korean tanks and troops.

The American jets were not

able to provide close support for ground troops because no
direct ground-to-air communications had yet been estab
lished.^^
The President met with the National Security
Council on the afternoon of June 2 3 .
scheduled meeting of the NSC.

This was a regularly-

Truman had not seen fit to

call this body into special session since the Korean
crisis had begun.

The President began the meeting with a

brief review of the bleak military picture in Korea.
Vice President Barkley, arriving late, informed Truman
that the draft extension bill had just cleared the Senate
by a unanimous vote.-^®

This meant that both houses of

the Congress had shown almost total unanimity in con
ferring greater military authority on the President.
Acheson cautioned that the present enthusiasm would wither
away if Americans began to die and taxes rise because of
Korea.

"The President, mistaking my purpose," Acheson

l^ N e w York Times, June 29, 1950; Warner, "How
Korea Decision Was Made," 10ij.-105.
IS^Truman, Memoirs, II, 3^0.
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recalls, ". . • insisted that we could not back out of the
course upon which we had started."

159

The remainder of the Security Council meeting
dealt with the probable intentions of the Soviet Union
and the desirability of making Administration policy clear
to MacArthur.

Truman and many others were anticipating

that the Soviet Union would take overt action somewhere
in the world in order to capitalize on American preoccupa
tion with Korea.

Another consideration was direct military

involvement by the Soviet Union in the fighting in Korea,
particularly since the United States had entered the con
flict.

Army Secretary Pace told Truman that he had

instructed military intelligence to be especially alert
for signs of a Soviet move into Korea.

Truman told Pace

that he had already ordered an intensification of strategic
intelligence efforts in the areas of northern Europe,
Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.

The President also ordered a

thorough reappraisal of American policies in all areas
continguous with the U.S.S.R.*^0
During the NSC meeting of June 28, Air Force Secre
tary Thomas Finletter suggested to the President that
General Vandenberg be sent to Tokyo to personally instruct

Ache son, Present at the Creation, ij.ll; Truman,
Memoirs, II, 3l|0•
■^^Truman, Memoirsi, II, 3/j.O-ij.l. See also, McLellan
and Reuss, "Foreign and Military Policies," 75*
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MacArthur in the strategic thinking of the Administration.
Pinletter was concerned that MacArthur might err in an
initial response to new developments in Korea without
such instructions.

However, Truman vetoed this suggestion

on the grounds that he needed the Chiefs of Staff with him
X 6l
in Washington during this crisis.
Recalling this dis
cussion in his Memoirs, Truman clearly had in mind his
later confrontation with MacArthur when he added:
. . . I understood the need for mutual understanding
between Washington and Tokyo and expressed my regret
that General MacArthur had so consistently declined
all invitations to return to the United States for
even a short visit. There had been no opportunity
for him to meet me as Commander in Chief. I felt
that if the Korean conflict^was prolonged I would want
to see General MacArthur.162
The limited records available do not indicate
whether or not the subject of employing American ground
forces in Korea was discussed in the National Security
Council session on June 28.

It is known that General John

Church had reported to MacArthur from the scene on
Wednesday (Korean time), his belief that the thirty-eighth
parallel could not be restored as the boundary line
without the use of United States ground combat forces.

^•^Truman, Memoirs, II, 3I4.O—Ip.. Pinletter was
correct. As described later, without requesting authority
to do so, MacArthur will order the Air Force to attack
targets north of the thirty-eighth parallel.
l62Ibid.t $1)1.
l63paige, Korean Decision, 223-2lj..
Acheson, Present at the Creation, i|ll.

See also,
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Some indication that the use of infantry may have been
discussed appears in an article published in the New York
Times the following morning.

Written by Hanson W.

Baldwin, the distinguished military analyst, shortly after
the Security Council adjourned, the article bears the
headline:

"Ground Aid in Korea: Use of U.S. Troops Con

sidered to Bolster Weak Southern Army."

Considering the

decision reached two days later, Baldwin displayed an
amazing prescience or access to someone in the inner
circles of the Administration:
The probability that United States ground troops
will have to be employed in Korea if the North Korean
Communists are to be driven back to the Thirty-eighth
Parallel increased by the hour today. . . .
If the invading forces cannot be held north of the
Han River . . . another defensive position of some
strength runs about across the center of Southern
Korea to the coast. A final line lies in a great
semi-circular arc in front of Pusan on the southeast
coast.
The next few days— particularly the operations
tomorrow— will probably determine whether or not the
intervention of United States ground combat forces
will be necessary. Such intervention should be
avoided, on military grounds, if possible. • . .
However, the political necessity for prompt
intervention— if the .South Korean ground armies melt
away— is clear; once our hand had been laid to the
plow we cannot turn back. Moreover, in a military
sense, prompt and decisive action to force the
invaders back to the Thirty-Eighth Parallel is deemed
of great importance; what we want to avoid in Korea
is a protracted wearing campaign of attrition which
would gradually such (sic., suck) in greater and
greater United States1 strength, and might result in a
sort of Spanish Civil War condition.

■^•^Hanson Baldwin, New York Times, June 29, 19$0.

Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Furtherreproduction prohibitedwithout permission.

k*>5
Baldwin continued with the same theme in an
article written on the twenty-ninth.

The journalist

claimed that two tentative answers had been proposed in
the event that the South Koreans could not repel the North
Korean forces, a result which now seemed certain.

First,

Truman could authorize his air and naval forces to operate
north of the thirty-eighth parallel against air fields
and weapons dumps.

Second, the President could commit

American ground elements to combat.

While Baldwin con

sidered these to be "unhappy alternatives," he particularly
saw great disadvantages in extending the fighting into
North Korea.

It was his opinion that such operations

would have psychological and political repercussions;
serve to unify the North Koreans against the United States;
cause questions as to the legality of American inter
vention and, while widening the war, provided no guarantee
that the war would be brought to a rapid and decisive
solution.

"There is a growing conviction here (in Wash

ington) ," Baldwin concluded, "that more quick and decisive
action in the form of one or both courses may be necessary
in the next few days. . . .

What Baldwin did not know

was that both decisions had already been taken before his
article appeared the next morning.
General MacArthur flew to Korea from Tokyo at dawn,

l6£lbid., June 30, 1950.
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June 29 (Korean time).

At some point in the flight he

dictated an order to Lt. General George E. Stratemeyer to
he sent by radiogram to Major General Earl E. Partridge,
who, in Stratemeyer’s absence, was commanding the Par East
Air Force.

The order read:

"Stratemeyer to Partridge:

Take out North Korean Airfield immediately.
MacArthur approves.

1 66

No publicity.

The Par East Commander took this

action without consultation or approval from Washington.

167

General Whitney, who was on the flight to Korea, explained
that MacArthur felt that allowing North Korea a sanctuary
beyond the thirty-eighth parallel ". . . would not be
giving to the South Korean defenders the ’effective
military assistance* that the U.N. had directed him to
give.

He concluded . . . that implicit in his directive

was the discretion normal to field command.”-^8

MacArthur

was, of course, never actually under the "direction" of
the United Nations.

The directive from his superiors in

Washington had specifically drawn the thirty-eighth
parallel as the outer limits of U.S. military activity.

l^Appieman, South to the Naktong,
According
to United Press reports from London, Soviet and North
Korean radio broadcasts charged, on June 29 » that U.S.
B-29’s were bombing Pyongyang, North Korea. Washington
denied these reports. Lindesay Parrott, New York Times,
June 30, 1950.
•^^Collins, War in Peacetime, 18-19j Lichterman,
"To the Yalu and BacIc7ir3STI
"^^Whitney, MacArthur, 326.
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"Here was no timid delay while authorization was obtained
from Washington, here was the capacity for command
decision and the readiness to assume responsibility which
had always been MacArthur’s forte.

There is no record

of any countermanding order or message of censure from
Washington.

170
1

Instead, less than twenty-four hours

later, the President sent MacArthur authorization to do
precisely what he had already done.
The reports arriving in Washington from Korea on
Thursday, June 29, continued to describe the ROK position
as desperate.

The North Koreans were massing along the

Han River for another push southward.

The South Korean

army was sustaining very heavy casualties and its ability
to continue resistance was diminishing hourly.

Shortly

before noon, Secretary Johnson called Truman to suggest
that he hold another meeting with the National Security
Council.

The President agreed, and the meeting was

scheduled for £:00 that evening.

171

One hour before his meeting with the NSC, Truman
held his regular weekly press conference, the first since

169

27- 28.

Ibid.; Higgins, Korea and the Fall of MacArth u r ,

■^^Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," £81.
17lLindesay Parrott, New York Times,June 30, 19£0.
See also, Smith, "Why We W e n ¥ to War in Korea," 86;
Fehrenbach, This Kind of W a r , 86; Goldman, Crucial Decade,

l6£-66.
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the crisis in Korea erupted.

In response to a reporter's

question, Truman said that the United States was not at
war.

Asked to elaborate, he said that South Korea had

been

. • unlawfully attacked by a bunch of bandits•

The United States was one of the members of the United
Nations aiding in the relief of Korea.

A reporter then

asked if it would be accurate to refer to American
assistance as a "police action" under the aegis of the
United Nations.

"That is exactly what it amounts to,"

was the President's

re p ly . ^73

The unfortunate phrase

became part of the language and a source of embarrassment
to Truman.

The President was concerned that action in

Korea be undertaken through the United Nations with the
active involvement of as many other nations as possible.
He revealed this concern for emphasizing that Korea was an
act of collective security in a personal letter written in
July:

"Every effort is being made to line up the United

Nations in a practical way on our side.

I hope we can get

it worked out so that all the allies on our side will be

■^^Item No. 179, Press Conference, June 29, 1950,
Public Papers . . . Truman, 1950, 50lj..
-*-73xbid., 50i|~5j Anthony Leviero, New York Times,
June 30, 1950.
In a press conference on 3uTy 13, a
reporter asked Truman if he would still call the Korean
fighting, a "police action." His reply was, "Yes, it is
still a police action." Item No. 191, Public Papers • . .
Truman, 1950, 522.
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in the fight.,|1711In the Security Council meeting following his press
conference, Truman listened as Secretary of Defense
Johnson presented the text of a proposed directive to
MacArthur which had been drafted by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.

Johnson said that the major difficulties encountered

by United States1 forces in carrying out the assigned
mission of aiding Korea were many:

a lack of proper ground-

air liaison existed between American fighters and the ROK
Army; support missions being flown from Japan could spend
only minutes over Korea because of fuel expenditure on the
long flights; transportation facilities available in Korea
made supplying American munitions difficult; the prohibi
tion of aerial and naval operations above the thirty-eighth
parallel provided the enemy with a sanctuary and secure
base of s u p p l y . T h e

directive proposed to offset these

disadvantages by allowing MacArthur to strike above the
thirty-eighth parallel (the conferees being apparently
unaware MacArthur had already given such an order), by
allowing the use of Army service units of the Signal Corps
and transport companies to provide air-ground communication

Ifij-Truman to Harry I. Schwiramer, July 12, 1950,
Truman Papers, OP,
Korean Emergency, Truman Library.
■*-7£paige, Korean Decision,
See also, Smith,
"Why We Went to War in Korea," ti6; Phillips, Truman
Presidency, 300-301.
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and transport of munitions, and by allowing the use of
Army combat forces to be stationed in the Pusan-Chinhae
area to protect the port and guard an airfield to be
used by American fighter aircraft.
In the general discussion that followed Johnson's
presentation, the proposed directive underwent substantial
revision.

Both Secretary Pace and Truman were reluctant

to allow a blanket endorsement for military action in
North Korea.

Truman also deleted some lines from the

directive that allowed the implication the United States
was planning for war with the Soviet Union:

"I stated

categorically that I did not wish to see even the slightest
implication of such a plan."

177

After other modifications

the President approved the directive for MacArthur, the
major decisions being that military operations against
North Korea were permitted and that the first ground
combat units were committed, although not for actual combat
purposes, since the Pusan area was some two hundred miles
south of the existing battle l i n e s . A

paraphrase of

■^^Truman, Memoirs, II, 3i|l» See also, Warner,
"How Korea Decision Was Made," 10£; Smith, "Why We Went
to War in Korea," 86; Paige, Korean Decision, 2lj.5; Collins,
War in Peacetime, 19-20.
•^^Truman, Memoirs, II, 3lj.l.
•^^Ibid., 3kl-k2 > See also, Acheson, Present at the
Creation, ip.1-12; Phillips, Truman Presidency, 301;
Goldman, Crucial Decade, 167; Smith, "Why We Went to War
in Korea,'' 88; Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 87; Alexander
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the original directive approved by Truman on the twentyninth reads:
. . • you will provide fullest possible support for
South Korean forces by attack on military targets so
as to permit these forces to clear South Korea of
North Korean forces.
Employment of Army forces will be limited to
essential communications and other essential service
units except that you are authorized to employ such
Army combat and service forces as to insure the
retention of a port and air base in the general area
of Pusan-Chinhae. . . .
You are authorized to extend your operations in
Northern Korea against air bases, depots, tanks, farms,
troop columns, and other purely military targets, if
and when this becomes essential for the performance
of your mission........ Special care will be taken to
insure that operations in North Korea stay well clear
of the frontiers of Manchuria or the Soviet Union.
The decision to commit United States air and naval
forces to provide cover and support for South Korean
troops does not constitute a decision to engage in
war with the Soviet Union if Soviet forces intervene
in Korea. . . . If Soviet forces actively oppose our
operations in Korea, your forces should defend them
selves but should take no action to aggravate the
situation, and you should report the situation to
Washing ton. ^79
Later in the evening of June 29, Acheson called
upon Truman to deliver to him the text of an offer just
received from President Chiang Kai-shek.

The Generalis

simo offered to provide 33,000 combat troops to South

L. George, "American Policy-Making and the North Korean
Aggression," in Guttman (ed.), Korea and the Theory of
Limited War, 73. Hereinafter cTEeT"asHIeorge” "American
Pol icy-Mak'ing."
1 7 % arshall testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 1,
536. See also, Appleman, SoutTi -bo Ehe* Nakkong, 6;
Paige, Korean Decision, 2^0-£1; Taige (ed.),' 1950: Truman1s
Decision, 150-51.
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Korea.

The offer was apparently contingent upon American

willingness to provide the transportation necessary from
Formosa.

180

In his eagerness to involve other U.N. member

nations in the Korean fighting, Truman wanted to accept
the offer immediately.

Acheson opposed this, arguing that

the Chinese were probably not properly equipped and that
they performed a much more valuable service by protecting
Formosa, which was vulnerable to attack from the Chinese
mainland.

While Truman was still disposed to accepting

the offer, he agreed to postpone a decision until a con
ference the following day with Acheson, Johnson and the

181

Joint Chiefs .

While these deliberations were going on in Washing
ton, MacArthur was completing a personal reconnaissance
of the Korean battlefield.

The General later recalled

that the battlefront scenes he witnessed convinced him
that the South Koreans had already depleted their
defensive potential.

American naval and air support was

not sufficient to reverse the tide:

"Only the immediate

lfiOpocs. No. 89, 90, Chinese Embassy to Department
of State, June 29, 30, 1950, United States Policy in the
Korean Crisis, £9-60. Documents are also publisnecT""in
Far ffast Searings, Pt. £, 3382-83.
■^^■Truman, Memoirs, II, 3ij-2j Acheson, Present at
the Creation, 1|12. See also, Paige, Korean Peels Ion ,~13j.9»
General MacArthur did not want the Formosan troops when
they were originally offered. See Bradley's testimony,
Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 6$2; Truman, Memoirs, II, 3q-8.
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commitment of ground troops could possibly do so.
answer I had come to seek was there.

The

I would throw my
*i O p

occupation soldiers into this breach."

On the flight

back to Tokyo, MacArthur drafted his report to the Penta
gon.

It called for a commitment to Korea far greater than

most of Truman's advisers had anticipated five days
earlier.
About three o'clock on Priday morning, June 30, the
Pentagon received a cable from MacArthur reporting on his
inspection trip to Korea.

The General said that the ROK

forces were disorganized and ill-equipped to repel the
North Korean invaders.

Unless some new factor was intro

duced, there was nothing to prevent the conquest of the
entire peninsula.

MacArthur felt that the only way to

stop the North Korean advance and retake the lost ground
was by employing United States ground combat forces.
cable concluded with a dire warning:

The

"Unless provision

is made for the full utilization of the Army-Navy-Air
team . . .

our mission will at best be needlessly costly

in life, money and prestige.

At worst, it might be

doomed.

^■®%IacArthur, Reminiscences, 333* See also,
Whitney, MacArthur, 329 V fount, Untold Story of Douglas
MacArthur, ij.52.
■^®^MacArthur, Reminiscences, 33^4-• The text of
MacArthur's cable is also published in Paige (ed.), 1950:
Truman's Decision, l£9-60. See also, Pehrenbach, This
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The duty officer at the Pentagon immediately in
formed General Collins, the Army Chief of Staff, of the
nature of MacArthur's message.

Collins ordered that a

telecon circuit be established with Tokyo so that he
might talk (by teletype) with MacArthur.

In the course of

their exchange, MacArthur insisted that he needed immediate
authorization for the use of combat troops if the situation
were to be saved.

Collins replied that the President had

shown considerable reluctance the previous day to using
ground forces in Korea and that he was sure that Truman
would want to consult further with his military advisers
before making such a decision.
hours.

This would take several

Collins suggested that the directive of June 29

just sent to MacArthur might be sufficient.

The General

replied that he needed new instructions at once, since he
proposed the immediate dispatch of a regimental combat
team from Japan to the Korean front.

MacArthur added

that he planned to build up to a strength of two divisions
in order to launch a counteroffensive.

18k

After repeated

Kind of War, 89J Paige, Korean Decision, 237-38; Whitney,
MacArllKur, 332-33; Phillips, Truman presidency, 303»
Higgins, Korea and the Fall of MacArthur, £6-27.
•*-®^Collins, War in Peacetime, 21-22; Appleman, South
in the Naktong, 1|7. See al so, Mchterraan, "To the Yalu and
lack, 5til; !Paige, Korean Decision,
Smith, "Why We
Went to War in Korea,,y 88. General Bradley testified in
1951i " . . . you might say we underestimated their numbers,
and their equipment and their ability to fight . . . at
least to start with." Far East Hearings, Pt. 2, 9I4-Q•
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urgings from General MacArthur, Collins said he would
try to contact the President through the Secretary of the
Army, Prank Pace.
Truman received a call from Secretary Pace shortly
before five o'clock.

Pace explained the substance of

MacArthur's messages from Tokyo, stressing that the
General was emphatic in his insistance that a combat
troop authorization was of the utmost urgency.
Secretary asked Truman for instructions:

The Army

"I told Pace

to inform General MacArthur immediately that the use of
185
one regimental combat team was approved."
Within
moments the command decision Truman had reached alone in
his bedroom at Blair House had been relayed to MacArthur.
Within two hours, the first -units of the combat regiment
began arriving by airlift at Pusan.
Colonel Henry Ahalt of the Joint Staff came to
Blair House from the Pentagon at seven o'clock to brief

Truman, Memoirs, II, 3U3i Harold Hinton, New
York Times, July 1, 19^0; Richard H. Rovere and Arthur M.
ScKIesinger, Jr., The General and the President and the
Future of American Foreign Pol’icy (New-York: Farrar,
Straus and Young, 1*951) > 10"5^ Hereinafter cited as
Rovere and Schlesinger, The General and the President.
See also, Goldman, CruciaT'Decade, 1 6 8 ^ 6 9 ; Phillips , Truman
Presidency, 30h; H x m t UnTold Story of Douglas MacArthur,
k33 1 Far East Hearings, Pi. 1, 2 3 5 - 3 Pt. 2,1122, llj.76.
^®6gmith, "Why We Went to War in Korea," 88. One
of MacArthur's biographers will later claim that Far East
Headquarters had not been consulted, " . . . when suddenly
General MacArthur received orders from Truman to inter
vene." Willoughby and Chamberlain, MacArthur, 355*
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the President fully on all of the telegraphic conversa
tions and the existing military situation in Korea.

As

soon as the briefing was completed, Truman called Secre
tary Johnson and said that he wanted a full-scale
conference with his military and diplomatic advisers (the
original Blair House conferees) in his office in two and
a half hours.

The President said his advisers should be

prepared to discuss and make recommendations on MacArthur's
request for two combat divisions and on the Nationalist
Chinese troop offer.'L®^
The June 30 conference began with Truman asking
his advisers if it would be worthwhile to accept the
33*000 troops offered by Chiang Kai-shek.

Acheson was

against the idea for the reasons expressed to Truman the
previous evening.

Additionally, he felt their use might

encourage the Red Chinese to intervene in Korea.

The

Joint Chiefs were agreed that the best of Chiang's troops
were not properly equipped or trained for modern combat
operations.

They believed that the available transport

could be better used to transfer American forces to Korea.
"I accepted," Truman wrote later, "the position taken by
practically everyone else at this meeting; namely, that

l87Truman, Memoirs, II, 3l|3«
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the Chinese offer ought to be politely declined."

188

The discussion of committing other divisions into
combat was brief.

There is no record of any adviser

present dissenting from the view that MacArthur should be
allowed to use available United States infantry forces to
stop the North Korean advance.

Truman ordered that the

limitations imposed upon American ground troop use in the
directive of the previous evening be rescinded and that
MacArthur be given full discretionary authority to use the
ground forces of his command in Korea.

The order did not

limit MacArthur to the two divisions which he had re
quested.

At Admiral Sherman's suggestion, Truman also

approved a second order to the Par East Command, estab
lishing a naval blockade of the entire coastline of North
Korea.The

meeting was over in thirty minutes.

There

seems to have been little consideration given to the
eventual cost in lives and treasure that could and did
ensue from this decision.

The employment of land armies

1flfi
Ibid. See also, Acheson, Present at the Crea
tion, 1+125 Higgins, Korea and the Fall of~lffacAr~tiaur,
2tf-£'9 J Spanier, Truman-llacArthur Controversy, 3 l . ' For
text of the State Department no te— de cl in frig "the National
ist Chinese offer, see Doc. No. 91> United States Policy
in the Korean Crisis, 60-61; Far East Hearings, P t . 5»

338T.------------- ---------------------

Iflq
Truman, Memoirs, II, 32+35 Acheson, Present at
the Creation, ip.2. See also, Collins, War in' Peace'time,
23; Paige, Korean Decision, 259-60; Fehrenbach, Thi's Kind
of W a r , 90; Appleman, South to the Naktong, i+?J Smith,
""ffihy We Went to War in™Torea"77T bb.
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on foreign soil is prone by nature to be regarded as an
irrevocable commitment.

This distinction is not accorded

to aerial and naval combat, probably because of their
remote and impersonal character.190
The President met with the congressional leadership
at eleven o'clock in order to inform them of the decisions
he had just reached.

Some thirty officials of the

Administration were joined in the Cabinet Room of the
White House by fifteen senators and representatives.191
Truman began the meeting by summarizing the actions taken
by both the United States and the United Nations during
the preceding five days.

The President then acquainted

the gathering with the latest battle reports from Korea,
which described an increasingly desperate general retreat
by the South Korean forces.

Truman then toldthe congres

sional leaders of his recent decision to send in combat
units.

There was a stunnedsilence, followed

comments indicating

by several

general approval .^92

A few of the members of Congress present registered
varying degrees of disapproval with the way Truman had

3-90por an interesting speculative analysis of the
thinking of the policy-makers at this meeting, see George,
"American Policy-Making," 71^-75191por a list of the congressmen in attendance see
Paige, Korean Decision, 262.
^•^Smith, "Why We Went to War in Korea," 88;
Acheson, Present at the Creation, I4.I3 .
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decided, but none challenged the decision itself.

Senator

Connally, not by way of censure, but "for the record,"
asked Truman if this were a unilateral action by the United
States, or in support of the U.N. resolutions.

The

President assured him that this step was taken in concert
with the United Nations.

193

Senator Kenneth Wherry

challenged the legal authority of the Commander in Chief
to make such a decision without the consent of Congress.
Truman replied that this was an emergency situation
requiring immediate action; that it was his duty to act
and he h a d . ^ ^

Senator Alexander Smith suggested that

Truman could still seek a congressional resolution
approving his decision and the President agreed to consider
such a step.

Wherry began again to question Truman's

right to act, but he was cut off by Representative Dewey
Short, the ranking Republican on the Armed Services
Committee.

Short told Truman that he was certain he

spoke for "practically everyone in Congress" in thanking
the President for the quality of his leadership in the
present crisis.

On that note, the meeting adjourned.^9^

^•^Paige, Korean Decision, 262. For the text of
Ambassador Austin's' statement to the Security Council later
the same day explaining the American action, see Doc. No.
18, United States Policy in the Korean Crisis, 2f>~27.
3-9^Smith, "Why We Went to War in Korea," 88.
19% b i d .
See also, Acheson, Present at the Creation,
i|13; Paige, Korean Decision, 262-63*
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Just as the meeting was ending, the White House released
the following presidential statement;
At a meeting with Congressional leaders at the
White House this morning, the President, together
with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State,
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reviewed with them the
latest developments of the situation in Korea. The
Congressional leaders were given a full review of
the intensified military activities.
In keeping with the United Nations Security
Council's request for support to the Republic of
Korea, the President announced that he had authorized
the United States Air Force to conduct missions on
specific military targets in Northern Korea wherever
militarily necessary, and has ordered a Naval blockade
of the entire Korean coast. General MacArthur has
been authorized to use certain supporting ground
units.196
The last sentence of the release was deliberately left
vague, for reasons of security.

However, the congressional

leaders were told very little more than that in the
meeting with regard to the number of troops that were to
be committed or how they would be employed.-^?
The decisions made on Friday morning, June 30,
were conclusive:

Truman had committed the United States

to the defense of South Korea.
explaining why:

He found no difficulty in

"We could not stand idly by and allow

196White House Press Release No. 2I45I4, June 30,
19^0, copy in Tannenwald Papers, Subject File, Chronology,
MacArthur Hearings, Truman Library. For text of this
statement see Item No. I 8I4, Public Papers . . . Truman,
1950, 513; Far East Hearings, Pt. 2, 987; Pt. 5, 3372;
Doc. No. 17, United States"Policy in the Korean Crisis,
214-25; Paige ( e d . 1950: ifruman's‘~5ecislon, 1&1-62.
197paige, Korean Decision, 263- 6I4.
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the Communist imperialists to assume that they were free
to go into Korea or elsewhere.
met--and it was m e t . " ^ 8

This challenge had to be

But the President, in meeting

this challenge, went to great lengths to point out that
the United States was merely acting as a member of the
United Nations, diligently upholding the principle of
collective security.

In truth, considerations of power

politics and the American doctrine of containment weighed
heavily in the decision to intervene.
phrased it:

"...

As Robert Osgood

our eagerness to represent American

intervention as an altruistic act of pure collective
security tended to obscure the underlying basis of
Realpolitik without which intervention, regardless of UN

199
sanction, would have been unjustified."
There is no reason to doubt that Truman's decision
to intervene in Korea was initially accorded strong public
acceptance.

As measured by public opinion pollsters,

■ ^ ® T r u m a n ,
Memoirs , II, l|i>h* General Bradley,
testifying in 1951 demonstrated complete accord with
Truman's sentiments. Asked why the United States inter
vened, he said that everyone was in agreement that this was
an act of aggression that had to be met. Far East Hearings,
Pt. 2, 890. Similar views were expressed by "former Sec
retary Johnson in his testimony.
See ibid., Pt. 1|, 2585See also, General Vandenberg's testimony, I b i d ., Pt. 2,
lij.90.

$
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Osgood, Limited War, 167 . D. F. Fleming would
agree with Osgood, addinig that the failure of the Truman
Doctrine in China endangered Truman's European policy as
well as his political base in America. Thus, he could not
afford another defeat in Asia. The Cold War, II, 602-603.

Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibitedwithout permission.

1^82
Truman's popularity was at one of its lowest points just
prior to the Korean crisis.

The Gallup Poll taken a few

days before the fighting began listed thirty-seven percent
of the public approving of his leadership.

200

The record

indicates that the President was under no significant
pressure from either domestic or foreign sources either
to intervene or stay out of the Korean conflict.

Also,

it is known that Truman deliberately excluded any consid
eration of domestic political repercussions from the
conferences held during the week in which these decisions
were made.

It is possible, that as an old political

hand, he knew intuitively that his decision would receive
strong public support.
case.

201

In any event, such was the

A Roper Poll taken in August 1950 claimed that a

total of seventy-three percent of the people agreed that

202
Truman was right in sending the troops into Korea.
Journalist Arthur Krock wrote prophetically on July 1,
1950, that eventually the American people would, " . . .
call for a reckoning by the transfer of office and power.
But few among these are disturbing the indispensable unity

20®Cited in Paige, Korean Decision, l\$,
201Ibid., 289, 30I/.-305, 310-11.
20 ?
Fifteen percent disagreed and twelve percent had
no opinion. Roper, You and Your Leaders, 1
In 1952 *
Truman told a reporter that the- decision to intervene was
backed by "almost" ninety percent of the American people.
Edward T. Folliard, Washington Post, December 27 > 1952.
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of the moment, or contending that in the circumstances
the President could have done otherwise."2^
This military intervention in Korea, that Truman
later called his "toughest" decision,20^- was made without
calling on the National Security Council, which his uni
fication reforms had established as the primary advisory
body on major military and foreign policy decisions.20^
The NSC did not have contingency plans available, because
the Korean peninsula had not been included in long-range
strategic planning.

20 6

The deliberative process of the

NSC, in which policy recommendations evolve gradually
from a series of position papers drafted by several
agencies which must be coordinated at several administra
tive levels, was too time-consuming to be utilized in a
crisis requiring immediate decisions.

However, even while

Truman bypassed his Security Council for the sake of
expediency, almost all of the members of that body were
present at the five informal meetings from which these

203Krock, "Korea: Truman’s Leadership," New York
Times, July 1, 19^0, reprinted in Krock, In the N ation,

TSIjT
20^Ernest B. Vaccaro, New York Herald-Tribune,
December 27, 19f?2. See also, Warren, Pre'si'dent as World
Leader, 335>»
2^Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," 5>79.
20^Higgins, Korea and the Pall of MacArthur, 22.

Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibitedwithout permission.

major military policy decisions emerged.

The President

preferred to work through the conventional staff and
command structure created by his administration, but he
was flexible and confident enough to find ad hoc
solutions in an emergency

c o n d i t i o n .

The President’s decision to forego asking Congress
for an authorization to intervene in Korea has far more
profound implications than his decision to ignore the
formal machinery of the National Security Council.

Truman

bypassed Congress on the advice of Secretary Acheson:
"I . . . recommended that the President should not ask
for a resolution of approval, but rest on his constitu
tional authority as Commander in Chief of the armed

2oQ
forces."

As with the decision not to involve the NSC,

the President may have been motivated by pressing consid
erations of t i m e . C e r t a i n l y historical precedent
supports the commander in chief’s prerogative of

^0?Hoare, "Truman," 190-91; Lichterman, "To the
Yalu and Back," 579.
208Acheson, Present at the Creation, /j.13-15* See
also, Paige, Korean Decision, 2897
209
Senator Tom Connally had told Truman on June 26
that a request to Congress for authorization would be illadvised because of the possibility of extended debate.
See Paige, Korean Decision, 305-306.
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w
committing troops without prior approval of Congress.

210

However, it is difficult to comprehend why Truman did not
ask Congress to sanction his decisions after they were
made.

In the first weeks of the war, with the nation

responding with generous ardor, aflush with crusading
zeal at yet another opporunity to safeguard democracy,
the consent of Congress was an absolute certainty.

211

Since Truman chose to act alone, he also stood alone as
the martial spirit faded from the nation when confronted
by the bitter reality of defeat in the hills of Korea.

210

See Chapter One, passim. Merlo Pusey has written
that Truman's failure to obtain congressional approval for
the Korean intervention violated the United Nations Partici
pation Act and stands as a precedent which imperils
democracy and impedes establishment of a sound system of
collective security. See Merlo J. Pusey, The Way We Go To
War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), 79-9£, passim. Here
inafter cited as Pusey, Way We Go To War. Raymond"’G.
O'Connor considered Truman* s reTusaT to secure a declara
tion of war from Congress to be, "among the innovations"
made by the President during the Korean War. See "Harry
S. Truman: New Dimensions of Power," 73*
^■^Senator Richard B. Russell said (in 1962) that
if the Administration had requested congressional approval
after the first troops went in, ". . . it would have been
granted unanimously." Quoted in Pusey, Way We. Go To War,

111

.
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CHAPTER VIII
THE PRESIDENT AND THE WAR
I pinned a medal on General MacArthur the other
day, and told him I wished I had a medal like that,
and he said that it was my duty to give the medals,
not to receive them.
That is always the way.
About
all I receive are the bricks.

Once the decision was made to intervene in Korea,
Truman established a procedural system wherein he kept
a close supervisory control over the conduct of the war.
Each morning at about ten o'clock, General Bradley or an
officer from the Joint Staff would call on the President
and provide him with a full briefing on the battle reports
2
received from Korea in the preceding twenty-four hours.
As Commander in Chief, Truman insisted that all directives
concerning the Korean War, except those involving the
most routine of matters, had to be presented to him for
approval prior to their being transmitted to the Par

Item No. 272, Remarks to Members of the National
Guard Association, October 25, 1950, Public Papers . . .
Truman, 1950* 688.
2Truman, Memoirs, II, 3l|i(.. See also, Lichterman,
"To the Yalu and Back," 583i O'Connor, "Harry S. Truman:
New Dimensions of J?ower," 69. When military activity had
scaled down considerably, these briefings were cut to
three per week. Hoare, "Truman," 19i|..

ij.86
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East Command.

3

The day-to-day strategic direction of the war was
handled by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Since the war was

limited in scope and area, the JCS were able to function
calmly and efficiently.

Military problems were referred

to the JCS from the Far East Command, the United Nations
Command, the National Security Council, the three service
Secretaries and the State Department.

These problems were

then channeled to the Joint Staff for deliberation and the
drafting of a paper.
paper's proposals.

The JCS would then consider the
If their decision necessitated a

directive to the Commander in Chief, "Par East (CINCFE), it
was transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for approval.
Then the directive was sent through the National Security
Council to the President.

If Truman assented, the order

was then forwarded to the theater commander by the Joint
Chiefs.

While very few commands to the military bore

Truman's name, they all were cleared through him.^

For

the remainder of his Presidency, Truman never slackened
this close control.

He considered it part of his function

as Commander in Chief to make all final decisions and

% o a r e , "Truman," 19^4-J Hermes, Truce Tent and
Fighting Front, £3 .
^Hoare, "Truman," 193~9ij-» See also, Lichterman,
"To the Yalu and Back," £82-83; Hermes, Truce Tent and
Fiediting Front, £ 3 , ££-£ 6 .
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approve all strategic plans dealing with the fighting in
Korea.

Truman's military chiefs and his civilian admin

istrators in the Pentagon clearly assumed a subordinate
role under the President's style of leadership.

As Wilber

Hoare wrote in his essay on Truman as Commander in Chief:
"The actions of the Secretary of Defense and of the JCS
all fell into one of two categories— advice to the
commander in chief or implementation of his directives."^
The system worked because the civilian advisers and the
military chiefs worked well together, free from most of
the interservice bickering that had fragmented efforts at
unified command in the past.0
Prom the very beginning of the war, Truman gave
increased prestige and importance to the deliberations and
recommendations of the National Security Council.

The

President ordered the NSC to meet weekly and he regularly
sat in on these sessions, a practice he had deliberately

^Hoare, "Truman," 199.
Ibid., 195-96. During most of the Korean War the
following men constituted the civilian-military hierarchy
of the Pentagon: George C. Marshall, Secretary of Defense;
Prank Pace, Jr., Secretary of the Army; Francis P.
Matthews, Secretary of the Navy; Thomas K. Finletter,
Secretary of the Air Force; General Omar N. Bradley,
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; General J. Lawton Collins,
Army Chief of Staff; General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Air Force
Chief of Staff; Admiral William M. Fechteler, who replaced
Admiral Forrest P. Sherman who had died of a heart attack
on July 22, 1951* Chief of Naval Operations.
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7
avoided in the past.

On July 6, the first time the NSC

met following the decision to send in land armies, Truman
gave instructions to all present that he did not want
unilateral proposals regarding Korea sent to him directly.

He said that recommendations requiring presidential action
must be transmitted to him through the machinery of the
Q
National Security Council.
Except in extraordinary cir
cumstances, policy would be formulated and decisions made
through this highly-institutionalized civil-military staff
structure.*^

The UN Security Council, recognizing the need for a
unified command in Korea, as well as the predominant role
played by the United States, passed a resolution on July 7*
1950.

The resolution asked all members providing military

assistance for Korea to integrate their forces into a
single command directed by the United States.^

In a

7Truman, Memoirs, II, 3i&.
Q
George M. Elsey to Charles S. Murphy, July 7* 1950,
Truman Papers, OF, ltfl-B - Korean Emergency, Truman Library.
^For a detailed description of the operation of the
chain of command under Truman, see Lichterman, "To the
Yalu and Back," 582-83.
■^For text of the Security Council resolution, see
Doc. No. 90, United States Foreign Policy in the Korean
Crisis, 66-6fl See also, Far Sast Hearings, T F T 5 * 3 3 7 2 .
The Soviet Union rejected "the July 7 resolution as an illegal
use of the United Nations to mask American aggression
against the people of Korea. Doc. No. 101, Cable, Andrei
A. Gromyko to Trygve Lie, July 11, 1950, United States
Policy in the Korean Crisis, 67-68.
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presidential statement released the following day, Truman
designated General MacArthur as commanding general of the
13
United Nations Command.
All other nations participating
in assistance to Korea would amalgamate their forces under
him.

The process was completed on July 15 when MacArthur

received a message from Korean President Rhee which
granted the General full command authority over all land,
sea and air forces of the Republic of Korea.

12

General MacArthur, who was now seventy years old,
shouldered an enormous burden.

He was Supreme Commander

for the Allied Powers in Japan (SCAP), the single executive
authority for the administration of the Japanese nation.
He was Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE), the overall
authority for all American military forces in the Far
East.

The General was also military governor of the

Ryukyus Islands and was in technical control of all U.S.
ground forces operating in the Far Eastern theatre.

And

now, as noted above, he was also Commander in Chief,
United Nations Command (CINCUNC), exercising command

■^White House Press Release, July 8 , 1950, copy in
Tannenwald Papers, Subject File, Chronology, MacArthur
Hearings, Truman Library. Truman's statement is printed
as Item No. 189, Public Papers . • . Truman, 1950, 520;
Doc. No. 100, United STa'bes Folicv in the Korean Crisis,
100; Far East Hearings, Pt. 5, 33 f2*^73. See also, Truman,
Memoirs, II, 34?J MacArthur, Reminiscences, 337.
to MacArthur, July 15, 1950, quoted in United
States Policy in the Korean Conflict, 10-11.
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responsibilities over the military forces of all nations
operating in and around K o r e a M a c A r t h u r had uncomplain
ingly accepted this additional command although the sum of
his existing responsibilities would have easily broken a
far-younger, less-gifted man.

When notified of his

appointment to the United Nations Command he wrote to
Truman:

"I can only repeat the pledge of my complete

personal loyalty to you as well as an absolute devotion
to your monumental struggle for peace and good will
throughout the world.

I hope I will not fail y o u . " ^ -

The placing of all forces in Korea under a United
Nations banner did not, in fact, substantially change
anything.

While Truman had to practice some restraint in

order to maintain United Nations support of the Korean
operations, the links in the chain of command remained
the same.

MacArthur still reported to the Army Chief of

Staff (Collins) and through him to the JCS, Secretary of
Defense, NSC and the Commander in Chief, who was not
obliged to clear anything with the United N a t i ons.^

•^MacArthur defined his commands during testimony
in 19^1• See Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 36- 37 . See also,
American Military History, £50, Hunt, Untold Story of
Douglas MacArthur,~lt56; Appleman, South to the Naktong, 112.
^-Quoted in Whitney, MacArthur, 338*
■^Hoare, "Truman," 19ij.-95» See also, Hermes, Truce
Tent and Fighting Front, $3 ; O ’Connor, "Harry S. Truman:
New Dimensions of Power," 68-69* Spanier, Truman-MacArthur
Controversy, 65*
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support forces.

18

He reported that he found the enemy to

be "both skillful and r e s o u r c e f u l . I n t e l l i g e n c e esti
mates at the time held that the North Korean Invading
force numbered about ninety thousand.

MacArthur had ten

thousand Americans and twenty-five thousand ROK forces

20
with which to meet the enemy.
Reports coming in from the Par East Command during

the second week of July continued to emphasize the need
for more troops and the gross underestimation of the
training and equipment of the North Korean People’s Army.

On the ninth, MacArthur informed the JCS that his tactical
situation continued to worsen.

He asked that four more

divisions, with all components, be sent to him, over and
above those already requisitioned.
MacArthur concluded,

operation."

21

"The situation,"

"has developed into a major

On the sixteenth, General Collins, Army

Chief of Staff, sent his own estimate of the tactical

10

Appleman, South to the Naktong. 118. See also,
Ridgway, Korean War,' 3$i WacArthur, Reminscences, 337 •
^•^MacArthur to Department of the Army, July 7> 19£0,
quoted in Appleman, South to the Naktong, 118.
20

Truman, Memoirs. II, 3
For MacArthur's esti
mate of the training and quality of the South Korean and
American forces at his command at the outset of the war,
see his testimony, Far East Hearings. Pt. 1,
236-37.
^MacArthur to JCS, July 9* 19f>0, quoted in
Appleman, South to the Naktong, 119.
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MacArthur himself later testified:

"Senator (Russell),

my connection with thp United Nations was largely
nominal.

. • • everything I did came from our own Chiefs

of Staff. . . .

I had no direct connection with the United

Nations whatsoever.

16

Had the Administration been

obliged to act through the UN Security Council, little
would have been accomplished.

On August 1 the Soviet

Union ended a seven-month boycott of the sessions.
Shortly thereafter the Soviet representative became
president of the Council.

17

By early July 195?0 American ground troops were
actively engaged in combat against the North Korean
People’s Army (NKPA).

MacArthur became immediately aware

that his first estimate of two divisions would be insuf
ficient to repulse the aggressors.

The General sent

several requests to Washington for various infantry, air
borne and Marine units, as well as three medium tank
batallions and seven hundred more combat aircraft.
Finally, on July 7> MacArthur told the Joint Chiefs that
turning back the North Koreans would require four and a
half full-strength infantry divisions and numerous other

•^ F a r East Hearings, Ft. 1, 10.
3-7Ma.1or Problems of United States Foreign Policy,

6.
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position of the United Nations Command to Truman.

Collins

praised MacArthur1s "magnificent leadership" and the
effectiveness with which the General had committed and
employed his forces.

However, Collins added, the North

Koreans are ", • . well-equipped, well-led, and battletrained and • . . have at times out-numbered our troops
PP
by as much as twenty to one."
While MacArthur was still certain that he had to
have more troops at once, he was much more optimistic in
a personal communication to Truman on July 19.

He told

the President that with the full deployment of the 8th
Army having by then been accomplished, the possibility of
a North Korean victory had ended.

MacArthur said his

hold upon southern Korea was not a "secure base" and that
he anticipated being able to establish a final stabiliza
tion line.

The General said that the NKPA had enjoyed the

advantages of surprise, over-whelming force, speed and
superior weapons.

But the extraordinary speed with which

Eighth Army had been deployed robbed the enemy of these
advantages:

"His supply line is insecure.

great chance but failed to exploit it.

He has had his

We are now in

22Collins to the Commander in Chief, July 16,
1950, Truman Papers, OF, ij.71-B - Korean Emergency,
Truman Library.
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Korea in force, and . . .

we are there to stay. • • „"

U95
23

MacArthur recalls being amazed when his initial request
for more troops was denied by Washington.

He was told

that his request was disapproved because no increase in
troop strength had been authorized, shipping was in short
supply and there was a need to maintain the American
military posture in other areas of the world.

MacArthur

dismissed this as faulty reasoning which placed the Far
East on the bottom of the priority list.
it should have been obvious,

The General felt

"even to the non- military

mind" that Soviet military deployment in Eastern Europe
was defensive, not o f f e n s i v e . ^

By way of rebuttal,

Truman wrote in his memoirs that area commanders always
lack a global perspective and believe that their command
should receive top priority.

The President said this was

understandable to him because during World Wa r I he had
considered his artillery battery to be the center of the

^MacArthur to Truman, July 19 , 1950, Lloyd Files,
Message to Congress and Speech re Korea, July 19, 1950,
Truman Library.
See also, "General MacArthur’s Estimate
of the Military Situation, July 11, 1950," Far East Hear
ings, Pt. 5, 3381-82; Item No. 19ij-, Radio AddresiT’Eo the
American People on the Situation in Korea, July 19, 1950,
Public Papers • . . Truman, 1950, footnote, 5^-2.
^MacAr t h u r , Reminiscences, 337* MacArthur’s state
ment can be contrasted with his testimony in 1951 when he
said that the responsibility for global strategy rested
with the JCS and other agencies in Washington and that he
was not familiar with their studies. Far East Hearings,
Pt. 1, 76 .
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entire war effort and had continually fought for more con
sideration for his u n i t . ^
The Administration had not completely disapproved
MacArthur*s recommendation, as he implied.

Decision was

postponed on any major commitment of American forces in
Korea over and above the units performing occupational
duties in the Par East.

Truman was reluctant to engage

a large body of troops without positive confirmation that
the Soviet Union would not take action elsewhere in the
world.

To this end, he had asked the State and Defense

Departments to consider the probable course of Soviet con
duct and report to him at a Cabinet meeting on July 1J+,
19f?0.

The report concluded that the Soviet Union possessed

the military capability, either alone or in concert with
satellite nations, of beginning a general war or applying
pressure at numerous locations along common borders.
Acheson told the President that Defense and State could
not agree on which area the Soviets might select to apply
military pressure.

However, he told Truman that the two

agencies were in complete agreement that there existed,
. • the extreme danger of some such action flowing from
either Soviet desire or the momentum of events."^

Truman

was also informed that should such military action occur,

25Truman, Memoirs, II,
^ A c h e s o n ,

Present at the Creation, lj.20-21.
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the United States did not possess military power sufficient
27
enough to make an adequate response.
The report of the Secretaries of State and Defense
recommended that Truman take several steps that represent
the first efforts to implement NSC-68, the major policyplanning paper drafted just prior to the outbreak of the
pO
Korean conflict.
The President was urged to request an
increase in the authorized manpower levels of the armed
forces from Congress, as well as substantial appropriations
for an increase in the production of military goods and the
power to allocate supplies of certain critical raw
materials.

Truman approved these proposals and five days

later (July 19 ), sent a special message to Congress re29
questing everything the report had called for.
The President's message of July 19 traced the course
of recent events in Korea and elsewhere in the world, in
sisting that circumstances dictated that the United States
increase its total military strength, not just to meet the
needs in Korea, but to prepare the common defense of all
free nations to resist further anticipated aggression.
The requested increments fell into three categories:

(1)

more men, supplies and equipment were required to meet the

27 l b i d ., ij.21.

28Hammond, "NSC-68," 3^1.
2^Acheson, Present at the Creation, ij.21.
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situation in Korea; (2) over and above the needs for
defending Korea, the force levels of the armed services
as well as the supporting materiel must be substantially
increased; (3) American military support of other nations
must be augmented by increased appropriations.

The Presi

dent also told the Congress he had instructed the Secre
tary of Defense to exceed budgeted levels for military
personnel in the Army, Navy and Air Force.

The Selective

Service System had been ordered to increase the draft in
order to fill the allocated spaces.

Truman's message also

revealed that he had directed the Secretary of Defense to
activate as many National Guard units and Array, Navy and
30
Air Force Reserve components as might be required.
The
day after his message was sent to Congress, Truman received
a note from John Foster Dulles of

the State

Dulles told thePresident that talks he had

with

Department.
the

Republican leadership on the message indicated he would
31
receive strong bipartisan support.
Responding on July
21, Truman thanked Dulles and added:

"I see no other way

to meet the present world situation than the manner in

3®Item No. 193, Special Message to the Congress
Reporting on the Situation in Korea, July 19# 1950,
Publi c Papers •
. . Truman, 1950,532.
■^Dulles
to the President, July 20, 1950, Truman
Papers, OF, ij-71-B - Korean Emergency (June-July, 1950),
Truman Library.
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which we are meeting it."

32

Truman found the Congress most cooperative in pro
viding the manpower levels and additional appropriations
which he requested in this and other messages during the
next few months.

Before requesting additional force levels

from Congress, he had already authorized the Army to
increase its manpower by 110,000 "spaces" above the total
strength of 592,000 at the beginning of

J

u

l

y

.

on the

day Truman's message went up to Congress (July 19) a bill
was introduced which would remove all statutory limita
tions on personnel ceilings for the services for the next
four years.

The bill was approved on August 8, 1950.3^-

In

the next few months a bewildering series of measures flowed
swiftly through the Congress moving the country, as
Acheson put it, ". . • in a somewhat disorderly way into
a more formidable military posture."

35

this partial mobilization was amazing.

The rapidity of
For example,

within eleven months the size of the Army had almost
tripled.3^

The assumptions which guided Truman and his

3^Truman to Dulles, July 21, 1950# ibid.
3^Collins testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 2, 1309«
See also, Hammond, "NSC- 60 ,
3**Hammond, "NSC- 68 ," 351.
3^Acheson, Present at the Creation, ij.21.
3^Collins testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 2,

1309.
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planners in this urgent rearmament effort were taken
largely from NSC-68 . ^
To the small American force first committed to
battle in early July by MacArthur’s self-styled "arrogant
display of strength,"
ment came too late.

the additional troops and equip
They were committed to fighting a

superior force with outdated equipment.

In a letter to

Eleanor Roosevelt, Truman denied that the forces were illequipped for combat, an accusation made in a story in the
New York Herald Tribune on August 8, 1950•

The President

told Mrs. Roosevelt that he had checked with "no less an
authority than General Bradley himself," and the General
had assured him that the story was untrue.

Apparently the

story had been leaked to the press by someone high in the
Administration, for Truman wrote:

"Nevertheless, I

fervently wish that some of my top men would learn the old,

37jp0r an excellent description of the relationship
of NSC-68 to rearmament, see Hammond, "NSC-68," 35l-55>
358-59. The myriad of changes in troop levels and supple
mental budgetary increments brought on by Korea are detailed
in Schilling, "Politics of National Defense," 211-13. See
also, Bernardo and Bacon, American Military Policy, 485-86;
Ache son, Present at the Creation*, U21; Fehrenbach, This
Kind of W a r , 163-T>E;L ^Louis Johnson!s Testimony Before
Armed~!Tervlces Subcommittee on Appropriations, House of
Representatives, July 25, 1950," printed in Far East Hear
ings, Pt. 5> Appendix AA, 3250-55*
MacArthur, Reminiscences, 338.
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old lesson about the golden quality of silence."

The

official A m y history of the Korean War does not support
Truman and Bradley's contention that these forces were
properly equipped.

One of the major problems noted in

the account of early fighting, for example, was the lack
of any ordnance capable of stopping the powerful Russianbuilt T-3lj. tank with which the North Koreans were
equipped.

There were no anti-tank mines immediately

available, and the standard 2.36-inch bazooka rockets and
75-mti recoiless rifles were ineffective against these
tanks.

Task Force Smith of the 21st Infantry Division,

the first sizable unit to see combat in Korea, reported
that even at close range their standard high-explosive
rounds for the 105-ram howitzer bounced harmlessly off the
T-3lj.'s.

Almost all of the equipment was of World War II

vintage, much of it was obsolete and worn and not combat
serviceable.

"Equally bad," was the term used by the

official A m y historian to describe the physical condition
of military vehicles and combat weaponry employed in the
first months of the fighting in Korea.^0
The ground combat forces initially committed in

■^Truman to Eleanor Roosevelt, August 22, 1950,
Truman Papers, OF, i|71-B - Korean Emergency, Truman Library.
^Appleman, South to the Naktong, 68-72, 113-llj..
See also, Millis, Arms and~~Men, 29ij.-95*
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Korea fought gallantly and suffered great losses.^Essentially, they were involved in a delaying action,
trading space for time.

MacArthur felt they did admirably,

causing the enemy to delay and re-deploy in a conventional
line of battle, rather than pressing through with their
unstoppable tank columns.

"This,” MacArthur later wrote

of his North Korean counterpart, "was his fatal error.
This miscalculation of American strength gave MacArthur
time to place enough force in Korea to establish a secure
foothold on the southeastern tip of the peninsula.

By

early August the Korean and American defenders were crowded
into the "Pusan Perimeter," an area roughly the size of
the state of Connecticut.^

The perimeter was staunchly

maintained by Lt. General Walton H. Walker, Commander of
the Eighth Army, to whom MacArthur had delegated field
command over all ground forces in K o r e a . ^

The important

thing about the perimeter was that it fixed the enemy in a
relatively static position on the end of a very long,

^•As of September 30, 1950, the U.S. Army had
103,601 personnel committed in Korea. They had sustained
2i|.,172 casualties by September 30, with 5*l4£ of that total
having been killed in action. See Appleman, South to the
Naktong, 605-606.
^MacArthur, Reminiscences, 336.
^ B e r n a r d o and Bacon, American Military Policy,

^■Truman, Memoirs, II, 3ij-7*
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vulnerable line of supply.
MacArthur had always intended, once he was able to
halt the North Korean advance, to strike deep behind the
enemy, cutting supply and communication lines and blocking
the escape routes.

This would place the main body in an

untenable position, between the "hammer" and the "anvil"
of military jargon.

Early in July MacArthur had informed

Washington that this was his intention:

"Once he (NKPA) is

fixed, it will be my purpose fully to exploit our air and
3ea control, and, by amphibious maneuver, strike him
behind his mass of ground f o r c e . G i v e n MacArthur's
extraordinary success in World War II with amphibious
sweeps striking at his opponent's rear, it was natural for
him to devise such a tactical maneuver for relieving the
pressure on the Pusan Perimeter
It was MacArthurfs genius as a tactician to choose
the one site the enemy would consider least likely as an
invasion target and the one locale that would bring the
quickest military rewards if successful.

The General's

problem was that he alone, among the military hierarchy,
believed that such an assault could succeed.

Eor

MacArthur selected the port city of Inchon (Inch'on) on

^ C I N C F E to Department of the Army, July 7> 1950,
quoted in Appleman, South to the Naktong, 118. See also,
Truman, Memoirs, II,
-7.
^ A p p l e m a n , South to the Naktong, lf.88 •
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the western coast of Korea.

The second largest port in

South Korea, Inchon is located on the Yellow Sea, some
twenty-five miles west of the capital city of Seoul,
which is a point of convergence for the highways and rail
| M

lines of Korea.

However desirable a target the Inchon-

Seoul area represented, the physical geography of the
area created seemingly insurmountable obstacles to a
massive amphibious assault.

As one of MacArthur's

planning staff for Inchon remarked:

"We drew up a list of

every conceivable and natural handicap and Inchon had them
all."^

MacArthur was firmly convinced that Inchon must

be the attack site.

On July 23 he wired the Pentagon for

clearance of the operation, telling his superiors that the
alternative would be an expensive, protracted breakthrough
from the Pusan Perimeter.
for a response.

The General waited three weeks

When it came, it was a wire informing him

that Army Chief of Staff Collins and Chief of Naval Opera
tions Sherman were flying to Tokyo to discuss the proposed
operation with him.

MacArthur believed Collins and Sherman

were sent to dissuade him, not to discuss his plans.
Behind Washington's opposition to the Inchon invasion,

^Amer i c a n Military History, 553; MacArthur,
Reminiscences',' 3h6.
^ Q u o t e d in Higgins, Korea and the Pall of Mac
Arthur, I+I4.• See also, Willoughby and Chamber 1 aTn,
MacArthur •
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according to MacArthur, wore General Bradley and Presi
dent Truman; the former believing that amphibious
operations were obsolete, the latter opposing any use
of the Marines except as a police f o r c e . ^
MacArthur and his staff met with Collins and
Sherman on August 23, to discuss the Inchon invasion.

A

naval briefing team began the meeting by explaining that
many hazards were present at Inchon.

Most notably, one

of the greatest tides in the world, that on the antici
pated invasion date (September 15) would fall about
thirty feet at full ebb, leaving mud flats extending
from the shore as much as two miles.

This meant that

landing craft would have about two hours in the morning
and two and a half hours in the evening to land troops,
neutralize defenses, secure a beachhead and prepare for
counterattack.

The rest of the time the landing craft

would be stuck helplessly in mud awaiting the next full
tide.-’®

The Marine invaders would face sixteen-foot

high seawalls in an attack on a highly-built up area
offering extensive cover to the defensive forces.

Admiral

James T. Doyle, the Amphibious Group Commander, summarized

^MacArthur, Reminiscences, 3JU-6—JU-7•
Truman, Memoirs. II, 3lj-7-lfH.

See also,

-^MacArthur, Reminiscences. 3^4-Q• See also,
A m erican M i l i t a r y H i s t o r y , 553; A pplem an, South t o th e
H a k to n g , I}.93.
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the Navy's position by saying that while the operation
Cl
was not impossible> he would recommend against it.
General Collins suggested that the amphibious assault take
place further down the coastline at the port of Kunsan,
the object being a flanking envelopment linking with
General Walker's force in the Pusan Perimeter.
Sherman indicated he favored Collins' proposal.

Admiral

£2

MacArthur took the floor and in a veiy eloquent
forty-five minute discourse, made believers of almost all
of the skeptics present.

He argued that Collins' plan

would be a wasteful "short envelopment" that would serve
no real purpose.

The value of striking at Seoul was

simply that it was the key to the extended enemy supply
line.

He recognized all of the Navy's objections as real

but not insuperable obstacles.

MacArthur said his ex

perience with the Navy in the last war made him confident
they could accomplish their part of the task.

To those

who doubted, he cited the example of James Wolfe at
Quebec in 1759# who won a pivotal battle of the French and
Indian War by attacking the Marquis de Montcalm at the one
point where the French deemed an attack to be impossible.
In closing, MacArthur said that he would be at Inchon and

^Fehrenbach, This Kind of W a r , 21+0.
^Collins, War in Peacetime, 123, 125* See also,
MacArthur, Heminiscences, 3ll#-49; Higgins, Korea and the
Fall Of MacArthur, Uli-liS,
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if the defenses were too strong, he would order with
drawal:

"The only loss then will be my professional repu

tation.

But Inchon will not fail.

Inchon will succeed.

And it will save 100,000 lives.
Sherman and Collins returned to Washington follow
ing their meeting with MacArthur to discuss Inchon with
the other members of the Joint Chiefs.

The plans were sub

sequently brought to Truman with the JCS recommendation
that they be approved.
writing:

The President agreed, later

"It was a daring strategic conception.

I had

the greatest confidence that it would succeed."^
Truman’s enthusiasm after the fact is quite strong, but
the JCS directive he approved for transmission to Mac
Arthur carried qualifications.

It read, in part:

We concur in making preparations for and executing a
turning movement to amphibious forces on the west
coast of Korea, either at Inch'on in the event the
enemy defenses in the vicinity of Inch'on prove
ineffective, or at a favorable beach south of Inch'on
if one can be located. We further concur in

^MacArthur, Reminiscences, 3ij.9-50; Collins, War in
Peacetime, 125-26. See also, Appleman, South to the
Nakt o n g T h93-9li; Willoughby and Chamberlain, MacArthur,
370-72J Ridgway, Korean War, 33; Higgins, Korea and the
Fall of MacArthur, li5.'
^Truman, Memoirs, II, 358* Apparently Secretary
Johnson was the only Washington official to back the
Inchon plan from the outset. See his testimony, Far East
Hearings, Pt. ij., 2618, 2661.
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preparations, if desired by CINCFE, for an
envelopment by amphibious forces in the vicinity
of Kunsan.55
Since the invasion of Inchon had not been ruled
out, MacArthur concentrated on it with single-minded
purpose.

The target date was set at September 15*

On the

fifth he received a message from the Joint Chiefs asking
for details on pending operational plans.
replied that his plans remained unchanged.

The General
The JCS

cabled the Far East Commander again on the seventh.

They

expressed concern over the Inchon attack in light of a
recent massive offensive against General Walker’s Eighth
Army around Pusan.

The Joint Chiefs reminded MacArthur

that he would be committing practically all of his avail
able reserves and that the only substantial reinforcements
available— recently federalized National Guard divisions—
would not be ready for an additional four months.
basis they asked MacArthur to reconsider his plans.

On this
56

MacArthur’s reply to the JCS was that he contemplated no
change in his plans and that he believed that the Inchon
operation presented the only genuine opportunity to take

^\JGS to CINCFE, August 28, 1950, quoted in Apple
man, South to the Naktong, lf.9lf-* See also, MacArthur,
Reminiscences, 351; dollins, War in Peacetime, 127•
JCS to CINCFE, September 7, 1950, printed in Far
East Hearings, Pt. k, 2661-62. See also, Appleman, Soirbb
to theTNak'fcong, lj.9lf.-95*
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the initiative away and strike a decisive blow.

57

Mac

Arthur recalled, while waiting anxiously for a reply,
that he asked himself if, 11. • . even now . . .

timidity

in an office thousands of miles away, even if by a Presi
dent himself, could stop this golden opportunity to turn
.,58
defeat into victory?"
A message from the Joint Chiefs
soon arrived to reassure the General:

"We approve your

plan and President has been so informed."

59

It is a tribute to the military brilliance of
Douglas MacArthur that the Inchon landing went off on
September 15 exactly as planned.

The Tenth Corps,

especially created for this attack, captured Inchon
against unexpectedly light resistance.^®

The American force

^MacArthur to JCS, September 8 , 1950, quoted in
Appleman, South to the Naktong, lj.95* MacArthur also
printed his reply in liis Reminiscences. 352. See also,
Par East Hearings, Pt. It, 2&62; Higgins, Korea and the Pall
------------------o T ~MacAr thur~,HiT."
£® M acA rth u r, R e m in is c e n c e s , 3 5 2 .

^ J C S to CINCFE, September 8 , 1950, quoted in
Appleman, South to the Naktong, lj.95*
60A m erican M i l i t a r y H i s t o r y , 555* The N o r th Koreans
p r o b a b ly knew t h a t an am phibious a s s a u lt was im m in e n t, b u t
w ere u n c e r t a in o f th e s i t e .
Appleman, South t o th e N aktong
( p . lj.87) says i t was g e n e r a lly known among UN fo r c e s t h a t
such a la n d in g was p la n n e d f o r m id -S e p te m b e r. Dean Acheson
c la im s t h a t th e In c h o n a t t a c k was n ickn am ed , " O p e ra tio n
Common K now ledge" i n Japan. He a ls o says t h a t Communist
s p ie s le a r n e d o f th e in v a s io n p la n s th ro u g h a s e c u r it y
l e a k , b u t w ere u n a b le t o c o n ta c t t h e i r N o rth K o rean c o u n te r
p a rts .
P re s e n t a t th e C r e a t io n , Jjij.8 .
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pushed inland against stiffer opposition with one a m
heading south to seize Suwon and the other moving relent
lessly toward Seoul, which was recaptured on the twentyeighth,

On September 16 General Walker had begun to

push out of the Pusan Perimeter,

Hie Eighth Army gained

slowly at first, but the NKPA, cut off from supplies and
reinforcements and aware of the impending envelopment,
broke into disorderly retreat on September 23.

Three days

later, elements of the Tenth Corps and Eighth A m y linked
up.

Allied troops continued to roll back th6 North

Korean Army with little difficulty once the rout began.
A t th e end o f Septem ber o r g a n iz e d r e s is t a n c e had ceased
s o u th o f th e t h i r t y - e i g h t h p a r a l l e l . ^
The J o in t C h ie fs o f S t a f f , who h a d doubted th e
wisdom o f In c h o n fro m th e v e ry b e g in n in g , w i l l i n g l y
acknow ledged M a c A rth u r's triu m p h :

”. . .

you have

exploited to the utmost all capabilities and opportunities.
Your transition from defensive to offensive operations was
magnificently planned, timed and executed."

62

Similar

^American Military History, 555* Out of a force
of some 100,066, approximately 50,000 ©scaped into North
Korea, disorganized and without their support equipment.
See L ic h t e m a n , "To th e Y a lu and B a c k ," 56^5 S p a n ie r ,
Trum an-M acA rthu r C o n tro v e rs y , 81; R overe and S o h le s in g e r ,
The G e n e ra l and""the P r e s id e n t , 1 3 3 - 3 k * F o r a f u l l acco u n t
o f th e f i g h t i n g f o r In c h o n and up fro m th e Pusan p e r im e t e r ,
see Applem an, S outh t o th e N a k to n g , 488- 606.
^ Q u o t e d in MacArthur, Reminiscences, 356.
also, Collins, War in Peacetime, litl.

See
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w arn messages o f c o n g r a tu la tio n s on th e In c h o n v i c t o r y
w ere r e c e iv e d by M a c A rth u r fro m th e S e c r e ta r y o f D e fe n s e ,
S e c r e ta r y o f th e Army, G e n e r a l E is e n h o w e r, W in s to n
C h u r c h i l l , A d m ira l H a ls e y and numerous o t h e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l
fig u r e s .

Truman s e n t a message o f c o n g r a tu la tio n s

p r a i s i n g M a c A rth u r's h i s t o r i c

triu m p h :

I know t h a t I speak f o r th e e n t i r e A m erican
p e o p le when I send you my w arm est c o n g r a tu la tio n s on
th e v i c t o r y w h ic h has been a c h ie v e d under y o u r
le a d e r s h ip i n K o re a . Few o p e ra tio n s i n m i l i t a r y
h i s t o r y can m atch e i t h e r th e d e la y in g a c t io n where
you tr a d e d space f o r tim e i n w hich to b u i l d up y o u r
f o r c e s , o r th e b r i l l i a n t m aneuver w h ic h had now
r e s u l t e d i n th e l i b e r a t i o n o f S e o u l.
I am p a r t ic u 
l a r l y im p ressed by th e s p le n d id c o o p e ra tio n o f o u r
Army, Navy and A i r F o r c e . . . . My th a n k s and th e
th a n k s o f th e p e o p le o f a l l th e f r e e n a tio n s go o u t
to y o u r g a l l a n t f o r c e s . • •
I n th e m id s t o f th e In c h o n -S e o u l campaign th e
D efense D ep artm en t a c q u ire d a new S e c r e t a r y , f o r Truman
fou nd i t

e x p e d ie n t t o r e p la c e L o u is Johnson,

As S e c re 

t a r y o f D e fe n s e , Johnson had come u n d e r c r i t i c a l f i r e

fo r

th e la c k o f p re p a re d n e s s o f th e Am erican m i l i t a r y t h a t
had been made e v id e n t by th e e a r l y f i g h t i n g

in K o re a .

A lth o u g h t h i s c o n d it io n was caused by th e budget cuts
imposed by Truman and th e Congress on th e m i l i t a r y e s ta b 
lis h m e n t , th e S e c r e t a r y was t h e n a t u r a l t a r g e t o f

^ M a c A r t h u r , R e m in is c e n c e s , 356-57*
^ T ru m a n t o M a c A rth u r, S eptem ber 29, 1950, Truman
P a p e rs , OF, i|.71-B - K o rean Emergency (A ug ust-N o vem b er,
1950), Truman L i b r a r y .
v
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criticism.

Additionally, it was widely-known that

Johnson was unable to get along with Dean Acheson and the
State Department.^

Johnson testified in 1951 that he

had no idea why he had been made to resign, but it would
seem that his feud with Acheson and an unfavorable press
made him an expendable liability to Truman.

66

Johnson's

testimony makes it clear that his resignation was a
result of pressure from the White House.

He said he did

not know why he was "ousted" and regretted having to resign
three days before the Inchon landing which he felt would
end much of the criticism, since he had favored the plan
67
from the outset.
He said when the White House failed
to deny an Associated Press story that he was to be
removed and Acheson was to remain in the Cabinet, he called
Truman and later resigned as a result of that telephone
conversation•^
In his letter of resignation, dated September 12,
Johnson recalled telling Truman when accepting the post

^Hoare, "Truman," 196-97. See also, Bernardo and
Bacon, American Military Policy, lj.77; O'Connor, "Harry S.
Truman: New Dimensions of Power," 695 Steinberg, Man from
Missouri, 380-81; Johnson testimony, Far East Hearings,
ij., 2625.
^ F a r East Hearings , Pt. ij., 26l8.

67Ibid.
68

Ibid., 262/4.. *n kis memoirs, Truman does not
discuss Johnson's dismissal at all.
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that in performing his tasks as Secretary he would
probably make more enemies than friends and now admitted,
’’somewhat reufully," that he had been right.

So Johnson

tendered his resignation for the sake of the war effort.
He closed by recommending that Truman appoint as his
successor a man whose stature would promote unity, General
George C. Marshall.

69

Truman accepted Johnson’s resigna

tion in a letter dated the same day.

He spoke of the

’’terribly regrettable circumstances” that had arisen,
forcing him to concur in Johnson's decision to resign,
effective September 19.

The President also accepted the

recommendation that Marshall be appointed as the new
70
Secretary of Defense.
Johnson departed without rancor
71
and full of praise for Truman and Marshall.1

For

seventy-year old General Marshall to be appointed, Truman
would have to change the law, since the National Security
Act of 19if-7 in Section 202(a) prohibited service by a
military officer as Secretary of Defense.

^ Johnson to Truman, September 12, 1950, Truman
Papers, OF, 1285, Truman Library.
7°Truman to Johnson, September 12., 1950, ibid.
This letter waa published as Item No. 2l\$, PublicHFapers
. . . Truman, 1950, 632.
7*See, for example, Johnson's remarks before the
American Bar Association on his last full day in office,
September 18, 1950» Office of Publio Information, Depart
ment of Defense, Press Release No. 177-50S, copy in Truman
Papers, OF, 1285, Truman Library.
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Truman was prepared to act on General Marshall’s
appointment.

The day after Johnson’s letter of resigna

tion, he sent draft legislation that would allow Marshall
to serve as Secretary of Defense to the chairmen of the
House and Senate Armed Services Committees.

In a covering

letter, Truman explained that he believed strongly in the
"general principle" that civilians should direct the
Department of Defense.

"However," Truman wrote, "in view

of the present critical circumstances and of General
Marshall’s unusual qualifications, I believe that the
national interest will be served best by making an
72
exception in this case."
The Congress was willing.

On

September 18, only five days after submitting his draft
legislation, Truman was able to sign the bill into law.
Senate confirmation quickly followed, and Marshall took
77

the oath of office on September 20, 1950.
The defeat of the aggressors in South Korea in the
last week of September restored the status quo ante bellum.
It must have seemed to many that MacArthur’s bold strike
at Inchon had dramatically achieved the objective for
which the United States had fought.

At the outset Acheson

^ T r u m a n to Millard E. Tydings, September 13, 1950,
Truman Papers, OF, 1285, Truman Library.
73”a Bill . . . to Appoint General of the Army
George C. Marshall to the Office of Secretary of Defense"
(64 Stat. 853). See Item No. 246, Public Papers • . •
Truman. 1950. 633-34-
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had said that American intervention was ". . • solely for
the purpose of restoring the Republic of Korea to its
status prior to the invasion from the north.

But the

expulsion of the North Korean attackers led to a decision
to change objectives from maintaining the independence of
South Korea to the conquest and political unification of
all Korea.

Through hindsight it can be seen that the

decision to cross the thirty-eighth parallel was a tragic
miscalculation.

75

The first suggestion that the United Nations
forces should carry the fight into North Korea came from
MacArthur.

On July 13 he told Generals Collins and

Vandenberg that the destruction of the enemy forces might
necessitate the occupation of all North K o r e a . on
July 31, 1950, the National Security Council completed a
study of crossing the parallel, which was submitted to the

^ Q u o t e d in American Military History, 556.
^ D . P. Fleming, who had described the crossing of
the 38th parallel as a ‘'monumental error” and a "plain
invitation to disaster," has estimated that a total of five
million casualties (on both sides, military and civilian),
resulted from the fighting in Korea, with two million of
these dead. Of all casualties, according to Fleming,
four-fifths were sustained after the liberation of South
Korea. The Cold War, II, 655-56. See also, Fleming,
"America*s~ResponsTbility," 15-16; Hermes, Truce Tent and
Fighting Front, 10,.
^Higgins, Korea and the Fall of MacArthur, 51.
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State and Defense Departments for comment.

The plan recom

mended that MacArthur be allowed to cross the boundary
line in order to defeat the North Korean People's Army and
occupy the country.
assumptions:

The proposal carried three contingent

(1) that America would provide the men and

materiel sufficient to the task without depleting forces
in other strategic areas around the world; (2) that no
threat of Soviet or Chinese intervention in Korea or else
where then existed; (3) that Truman, Congress and the
United States accepted the unification and independence of
all of Korea as a new war objective.??
The National Security Council proposals, incorpo
rating some modifications suggested by the JCS, were
approved by the President on September 11, 1950.

The

President also allowed the Joint Chiefs to send MacArthur
a tentative advisory in respect to operations above the
thirty-eighth parallel.?®

The message to MacArthur, dated

September 15, informed him that final decisions on future
operations could not yet be made until several factors
were added to bhe equation regarding Soviet and Chinese
intentions, the risk of general war involved and the

??Acheson, Present at the Creation, ij5lj Truman,
Memoirs, II, 359. See also, Lichterman, "To the Yalu and
Back,^ 58i|-J Collins, War in Peacetime, II4I1
-—14.6 •
?®Truman, Memoirs, II, 35>9J Collins, War in
Peacetime, llj.6•
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viewpoint of "friendly members" of the United Nations.
However, MacArthur was told that it was Washington’s belief
that a legal basis for crossing the parallel into North
Korea already existed on the basis of the UN resolution of
June 27*

The directive instructed MacArthur to make plans

for the invasion and occupation of North Korea, but to
execute the order only with the express consent of Presi
dent Truman.

The General was also cautioned not to under

take ground action into North Korea if Soviet or Chinese
Communist units were found to occupy the area, although he
could continue to attack with his air and naval units.
One last warning was a portent of the future:

MacArthur

was informed that if a major Chinese Communist force pene
trated below the thirty-eighth parallel, he was to resist
this incursion as long as it was militarily feasible to do
so, but that the United States would not— as a matter of
policy— allow itself to be drawn into a general war with
China. ^
Six days after instructing MacArthur to prepare for
an advance into North Korea, a reporter asked Truman if he
had decided what American troops would do when they reached

?9 j c s to MacArthur, September 15, 1950, printed in
Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 718. This message also appears
in Lichterraan, tto the Yalu and Back," 58^-85* See also,
Warren, President as World Leader, 338; Spanier, TrumanMacArthur Controversy, 95? Higgins, Korea and the' gall""of
MacArthur, 5l-52.
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the thirty-eighth parallel:

"No, I have not.

That is a

fln

matter for the United Nations to decide.

Asked in a

press conference on September 28, seven days later, if
MacArthur had been granted specific authority to cross the
boundary, the President replied that he could not answer
the question publicly yet.

The questioner persisted,

asking Truman if he considered that MacArthur had implied
authority to cross the thirty-eighth parallel.
replied:

Truman

"General MacArthur is under direct orders of the

President and the Chief of Staff, and he will follow those
„8l
orders."
Truman had inadvertently tripped on the thread
of fiction which held that the United Nations, not the
United States, was determining the course of action in
Korea.

A reporter reminded him that a week earlier he had

said that crossing the thirty-eighth parallel was a
decision to be made by the United Nations, but he was now
saying that the United Nations Commander would take orders
directly from him on whether or not to cross the parallel.
Truman tried to salvage the sinking myth by saying that
while it was he who would give orders to MacArthur, the
United Nations would have to first decide the matter and

Po

Item No. 253, Press Conference, September 21,
1950, Public Papers . . . Truman, 1950, 61jl|..
Q*|

Item No. 258, Press Conference, September 28,
1950, Public Papers • . '. Truman, 1950, 658.
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02
then request that he command MacArthur to act.
On the day prior to this press conference of
September 28, Truman had approved a directive which the
Joint Chiefs transmitted to MacArthur.

Based on the NSC

policy statement the President had endorsed on the
eleventh, it began:

"Your military objective is the

destruction of the North Korean armed forces.

In attaining

this objective, you are authorized to conduct military
operations north of the thirty-eighth parallel in
Korea."

The directive also specifically commanded that

the General was not to allow his ground, sea, or air
elements to cross the borders of North Korea into Mancuria
or the USSR.

MacArthur was further instructed to use only

Korean ground forces in those provinces bordering China
and the Soviet Union.

Decisions as to the "character of

occupation of North Korea" would be made later as circum81+
stances warranted.
Why Truman and his advisers decided to cross the

®^Ibid.,. 659. See also, Stone, Hidden History of
Korean War, 108-109; Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy,
100- 101*:
^ Q u o t e d in MacArthur, Reminiscences, 358*
®^Ibid. T?or a paraphrased text of the directive,
see Acheson, Present at the Creation, 1+52-53S Collins, War
ln Peacetime, lli?-li.8. See also, Truman, Memoirs, II,
3t>0-62; Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," 585-87;
Higgins, Korea and the Fall of MacArthur, 53? Ridgway,
Korean W a r , lili-li'57 Appleman, South to the Naktong, 607J
Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 273'»
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thirty-eighth parallel, having already achieved their
limited objective of containment, seems to have been based
on considerations largely divorced from the original
purpose.

The explanation favored by Acheson was that it

was a tactical decision.

Not to pursue the retreating

North Korean force and destroy it would have violated a
fundamental principle of warfare.

The North Korean Army,

if not pursued and conquered, would be able to re-group
in its sanctuary and launch another offensive.

At the

same time, barring an unknown factor such as Chinese
intervention, the political unification of Korea would
constitute a desirable by-product of this purely military
operation.®-*’ MacArthur later testified that his original
mission was to "clear all of Korea" and that if he had
not crossed the 38th parallel he would have been in
86
defiance of the orders which he had received.
That an imperative military need to cross into
North Korea motivated Truman's decision is unlikely, at
best.

The very fact that the Secretary of State took the

initiative in urging this step would argue against such
an assumption.

The unexpectedly swift conquest of the

invading army after months of clinging tenaciously to a

®**Acheson, Present at the Creation, lj-53; Acheson
testimony, Par East Hearings
3, I$k3-Wl, 2258* See
also, Spanier, ttruman^MacArktaur Controversy, 89-90.
®^Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 2i}5-lj.6.
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toe-hold on the peninsula had created a new atmosphere of
confidence.

Additionally, the opportunity to accomplish

the long-frustrated promise of a unified, independent
Korea must have been an irresistible temptation, seemingly
easy to achieve.

The threatened Chinese intervention was

not taken too seriously.

One other factor may have been

weighed in the balance by the President:

His Administra

tion's Par Eastern policies had been severely criticized
since the fighting began and the mid-term congressional
elections were only weeks away.

There is no justification

for implying that Truman would allow the invasion of
North Korea in response to domestic political pressures,
but the fact is that the pressure existed.

The subcon

scious mind is a trackless labyrinth and it would be
presumptuous to attempt to measure its influence on
conscious decisions.

On the other hand, it would be

naive to assume that Truman was superior to personal and
political considerations that influence the best of men.®?
Having received authority to invade North Korea
in the September 27 directive from Washington, MacArthur
submitted his plans for this attack to the JCS.

He

®?Truman did not discuss this decision at any great
length. For estimates by others of his thinking, see
Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," 595-97; Spanier,
Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 89-91, 95-96, 100-103;
!!?Eone, Hidden Efistory of Korean War, 108-110.
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proposed to send the Eighth A m y up the western coastal
corridor through Kaesong and Sariwon to Pyongyang, the
capital of North Korea.

By an amphibious operation, the

Tenth Corps was to attack Wonsan, a port city on the
eastern coast, roughly parallel to Pyongyang.

Following

a juncture along the Wonsan-Pyongyang road by his
separate commands, MacArthur proposed to advance north
ward toward the Yalu River.

Since his directive had

instructed him not to use non-Korean forces close to the
Russian and Chinese borders, the General’s plan called
for the use of South Korean forces only, north of a line
(Chungjo-Yongwon-Hungnam) fifty miles beyond the PyongyangWonsan line and approximately sixty miles below the Yalu
at its mouth.

MacArthur ended by saying he had no indi

cation of entry into Korea by major Russian or Chinese
communist armies.®®
Both Secretary of Defense Marshall and Secretary of
State Acheson recommended MacArthur’s operational plans
to Truman, who gave his consent.

89

MacArthur had

®®MacArthur, Reminiscences, 358; Far East Hearings,
Pt. 1, 719, Acheson, Present at bhe CreaTTTon, h53. See
also, Truman, Memoirs, ll, 36TT riiggins, Korea and the
Fall of MacArthur, 53-51u
®^Ache son, Present at the Creation, i|53* General
Collins admits that he ahd"""£he other Joint Chiefs, "some
what overawed by the success of Inchon," recommended
approval of MacArthur's plan without having received any
details. See his War in Peacetime, 158.
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resented the insistence that he submit his plans to the
Pentagon for final approval prior to crossing the
thirty-eighth parallel.9®

Apparently to placate him,

Marshall sent a curious "eyes only" personal message to
MacArthur on September 29, the same day the Joint Chiefs
transmitted to him the Presider\t's approval of his battle
plans.

In part, Marshall's message reads:

"We want you

to feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed
91
north of the 38th parallel."
The Secretary also added
that the President concurred in this view.

92

ing day, September 30, MacArthur responded:

The follow
"Unless and

until the enemy capitulates, I regard all of Korea open
go
for our military operations."
It is difficult to
comprehend the necessity for the secret message to Mac
Arthur.

It was later used by him to justify using American

troops in the provinces bordering Manchuria; an action
which precipitated intervention by Chinese forces.

His

response would appear to indicate that the General did
not feel bound by the restrictions of the September 27
directive or the restrictions on the use of non-Korean

^ A p p l e m a n , South to the Naktong, 607-608•
^Acheson, Present at the Croat ion, lj.£>3.
92|?ehrenbach, This Kind of War, 273*
Appleman, South to the Waktong,"!^#.

See also,

^ A p p l e m a n , South to the Naktong, 608.
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5211troops he wrote into his own operational plans of the
twenty-ninth,

Acheson, who was unaware of this message at

the time, feels it w' ; sent simply to soothe MacArthur*s
ruffled feelings at having to seek approval from Washing
ton for his p l a n s . ^
The General Assembly of the United Nations adopted
a resolution on October 7> 1950, which had the effect of
sanctioning the invasion of North Korea by the United
Nations Command.

The resolution recommended that "All

appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of
stability throughout Korea • • . including the holding of
elections . • . for the establishment of a unified, inde
pendent and democratic government in the sovereign State
of Korea."

95

The thinking behind this act seemed to be

more than just an effort to place the United Nations
behind a decision already made by the American Commander
in Chief.

The United Nations was also changing objectives

^Acheson, Present at the Creation, i|>53-5h«
9^D o c . N o . 9, Resolution Adopted by the General
Assembly, October 7» 1950, United States Policy in the
Korean Conflict, 17-18. Text of the resolution aTso
appears in Far East Hearings , Pt. 3 $ 2i|j6“37i Lichterman,
"To the Yalu and feack, " 59IT The resolution, which
passed forty-seven to five, witheight abstentions, had
been introduced by Kenneth Younger, the British delegate,
with the "full support" of President Truman. Guttman
(ed.), Korea and the Theory of Limited War, 6-8. The
Joint Chiefs believed that tEe language of the resolution
gave permission for military operations north of the
thirty-eighth parallel. JCS to CINCPE, October 6, 1950,
printed in Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 720.
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in the light of MacArthurfs success, from simple preser
vation of the independence of South Korea, to the
unification of all Korea as called for in the resolution
of November 11}., 19i|7*^
The Republic of Korea, whose very existence was
threatened in mid-September, was eager to take over the
governing of all Korea early in October.

Truman had

received a message from President Rhee of South Korea
following the liberation of Seoul that expressed deep
gratitude:

"The Korean people will always cherish the

memory of your bold leadership in defense of liberty.
On October 11, ten days after this message, the President
met with representatives of the Korean government, who
thanked him for liberating their country.

They also

expressed the hope that now all of Korea could be united
under the rule of President Rhee.

.

Truman thanked his

callers, but avoided committing himself on the question of
unification under Rhee, saying only that the United States
would have to be guided by the forthcoming survey report

^Acheson, Present at the Creation, kSk*
^ R h e e to the President, quoted in cable, Truman
to Acheson, October 1, 1950, Truman Papers, OP, If71-B Korean Emergency, Truman Library.
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of the United Nations

C o m m i s s i o n . ^

The following day

the UN Interim Committee resolved that South Korean civil
authority extended only to the thirty-eighth parallel and
all civil control north of the border was delegated to
og
General MacArthur.
The United States endorsed the
Interim Committee resolution on October 13*

The resolu

tion was declared "unacceptable" by the South Korean
Government on the following day.

A week later President

Rhee announced that it was his intention to rule over all
of K o r e a . T h e

intervention of the Chinese forces

would spoil these plans.
At nine o'clock on the morning of October 9, 1950
(Korean time), the American Eighth Array began its initial
advance across the thirty-eighth parallel.

It had been

preceded by several divisions of the ROK Army a few days
earlier.

The Korean units made excellent progress,

particularly along the eastern seaboard.

They captured

Wonsan on October 10, two weeks before landings could be

9®Those present at the meeting were the Korean
Ambassador, John M. Changj the Vice Chairman of the
Korean National Assembly, T. S. Chang; the Korean Foreign
Minister, Ben C. Limb; President Truman and Acting Chief
of Protocol, R. D. Muir. See Muir, Memorandum of Conver
sation, October 11, 1950, Truman Papers, OF, 1|.71 (191J.9-50),
Truman Library.
^ U n i t e d States Foreign Policy in the Korean
Conflict, Appendix III, 50•

100Ibid.
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made there by units of the U.S. Tenth C o r p s . I n

the

west, however, Eighth Army met very strong resistance in
its drive toward the North Korean capital city of
Pyongyang.

By October llj. Eighth Army had moved approxi

mately one-third of the distance along the axis of
advance toward its immediate objective, penetrating the
major prepared defensive positions which the enemy had
established between the thirty-eighth parallel and
Pyongyang.

The North Korean forces were now in confusion

and an integral front line of resistance had ceased to
102
exist.
However, a few Chinese Communist soldiers had
been captured by this time; an ominous portent of the
full-scale intervention which China had been threatening
103
since American troops first massed along the parallel.
At this point, on October 15* a unique meeting was held
between the Commander in Chief of the United Nations
Command and his Commander in Chief.
The White House released a presidential statement

■*-°*Appleman, South to the Naktong, 612.
1 OP

Ibid., 623-30, pa-sslm; Esposito (ed.), West
Point Atlas, II, Sect. 3» M&P Plate No. 7*
^^Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," 572. Early
in October, the Joint Chiefs warned MacArthur that if
"major Chinese units" intervened in Korea, he was to
resist only so long as he had a reasonable chance to win.
He was also warned not to attaok Chinese territory with
out prior approval. JCS to CINCFE, October 9, 1950,
printed in Par East Hearings, Pt. 1, 720.
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to the press on October 10, 1950, in which Truman
announced:

"General MacArthur and I are making a quick

trip over the coming week end to meet in the Pacific.
The President’s message explained that he was meeting with
MacArthur to discuss the last phase of the United Nation
operations in Korea and other matters relating to the Par
East C o m m a n d . T r u m a n

explained in his memoirs that

he had several reasons for wanting to talk with MacArthur:
"The first and the simplest reason . . . was that we had
never had any personal contacts at all, and I thought
that he ought to know-’his Commander in Chief and that I
ought to know the senior field commander in the Par
East."

io 6

Truman said that he also made the trip because

MacArthur was out of touch with America, having been away
for fourteen uninterrupted years.

This caused MacArthur

to consider things from a limited perspective which gave
priority to Par Eastern affairs.

Truman hoped to help

the General adjust his thinking to the world-wide picture.
The President was also concerned about intelligence reports

10^Doo. No. 10, Statement by the President, October
10, 1950, United States Policy in the Korean Conflict, 19.
Text of Truman’s statement can aTsq be founc^lai' Mie ITew
York Times, October 10, 1950; Far East Hearings , P t . 5»
3i|ti3~bZj.; Item No. 26ij., Statement by the President on His
Forthcoming Meeting With General MacArthur, October 10,
1950, Public Papers . • • Truman, 1950, 665-66.
lO^New York Times, October 10, 1950.
10^Truman, Memoirs, II, 362-63.
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and repeated threats from Peking that Chinese forces
would intervene in Korea, and he wanted MacArthur's views
on the possibility of such an attack.

As for the timing

of his trip to the mid-Pacific (they met on Wake Island),
Truman explained that he had to speak on October 17 in
San Francisco and a week later address the UN General
Assembly in New York and he wanted to bring back a firsthand report from the United Nations Commander.

107

Secretary of State Acheson was invited by the
President to join him in this conference with MacArthur.
Acheson asked to be excused since he found the whole idea
repugnant.

He told Truman that the General had many of

the attributes of a foreign ruler and was just as diffi
cult to control.

Acheson thought it unwise for the

President to go to MacArthur.

To the Secretary this was

tantamount to acknowledging the General’s image as a
sovereign.

"I wanted no part of it," Acheson later wrote,

"and saw no good coming from it. . . . talk should
precede, not follow, the issuance of orders."-1-0®

In terms

of protocol, the normal procedure would be for the
commander in chief to summon a field commander to Washing
ton.

However, as General Bradley later testified, Truman

1Q 7ibid., 363.
Controversy, 110-11.

See also, Spanier, Truman-MacArthur

^O^Acheson, Present at the Creation, ij-56.
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was willing to go to MacArthur rather than pull him away
from his command at this critical juncture for any length
of time.109

The timing of Truman's visit was probably
influenced by his concern over Chinese intentions and an
incident on October 9 in which two F-80 fighter aircraft
attacked a Soviet air station.

The base was located

sixty-two miles north of the Korean border and eighteen
miles to the southwest of the Russian port of Vladivostok.
When the Soviet Union protested this "gross violation" of
its territory, an Air Force spokesman in Tokyo denied any
knowledge of the charges and the State Department said it
was a matter to be taken up with the United Nations,
since the planes operated under its auspices.

But the

day following the attack, the President announced he was
going to Wake Island to meet with MacArthur.

110
w

■^^Bradley testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 2,
1115; Marshall testimony, ibid.7 Ft." 1, h39. MacArthur
recalls receiving a cable Trom Secretary Marshall on
October 12, indicating that the President wanted a con
ference with him on the 15th and had suggested Honolulu as
the meeting place. However, if MacArthur felt that this
would keep him away from his command too long, Truman
would be willing to go to Wake Island. MacArthur responded
that he would be "delighted to meet the President" . . •
on Wake Island. Reminiscences, 360* In his San Francisco
speech on the 17th, Truman saTd he had gone to Wake Island
because he did not wish to take MacArthur away from his
command for any length of time. Item No. 269, Public
Papers • . • Truman, 1950, 673*
110Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 111-12j
Stone, Hidden History of the Korean War, 139-h0»
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While the incident was not widely noted at the
time, it may have had a dramatic effect on the President.
He had been from the outset of the conflict vitally con
cerned with keeping Korea a limited conflict, to avoid
giving China or the Soviet Union a reason to intercede
and widen the war.

Nations had gone to war in the past

for less provocation than that generated by the errant
P-80's.

Pour days after the Wake Island meeting,

Ambassador Warren Austin presented a report to the Security
Council from MacArthur.

The report attributed the attack

to navigational miscalculation by the pilots and a failure
properly to identify the target prior to their attack.
Austin stated that disciplinary action was being insti
tuted against the two pilots and that the commander of
their air group had been relieved.

111

Author John Spanier

has suggested that the sequence of events following the
incident indicates Truman’s concern and may have been a
major factor in his decision to meet with MacArthur.

If

this is so, Spanier concludes, ”• • . it underlined the
urgency of the President’s desire to achieve a better
working relationship with MacArthur during this final

111

Stone, Hidden History of the Korean War, li|.0.
On October 19# the UnXted states acknowledged responsi
bility for the attack and offered to make restitution.
Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 111.
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s ta g e o f th e c am p aig n ."

112

Truman came to Wake Is la n d b e a rin g g i f t s :

a fiv e -

pound box o f c a n d ie d plums f o r Mrs • M a c A rth u r and a f o u r t h
Oak L e a f C lu s t e r to add to th e G e n e r a l's D is t in g u is h e d
S e r v ic e M e d a l . P o r

h is

been w arned a b o u t Trum an's

p a r t , M a c A rth u r s a id he had
"q u ic k and v i o l e n t tem per and

p r e j u d i c e s , " b u t t h a t he fo u n d th e P r e s id e n t t o be c o u r te 
ous and hum orous:

"He has an eng agin g p e r s o n a l i t y , a

q u ic k and w i t t y to n g u e , and I l i k e d him fro m th e s t a r t .
Truman r e c a l l s
fir s t

t h a t M a c A rth u r— th e y w ere m e e tin g f o r th e

and l a s t tim e — was f r i e n d l y and t h a t he " .

.

.

found him a m ost s t im u la t in g and i n t e r e s t i n g p e r s o n ."

ll

p

The two men m et p r i v a t e l y f o r a p p ro x im a te ly f o r t y - f i v e
m in u te s and th e n met w it h o th e r members o f t h e i r s t a f f s
f o r a g e n e ra l c o n fe re n c e l a s t i n g a b o u t n i n e t y m in u te s .

l-^Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 112.
I. P. Stone, in hi3 Hidden History of~bhe Korean War
(p. l£0), agreed with Spanier that TiKe’"aTr attack on Soviet
territory precipitated Truman's insistance on an immediate
meeting with MacArthur. General Willoughby was certain
that Truman came to Wake Island for political purposes
only, with an eye to the November elections. He was able,
thereby, to "drape the mantle of MacArthur about his
shoulders," by misleading the people. Willoughby and
Chamberlain, MacArthur, 382, 390-91. However, MacArthur
did not agree with this judgment. He wrote that it was
an injustice to say that Truman was motivated by political
considerations. Reminiscences, 363-6l|..
■^spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, lOij..
■^•^MacArthur, Reminiscences, 361.
H^Trmnan, Memoirs, II, 365*
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What transpired in the private meeting is open to
conjecture,

MacArthur declined to testify as to the

substance of their conversation during the hearings on
his dismissal in 1951* which was proper, since it represented a privileged communication.

116

General Whitney,

MacArthurfs aide and biographer, felt oonstrained to
reveal part of what the General told him about the conver
sation.

Whitney claims a passing reference was made to

Formosa and that the bulk of the conversation dealt with
". . . the fiscal and economic problems of the Philippines."

117

In his memoirs, Truman recalled that only a

brief reference was made to Formosa, but made no mention
whatever of the Philippines.

Instead, he wrote that Mac

Arthur assured him victory in Korea was a certainty and
Chinese Communist intervention was quite unlikely.

The

General also told the President that he should be able to
release at least a division from Korea for service in

•^^MacArthur testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 1,
kl.

■'■■^Whitney, MacArthur, 387* This is partially
borne out by the record of the general meeting at Wake
Island, wherein Truman is recorded as saying that he had
already talked at length with MacArthur about the Philip
pines. He also said there was no need to discuss Formosa,
since that subject had been fully "discussed with Mac
Arthur and that they were in full accord." U.S., Congress,
Senate, Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations,
Substance of Statements Made at Wake Island Conferences on
October l5T"‘l§50, compTled by iSmar it. Bradley, 52 Cong.,
1 Sess. T^ashington, 1951)* 7-8. Hereinafter cited as
Substance of Statements Made at Wake Island.
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53i|.
Europe by J a n u a ry of 1951
The g e n e ra l c o n fe re n c e a t Wake I s l a n d s t a r t e d
im m e d ia te ly a f t e r th e P r iv a t e
M a c A rth u r.

119

s e s s io n b e tw ee n Truman and

The m e e tin g began w it h th e G e n e ra l t e l l i n g

th e P r e s id e n t t h a t fo r m a l r e s is t a n c e in a l l o f K o re a
s h o u ld end by T h a n k s g iv in g .

If

t h i s p ro v e d t o be th e

c a s e , he p la n n e d to w ith d ra w th e E ig h th Army t o Japan by
C h ris tm a s .

M a c A rth u r e x p re s s e d th e hope t h a t th e U n it e d

N a tio n s w ould be a b le t o conduct e le c t io n s
soon a f t e r th e f i r s t o f th e y e a r ,

i n N o rth K o re a

f o llo w in g w h ic h he

p ro p o sed t o p u l l o u t a l l o c c u p a tio n f o r c e s .

120

L a te r in

•^^Truman, Memoirs, II, 36i}-65j Spanier, TrumanMacArthur Controversy, 105»
11^The principal figures in attendance at this meet
ing, in addition to Truman and MacArthur, were General
Bradley, Ambassador Muccio, Ambassador-at-Large Phillip
Jessup, Assistant Secretary Dean Rusk, Army Secretary
Pace, W. Averell Harriman and Admiral Arthur Radford, Com
mander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Substance of Statements
Made at Wake Island, 1. This document was the cause of
much controversy later. It was based on notes of the
meeting taken by Bradley, Jessup, Harriman, Rusk, and two
staff officers, also present. In addition, they draw from
a reasonably full stenographic record taken unofficially
by Jessup’s secretary, Vernice Anderson, whojwas waiting
in an adjoining room to type out a communique on the meet
ing. MacArthur and his aide, General Whitney, have claimed
that Truman's Press Secretary, Charles Ross, had cautioned
them that no notes were to be taken during the conference.
See MacArthur, Reminiscences, 361 j Whitney, MacArthur, 388*
381-92. For other commentary on these notes, see Truman,
Memoirs, II, 365; Acheson, Present at the Creation, h56;
Appleraan, South to the Naktong, fooTjnote',- 760 \ i?ar East
Hearings, F f c 7 T , T 7 ^ ,
Pt. 2, 926-28,
l^Qsubstance of Statements Made at Wake Island, 1,
6; Trum an, M em o irs, T I , 365-65; F e h re n b a c h , T h is K in d o f
War., 277.
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the meeting, Bradley asked MacArthur if he would he able
to spare a division for redeployment to Europe by
January*

MacArthur said he could have the' Second Division

by then.’*’2-1* When asked by Army Secretary Pace if there
was any more that needed to be done in terms of cooperation
with the Ear East Command, MacArthur replied:

"No com

mander in the history of war has ever had more complete
and adequate support from all agencies in Washington than
I have."122
Toward the close of this meeting, Truman asked
MacArthur to estimate the chances of Soviet or Chinese
intervention in Korea.

"Very little" the General replied.

"Had they intervened in the first or second months it
would have been decisive.
their intervention."

123

We are no longer fearful of
MacArthur went on to explain that

the Soviet Union had no appreciable ground forces nearby
and that the Chinese, who had about 125*000 troops along
the Yalu River, could only commit about 60,000 across the
river.

Because they lacked a proper air force for support,

^2^Substance of Statements Made at Wake Island, 6.
^ ^Ibid., 3» During the 1951 hearings on his dis
missal, MacArthur reaffirmed this statement, adding that
it was correct up to that time. See his testimony, Far
East Hearings, Pt. 1, 213*
•^^Substance of Statements Made at Wake Island, 5*
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MacArthur believed that ”. • • if the Chinese tried to get
down to Pyongyang there would be the greatest slaughter
As to the possible combination of Russian air support of
Chinese ground operations, the General believed that
liaison would be too difficult to be e f f e c t i v e S h o r t l y
after this meeting ended, MacArthur flew back to Japan
and Truman departed for San Francisco.
In a statement issued following the Wake Island
conference, Truman described the meeting as ’’highly satis
factory,” and indicated that a ’’very complete unanimity
of view” had prevailed.

The President said that he had

primarily discussed with MacArthur the military aspects
of the Korean situation and the further steps which would
be required to bring peace and security to the area.

126

12lj-ibid. See also, Truman, Memoirs, II, 366;
MacArthur, Reminiscences, 362; Fehrenbacii, This Kind of
War, 277.
•^■^Substance of Statements Made at Wake Island, 55
Truman, Memoirs, II,~36~5T MacArthur has since stated that
the views he expressed on the possibility of intervention
had been qualified beforehand as pure speculation, based
on an entirely military point of view towards a question
that was basically political. Reminiscences, 362. See
also, Appleman, South to the Naktong, 76 o . For other views
of the Wake Island discuslTfon on the subject of Chinese
intervention, see Whitney, MacArthur, 392-935 Fleming,
The Cold War, II, 617-18; Rovere and Schlesinger, The
General and the President, 132-335 Willoughby and
Chamberlain,“*HacArthur, 382-835 Collins, War ih Peacetime,

l53-5i|-.
126item No. 268, Statement by the President on
His Meeting with General MacArthur at Wake Island,
October 15* 1950, Public Papers . . . Truman, 1950,
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Speaking at the War Memorial Opera House in San Francisco
two days later, Truman said that there was no need for
speculation about why he went to Wake Island:

"I went

because I wanted to see and talk to General MacArthur. • . •
There is no substitute for personal conversation with the
commander in the field who knows the problems there from
first-hand experience."

127

Five days after the Wake Island Conference, the
Eighth Army, employing a ground attack and parachute drop,
enveloped and captured the North Korean capital city of
Pyongyang.

Resistance to the United Nation’s advance

beceme increasingly sporadic, often confined to guerrillatype actions of limited effect.

MacArthur later wrote

that the fall of Pyongyang, " . . .

symbolized the complete

10 0

defeat of North Korea."

Truman cabled MacArthur his

congratulations for the "remarkable" progress made since
129
their meeting at Wake Island.
The General’s confidence
that the fighting was over shows clearly in a message to

672. See also, Doc. No. 11, United States Policy in the
Korean Conflict, 19-20; Collins testimony, Far EasT~
Hearings, Pt. 2, 1307; Ibid., pt. 5, AppendTSrvYrTfB),
jlj.bli.-b5; New York Times, October 16, 1950.
127ltem No. 269, Address in San Francisco at the
War Memorial Opera House, October 17, 1950, Public Papers
. . . Truman, 1950, 673*
•^^MacArthur, Reminiscences, 36ij..
•^^Quoted in ibid.
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the Joint Chiefs on October 21.

He informed his

superiors that he hoped to start the movement of the
Eighth Army back to Japan before Thanksgiving and intended
to complete the transfer before Christmas.

130

The ROK forces driving northward from Pyongyang
were moving too slowly to satisfy General MacArthur.

On

October 2l\., without prior consultation with Washington,
he advised his commanders that he was lifting all restric
tions on the use of non-Korean forces close to the
Chinese border.

The field commanders were instructed by

MacArthur to ignore the restraining line he had previously
imposed upon them and to use any and all forces at their
command necessary to complete the capture of North Korea.

131

This order countermanded the JCS directive of September
27, which had restricted operations in the northern
provinces to Korean troops exclusively.

The JCS informed

MacArthur on the same day that they were sure he had good
reasons for taking this action, but wished to be informed
as to what these reasons were.

132

Replying on October 25,

MacArthur said that his orders were a matter of "military

■*-30j4acArthur to JCS, October 21, 1950, quoted in
Par East Hearings. Pt. 1, 720.
l31Ibid., pt. 2, 1216-17, 12l;0. See also, Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," 600} Higgins, Korea and the
Fall of MacArthur, 61j..
132par East Hearings, Pt. 2, 121^0.
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necessity” because the strength and leadership of the ROK
forces were insufficient for the accomplishment of his
objective.

It was the General’s opinion that his new

instructions were not in violation of the September 27
directive.

He also indicated that Secretary Marshall’s

message to him of September 30 provided him with the
"necessary latitude" to modify his instructions to suit
the combat situation.

MacArthur also said that the whole

subject had already been covered in his meeting with
Truman on Wake Island .^ 3

While the Joint Chiefs

apparently were still convinced that MacArthur had
violated his instructions, they did not move to counter
mand his orders.

Nor is there any indication that the

President was consulted.

The matter was simply dropped,

the Defense Department being unwilling to overrule a
field commander arguing military necessity, particularly
one of MacArthur’s prestige.^^

to JCS, October 25, 1950, quoted in
ibid., Pt. 1, 721; Pt. 2, 12ljl. The paraphrase cited here
was censored prior to publication of the testimony. The
placement of the deletion marks would seem to indicate that
MacArthur had amplified upon his reasons for the "military
necessity" of using American forces in the drive to the
Manchurian border. However, this is only speculation,
since the deletions are still classified. See also,
Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," 600; Appleman, South
to the Naktong, 670; Acheson, Present at the Creation,
7£6l-62; Truman, Memoirs, II, 372.
^ M a c A r t h u r

13lj-Collins, War in P e a c e tim e , 180-81. See also,
L ic h te rm a n , "To th e Yalu and B a c k , 11 600-601; Applem an,
South to the Naktong, 670-71.
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During the Blair House meetings in which the
decision was made to involve the United States in Korea,
consideration was given to the possibility of Communist
China entering the war.

There was general agreement then

that while a risk did exist, such intervention was not
likely to o c c u r . I t

will be recalled that the direc

tives to MacArthur regarding his operations above the
thirty-eighth parallel, which Truman had approved in
September, carried a restrictive proviso in the event of
major intervention by Soviet or Chinese Communist
Forces.*3^

Acheson testified later that it was the belief

of the President’s advisers that crossing of the thirtyeighth parallel probably would not cause China to intervene.-*-37

This‘belief must have been based on the

assumption that the Chinese were only bluffing, for they
had indicated otherwise on several occasions.
General Nieh Yen-jung, acting Chief of the
Communist General Staff, had discussed the American
crossing of the thirty-eighth parallel with the Indian
Ambassador at Peking, Sardar K. M. Panikkar, on September

2$.

He informed the Ambassador that China would not

•^^Bradley testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 2,
938-39; Johnson testimony, ibid'., P't. Zj., £621-22.
3-36jfrid.t pt. 1, 718; MacArthur, Reminiscences,
35>8; Ridgway, Korean War,
1 3 7 p ar

East Hearings, Pt. 3, 2100-101.
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permit the United States to advance to the Yalu River.
In public speeches on September 31 and October 1, China's
Foreign Minister, Chou En-lai, said that his country
would resist foreign aggression against its North Korean
neighbors.^39

Qn October 3 Chou summoned Panikkar to

inform him that if American troops advanced across the
parallel China would enter the war.

It was Panikkar's

understanding that if only .South Korean forces entered
North Korea, this would not precipitate Chinese inter
vention.^®
The President and his advisers believed that Chou
En-lai's warnings were designed to "blackmail" the United
Nations.

However, Truman concluded that the possibility

of Chinese intervention was too great to be ignored.

He

ordered the Joint Chiefs to send a directive to MacArthur
in the event that Chinese Communist Forces were committed

138spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 85*

139jbid., 86.
■^Acheson testimony, ~Far East Hearings, Pt. 3*
1833. See also, Acheson, Present aF t h e C r e a/faion, 452;
Truman, Memoirs, II, 361-62; Lichterman, "To the Yalu and
Back," 593; Higgins, Korea and the Fall of MacArthur,
Rovere and Schiesinger, TSie (jenhraT and the Presi
dent, llj.7. The authors of the latter work disagree with
the generally-accepted view that the Chinese Communists
intervened because the U.S. forces crossed the thirtyeighth parallel.
(See pp. Iif.7-l5l) They are supported in
part by Willoughby and Chamberlain, who believe that
North Korea had assurances of Chinese military support
prior to the outset of the war. See MacArthur, 380.
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in North Korea.

The instructions to the Par East Com

mander, dated October 9, read, in part:
In light of the possible intervention of Chinese
Communist forces in North Korea the following ampli
fication of our directive . . . is forwarded for
your guidance:
Hereafter in the event of the open or covert
employment anywhere inKorea of major Chinese
Communist units, without prior announcement, you
should continue the action as long as, in your judg
ment, action by forces now under your control offers
a reasonable chance of success. In any case you will
obtain authorization from Washington prior to taking
any military action against objectives in Chinese
territory
Truman considered the October 9 directive to be a
restrictive, cautionary gesture.
Arthur greater latitude.

In fact it allowed Mac-

The September 27 directive had

prohibited advancement into North Korea if Chinese actions
constituted a major threat of intervention.

The corollary

of October 9 allowed MacArthur to continue his advance
northward even if the Chinese did attack, so long as the
General felt he could win.

This willingness to risk a

confrontation with a fresh new opponent was a product of
the optimism generated by the triumph at Inchon and a

^ J C S to CINCFE, October 9, 1950, quoted in
Truman, Memoirs. II, 362. Message also appears in Far East
Hearings, Pt. 1 , 720. See also, Collins, War in PeacetimeT
171J--75S Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," 59*57 Richard
E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leader
ship (New York: New American Library, 1961}.), ljT^-33•
Hereinafter cited as Neustadt, Presidential Power.
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failure of military and political i n t e lligence.^^

Inchon

had made the long-sought goal of Korean unification seem
within easy grasp.

MacArthur's military intelligence had

informed him that Chinese armies were being moved to the
banks of the Yalu.

But it was assumed that with the North

Korean Army in disarray and the presumed ability of
American air power to prevent any sizable movement south
ward by the Chinese, the logic of the military situation
argued against an invasion.’*'^

The political intelligence

that China would go to war regardless of sound military
strategy was not available, as MacArthur later observed.
In the closing days of October, the evidence that
Chinese troops were involved in North Korea began to
accumulate.

Truman had received a memorandum on the

twentieth from the CIA that the Chinese would be moving
into North Korea to establish a protective perimeter
around several power plants on the Yalu which serviced

■^^Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," £93* £96.
Journalist James Res ton felt that Truman also allowed Mac
Arthur to move northward as he wished because the General's
political prestige was very high after Inchon and Truman
could not afford an open break with his popular field
commander. New York T i mes, November 30, 19£0.

^ % a c A r t h u r testimony, Par East Hearings, Pt. 1,
18-19* 8!j.j MacArthur, Reminiscences, 3£9» See also,
Phillips, Truman Presidency, 323"
^^MacArthur testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 1,
18-19» See also, MacArthur, Reminiscences, 36o.
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MManchuria.-!-^

ROK units close to the Yalu began to engage

in battle with Chinese units and on October 26 captured

llj.6

the first prisoners from these units.

The prisoners

informed their captors that their units had crossed the
Yalu on October 16.
"...
1

This was, Truman later wrote,

only one day after General MacArthur had assured

me on Wake Island that if any Chinese were to enter Korea
they would face certain disaster but that he did not
expect them to try anything that f o o l i s h . B y

October

30 there were reports that elements of the Chinese 39th,
l|.Oth and ijiind Armies were in North Korea.

The Par East

Command informed Washington that there was no confirmation
of these reports and that the Chinese engaged were
,.124.8
probably volunteers."
Truman ordered the Joint Chiefs
to secure a complete and up-to-date assessment of the
Chinese incursion from MacArthur.
On November I4 General MacArthur told the JCS that
available combat intelligence was insufficient for the
purpose of adequately estimating the degree of Chinese

•^•^Truman, Memoirs, II, 372. See also, Hanson
Baldwin, New York Times, October 22, 1950.
^^Ridgway, Korean W a r , 5lJ Millis, Arms and Men,
See also, Acheson te'st'imony, Far East hearings, Pt. 3#
1833 J Acheson, Present at the Creation, 1{.62.

296.

^7giruman> Memoirs, II, 373*
■^®Ridgway, Korean War, 51 •
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involvement.

He felt it was most likely that China would

provide some volunteers and military aid surreptitiously
to the North Koreans.

Regarding a full-scale military

intervention by the Chinese Communist Government, Mac
Arthur said, "While it is a distinct possibility . . .
there are many fundamental logical reacons against
it. . . .

jj0 d o s e d by cautioning against drawing

premature conclusions pending accumulation and appraisal
of military data . ^ 0

Matthew Ridgway, MacArthur*s

eventual successor, felt that the Far East Commander
"simply closed his ears" and ignored the early signs that
the Chinese had crossed the Yalu in f o r c e . I n

a

special report to the United Nations on November 5, Mac
Arthur wrote that his forces were in "hostile contact"
152
with Chinese Communist military units.
On the following
day MacArthur issued a special communique which began
with the declaration that the North Korean Army had been

^•^Q^oted in Truman, Memoirs, II, 373* See also,
Acheson testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 3* 1833*
l£0Truman, Memoirs, II, 373. See also, Spanier,
Truman-MacArthur Controversy, ll8 j Appleman, South to the
Naktong, f62; Acheson, Present at the Creation, k&3»
•^•^Ridgway, Korean War, Zj.7•
^ % a c A r t h u r , "Special Report to the Security
Council, United Nations," November 5, 1950, reprinted in
Far East Hearings, Pt. 5, 3^92-935 New York Times,
November 7, 1950. See also, Spanier, Truman~MacArthur
Controversy,118-19.
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decisively beaten and the Korean war had been brought to
a "practical end."

But the United Nation's Command now

faced a "new and fresh arnny of Communist Chinese."

By

their actions, MacArthur said, the Chinese Communists
". . • committed one of the most offensive acts of international lawlessness of historic records.

. . ."

153

The

statement closed by asserting that it was now the mission
of the UN Command to destroy the force newly deployed
against it in North Korea.
MacArthur had cautioned Washington on November If.
against making hasty judgments regarding Chinese inter
vention.

But on the following day he sent orders to his

air chief, General George E. Stratemeyer, telling him to
concentrate his forces on the destruction of the Korean
end of all bridges crossing the Yalu, as well as means of
communication, factories and other installations in North
Korea, except for the hydroelectric plants.

Stratemeyer's

first objective was to take out the bridges connecting

^ % e w York Times , November 6, 1950. Reprinted in
MacArthur, emln'iscences, 368 . See also, Truman, Memoirs,
II, 376; Appleman, South to the Naktong, 762; Spanier,
Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 119; Acheson testimony,
Far East Hearings, Pt. 3, lo3ll»
•*~%ew York Times, November 6, 1950.
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Sinuiju, North Korea and Antung, China.

l££

Three hours

before the intended strike, Stratemeyer sent a copy of his
orders to the Pentagon.

Under Secretary of Defense Lovett

immediately met with Acheson and Dean Rusk, Assistant
Secretary of State.

Lovett expressed a fear that Mac

Arthur’s order might cause the bombing of the Manchurian
city.

He also believed that destroying the bridges would

not materially affect the flow of Chinese troops into
North Korea.

Rusk reminded Acheson of the American

commitment to consult with Great Britain before moving
against Manchurian targets.

The three were in agreement

that the proposed attack should be postponed pending con
sultation with the President.

Acheson called Secretary of

Defense Marshall, who agreed to order the JCS to counter
mand MacArthur’s orders to Stratemeyer, pending new instructions from Truman.

l£6

^Truman, Memoirs, II, 371}-} Acheson, Present at
the Creation, 463. See also, Appleman, S o u t h T o the
Naktong, 71^} Higgins, Korea and the Pall of~~MacAr£5ur, 68•
* ^ A c h e s o n , Present at the Creation, 463} Truman,
Memoirs, II, 373-74} Collins, War in Peacetime, 200.
Acheson, Truman and Collins all ¥tat~e that the Pentagon
copy of MacArthur’s orders was sent by General Stratemeyer
to Washington, not by MacArthur, thus implying that the
latter sought a fait accompli. The official Army history
of the war says tliat the JCISf, " . . . received from Mac
Arthur a radio report of the order.” See Appleman, South
to the Naktong, 7l£» MacArthur's Reminiscences (p. 368),
HjKed no l i g h t o n who sent a copy of the orders to Washing
ton, but the General does acknowledge that there was a
danger of accidentally bombing Manchuria involved. He
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Shortly after talking with Marshall on November 6,
Acheson was able to reach the President by telephone in
Kansas City, where he had gone to cast his ballot in the
off-year elections.

After being brought up to date by

the Secretary of State, Truman said that he was willing
to authorize any action necessary for the safety of the
troops.

However, MacArthur's la3t message (on the

fourth) , had given no indication of movement across the
Yalu that would justify such an action.

Truman repeated

that he wished to’do nothing that might jeopardize the
United Nations' forces, but approved of the temporary
cancellation of the bombing mission until MacArthur
explained why the attack was necessary.

1^7

Accordingly,

less than two hours before the massive flight of bombers
was to leave its bases in Japan, Truman's countermanding
order was radioed to Par East Headquarters by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.

MacArthur was informed that the impli

cations of his proposed air strike were being considered
on a governmental level.

He was told of the need to con

sult with the British prior to taking action which might
involve Manchuria.

Until such time as orders were issued

leaves the impression that the risk was no longer
important, since some Chinese forces had become involved
in the fighting. See also, Lichterman, "To the Yalu and
Back," 602-603.
•^^Truman, Memoirs, II, 37k~7$i Acheson, Present
at the Creation, lj.63-61j.jCollins, War in Peacetime, 200-201.
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to the contrary, MacArthur was instructed to adhere to a
v

...

previous JCS directive which prohibited him from bombing
targets within five miles of the Manchurian border.

The

Far East Commander was also ordered to provide Washington
with a new estimate of the military situation and an
1^8
explanation for his order to destroy the Yalu bridges. ^
"It would be impossible to exaggerate my astonish
ment. . .

MacArthur has written in describing his

reaction to the order suspending the air mission against
159
the Yalu bridges.
He quickly drafted a dramatic
response to the JCS request for justification.

His

message said that Chinese troops and military supplies
were "pouring" across the target bridges.

It was his

belief that this movement not only endangered his troops,
but also threatened to accomplish the total destruction
of the armies under his command.

MacArthur said that

only destruction of the bridges could prevent reinforce
ment of the enemy.

He also advocated full utilization of

his air power to accomplish the destruction of all instal
lations in northern Korea which could contribute to the

^58jcs to MacArthur, November £, 1950, quoted in
MacArthur testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 20; Major
General Emmett 0 1Donnell 'testimony, lFid., Pt. If., 3090.
See also, Truman, Memoirs, II, 375J Acheson, Present at the
Creation, k&ki MacArthur, Reminiscences, 368; Appleman,
South to the Naktong, 715J Lichterman, "To the Yalu and
Back,irT o T T "
l 5 % aCArthur, Reminiscences, 368.
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support of the Chinese advance.

The unusual, adamant

tone of MacArthur*s closing lines reveal the fervor of
his conviction that his superiors were in error.

He

appealed over their heads directly to the Commander in
Chief:
I am suspending this strike and carrying out your
instructions. What I had ordered is entirely within
the scope of the rules of war and the resolutions
and directions I have received from the United
Nations and constitutes no slightest act of
belligerency against Chinese territory, in spite of
the outrageous international lawlessness emanating
therefrom. I cannot overemphasize the disastrous
effect, both physical and psychological, that will
result from the restrictions which you are imposing.
I trust that the matter be immediately brought to
the attention of the President as I believe your
instructions may well result in a calamity of major
proportion for which I cannot accept the responsi
bility without his personal and direct understanding
of the situation. . . .160
Upon receipt of this message in Washington, General
Bradley called the President and read him the text.
Truman was very concerned about the danger of precipi
tating a far wider war.

"But," he wrote, "since General

MacArthur was on the scene and felt so strongly that this
was of unusual urgency, I told Bradley to give him the

l60Teiecon, MacArthur to JCS, November 6, 1950,
(Nov. 7> Tokyo), reprinted in Truman, Memoirs, II, 375*
General Collins has described as an "extraordinary request,"
MacArthur*s request that the matter be brought directly to
the President. War in Peacetime, 201. For copies of the
paraphrased text of TSEis message, see MacArthur,
Reminiscences, 368-69; Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back,"
603; Far East Hearings, Pt. I)., 3090; Acheson, Present at
the Creation, £|.6l|.; Appleman, South to the Naktong, 715-TE;
Phillips', Truman Presidency, 32$ •

Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibitedwithout permission.

$$1
'go-ahead.'

In their message transmitting the Presi

dent's decision to MacArthur, the Joint Chiefs apparently
could not resist chiding MacArthur for the extreme dif
ference between the situations depicted in his messages
of the fourth and sixth.

They acknowledged that bombing

the bridges would contribute to the security of his
forces, but, since this action might bring full inter
vention by China or the Soviet Union, his force would be
in greater danger and the war vastly extended to a degree
dangerous to American self-interest.

However, MacArthur

was allowed to proceed with his bombardment.

The

directive expressly enjoined against attacks on dams or
l A?
hydroelectric plants along the Yalu.
The new concept
of limited warfare is evident throughout the message.
Most notably, MacArthur was advised to be absolutely
certain not to violate Manchurian soil or airspace,
". . . because it is vital in the national interests of

■^■^Truman, Memoirs, II, 375>-76. MacArthur later
testified that it was his "violent protest" which caused
rescinding of the countermand, see Far East Hearings.
Pt. 1, 20.
^•^Quoted In Truman, Memoirs, II, 376. See also,
Bradley testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 2, 7l£j Aoheson,
Present at the Creation, libh; Collins, War in Peacetime,
201-202; Appleman, South to the Naktong, 7l*5T Within a
few days the bridges werelcnocked out. However, less than
two weeks later the Yalu was frozen over, allowing the
passage of even the heaviest military equipment. See
Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," 601}.•
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the U.S. to localize the fighting in Korea. , .

A military intelligence estimate by MacArthur
arrived in Washington on November 7*

In it the "Par East

Commander reaffirmed his belief that the Chinese inter
vention did not constitute a full-scale intervention.

But

the General did add that the troops which had crossed the
Yalu could be reinforced to the point where they could
check the completion of his advance northward and,
possibly, force him into a retrograde movement.

MacArthur

said he intended to advance against these new units in
order to estimate their potential s t r e n g t h . T r u m a n
already had in hand a Central Intelligence Report (dated
November 6) which estimated that about two hundred
thousand Chinese troops were poised in a striking position
in Manchuria.

The CIA estimate was in agreement with

MacArthur that intervention by these troops would halt
his advance and probably force a retreat.

The drafter of

the report were convinced that China was aware that such
involvement could bring about a general war.

The CIA

■^^Quoted
Truman, Memoirs, II, 376. The follow
ing day, Secretary Marshall wrote to MacArthur, telling
him he appreciated the difficulty faced in fighting a
limited war, but that conditions made it unavoidable.
Marshall is quoted in MacArthur, Reminiscences, 370. The
text of Marshall’s letter also appears in Higgins, Korea
and the Pall of MacArthur, 71•
^ Q u o t e d in Truman, Memoirs, II, 377*
Par East Hearings, Pt. 3» l&3k*

See also,
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also told Truman that the Soviet Union was not inclined
to join directly in the Korean fighting but hoped to keep
the United States deeply involved there, thus allowing
them freer rein in

E u r o p e .

^5

In a second message on November 7 General Mac
Arthur told of the ever-increasing number of Russian-built
MIG-15 j©t fighter aircraft that were attacking his air
units operating near the Yalu.

The MiG's were using very

effective hit-and-run tactics, striking quickly and then
breaking contact and retreating across the border into
Manchurian airspace.

Since MacArthur had been ordered

not to penetrate the border, pursuing aircraft had to
halt at the Yalu River, the area beyond constituting a
sanctuary.

The General described this as an "abnormal

condition" having a debilitating effect on combat
efficiency and the morale of air and ground troops.
requested new instructions from Washing ton.

He

What Mac

Arthur wanted was the right of "hot pursuit," which he
subsequently defined as permission ". . . to pursue an
attacking enemy plane to the death, whether it was over
the border line or not."^^^

l65Truman, Memoirs, II, 376, 378? Lichterman, "To
the Yalu and Back," 666.
■^^MacArthur to JCS, November 7> 1950, quoted in
Truman, Memoirs, II, 377•
•^^MacArthur testimony, 3?ar East Hearings, Pt. 1, 12.
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Th© principle involved in "hot pursuit" was clearlyestablished in international law and by historical precedents involving the rules of warfare.

168

The Joint Chiefs

of Staff, Defense Department, State Department and the
President were all willing to allow this latitude to
169
pursuing aircraft.
Secretary Acheson believed it
proper to inform the other nations with forces involved in
Korea that such an order was to be issued.

Accordingly,

on November 13, he dispatched a message to the American
embassies in the nations concerned asking the ambassador
to inform the government to which he was accredited that
United Nations aircraft might soon be granted permission
to pursue attacking aircraft up to a limit of three minutes
flying time into Manchuria.

Acheson concluded his

message by saying that since only limited application of
the pursuit doctrine was involved and because the order
was based on "military necessity and elementary principles
of self-defense," the concurrence of the respective
170
countries was not being sought.

■^^Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," 60I4..
I69par Ea3t Hearings, Pt. 2, 887-88 , 1388; Pt. 3>
1722-2Ij.. See also, Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back,"
601\.; Higgins, Korea and the Fall of MacArthur, 70.
170j»or text of letter, see Far East Hearings, Pt. 3 »
1928. Those governments, aside from tlie Iff.S . and Korea,
contributing military forces to the fighting by midNovember, 1950, were Australia, Belgium, Canada, France,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey,
and the United Kingdom. See ibid., Pt. 3, 1929.
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Concurrence of the allies was not requested in
Acheson*s notification that "hot pursuit" might be
employed, but they responded— unanimously and negatively—
to the whole idea.

The ambassadors reported that these

nations regarded hostile action over Manchuria as
undesirable and dangerous.

In the face of such general

opposition, the matter was dropped.

171

The President's

views on the aerial pursuit question are not altogether
clear.
oil.172

Acheson does not recall Truman being consulted at
jn

memoi;rs t Truman did not offer any personal

judgment on the question, he merely recorded MacArthur's
message asking for a new directive to meet the situation.
However, he follows MacArthur's message with some general
commentary which reveals his concept of how he had to
conduct this unique type of limited, coalition warfare:
. . . I valued the expression of MacArthur’s opinions,
and so did the Joint Chiefs. There was never any
question about my high regard for MacArthur’s military
judgment. But as President I had to listen to more
than military judgments, and my decisions had to be
made on the basis of not just one theater of operations
but of a much more comprehensive picture of our
nation’s place in the world.
• . . neither he (MacArthur) nor I would have been
justified if we had gone beyond the mission that the
United Nations General Assembly had given us.
There was no doubt in my mind that we should not

■^•kAcheson testimony, ibid., 1722-24, 1735-36.
See also, MacArthur, Reminiscences, 365.
^ ^ Far East Hearings, Pt. 3, 1723. Truman says
that the "EoT pursuit" inquiries were submitted to the
nations concerned with his approval. Memoirs, II, 382.
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allow the action in Korea to extend into a general
war. All-out military action against China had to be
avoided, if for no other reason than because it was a
gigantic booby trap,173
The deep misunderstanding that developed between
the Commander in Chief and his field commander was not
lessened by these limitations imposed on the conduct of
operations above the thirty-eighth parallel.

The

restrictive policy Truman adopted was designed to avoid
any activity that would alienate American allies or serve
to justify the enemy’s expansion of the conflict into a
general war.

Nor were these self-imposed limitations

designed solely to prevent the onset of World War III,
They were also part of an "implicit bargain" with the
Communists,

Although Truman did not allow MacArthur to

violate the Manchurian sanctuary in any manner, the enemy
allowed the United States a privileged sanctuary.

For

example, enemy air power was very rarely employed against
American ground units, supply depots, railroads, or
bridges.

Shipping was not endangered by enemy actions.

Port facilities could offload military supplies at night,
fully illuminated and inviolate.

While it is difficult

to speculate on the enemy’s motivations, save to suggest
that they, too, may not have desired a general war " . . .
it is important to remember that they did fight under

•^73Truman, Memoirs, II, 377-78•
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limitations that were quite as restrictive as our own.
Amidst the uncertainties of Chinese Communist
intentions in the first week of November, Truman instructed
the JCS to provide him with their recommendations

respecting intervention.

The President was given a three-

point memorandum on November 8.

The Joint Chiefs

recommended first, that all available political and
diplomatic means should be employed to assure China that
the UN forces in North Korea did not constitute a threat
to their security.

Secondly, since the military objectives

and degree ofinvolvement by the Chinese Communists were
still unknown, orders should remain unchanged, pending
later review.

Lastly, all planning and preparations by

the United States should henceforth be predicated on the
assumption that the possibility of global conflict had
been increased.

1 7 1?
1^

The National Security Council met on November 9 to
discuss the JCS recommendations and review the changing

■^^Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back,” 605.
General Ridgway agrees that the UN forces enjoyed a
privileged sanctuary, ”. . . without which the Korean War
could have been a far more tragic story." Korean War,
75*
See also, Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy,
277-79, Morton H. Halperin, "The Limiting Process In the
Korean W a r , ” in Guttman (ed.), Korea and the Theory of
Limited W a r , 92-106, pa ssim. Hereinafter cited as
Halperin, ""limiting Process in Korean War."
175Truman, Memoirs, II, 37^5 Collins, War In
Peacetime, 206.
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conditions of the war.

Truman was not present.

Speaking

for the Joint Chiefs, Bradley said that the Chinese had
three possible intentions:

establishing a buffer zone

to protect the hydroelectric facilities along the Yalu;
forcing the United States to fight a war of attrition
that would weaken the nation decisively in the event of
a global conflict with the Soviet Union; driving the UN
command completely off the Korean peninsula.

If the

latter was their objective, Bradley stated, they would
require a degree of Soviet assistance that might bring
about another world war.

MacArthur should be able to hold

off an attack along his present line, but the proscription
against attacking Manchurian bases left this questionable.
Bradley did not agree with MacArthur that destroying the
Yalu bridges could halt the Chinese.

General Bedell

Smith of the CIA noted that the Yalu would soon freeze
over and be passable without bridges.

Secretary Marshall

told the council members that MacArthur’s eastern flank
was dangerously thin and dispersed over a very wide area.
Marshall explained that this was done so that MacArthur
could carry out his primary objective to pacify, occupy,
and hold elections in North Korea.

The meeting ended in

general accord with the principles expressed in the JCS
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memorandum of the e i g h t h . T h e Joint Chiefs’ memorandum
and the Security Council meeting demonstrated that Truman’s
civil and military advisers agreed on the potential
capacity of Chinese forces to destroy what had been accom
plished.

But they could not solve the riddle of Chinese

intentions, so they agreed that MacArthur’s strategic
disposition should remain unchanged while the Administra
tion sought answers through indirect diplomacy.
What Truman’s advisers did not know was that while
they deliberated the Chinese were in the process of
completing a massive infiltration into North Korea.

Mac

Arthur, after his earlier concern that the Chinese
constituted a genuine threat to his forces, was convinced,
from November 9 until the last days of the month, that
the Air Force could prevent any major Chinese reinforce
ment across the Yalu and that his ground forces would
soon dispatch the remaining opposition in North Korea.
His reports in this period reflect calm assurance and
heartening o p t i m i s m . M e a n w h i l e ,

the Chinese Communist

Forces were moving the last units of a force of 300,000
into the mountains of North Korea.

Moving only at night,

•*•7^Truman, Memoirs, II, 378-80. See also, Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," 606-607; Acheson, Present at
the Creation, lj.65-66; Collins, War in Peacetime, 206-20*57
Neustadt, Presidential Power, l3^**3"7T
^■^^Ridgway, Korean W a r , 60.
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in a very effective "march and bivouac" discipline, the
Chinese had accomplished one of the great secret mass
troop movements in military history.

American military

intelligence, serial observers and aerial photographs all
failed entirely to detect this infiltration which had
begun some time in October.
As part of the diplomatic initiatives recommended
to Truman by the Joint Chiefs, a resolution was introduced
in the UN Security Council on November 10.

It asked the

Chinese to desist from continued intervention in Korea
and affirmed that it was UN policy, ". . . t o hold the
Chinese frontier with Korea inviolate and fully to pro
tect legitimate Chinese and Korean interests in the
frontier zone."

179

Speaking in support of the resolution

in a public statement on November 16, his remarks clearly
directed at China, Truman said that the United States
fully endorsed and was acting within the scope of limits
imposed by United Nations.- policy in Korea.

He said that

American policy "never at any time" envisioned carrying

■^^Appleman, South to the Naktong, 770; Esposito
(ed.), West Point Atlas, lT7 Sec. "3, Map Plate No. 9*
Regarding this undefect'ed infiltration, Senator Leverett
Saltonstall asked Acheson:
"They really fooled us when
it comes right down to it, didn't they?
Acheson replied,
"Yes, sir." Far East Hearings, Pt. 3, 1835*

179doc.

No. 13 » Joint Resolution in the Security
Council, November 10, 1950, United States Policy in the
Korean Conflict, 22-23.
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November 21.

But on the northwestern flank, Eighth

Army,

advancing in widely separated columns, was finding it
increasingly difficult to move forward.
In mid-November, as MacArthur planned his offensive,
there had been growing concern over the deployment of his
forces.

Apparently General Ridgway was the first to note

the danger in the tactical dispositions, wherein Eighth
Army in the west and Tenth Corps in the east were not
linked together or advancing at the same pace.

In addition,

these two forces were subdivided into unattached columns
dispersed over a wide front.

Given the logistical

problems being encountered, the mountainous terrain, the
oncoming winter and the possibility of major Chinese
intervention, the United Nations Command could be in
iQc?
jeopardy. ^ This situation was a principal subject for
discussion between the Secretaries of State and Defense
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a meeting together on
November 21.

When Acheson expressed concern over the

scattered forces, Marshall and Bradley said they were not
prepared to order a change in MacArthur’s troop disposi
tions since they were seven thousand miles from the front.
Acheson concluded that their reluctance to ask the

•^®%acArthur, Reminiscences, 365-66.
•^■'’Acheson, Present at the Creation, lj.67; Lichterman,
"To the Yalu and Back, tr 602.
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the war into Chinese territory.

l 80

The Security Council

resolution was vetoed by the Soviet Union on November 30,
1950 .181
On November 11 units of General Walker’s Eighth
Army advancing northward encountered stiff resistance
just above the Chongchon (Ch'ongch'on) River.

Walker

reported to MacArthur that the opposition came from
”. . • fresh, well-organized, and well-trained units,

102

some of which were Chinese Communist forces.”

Six days

later, determined to test the full extent of Chinese
involvement and, if possible, complete the conquest of
North Korea, General MacArthur informed the Pentagon that
he intended to launch a general offensive on November 2ij.,
designed to bring his whole line of advance up to the
Yalu.^8^

Before the offensive got off, forward elements

of Tenth Corps on the eastern flank reached the Yalu on

l^Oitem No. 28?, Press Conference, November 16, 1950,
Public Papers . . . Truman, 1950, 711-12.
Text of Truman's
statement can also be found in New York T i m e s , November
17, 1950; Ear East Hearings, PtV "5,
Doc. No. lip,
United States Policy"in the Korean Conflict, 23•
l8lThe resolution had been sponsored by the United
States, United Kingdom, Prance, Cuba, Ecuador and Norway.
Doc. No. 13, United States Policy in the Korean Conflict,
footnote, 22 .
•^^Qaoted in Ridgway, Korean War, 59.
■ ^ A c h e s o n ,
Present at the Creation, I4-67 . Mac
Arthur explained the reasons why^he considered this
advance necessary in his Reminiscences, 171-72. See
a3so, Spanier, Truman-MacArtbur Controversy, 129-33*
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President for an order changing the deployment was based on
an underlying respect for the "MacArthur mystique" and a
lack of desire to restrain "the sorcerer of Inchon.
General Bradley testified (in 1951) that he would certainly
have deployed the troops differently.^®"^

However, at the

meeting of November 21, 1950, the generals, while express
ing great apprehension, would not countermand the
commander in the field.

And, as Acheson later wrote, "I

was unwilling to urge on the President a military course
1 Rfl
that his military advisers would not propose."
This
reluctance among Truman’s advisers left him unaware of
the potential danger to these forces for which he was
ultimately responsible.

The Joint Chiefs were concerned

enough to send MacArthur a message on the twenty-fourth
suggesting that he halt his advance on the high ground
which dominated the approaches from the Yalu Valley.

The

Par Bast Commander responded by saying that it would be

Acheson, Present at the Creation, 467.
■^^Bradley gave a full explanation of his position
regarding MacArthur’s troops dispositions in response to
questions from Senator J. William Fulbright, Far East
Hearings, Pt. 2, 972-75> 1143-45•
■^^Acheson, Present at the Creation, 468; Ridgway,
Korean War, 61. For MacArtHur1s defense of his disposi
tions, see Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 19, 192, 246-47?
MacArthur, Ifteminisciences, 359-60. For an excellent
analysis of why Truman's major advisers were reluctant to
go to him for decision, see Neustadt, Presidential Power,
138-40.
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"utterly impossible" to halt his advance at that line.

He

also offered his personal view that Chinese plans could
not be altered by American timidity.
General

189

MacArthur flew to Eighth Army headquarters

on the Congchon River on November 2k to launch personally
the "final" offensive.

He announced that the assault

should bring an end to the war.

MacArthur also told his

corps commanders that he hoped American troops could be
190
pulled out of Korea by Christmas.
On the flight to
Korea, the General had ordered his plane to fly along the
Yalu so that he might observe the area for himself.

Upon

his return to Tokyo, MacArthur issued a statement saying,
"An air reconnaissance behind the enemy's line and along
the entire length of the Yalu River border showed little
sign of hostile military activity."191

on the day of this

■^^Texts 0f
messages exchanged between the JCS
and MacArthur are in Ear East Hearings, Pt. 2, 1229-30.
See also, MacArthur, Reminiscences, 373; Rovere and
Schlesinger, The General and theHPresident, Ikl-k2 * Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back/0 '66$;'"Spanier, Truman-MacArthur
Controversy, 125-26. General Ridgway describes MacArthur 1a
stubborn insistence on advancing to the Yalu as comparable
to General Custer's behavior at Little Big Horn. Korean
W a r , 76-77.
•^^New York Times, November 2ij., 25, 1950; MacArthur,
Reminiscences, 37?. See also, Truman, Memoirs, II, 381;
Ridgway, Korean War, 60. A discussion of MacArthur's unfortunate ''home b‘y~Christmas" statement was held in a
National Security Council session on November 28. Truman
describes the commentary in his Memoirs, II, 386-87 . See
also, Acheson, Present at the Creation, 1+71.
^ ^ N e w York Times, November 25, 1950.
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statement, Far East Headquarters had been provided with a
copy of a CIA report which estimated that the minimal
response from the Chinese Communists that could be expected
was an increase in their military operations.

They would,

the CIA claimed, seek to immobilize the United Nations
forces, wage a prolonged war of attrition and attempt to
preserve the semblance of a Communist North Korean state.
But the Chinese had sufficient strength, if employed, to
force the UN armies into withdrawal and a defensive

posture."*-^
The first two days of the offensive went well against
light opposition.

But on November 26, 200,000 Chinese

Communist troops struck in the wide gap between Eighth
Army and Tenth Corps.

In a matter of hours they had

swept through the R0K Second Corps and all but eliminated
the right flank of Eighth A r m y . ^ ^

Walker’s army began

a

retreat that continued until the Chinese temporarily broke
contact, a distance of some forty miles.

In the eastern

sector, Tenth Corps advance units— First Marine Division
and Seventeenth Infantry Regiment— were surrounded and cut

Memoirs, II, 381.
3-93flew York Times, November 25* 19^0. See also,
Ridgway, Korean War, 6$; MacArthur, Reminiscences, 37b»
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off by several Chinese divisions.
It was the President’s usual routine to meet with
the White House staff before his business day began.

On

November 28, in a quiet, solemn voice, he told the staff
that he had received a telephone call from General Bradley
at six-fifteen that morning.

The Chairman of the JCS had

told Truman of a "terrible message" just received from the
Par East.

"MacArthur said there were two hundred and

sixty thousand Chinese troops against him out there. . , ,"
Truman told his staff.

"He says he's stymied.

has to go over to the defensive. . . .
come in with both feet."

195

He says he

The Chinese have

MacArthur acknowledged that

the Chinese attack had shattered the hopes he had enter
tained that his offensive would bring a prompt end to the
fighting:

"We face," he said, "an entirely new war."^*^

Truman convened a special session of the National
Security Council on the twenty-eighth to examine policy in
light of the dramatic reversal of military fortunes in

^9^LiCh.terman, "To the Yalu and Back," 610; Phillips,
Truman Presidency, 326; MacArthur, Reminiscences, 37k*
52.

■^^Truman is quoted in Hersey, "Profiles," Pt. 2,
See also, Truman, Memoirs, II, 385.

■^^Quoted in Acheson, Present at the Creation, 14.69 •
See also, MacArthur, Reminiscences, 375? Truman, Memoirs,
II, 381+J Phillips, Truman Presidency, 326; Collins, War in
Peacetime, 220-21; Fehrehbach, This Kind of War, 377 1 Far
East Hearings, Pt. 3» 18314-*

Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibitedwithout permission.

567
Korea.

All of the President’s military advisers— the

Secretaries of Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff— were in full agreement that the war
had to remain limited.

The United States should not allow

itself to be drawn into a general war with China.

Not

only could the Communists draw on an enormous manpower
reserve, but no additional reinforcements would be avail
able for Korea until March of 1951*

Additionally, an all-

out war against China would necessitate halting the
build-up of the military defenses of Western Europe
(which was a primary objective set by NSC-68, the global
policy statement drafted by this same C o u n c i l ) . T h e
President’s advisers offered no recommendations for his
decision, being content, for the time being, to wait for
the battlefield situation to clarify.
MacArthur was left in a very difficult position.
The prohibitions against bombing Manchuria and the Yalu
dams and hydroelectric stations remained, as did the
denial of hot pursuit.

While the United Nations Command

was badly outnumbered and facing a fresh enemy, their
commander was informed that he should not expect even
limited reinforcements until the following March and few

197Truman, Memoirs, II, 385-86; Acheson, Present at
the Creation, Ij.69. See also, Fehrenbach, This Kind of War,
TT7-7HT For Truman’s analysis of the international
situation which determined his limited response in Korea
at the time (November, 1950), see Memoirs, II, 380-81.
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replacements before January.-*-98

On November 29 a message

arrived from General MacArthur asking the Administration
to accept the offer of thirty-three thousand Chinese
Nationalist troops made by Chiang Kai-shek at the outset
of the war.

After a long talk with the State and Defense

Departments, Truman ordered the JCS to tell MacArthur that
the subject was under study.

But the message made it clear

that for numerous diplomatic reasons, the proposal was not
T O O

favorably received. 77
MacArthur's "general offensive" of November 2l\.t
which he subsequently referred to as a "reconnaissance in
force," had at least answered the question of Chinese
intentions.^®®

His critics have called the operation "a

19QTruman, Memoirs, II, 386-87; Acheson, Present at
the Creation, lj.69, 1+71. While MacArthur continuously
requested authority to bomb Manchuria and blockade the
China coast, he never requested that his ground forces be
used to invade mainland China. In his testimony in 1951
he characterized such a suggestion as "utterly reckless"
and "ridiculous." Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 29, 1+3*
W j C S to MacArthur, November 29, 1950, printed in
Truman, Memoirs, II, 385* See also, MacArthur,
Reminiscences, 375-76.
^®®MacArthur to Frank W. Boykin, December 13* 1950.
Truman Papers, OF, lj.71-B - Korean Emergency, Truman
Library. See also, MacArthur testimony, Far East Hearings,
Pt. 1, 21. Army Chief of Staff Collins testified that the
advance by MacArthur was not a "reconnaissance in force,"
but a full-scale offensive designed to destroy the remain
ing NKPA forces. See ibid., Pt. 5> 3^95•
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first class American defeat"2^

and "one of the most

ignominious defeats in American history."

202

MacArthur

denied this, saying that his advance was designed to
determine enemy capability and that his reversal was a
strategic withdrawal, accomplished in "magnificent order
and s h a p e . T h e

truth lies somewhere between these

extremes, but it is worthwhile to note that--at the
time— Truman's faith in MacArthur's generalship had not
waivered.

Queried about the developing crisis, Truman

said:
People who don't know military affairs except
everthing to go well all the time. They don't under
stand. A general can't be a winner every day of the
week. The greatest of generals have had to take
reverses. I advise you to study the lives of
Alexander the Great, Tamerlane, Gustavus Adolphus,
Hunyadi--and Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson.
You'll find they all won most of the time, but they
all had their troubles, too. I'm not upset, like
most people, about these reverses MacArthur is
taking.2^4
The Chinese continued to press their advantage in
the last days of November.

They had driven a large wedge

between the Eighth Army and Tenth Corps.

The CCF

^Olspanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 133.
2®2Rovere and Schlesinger, The General and the
President, 152.
21.

2®^MacArthur testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 1,
See also, MacArthur, Reminiscences, 3VU«
2<^Quoted in Hersey,

"Profiles," Pt. 1, JLf.3•
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apparently planned to envelop the inland flanks of both
commands, drive them into defensive pockets on the coasts
and destroy them.

Meanwhile, the major thrust of the

Chinese attack would advance southward through the central
20^
breach down the entire peninsula.
In a message
received by the Joint Chiefs on November 30 $ MacArthur
explained that if enemy pressure continued to develop as it
was at the time, he would contract the Tenth Corps into a
defensive sector between the deep-water ports of Hungnam
and Wonsan on the eastern seaboard.

206

Replying the same

day, the Joint Chiefs expressed concern over the exposed
positions of Tenth Corps.

They suggested that MacArthur

attempt a coordination of Eighth Army with Tenth Corps
sufficient enough to prevent their being outflanked or
allowing any large CCF force to advance between them.
it became necessary, Tenth Corps should be evacuated.

If

207

On the morning these messages were being exchanged,
the President held a press conference.

He began by

reading a statement to the reporters regarding Chinese
intervention, which he described as a "new act of

20j?Esposito

(ed.), West Point Atlas, II, Sec. 3,

Map Plate No. 9.
^^MacArthur to JCS, November 30, 1950, printed in
Far East Hearings, Pt. 2, llij.6.
^°^JCS to MacArthur, November 30, 1950, ibid.,
llij.5-lf.6. See also, Collins, War in Peacetime, 2^7-28.
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aggression in Korea” by which China was being " . . .

forced

or deceived into serving the ends of Russian colonial
Q
policy in Asia."
While the battlefield situation was
then uncertain, Truman said that the United Nations did
not intend to abandon its mission.

He described the attack

as just a part of a global pattern which endangered all
free nations and emphasized the necessity for reapidly
expanding military defenses and establishing an integrated
NATO force in Europe.

The President said that he would

immediately submit a request to Congress for supplemental
appropriations, which would include additional funds for
the Atomic Energy Commission, as well as the Army, Navy,
and Air Force.

The purpose of these budgetary requests

would be to expand the size of the armed forces and
increase the effectiveness of the entire military-defense
system. ^09
Following his statement, Truman opened the press
conference to questions.

Early in the course of this

meeting Truman defended MacArthur by explaining that he,
as Commander in Chief, was kept fully informed by the
General of "every detail" in his tactical planning.

As

^®®Itera No. 295* Press Conference, November 30, 1950,
Public Papers . . . Truman , 1950> 721J.-25*

209jbid. The text of Truman’s statement also
appears in New York Times, December 1, 1950; Truman,
Memoirs, II,' 3ttb-9o; Far East Hearings, Pt. £, 3^96-97.
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the questioners persisted, Truman responded by telling
them that MacArthur was doing a good job and had not
exceeded his command authority.

To further questioning,

Truman revealed that he was still not going to use Nation
alist Chinese troops in Korea and, while refusing to say
whether MacArthur would be allowed to bomb beyond the
Yalu, did acknowledge that if the UN authorized such a
step, it would be taken.

Elaborating on the latter point,

the President said that he was prepared to take whatever
steps were necessary to meet the new military situation.
A reporter asked if this included use of the atomic bomb.
Truman replied:

"That includes every weapon we have."

210

Continuing, in response to several more queries, the Pres
ident went on to say that while the atomic bomb was a
"terrible weapon" he did not want to employ, its use in
the Korean War was, and always had been, under active
consideration.

211

Asked if atomic weapons would be used

against military or civilian objectives, the President
said:

"It's a matter that the military people will have to

^ ^ I t e m No. 295, Press Conference, November 30,
1950, Public Papers . . . Truman, 1950> 727.
^^Ibid.j Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 398; Truman,
Memoirs, II, 395* See also, S’t o n e Hid*3en History of the
Korean War, 199; Phillips, Truman Presidency, 329; HTlTis,
Arms and Men, 299. In response to a reporter's question in
a press conference in July, Truman had said that he was not
considering use of the atomic bomb in Korea. See Item No.
203 t Press Conference, July 27, 1950, Public Papers . • •
Truman, 1950* 562.
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decide.

I'm not a military authority that passes on those

things."

212

Truman's answer makes little sense.

He was

the only human being in the world who had ever decided on
the use of atomic devices and the type of target they were
to be used against.

After World War II he had wisely

insisted that atomic weapons policy decisions rest exclu
sively with the commander in chief.

The President's

exclusive control of nuclear weaponry was emphasized in a
clarifying statement issued by the White House shortly
after the press conference ended.

21

J

American allies,

most notably Great Britain, later required additional
assurance that the bomb would not be u s e d . ^ ^
The message to Congress requesting supplemental
appropriations was sent up on December 1, 1950.

In it the

212jtem No. 295* Press Conference, November 30,
1950, Public Papers . . . Truman, 1950* 727*
^■^White House Press Release, November 30, 1950,
copy in Truman Papers, OF, U71-B - Korean Emergency,
Truman Library.
2l4]3ritish Prime Minister Clement Atlee flew to
Washington on December ij. to receive personal reassurances
from Truman respecting atomic policy. For accounts of their
conversations, see Truman, Memoirs, II, 396-1j.13» Acheson,
Present at the Creation, Zj.83-81}.; Warren, President as World
Leader,' T?9-k7); Spanier,Tr\mian-MacArthur Controversy,
166-67; LaFeber, America, Russia, and EKe Cold War, 112;
O'Connor, "Harry S . Truman: ftew Dimensions of Power," 2728; "President's Communique of December 8 , 1950, regarding
His Conferences with Prime Minister Atlee," Far East Hear
ings, Pt. 5>, Appendix G, 3501-50lj.; Item No. 30l, "Joini
Statement Following Discussions with the Prime Minister of
Great Britain, December 8 , 1950, Public Papers . . • Truman,
1950, 738-ij.O.
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President requested an additional $1.05 billion be pro
vided the Atomic Energy Commission to increase its capacity
to produce fissionable materials and fabricate nuclear
weapons.

He asked that $16.8 billion more be added to the

Department of Defense budget for fiscal 1951*

Truman said

that this latter increment was necessary to sustain
America’s military participation in the UN action in Korea
and ". . . t o increase the size and readiness of our armed
forces should action become necessary in other parts of the
world."

2X5

The President’s message justified the need for

additional funds and forces with much the same logic and
language employed in the statement he read to his press
conference the previous day.

To Truman the Chinese attack

was but one facet of a global strategy directed by the
Soviet Union.

In the process of implementing this policy,

the Russians were knowingly running the risk of bringing
on a third world war.

Truman's assumption was neither

provable nor subject to documented refutation.

But it

became the operating premise which guided the determination
of American military policy for the remainder of his admin
istration.

In retrospect, while China’s intervention may

21Sitem No. 296, Special Message to Congress Request
ing Additional Appropriations for Defense, December 1,
1950, Public Papers . . . Truman, 1950, 728-31. Full text
of this message is reprinted in Far feast Hearings, Pt. 5,
Appendix F, 3^-97-3501. Truman signed the Second Supple- .
mental Appropriation Act of 1951 (6)4. Stat. 1223), on
January 6 , 1951 •
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have neatly meshed with existing Soviet policy, national
self-interest was the most likely primal determinant.

The

Chinese border was threatened by a large armed force rep
resenting a hostile political ideology.

China intervened,

at least in part, to preserve a neighboring Communist
pi

nation’s existence.

L

However, it would be inaccurate to

conclude that the President overreacted to the Chinese
incursion by falsely assuming that it was part of a Soviet
master plot.

The Central Intelligence Agency had provided

him with a great deal of data substantiating just such a
conclusion.

This intelligence appreciation was concurred

in by Secretaries Marshall and Acheson.^^

It could well

be that the American build-up and countervailing movements
frustrated Soviet intentions.
In a lengthy report to the JCS on December 3,
MacArthur described the situation of Eighth Army as
"increasingly critical" and said that he was moving Tenth
Corps into a beachhead as rapidly as possible.

The TJN

Commander said that the suggestion of a continuous,
defensive line across the peninsula was militarily unsound
because of the size of the enemy forces.

MacArthur

claimed his air power was diminished by the terrain and

O'] ZL

Item No. 296, Public Papers . . . Truman, 1950>
728; Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," 6l7-l8•
217Truman, Memoirs, II, 390-91; Acheson, Present at
the Creation, if-73—7i|-*
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"enormously" hampered by the prohibition against attacking
across the international boundary.

Because the enemy was

concentrating force along deep interior lines, amphibious
maneuvers and naval gunfire support were rendered inef
fective.

Thus MacArthur’s air and naval superiority were

of little use. He said that unless he received ground rein
forcements "of the greatest magnitude," he would have to
continue a costly withdrawal tactic or form beachhead
bastions.

MacArthur continued:

This small command actually under present conditions
is facing the entire Chinese nation in an undeclared
war and unless some positive and immediate action is
taken. • . , attrition leading to final destruction
can reasonably be contemplated. . . .
The directives under which I am operating based
upon the North Korean Forces as an enemy are completely
outmoded by events. . . . This calls for political
decisions and strategic plans in implementation
thereof, adequate fully to meet the realities
involved.218
MacArthur's message, which Army Secretary Lovett
described as a "posterity paper,1,21^ prompted a meeting
between officials of the Defense and State Departments and
a subsequent meeting with Truman.

In the Pentagon session

the military advisers expressed the belief that

^ ®MacArthur to JCS, December 3, 1950 > quoted in
Truman, Memoirs, II, 391-93. Sec also, Collins, War in
Peacetime, 228-29; Higgins, Korea and the Fall of'"Mac Arthur,
86; Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 137-3F; Sherman
testimony, Far E a s T Hearings, ftt. £, 1617.
^■^Quoted in Acheson, Present at the Creation,
k7k-
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MacArthur's forces would face a crisis within three days.
They believed that Tenth Corps had to be evacuated and that
Walker's Eighth Army might eventually be forced to
evacuate as well, unless a cease-fire could be arranged..
Acheson opposed asking for a cease-fire.

Evacuation of

all UN forces from the Korean peninsula— they were all
agreed--should be undertaken only as a last resort.

Mac-

Arthur's decision not to attempt to form a continuous
Opn

defensive line would not be countermanded.

The reason

for this, as explained by the Army Chief of Staff, was
that it was the "established policy" of the JCS not to
override a theater commander.

221

Apparently the Joint

Chiefs reasoned that MacArthur, conducting the war in
Korea from Japan, four hundred miles away, had a better
perspective than they did in Washington, seven thousand
miles from the battlefield.
reason.

There may have been another

General Ridgway, as the meeting ended, asked

General Vandenberg,

the Air Force Chief, why the JCS did

not simply tell MacArthur what to do.
responded,
orders.

"What good would that do?

Vandenberg
He wouldn't obey the

What can we do?"222

220Ibid.,
22^Collins, War in Peacetime, 229.

222Ridgway, Korean W a r , 62.
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The President was apprised of the conclusions
reached in this session shortly afterward by Marshall and
Acheson.

He immediately ordered the JCS to dispatch a

message to MacArthur which read:

"We consider that the

preservation of your forces is now the primary consider
ation.

Consolidation of forces into beachheads is con

curred in."^2^

During this meeting with Truman, the

Secretary of State urged him to declare a state of national
emergency.

Acheson reasoned that this would alert the

public to the serious situation the Government faced as
well as provide the President with the extraordinary
powers he would now need to control wages, prices and
production.

Truman accepted the Secretary's suggestion and

preparations to take this step were initiated.22^

Also,

on the suggestion of Marshall and Acheson, the President
directed that General Collins depart immediately for
Tokyo and Korea to assess the combat situation and discuss
operational planning with General M a c A r t h u r . ^ ^
Collins returned on December 8 to report his

223Quoted in Truman, Memoirs, II, 393. Truman said
that all his military advisers told him that holding the
beachheads would be impossible. He said he wanted them to
try, anyway. See ibid., 399. See also, Lichterman, "To
the Yalu and Back,111 617J Fehrenbach, This Kind of W a r , 381.
22^Acheson,.Present at the Creation, ij-75-76.
22^Collins, War in Peacetime, 229; Truman, Mem o i r s ,
I I t 393* See also, Acheson, Present at the Creation, h l d’ ,
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findings to the President in a meeting held in the Cabinet
Room of the White House.

Also present were British Prime

Minister Atlee, the British Ambassador, Sir Oliver Franks,
General Bradley and Secretaries Marshall and Acheson.

The

Army Chief of Staff explained to this gathering that it
was no longer possible to hold the Seoul-Inchon area.

He

reported that General Walker felt he could hold again in
the Pusan region, especially if he was reinforced by the
Tenth Corps which, by now, MacArthur agreed, would have
to be evacuated from the Hungnam-Wonsan bridgehead on the
Op A
eastern coastline.
Recalling his conversations with the Far East
Commander, Collins said that MacArthur believed that there
were now three possible courses of action open:

First, to

continue fighting under the existing limitations against
bombing Manchurian bases, using Formosan troops, imposing
a naval blockade, or providing large-scale reinforcements.
This, MacArthur believed, would be tantamount to surrender
and would inevitably result in his command being driven
from Korea entirely.
could be dropped.

Second, all the named restrictions

In addition, Chinese Nationalist troops

should be encouraged to attack South China.
favored this course.

MacArthur

Third, if the Chinese Communist

armies voluntarily confined themselves north of the

22^Collins, War in Peacetime, 232-33*
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thirty-eighth parallel, the United Nations could negotiate
an armistice on that basis.

If the second alternative was

unacceptable, MacArthur felt the third course to be the
next most desirable.

227
'

After recording Collins’ report of MacArthur*s views
in his memoirs, Truman wrote of his dismay that he and the
United Nations Commander were so far from agreement.
Truman believed that the alternative MacArthur favored—
particularly the introduction of Nationalists troops into
South China— might well bring on an all-out general war,
probably, an atomic war.

*’I was left," Truman wrote,

"with just one simple conclusion:
ready to risk general war.

General MacArthur was

I was not."22®

In the early days of December Truman was subjected
to severe pressures as numerous interest groups tried to
influence his thinking on the Korean crisis.

Much of this

activity was based on press reports, which in turn were
based on information emanating from MacArthur*s head
quarters, to the effect that the General could win the war
were it not for the unparalleled restrictions placed upon

227Truman, Memoirs, II, i|l5» See also, Collins,
War in Peacetime, 231-32. Sherman testimony, Par East
Hearings, Pt. 2, 1617-18, 1628-30; Pt. ij., 2956'=57;
Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, lj.05; Higgins, Korea and the
Fall of MacArthur, 91-^2’.
Truman, Memoirs, II, ip.5-16.
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him by the Truman Administration.229

in a letter dated

December 6 the national commanders of the four largest
veteran's organizations in America petitioned the Presi
dent to ". . . give General MacArthur full authority to
employ such means as may be necessary.

. . . ”

These ex-

warriors told Truman he must end the restrictions and
delays and lift the "imposed limitations" because American
soldiers " . . . must not be sacrificed to delusions of
appeasement."23°

jn a joint letter on the fifth, eight

Congressmen urged Truman to resist the pressures put on
him by "buy peace in the Orient" by appeasing the Chinese
Communists.

They also wanted to know why he had not used .

the Nationalist Chinese troops, who could make an
important military contribution, and would also serve to
refute the charge that Korea represented an attack by white

231

men on orientals.

Senator Joseph McCarthy wired the

22^Ibid., 1|.15. In an interview on December 1, for
example, MacArthur said that prohibition against striking
at Manchurian bases was.a terrible handicap "without prece
dent in military history.',* Quoted in Acheson, Present at
the Creation, 71-72. For similar statements by MacArtEur,
see Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 3l+2> 570-71* Truman finally
caused a directive to be issued on December 6 which had
the effect of ordering MacArthur to clear policy state
ments through the Pentagon. See Spanier, Truman-MacArthur
Controversy, 150-51*
230i2arl Cocke, Jr. to Truman, December 6, 1950,
Truman Papers, OF, 1|71-B - Korean Emergency, Truman Library.
231]Brooks Hays, Walter Judd, Kenneth Keating, at.
al., to the President, December 5> 1950, ibid.
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President on December 2, saying that American mothers
demanded to knw why he was allowing Acheson and the rest of
the "crimson clique in the State Department" to "run
amuck" with the lives of American soldiers.

It would be

necessary to impeach Truman unless he ended "this treason
able farce," removed Acheson, and brought the Formosan
232
forces into the fight.
John Chang, the Korean Ambas
sador, met with the President on December 6, imploring
him to continue the military action in Korea in spite, of
the reversals.

Truman assured the Ambassador that he

would do all within his power to save Korea.

233

A day

earlier the Chairman of the Korean National Assembly had
informed Truman that a successful conclusion to the
existing crisis called for an increase in American military
assistance to build up the ROK f o r c e s . T h e

strain is

evident in a diary note the President wrote on December 9:
"I have worked for peace for five years and six months
and it looks like World War III is near.

I hope not--but

Joseph R. McCarthy to Truman, December 2, 1950
(Telegram), ibid.
^^Memorandum Qf Conversation, John F. Simmons
(Chief of Protocol), December 6, 1950. Truman Papers, OF,
I|71> Truman Library.
^3^P. h. Shinicky to Truman, December 5* 1950
(Telegram), Truman Papers, OF, Lf.71-B - Korean Emergency,
Truman Library.

Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibitedwithout permission.

583
we must meet whatever comes--and we

w i l l .

"^5

Truman called a meeting of the National Security
Council on December 11 to discuss with them a cease-fire
resolution soon to be proposed in the General Assembly.
The '■’resident told his advisers that he and Prime Minister
Atlee had agreed not to seek a cease-fire in Korea
unilaterally, but that they were undecided as to what
position to assume with regard to the forthcoming resolu
tion, sponsored by thirteen Asiatic nations.

Additionally,

he informed them that he had an understanding with Atlee
that tne UN command would not surrender; it would only
leave Korea if driven off the peninsula by force of
arrns.^^

The Joint Chiefs and Secretary of Defense

opposed a cease-fire for the present, particularly one
without preconditions.

Truman said he had no intention of

accepting any armistice without first arriving at terms.
Secretary Marshall asked the President if MacArthur should
be ordered to withdraw to the thirty-eighth parallel in
anticipation of it becoming the cease-fire line.

Truman

told him to let MacArthur*s orders stand (holding to his
existing positions), until the Tenth Corps was safely

^Hillman (ed.), Mr. President, llj.3* Secretary of
Defense Marshall agreed wTEh Truman on the seriousness of
conditions. In a speech on December 8 he described the U.S.
military situation as "more grave" than it had been in
19ij.2. Payne, Marshall Story, 313-l^J-*
236jruman^ Memoirs, II, if.17*
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evacuated from the east coast and a satisfactory cease-fire
arrangement had been concluded.

Marshall pointed out that

present JCS planning called for a gradual retirement south
ward and asked if the President objected to this.

Truman

explained that he was only opposed to a hurried withdrawal
based on political expediency; the rate of withdrawal
should be determined by military considerations alone.

237

The Tenth Corps’ successful evacuation from
Hungnam, which Truman described as "the best Christmas
present" he could have, began on December 13.^38

The

following day the TIN General Assembly adopted a resolu
tion creating a three-member group to determine the basis
239
for a satisfactory cease-fire.
The United States voted
for the resolution.

The member states participating in

the Unified Command subsequently indicated general agree
ment on the thirty-eighth parallel as an acceptable cease
fire line.

This decision represented a return to the

original objective in Korea and a tacit repudiation of the
October 7 resolution which sought unification of Korea

^37lbid.f lji8. See also, Lichterman, "To the Yalu
and Back," 61b; Higgins, Korea and the Pall of MacArthur,
92.
^ ® F i l e memorandum, December 25> 1950, Truman
Papers, OP, lj.71-B, Truman Library.
239d q c . N o . 18, General Assembly Resolution,
December l!|, 1950, United States Policy in the Korean
Conflict, 27.
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under one g o v e r n m e n t H o w e v e r ,

on the seventeenth a

Communist Chinese envoy rejected the UN proposal, calling
it a "trap" and stated that the conditions for peace were
an end to American aggression and complete US withdrawal
from Korea.
Truman spent a substantial part of the second week
of December working on plans for declaring a state of
national emergency.

A brief survey of the available

presidential powers had been made at the beginning of the
Korean fighting.

Although the President had available to

him a vast range of powers to control the domestic economy
and achieve industrial mobilization, most of these legis
lative grants of authority were contingent upon a declara
tion of national e m e r g e n c y . T h e decision to declare
such an emergency was discussed by Truman in numerous
sessions with White House aides and speechwriters, at a
Cabinet meeting on December 8, in two meetings with the
National Security Council and in a stormy session with
the congressional leadership on Wednesday, December 13.
In the latter conference, Republican Senators Taft and

^^Lichterman,

"To the Yalu and Back," 618.

^~*~United States Policy in the Korean Conflict, 52•
^-%few York Times, June 28, 1950. See also
("E.B.S.")To Charles S. Murphy, July 17, 1950, Murphy
Papers, White House Piles, Presidential Powers folder,
Truman Library.
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Wherry insisted that Truman had not shown just cause for
the proposed proclamation.

However, the majority of those

present accepted the President’s

e x p l a n a t i o n .

^3

on

the

evening of the fourteenth, Truman reviewed an address he
planned to deliver the following day.

He told his speech-

writ ers they would have to delete a line that read:

"Our

troops are well able to take care of themselves. . . . "
Truman explained that he could not give any such
assurance, for he had just heard from Tokyo that Eighth
Army’s right flank was extremely vulnerable.

He hoped

that the Tenth Corps, having been evacuated from the
east coast, could fill in the gaps and secure the line.
The President continued:
I think if we can pull back a little, to where their
supply lines are stretched out, we may hold them a
good long time and win out in the end. I ’ve thought
so all this week, while everybody has been hollering
about a Dunkirk. I ’m not giving up, you must under
stand that. But at this moment I can’t honestly give
the impression that our soldiers are going to stay
right where they are. I don’t know that for a fact
at this time.2i]J|
In his message to the nation, the President said
that the Chinese intervention had pushed the world to the

^Truman, Memoirs, II, ip.7-27. See also, Item
No. 302, White House Statement Concerning a Meeting with
the Congressional Leaders to Discuss the National Emergency,
December 13, 1950, Public Papers . • • Truman, 1950, Ikl •
^^•Quoted inJohn Hersey, "Profiles— Mr. President,"
Pt. 5, "A Weighing of Words," The New Yorker (May 5,
1951), 39. Hereinafter cited as Hersey'J "Profiles," Pt. 5»
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brink of general war, with the very future of civilization
dependent upon American action.
national security" in his speech:

He set "four tasks for
continued support of the

principles of the United Nations; continued cooperation to
strengthen collective security; a build-up of the Army,
Navy and Air Force and the requisite weaponry; and an
expansion of the entire economy, with safeguards against
inflationary wage-price spirals.

During the course of the

speech, Truman indicated he was raising the military man
power level from the existing two and one-half, to three
and one-half million personnel.

He also raised Selective

Service quotas and ordered two additional National Guard
divisions to active duty.2^

The formal proclamation

establishing a state of national emergency was issued by

21+6
the White House the following morning.

By this action,

provisions of some seventy separate legislative acts
became operative, significantly increasing the executive

2^ I t e m No. 303, Radio and Television Report to the
American People on the National Emergency, December 15,
1950, Public Papers . . . Truman, 1950* 7^4-1—^4-6 • Text also
appears in ffar East Hearings, Pt. 3>, 35l4~20. An abridged
version is in- Truman, Memoirs, II, l\.27-29.
2^*Item No. 30i|, Presidential Proclamation No.
291kt December 16, 1950, Public Papers . . . Truman, 1950*
7l|6-ij.7. Text of this document is reprinted in Far East
Hearings, Pt. £, 3520-21.
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authority of the President

In addition, the President

asked for, and received, legislation extending and
amending title II of the First War Powers Act of 19^1>
generally concerned withgovernmental contracting powers,
which became law on January 12, 1 9 5 1 . ^ ®
General Walker’s Eighth Army had established a con
tinuous defensive line across the Korean peninsula just
north of the thirty-eighth parallel.

This line was forti

fied by elements of the evacuated Tenth Corps, now
amalgamated into Eighth Army.

But this line was thinly

spread and could not hold against any serious Chinese
pressure.

The enemy had broken off pursuit, but intelli

gence reports indicated they were preparing for an all-out
resumption of the offensive on New Year’s Day.

2k9

The Eighth Army lost its commander in a fatal
traffic accident on December 23.

MacArthur immediately

requested that General Matthew B. Ridgway, then Deputy

For a full description of the legislative acts
placed in force by the national emergency declaration, see
J. Howard McGrath to Secretary of the Air Force (Syming
ton), December 18, 1950, RG3lj.O, S/AF, 031 .I* National
Archives.
2^6 (6Ii St at. 1257). Truman requested this additional
grant of power in identical letters, dated December 18,
addressed to the President of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House. See Item No. 307* Public Papers . . •
Truman, 1950, 7^9-50.
Eighth Army line extended from the Imjin
River on the west coast, through Yongpyong and Huachon,
to Yangyang on the east.
Collins, War in Peacetime, 235-36.
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Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration, be
appointed as Walker's replacement.

The President gave his

appro1 al, and Ridgway was briefed by MacArthur on the
twenty-sixth and warned not to underestimate the ability of
his e n e m y . B y

the next day Ridgway found himself in

full tactical command of an endangered army, far removed
from the serene corridors of power in the Pentagon.
With the knowledge that no immediate reinforcements
were available for the United Nations Command and a
resumption of the massive Chinese Communist assault in
the offing, the President's military advisers were
increasingly insistent that ways be considered for with
drawing "with honor" from Korea.

However, Acheson and

the State Department felt the troops should not leave
Korea unless they were driven out.

"Anything else," as

Truman phrased it, "would be an abandonment of the
principle that caused us to go in in the first place."

251

This divergence of views caused Truman to summon Generals
Bradley and Marshall and Secretary Acheson to Blair House
on December 26.

The Generals made it clear to the Presi

dent that they believed a general war was near and that
Korea was definitely not the place to fight it.

Acheson

250Ridgway, Korean War, 79, 81-83, 100-101;
Collins, War in Peacetime, 238-37; MacArthur, Reminiscences,
383J MacArthur testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, l5o.
251 Truman, Memoirs, II, Ij.32.
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argued that the stakes involved in Korea were so high that
the United Nations should fight on until Chinese strength
and resolution had been fully tested.

Then, Acheson said,

if required by "dire military necessity," Korea should be
evacuated.

The Secretary of State suggested to the Presi

dent that MacArthur1s directives be revised to allow him
to inflict maximum attrition against the enemy up to the
point where his own force was in danger of destruction.
MacArthur should be warned against risking the loss of his
command, since upon these forces the ultimate safety of
Japan depended.

Marshall and Bradley agreed to this, and

Truman instructed them to prepare a new directive for his
approval •
The Joint Chiefs transmitted the approved directive
to the Par East Commander on December 29.

Acheson has

provided a concise summary of the message:
1. If with present UN strength, we could resist
at some point in Korea without our incurring serious
losses, and if the apparent military and political
prestige of Chinese Communists could be deflated,it
would be of great importance to our national interests.
2.
"In the face of increased threat of general
war" the Joint Chiefs of Staff would not commit
additional U.S. ground forces in Korea. Major war
should not be fought in Korea.
3.
"Therefore • . . y o u r directive now is to
defend in successive positions, subject to safety of
your troops as your primary consideration, inflicting
as much damage to hostile forces in Korea as is
possible."

^-^Acheson, Present at the Creation, 51
Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back, " 619.

See also,
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I).. Decision was to be made ahead of time by the
Joint Chiefs on the last reasonable opportunity for
orderly evacuation, General MacArthur’s views were
requested on the conditions which should determine
evacuation.253
The directive reflects a change of policy of con
siderable magnitude.
was

not mentioned.

The objective of Korean unification
Theobjectives of repelling aggres

sion and restoring peace and security were to be
abandoned if unobtainable with the existing force.

Mac

Arthur was to take extreme care that his force not be
placed in jeopardy, since— the directive emphasized— his
primary objective was preservation of the security of
Japan, not K o r e a . T h e
MacArthur:

directive asked too much of

without any increase in his forces, or

lessening of the restrictions upon his operations, he was
asked to wage a war of attrition against a superior force
without endangering his own troops.
MacArthur’s reaction to the December 29 directive
was that it indicated to him that the Administration seemed
to have lost the will to win in Korea: "President Truman’s
resolute determination to free and unite that threatened

^^Acheson, Present at the_ Creation, 5li[., 755*
For text of the JCS message'To_TyfacArthur, see Far East
Hearings. Pt. 2, llj.6Jj., I6l8; Pt. 3, 2179-80, 2*223-’2 S 7 ”
22ijij.-ij.5J MacArthur, Reminiscences, 377-78. See also,
Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 138-39.
^^Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," 620.
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land had now deteriorated almost into defeatism.

Mac-

Arthur responded immediately to the JCS directive, saying
that the continued restrictions on his air and naval
operations deprived him of the available military capacity.
The additional potential represented in utilizing Chinese
Nationalist troops was also being ignored.

If, MacArthur

said, the United States were willing to make the
"political determination" that a state of war existed
because of Communist China's action, four desirable
retaliatory measures could be taken:

a naval blockade

of Chinaj air and naval action to destroy China's
military-industrial capacity; procurement of needed rein
forcements from Formosa; and an end to restriction on
Chinese Nationalist attacks against the China mainland.
The bulk of MacArthur's message dealt with the advantages
which would ensue from such- a course.

The general tone

of this communication was one of thorough dissatisfaction
with the new directive and an urgent repetition of his
request that all tactical and political limitations be
removed.

256

The resumption of the Chinese offensive on

p;jMacArthur, Reminiscences, 378.
^^Ibid., 378-80. For other texts of MacArthur's
message of the 30th, see Guttman (ed.), Korea and the
Theory of Limited War, 11-12; Bernstein and^Matusow Teds.),
Truman Administration, lj.50-52; Lichterman, "To the Yalu
and Back," 620; Far~East Hearings, Pt. 2, lij.65; Pt. 3 >
2180-81. See also, Acheson, Present at the Creation,
51U“15j Truman, Memoirs, II, i+33; Ridgway, Korean War,
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the first day of 1951 made an end to this dispute
essential.
The renewal of offensive activities on New Y e a r ’s
Day forced the United Nations Command to abandon the
South Korean capital of Seoul as they gave ground south
ward.

Meanwhile, Washington

considered a reply to Mac

Arthur 's message of December 30.

At last, on the ninth

of January, Truman approved a JCS message to the Par East
Commander which informed him that the retaliatory steps
he advocated had been given and were continuing to receive
thorough consideration.

MacArthur was informed that the

Administration fully appreciated the difficulties he now
faced because of Chinese intervention.

However, the JCS

message read, reconsideration of existing conditions led
to the acceptance of certain new operating assumptions.
Among the imperatives now accepted by the Joint Chiefs
(and the President) was that conditions outside of Korea
did not justify a strengthening of U.S. military forces
there.

Additionally, the proposed naval blockade and use

of Chinese Nationalist troops were viewed with disfavor
for diplomatic reasons.

As for the bombing of

objectives in China, this would only be undertaken in
response to a Chinese attack on UN forces outside

91; Walter Millis, "Truman and MacArthur," in Guttman
(ed.), Korea and the Theory of Limited War, lj..5-k6. Here
inafter cited as Millis, '‘Truman and MacArthur."
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Korea.^-^

The JCS message concluded by repeating the

instructions.sent to MacArthur on December 29:

"To defend

in successive positions, inflicting maximum damage to
hostile forces in Korea. . .

with evacuation to be

undertaken if essential to the preservation of his
command in order to carry out the primary mission,
2^8
defense of Japan. ^
Like MacArthur, President Rhee of South Korea had
a plan for turning the tide of the war which he pressed
upon Truman during the early days of January.

Rhee

proposed that the United States underwrite a dramatic
increase in the size of the Republic of Korea Army.

When

queried about this by the JCS, MacArthur replied, on
January 6, that given the performance levels of ROK Army
units and friendly guerrilla units, the military equip
ment involved could be put to better use if given to the

JCS to CINCFE, January 9# 1951# printed in Far
East Hearings, Pt. 1, 332-33; Pt. 2, 1322. Message also
appears in MacArthur, Reminiscences, 380. See also,
Truman, Memoirs, II, k55-3k* Acheson, Present at the
Creation^ 5l5# Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Ba"clc, 'r 621;
Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, lij.1.
^ ® J C S to CINCFE, January 9# 1951# Far East Hear
ings , Pt. 2, 1599-1600. Defense Secretary Marshall
testified that MacArthur's proposals would, in his judg
ment, not have brought a quick decision in Korea, but
would have created a hazardous condition, if not world
war. See ibid., Pt. 1, 369. For an examination of
military and diplomatic objections to MacArthur's specific
proposals, see Ridgway, Korean War, H j.6-!j.8.
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newly-formed National Police Reserve of J a p a n . R h e e
persisted, however.

In a personal letter to Truman,

dated January 10, he told Truman that "even now you can
save the situation," by fully arming and equipping a
half-million Korean youths.

The South Korean President

also asked Truman to grant MacArthur the authority to
". • . use any weapons that will check Communist
aggression anywhere, even the atom bomb.

A few bombs on

Moscow alone will shake the Communist world."

260

Truman

ignored Rhee’s message until February 10, when he sent a
noncommittal response x^ritten for him by the State Depart
ment.2^1
Truman and his military advisers found General
MacArthur not as easy to ignore.

Irritated by the JCS

message of January 9# which he felt left all decisions
contingent upon tactical actions initiated by the enemy,
MacArthur, "shot a query right back."2^2

MacArthur

2^ J C S to CINCFE, January 1^., 1951# copy in Tannenwald Papers, Subject File, Chronology, MacArthur Hearings,
Truman Library. See also, CINCFE to Department of the Army
(for JCS), January 6, 1951# ibid. See also, Far Ea 3t
Hearings, Pt. 5, 3530-32; Truman, Memoirs, II, 1+32-35•
2^ R h e e to Truman, transmitted in letter, John M.
Chang to Truman, January 10, 1951# Truman Papers, OF,
471-B - Korean Emergency, Truman Library.
ibid.

Acheson to the President, February 9# 1951#
See also, Truman to Rhee, February 10, 1951# ibid.

2 ^MacArthur, Reminiscences, 380-81.
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requested a clarification of his orders, since it was
"self-evident” that his command was not of sufficient
strength to carry out the twin tasks of holding in Korea
and simultaneously protecting Japan from assault.

He

could hold a "beachhead line" temporarily, but only at
great cost.

MacArthur reported his troops to be

embittered and worn out, with their morale at such an
ebb that their battle efficiency would be severely
impaired " . . .

unless the political basis upon which

they are asked to trade life for time is clearly
delineated, fully understood, and so impelling that the
hazards of battle are accepted cheerfully.

..263

..."

If

no such basis existed, MacArthur said his command should
be removed from Korea as rapidly a3 possible.

"The issue

involves a decision of highest national and international
importance. • . .
Therefore, my query amounts to this:
is it the
present objective of United States political policy
to minimize losses by evacuation as soon as it can
be accomplished, or to maintain a military position
in Korea--indefinitely, for a limited time?
Under the extraordinary limitations and conditions
imposed upon the command in Korea, as I have pointed
out, its military position is untenable, but it can
hold, if overriding political considerations so

^^MacArthur to JCS, January 10, 1951, printed in
Far East Hearings, Pt. 2, 906.
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dictate, for any length of time up to its complete
destruction. Your clarification requested.2^
General MacArthur’s message clearly shifted respon
sibility for any disaster involving Korea or Japan back to
Washington, unless the "extraordinary limitations" were
lifted.

Reaction to the message was strong.

Admiral

Sherman believed that this message brought about a serious
impairment of the normal command relationships between
MacArthur and the JCS.2^
the January 10 cable:

Secretary Acheson has written of

"Nothing further was needed to con

vince me that the General was incurably recalcitrant and
basically disloyal to the purposes of his Commander in
Chief.Aware

of the gravity of MacArthur's message,

Secretary of Defense Marshall brought it to the President
soon after receiving it.

Truman recalls being "deeply

disturbed" by MacArthur's words:

"The Par East commander

was, in effect, reporting that the course of action decided
upon by the National Security Council and by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and approved by me was not feasible."2^

26^Ibid. See also, MacArthur, Reminiscences, 38081; Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," 621-22; Spanier,
Truman-MacArthur Controversy, llj.2; Phillips, Truman
Presidency, 33^7
2^Sherman testimony, Par East Hearings, Pt. 2,

1600-601.

-----------

266

Acheson, Present at the Creation, 5l5*

2^^Truman, Memoirs, II, lj.34*
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The President reacted to MacArthur’s message by putting
the JCS to work studying recourses and ordering a special
meeting of the National Security Council to convene on
, 9 268
January 12.
The Joint Chiefs drafted a directive for MacArthur,
but in consultation with the State Department, a dispute
arose over the inclusion of foreign policy matters in a
military directive.

The disagreement was laid before the

President in the NSC meeting of the twelfth.

He resolved

it by agreeing to write a personal letter to MacArthur
regarding the political policy matters the State Department
wished to emphasize and he approved the purely military
directive which was dispatched immediately.

269

This new

directive began with the JCS informing MacArthur that they
recognized, based primarily on information he had pro-*
vided, that it would not be feasible to hold in Korea
under extant conditions for any protracted period.

How

ever, national interests, the world-wide prestige of the
United States, and the future of the UN and NATO organi
zations rested upon his ability to inflict "maximum
practicable punishment" on the aggressors.

He was to

evacuate only when compelled to do so by military

268Ibid.
^^Bradley testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 2,
736-37.
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considerations.^7®

The sense of the message was that

MacArthur's orders remained
The personal message
on national policy is dated

unchanged.
Truman agreed to send MacArthur
January 13.

In

part, it reads:

. . . I wish in this telegram to letyou have my
views as to our basic national and international
purposes in continuing the resistance to aggression
in Korea. • • . This present telegram is not to be
taken in any sense as a directive. Its purpose is to
give you something of what is in our minds regarding
the political factors.
1.
A successful resistance in Korea would serve
the following important purposes:
(a) To demonstrate that aggression will not be
accepted by us or by the United Nationse • . .
(b) To deflate the dangerously exaggerated
political and military prestige of Communist
China. • . .
(c) To afford more time for and to-give direct
assistance to the organization of non-Communist
resistance in Asia. • • .
(d) To carry out ourcommitments of honor to the
South Koreans. . . .
(e) To make possible a far more satisfactory
peace settlement for Japan and to contribute greatly
to the post-treaty security position of Japan in
relation to the continent.
(f) To lend resolution to many countires not only
in Asia but also in Europe and the Middle East • . .
to let them know that they need not now rush to come
to terms with Communism on whatever terns they can
get, meaning complete submission.
(g) To inspire those who may be called upon to
fight against great odds if subjected to a sudden
onslaught by the Soviet
Union or by Communist Chinav
(h) To lend point and urgency to the rapid build-up
of the defenses of the western world.
(i) To bring the United Nations through its first
great effort on collective security and to produce a
free-world coalition of incalculable value to the
national security of the United States.

270JCS to CINCFE, January 12, 1951, printed in ibid..
Pt. 2, 737-38, 907, 1 W - 1 5 .
See also, Lichterman, "To
the Yalu and Back," 623.
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(j) To alert the people behind the Iron Curtain
that their masters are bent upon wars of aggression
and that this crime will be resisted by the free
world.
2. Our course of action at this time should be
such as to consolidate the great majority of t h e United Nations. . . . Further, pending the build-up
of our national strength, we must act with great
prudence in so far as extending the area of hostil
ities is concerned. Steps which might in themselves
be fully justified and which might lend some
assistance to the campaign in Korea would not be
beneficial if they thereby involved Japan or Western
Europe in large-scale hostilities.
3. We recognize, of course, that continued
resistance might not be militarily possible with the
limited forces with which you are being called upon to
meet larger Chinese armies. Further, in the present
world situation, your forces must be preserved as an
effective instrument for the defense of Japan and
elsewhere. However, some of the important purposes'
mentioned above might be supported, if you should
think it practicable, and advisable, by continued
resistance from off-shore islands of Korea. • • , if
it becomes impracticable to hold an important portion
of Korea itself. In the worst case, it would be
important that, if we must withdraw from Korea, it
be clear to the world that that course is forced upon
us by military necessity and that we shall not accept
the result politically or militarily until the
aggression has been rectified.
1+. In reaching a final decision about Korea, I
shall have to give constant thought to the main
threat from the Soviet Union and to the need for a
rapid expansion of our armed forces to meet this
great danger.

5• . . . .
6. The entire nation is grateful for your splendid
leadership in the difficult struggle in Korea and for
the superb performance of your forces under the most
difficult curcumstances .271

^Truman to MacArthur, January 13, 1951 > printed
in Truman, Memoirs, II, ij-35-36. Text of Truman's message
also appears" in Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 503-505; Mac
Arthur, Reminiscences, 381-b^. See also, Collins, War in
Peacetime, 25>0-51; Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, lf.06-Zj.09T
Whitney, MacArthur, I4.36—38 J Higgins, Korea an(Tthe Fall of
MacArthur, 97-98.
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By any measure, Truman’s message was an extra
ordinary document.

Not only was it a uniquely candid

communication between the Commander in Chief and a theater
commander, but also a concise, thorough delineation of the
goals of national military and diplomatic policy.

In

paragraph (2) of the telegram, the President provided a
definition of the new concept of limited warfare by
acknowledging that there were militarily-advisable steps
which were not being taken because of the danger of pre
cipitating a wider war.

MacArthur's reaction on receipt

of the message was to inform his staff that the question
of evacuation was settled; there would be none.^ 2

After

MacArthur's recall, his spokesman, General Whitney
maintained that Truman's cable was the first clear state
ment the Far East command received indicating that the
273
Administration desired to hold in Korea.
Truman chose
not to comment on this interpretation in his memoirs •
After quoting from his message, he said its purpose was
to get General MacArthur to accept,

• . as a soldier

should, the political decisions which the civil author
ities of the government had determined upon."^^"

^^MacArthur, Reminiscences, 382.
^^Washington Post, May 11, 1951; Far East Hearings,
Pt. 2, 976-79, 1638-3^7"Pt. 3, 2208; Pt. IjT^TB^STi
Whitney, MacArthur, [(.36-39 •
27i|-Truman, Memoirs, II, I4.36 .
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MacArthur's message of January 10 generated feverish
activity in the Washington hierarchy.

The special session

of the National Security Council, the JCS directive, and
Truman's telegram have already been noted.

Two other

developments can also be attributed to MacArthur’s message:
first, a study proposing numerous courses of action
received "tentative approval" by the JCS and was sub
mitted by Marshall to the Security Council for initial
275
consideration on the twelfth.
Secondly, in the NSC
session, Truman approved a recommendation that two members
of the Joint Chiefs— Collins and Vandenberg— be sent
immediately to Japan and Korea for a fresh evaluation of
the military situation.^^
The study tentatively accepted by the JCS was pre
pared by its own Joint Staff.

It contained sixteen

courses of action which might be undertaken in the Par
East in the event the United Nations force had to
evacuate Korea and a full-scale war with China developed.
The proposals were military, economic and diplomatic in
nature and included the four retaliatory measures against
China which MacArthur had recommended on several

275jv[arshall testimony, Par East Hearings, Pt. 1, 32l±,
335-36, 703.
^7^Ibid., 32k > Bradley testimony, ibid., Pt. 2,
907.
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occasions.

277

On January 12 the NSC deferred discussion

of the Joint Chiefs’ study until their next scheduled
session five days later.

By that time their appreciation

of the military situation had improved to the point where
active consideration of the document was halted.

Thus,

while several of the proposed actions were later insti
tuted, in whole or part, the full study was never implemented as a national policy directive.

278

277MacArthur's four proposals, as stated in his
message of December 30 to the JCS called for:
(1) air and
naval attacks against Chinese military bases and industrial
plants; (2) naval blockade of Chinese coastline; (3) accept
Nationalist Chinese volunteers; (Ij.) allow Formosa to attack
mainland China. See MacArthur, Reminiscences, 378-80;
MacArthur testimony, Far East Hearings, Pb. T, 13-16.
Some of the other proposed courses o f a c t i o n remain classi
fied, but several have become public record through
congressional testimony. Among them are:
(1) continue
the bombing of military targets in Korea; (2) send a
military training mission and increase MDAP aid to
Formosa; (3) remove restrictions on air reconnaissance
of China’s coastal areas and of Manchuria; (1^.) continue
and intensify economic blockade of trade with China; (5)
stabilize military positions in Korea or evacuate to
Japan; (6) press for the UN to brand Communist China as an
aggressor. MacArthur’s suggested air and naval attacks on
China, while included in the sixteen proposals, were made
contingent upon China attacking American forces someplace
other than Korea. Marshall testimony, Far East Hearings,
Pt. 1, 333-3i> 3^0. As for (6) above, on February 1, l95l,
the General Assembly passed a resolution denouncing the
People's Republic of China as an aggressor in Korea. Doc.
No. 28, United States Policy in the Korean Conflict, 37.
^7®Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 329* 335-36, 505-506;
Pt. 2, 736^177“T321-22, 1551-33; Acheson, Present at the
Creation, 5l6•
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MacArthur had been briefed on the JCS study in a
meeting with Generals Collins and Vandenberg, who had just
arrived from Washington on January 1 5 (Tokyo time).

They

also discussed the Joint Chiefs’ directive and the Presi279
dent’s telegram to MacArthur.
Soon afterward, the two
members of the JCS left for an extensive study of the
Korean battlefields.

Collins already knew, from private

communication with General Ridgway, that the Eighth Army
leader was far more confident than MacArthur that his
q

Q

a

forces could not be driven from the peninsula.

In his

talks with Ridgway and numerous other commanders in
Korea, the Army Chief of Staff’s belief that they could
hold and fight effectively was confirmed.

In a message

radioed to Bradley on the seventeenth and a subsequent
meeting with Truman following his return to Washington,
Collins said that the Eighth Army was in ’’good shape"
and that the morale of the troops was "very satisfactory"
under the circumstances.

The Chinese were having severe

logistical difficulties and had made no serious efforts
to advance beyond the Han River (just south of Seoul).
Collins remembers that the President and his advisers were

^^Collins testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 2,
1210-11, 1227-28; Vandenberg testimony, Ibi'dT, lij.72-73*
For an account of the conference, see Collins, War in
Peacetime, 251|.-55»
280collins, War in Peacetime, 251-52.
American Military History, 5&1»

See also,
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"reassured" by the reports that he and Vandenberg brought
back from Korea:

"...

though it was realized that rough

times were still ahead of us, no longer was there much
talk of evacuation.

General Ridgway alone was responsible
m

Q *i

for this dramatic change."
By the third week of January it was evident that
the Communist offensive had halted at a point just above
the 37th parallel.

Apparently the enemy could not sustain

the offensive because of over-extended lines of communi
cation and supply.

Their logistical problems were made

more difficult by persistent aerial interdiction.

The

bulk of the enemy force was withdrawn northward from the
line of contact.

Sensing this development, Ridgway sent

out reinforced probes which encountered only thin
screening forces.

Accordingly, ridgway began to move

cautiously to the offensive with reconnaissances-in-force
in various sectors along the battle-line.

Meeting with

success, on January 25 > Ridgway ordered the western flank
of his Eighth Army, the First and Ninth Corps, on a
general sweep forward (Operation Thunderbolt).

January

ended with these forces encountering their first really

^Qlcollins, War in Peacetime, 253-55; Truman,
Memoirs, II, lj.36-37* See also, Marshall testimony, Far
East Hearings, Pt. 1, 32lj., 332; Collins testimony, ibid.,
Pt. 2, 1211; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 5l6;
American Military History, 562; Higgins, Korea and the
Fall of"'MacArthur, 96 «
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stiff resistance from a Communist delaying action near the
outskirts of Seoul,2®2
Stalled on the western flank, on February 5 Ridgway
ordered the American Tenth and ROK Third Corps to advance
in hope of reducing the deep salient in the central sector
of his front line.

This advance met strong opposition

and a concentrated counterattack launched on February 11.
The center sagged, but reinforced by all available
reserves, held, and the advance recommenced ten days
later, eliminating the salient.

On the western front, to

avoid being flanked, the enemy withdrew all forces below
Seoul on February 9, enabling UU forces to recapture
Inchon and Kimpo airfield the next day.

The combined

Chinese and North Korean force mounted a stubborn defense
in the capital city of South Korea and held it until midMarch.

Ridgway, who was more concerned with destroying

the enemy and maintaining the integrity of his line than
with the acquisition of places, did not press an attack
against Seoul,

By the end of February, 1951* the UN forces

occupied a line just south of Seoul, running from Inchon
in the west to Kangnung in the east, having advanced
roughly half the distance between the thirty-seventh and

2®2Esposito (ed.), West Point Atlas, II, Sec. 3>
Map Plate No. 11; Collins, War in !Peacetime, 257-58;
Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 12-13. See also,
MacArthur, Reminiscences, 3&3-BE* Phillips, Truman Presidency,
337 I American Military History, 561-62.
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thirty-eighth parallels.283
While it is reasonable to conclude that the Adminis
tration had by now given up any thought of reconquering
North Korea, since that would entail a ground war against
the almost limitless manpower reserves of China, MacArthur
was still actively devising such a campaign.

In long-range

plans developed in February, MacArthur intended to first
regain the Seoul line as a base of operations.

He would

then destroy the enemy's rear by massive air strikes
along the top of North Korea.

If still not permitted to

bomb enemy reinforcements in Manchuria, as he anticipated,
*

MacArthur planned to lay vast fields of radioactive atomic
wastes across all major enemy supply lines in North Korea.
Let the General describe his master stroke:
. . . then, reinforced by Nationalist Chinese troops,
if I were permitted to use them, and with American
reinforcements on the way, I would make simultaneous
amphibious and airborne landings at the upper end of
both coasts of North Korea, and close a gigantic
trap. . . . It would be something like Inchon, but on
a much larger scale .281j.
On March 7 General Ridgway began a new offensive
push (Operation Ripper), its objectives being the
destruction of enemy forces and the attainment of a new

283collins, War in Peacetime, 2£8-62; Ridgway,
Korean War, 1 0 7 - 1 1 2 . See also, Esposito (ed.), West Point
Atlas, II," Sec. 3 » Map Plate No. 11; American Military
History, 5>62.
^^MacArthur, Reminiscences, 38ij-85.
Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 198.

See also,
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front line, code-named "Idaho," located just south of the
thirty-eighth parallel.

As this movement advanced, it

resulted in the bracketing of Seoul, leaving the enemy
defenders in an untenable position.

Without opposition,

the Eighth Army recaptured the capital on the morning of
March l 5 « ^ ^

Korean President Rhee wrote to Truman

expressing gratitude for the return of Seoul.

In the

same letter Rhee urged the President not to listen to the
"pro-Communist appeasers" who were urging him to stop at
the thirty-eighth parallel and seek a cease-fire.

He

repeated his request that the United States immediately
provide arms and equipment for over a quarter-million
Korean youths who would be of material assistance in
driving the Chinese Communists back into Manchuria to
stay.288

By the final week in March Ridgway's forces were

at the thirty-eighth parallel, and he proposed to advance
and stabilize his position at a line (coded "Kansas")
slightly above the parallel.

The Eighth Army commander

was instructed to hold below the line pending an attempt
by the Administration to negotiate a settlement.

287

Truman's advisers in the State and Defense

28^Ridgway, Korean W a r , 113.
288Rhee to the President, March 26, 1951 » Truman
Papers, OF, 1+71 > Truman Library.
287collins, War in Peacetime, 262; Ridgway,
Korean War, 113-16.
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Departments had been meeting continuously, since Ridgway*s
success in January indicated to them the need to prepare
new policy recommendations for the President.

From the

viewpoint of the State Department in early February, five
possible courses of action existed:

abandoning Korea;

unifying the entire peninsula by force; extending the war
into China; enduring an indefinite stalemate at the current
positions; and trying for a negotiated settlement.

288

The

planners were at loggerheads; State Department was
reluctant to state political objectives until the Eighth
Army's military capabilities were clearly established and
the JCS insisted political goals had to be set before
military recommendations could be made.

289
7

At the same

time it appeared that the majority of UN member nations,
including those engaged in Korea, were against any
"general advance" across the parallel.

290

On February 23 Secretary Marshall received from
Acheson a draft memorandum which the Secretary of State
suggested they send as a joint statement to the President.
The memorandum cautioned against any general allied
advance beyond the thirty-eighth parallel, but recognized

288Collins, War in Peacetime, 263.
289Ibid., 263-6!]..

290Ibid., 261]..
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that MacArthur should feel free to continue air and naval
operations along with any necessary, limited ground action
north of that line.

291

Marshall referred Acheson’s note

to the JCS and the three service Secretaries.

292

The

latter group responded in agreement with Acheson’s m e m o 
randum that the UN resolution allowing advances north of
the thirty-eighth parallel was "permissive not mandatory."
They further agreed that the UN forces should not make a
general advance beyond the parallel except for tactical
reasons to acquire favorable defensive terrain.

Army Sec

retary Pace and Air Secretary Finletter also agreed that
this policy should be made a matter of public record.

On

this last, Acting Secretary of the Navy Daniel A. Kimball
demurred, believing it would "hamper effective military

4..

action.

i,293
The Joint Chiefs of Staff reported to Marshall

their direct disagreement with the service Secretaries and

2<^1I b i d .
2^2General Collins felt Marshall should not have
consulted the service Secretaries:
"So far as I know, this
was the first time that a question of major military sig
nificance was referred to the service Secretaries for
comment.
It would have been unfortunate if they had been
consulted regularly on such matters, because this would
have tended to interpose them between the JCS and the
Secretary of Defense, which was not contemplated by the
National Defense Act of 19l|-7, as amended in 19lj.9.” See
ibid., footnote, 265.

^^Pace, Kimball and Finletter to Marshall, Feb
ruary 2lj., 1951, RG330, OSD, CD 092 (Korea), National
Archives.
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Acheson's draft memorandum for the President.

They argued

that since there had been no change in the stated
political objectives of the United Nations or the United
States, no political reason existed for halting military
operations beyond the parallel.

MacArthur needed

freedom of maneuver to keep the enemy off balance and
ensure the safety of his own forces.

The JCS urged that

until such time as a new political objective was formu
lated, MacArthur's directive remain unchanged.

Backed

by these opinions, Marshall told Acheson he would not sign
the memorandum to Truman.

The Defense Secretary joined

the JCS in emphasizing the necessity for a definitive
statement on political objectives in Korea.

The President

did not see the memorandum in question, since State and
Defense were so far apart on its t e r m s . C l e a r l y ,
however, there existed a tacit understanding that the
nation must return to its original political objective of
preserving South Korea.

Except for General MacArthur and

President Rhee, no one seriously proposed the reconquest
of North Korea.
It was the success of General Ridgway's forces in

^^•C oil ins, War in Peacetime, 265-66. The reasoning
of the Joint Chiefs c a n T e seen in General James H. Burns'
commentary to Deputy Secretary of Defense Lovett on the
State Department draft memorandum, February 26, 1951 > RG33Q*
OSD, CD 092 (Korea), National Archives.
^ - ’Collins, War in Peacetime, 266.
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March that forced the Truman administration to a decision.
By mid-March the State and Defense departments, as well as
the National Security Council, were in substantial agree
ment that the time was opportune to seek a ceasefire,
looking toward a negotiated peace settlement.

It was felt

that the President, acting as executor for the United
Nations, should initiate such an approach by a public
appeal to the Communists.

Truman agreed: '

. . . in the first place, since we had been able to
inflict heavy casualties on the Chinese and were
pushing them back to and beyond the 38th parallel,
it would now be in their interest at least as much as
ours to halt the fighting, and secondly, the invaders
stood substantially ejected from the territory of the
Republic of K o r e a . 296
The draft of a statement was prepared for the Presi
dent by the State Department and agreed to by all the
principals on March 19.

On the following day a message to

MacArthur requested his recommendations:
State planning a Presidential announcement shortly
that with clearing of bulk of South Korea of aggres
sors, United Nations now prepared to discuss con
ditions of settlement in Korea. United Nations
feeling exists that further diplomatic efforts toward
settlement should be made before any advance with
major forces north of the thirty-eighth parallel. • . •
Recognizing that the parallel has no military
significance, State has asked Joint Chiefs of Staff
what authority you should have to permit sufficient
freedom of action for next few weeks to proved
security for United Nations forces and maintain

296Truman, Memoirs, II, I4.38 • See also, Collins,
War in Peacetime, 266-67; Phillips, Truman Presidency,
33T.
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contact with the enemy.
desired.297

Your recommendations

MacArthur responded on March 21, telling the JCS
that his existing directive was adequate and requesting
that ". . . n o further restrictions be imposed upon the
United Nations Command in Korea."2^®

Also, MacArthur

granted final approval to Ridgway's proposed "Operation
Rugged," which would carry UN forces slightly above the
thirty-eighth parallel.

This was entirely proper for

MacArthur to do, for without new instructions from Wash
ington, crossing the line into North Korea was simply a
PQQ

tactical decision.*"

However, Truman did not consider

MacArthur's next action to be entirely proper at all.
On March 2

(Tokyo time), MacArthur issued a

communique which he described as "routine" and Secretary

29?JCS to CINCFE, March 20, 1951 > printed in Far
East Hearings, Pt. 1, 3k3t 3k&S
5s 3180, 35kl» tfext
also appears in MacArthur, Reminiscences, 386-87; Truman,
Memoirs, II, ij.38-39; Collins, War in Peacetime, 267;
Lichterman, "To the Yalu and B"aclc,"rr’627; Higgins, Korea
and the Fall of MacArthur, 107 • For discussion of tKis
document during the investigation of MacArthur’s recall,
see Far East Hearings, Pt. 2, 1007-1008, 1021-23, lllj.2-

Ij.35 fET ITT9 1 ^ 7 2181+.
2 98]y[acArthur, Reminiscences, 387* See also,
Collins, War in Peacetime, 2671 Truman, Memoirs, II, lj.39;
Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 3ij.6; Spanier, Truman-MacArthur
Controversy, 199.
299Ri(3gWay f Korean W a r , 116. See also, Lichterman,
"To the Yalu and Back, " 629". On March 28, the Secretary
of Defense announced that crossing of the thirty-eighth
parallel was only a tactical decision.
Truman confirmed
this in a press conference on the twenty-ninth. .See Item
No. 63, Public Papers . • • Truman, 1951 » 203, 205-206.
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Acheson described as ". . • defiance of the Chiefs of
Staff, sabotage of an operation of which he had been
informed, and insubordination of the grossest sort to his
Commander in Chief."300

In this controversial document

MacArthur dwelt at length on the military weaknesses
demonstrated in the fighting by the Chinese and on the
success of his forces in spite of the inhibitions placed
on their activity.

The enemy should be aware, MacArthur

said, that if the United Nations were to drop its
"tolerant" efforts at keeping the war limited and allow
operations against China, that nation risked total
military collapse.

Although the fundamental questions

at issue in Korea were political and subject only to dip
lomatic solutions, MacArthur announced his willingness to
negotiate with the enemy commander in chief with a view
to finding military means for achieving the political
objectives of the United jNations in

K o r e a .

3°1

The President called a meeting the following morning
(March 2Lj., Washington time) to discuss MacArthur’s
communique.

In attendance were Acheson and Rusk from

300MacArthur, Reminiscences, 387? Acheson, Present
at the Creation, 519•
•^■^MacArthur, Reminiscences, 387-88 . Text of Mac
Arthur's communique is reprinted in Truman, Memoirs, II,
ljlj.O-lj.1; Higgins, Korea and the Fall of MacArthur, 108-110;
Lichterman, "To the Yalu and 6 a’cic,"TT "528; Fehrenbach, This
Kind of War, Ij22-13«
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State and Lovett and all the Chiefs of Staff.

At the

time, the process of clearing the proposed presidential
statement with the thirteen nations having forces in
302
Korea was just being completed.
Nevertheless, Truman
ordered the cancellation of his message, which would have
proposed a cease-fire, to be followed by mutual with
drawal, leaving to the United Nations the final solution
of the Korean question.3°3

Truman later wrote that what

was more important than the cancellation of his message
and the furor among the allies was that " . . .

once again

General MacArthur had openly defied the policy of his
Commander in Chief, the President of the United States."30^
After ascertaining that everyone present agreed that his
order of December 6, 1950* regarding the clearance of all
public statements was at issue, Truman personally dictated
an order to MacArthur:

302]ijarshall testimony, Far Bast Hearings, Pt. 1,
Bradley testimony, iEi'd., Pt. 2,899.
^ ^ T e x t Qf proposed statement is in Truman, Memoirs,
II, I4.39—I4.O• While Truman's statement gives lip-service
to the objective of a unified Korea, the principle
expressed throughout was really status quo ante bellum.
See Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back,"628.
30lj.Truman, Memoirs, II, 1}1|.2. I. F. Stone believes
Truman was relieved by MacArthur’s communique, for it
gave him an excuse not to issue the statement he was
reluctant to make. Hidden History of the Korean War,

.

270
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The President has directed that your attention be
called to his order as transmitted 6 December, 1950*
In view of the information given you 20 March, 1951
any further statements by you must be coordinated as
prescribed in the order of 6 December.
The President has also directed that in the event
Communist military leaders request an armistice in
the field, you immediately report that fact to the
JCS for instructions .305
Truman has stated— after the fact— that he had
decided to relieve General MacArthur of command upon
receipt of the March 2[j. communique, which the President
regarded as extreme insubordination.-^^

However, another

indiscreet statement by MacArthur two weeks later occurred
before Truman acted.

The final incident which may have

confirmed the President in his resolve concerned an
exchange of letters between MacArthur and Representative
Joseph ¥. Martin, Jr., leader of the Republican minority
in the House.

Early in March Martin wrote to the General

solciting his views on Ear Eastern policy and strategy.
In a reply dated March 20 MacArthur said he favored the
conventional military approach of "meeting force with
maximum counter-force."

He also said Martin’s suggestion

that the Nationalists on Formosa be allowed to open a
second front in Asia was consistent with logic and

30£jCS to CINCFE, March 2b,., 1951* printed in Far
East Hearings, Pt. 1, I4.O7 * Pt. 5* 3181-82, 35i|2; Acheson,
Present at frhe Creation, 519* Truman, Memoirs, II,
306Truman, Memoirs, II, iflj.2* kkk-k5»

-
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tradition.

The letter concluded:

It seems strangely difficult for some to realize
that here in Asia is where the Communist conspirators
have elected to make their play for global conquest
. . . here we fight Europe's war with arms while the
diplomats there still fight it with words. . . . As
you point out, we must win. There is no substitute
for victory.307
Without first obtaining MacArthur's approval,
Congressman Martin read the letter from the floor of the
House on April 5.

A series of meetings began between

Truman and various officials of the State and Defense
departments the following day.

The culminating session

came on Monday morning, April 9* with Marshall, Acheson,
Harriman and Bradley present, the latter reporting that
the Joint Chiefs were unanimous in recommending the
immediate relief of General MacArthur from command.

All

present concurred, including Truman, who revealed for
the first time that he had arrived at this decision follow
ing MacArthur's statement of March 2l\..3^®

qijiq President

directed Bradley to prepare the order which was trans
mitted April 11 (Washington time):

307Quoted in Truman, Memoirs, II, ljlj.5-l|6. See
also, Collins, War in Peacetime, 5S1; Far East Hearings,
Pt. 1, i|l2; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 519-20;
Higgins, Korea and the~~Fail oT~MacArthur, 11 2-lhl Fehrenbach, This Kind of filar, l£T5~TE.
-^®Truman, Memoirs, II,
See also, Collins,
War in Peacetime, 563; Higgins, Korea and the Fall of
MacArthur, 117-18.
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I deeply regret that it becomes my duty as Presi
dent and Commander in Chief of the United States
military forces to replace you as Supreme Commander,
Allied Powers; Commander in Chief, United Nations
Command; Commander in Chief, Par East; and Commanding
General, U.S. Army, Par East.309
The President appointed Lieutenant General Matthew
B. Ridgway to MacArthurfs commands.310

Shortly thereafter,

on the recommendation of Secretaries Pace and Marshall,
Truman approved Ridgway’s elevation to the rank of
General.

^11

Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet was

ordered from the United States to take command of the
Eighth Army.3**-^

Ridgway recalls that upon taking over his

new command he was determined not to exercise the tight
tactical control which MacArthur had exercised but to allow
Van Fleet the latitude necessary to field command.

When

he took command, Ridgway says, "clear policy decisions"
had been communicated to him by Truman and the Joint
Chiefs,

". . • the most immediate of which was to avoid

any action that might result in an extension of

^O^Item u0# 77 ^ Order by the President to General
MacArthur, April 11, 1951# Public Papers • . . Truman,
1951# 222. The dismissal o? General MacArthur is the
subject of the following chapter.
310Marshall to Ridgway, April 11, 1951# Truman
Papers, OP, 58k> Dismissal, Truman Library.
311
Pace to the President, May 8, 1951# Truman
Papers, OP, 1285-B, Truman Library.
3^2Pace to the President, May 21, 1951# ibid.
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hostilities and thus lead to a worldwide conflagration.

By mid-April, as the change of commanders took
place, UN forces had generally secured the "Kansas" line,
a front about six to eight miles above the thirty-eighth
parallel.

On April 22, twenty-one Chinese and nine North

Korean divisions began a massive counter-offensive along
the entire front, but with major stress against the
western flank, aiming at a recapture of Seoul.

The

Eighth Army was compelled to give ground, but did so in
good order, moving to successive delaying positions in
pre-established defensive fortifications.

Van Fleet was

thus able to contain the attack a few miles above Seoul.
The fighting ended five days later with the enemy’s with
drawal northward.

The Communist forces resumed their

offensive on May 16, this time against the eastern flank,
where they gained some thirty miles before being halted.
The "human wave" assault tactics of these two offensives
had cost the enemy an estimated 200,000 casualties, or
roughly one-third of the total Communist strength in
Korea.33-U-

Once the Communist offensive had been blunted,

Van Fleet’s forces had little trouble driving them back
until, by mid-June they reoccupied the Kansas line.

Since

^•^Ridgway, Korean W a r , 162, 169.
•^^ichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," 629; American
Military History, 561j.-65j Esposito (ed.), West Point Atlas,
II, Sec. 3, Map Plate No. 13, llj..
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no enthusiasm existed for advancing to the Yalu, either in
Washington or the allied capitals, Van Fleet ordered his
corps commanders to fortify the Kansas line in depth.
This was accomplished by construction of log-and-sandbag
bunkers connected by deep, narrow trenches across the
entire line of the peninsula, quite reminiscent of World
War I entrenchments.
had ended.

The fluid phase of the Korean War

From June 1951 until the final settlement in

1953 » military activity consisted mainly of constant
patrolling and small, localized clashes.
The character of the Korean War was altered by a
pivotal meeting of the National Security Council on
May 16, 1951*

It was

subsequently approved

the conclusion of this body—
by Truman--that a distinctionmust

henceforth be made between military and

political

objectives in Korea.The political aim would remain

the

same, establishment of a unified, democratic, independent
Korean state.

However, the military objective was now a

repulse of the invaders and an end to the fighting through
an armistice agreement.

Following such a cease-fire,

American purpose would be the securing of autonomy for
the Republic of Korea south of a line not substantially
below the thirty-eighth parallel, mutual withdrawal of

^Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 73-75J
American Military History, 310-11.
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non-Korean forces, and a buildup of ROK forces to a point
where they would constitute an effective deterrent to
renewed aggress ion.
Trygve Lie, UN Secretary-General, announced on
June 1 that a oease-fire established in the proximity of
the thirty-eighth parallel would accomplish the objectives
of the United Nations in Korea.

Speaking on the seventh,

Acheson took the same p o s i t i o n . T w o

days earlier,

George P. Kennan, on leave from the Department but acting
as Acheson's agent, had an "unofficial" conversation with
Jacob Malik, chief Soviet delegate to the United Nations.
Kennan learned that the Soviet Union desired a peaceful
and rapid solution in K o r e a . O n

June 23, speaking on

a UN radio program in New York, Malik said that his
nation believed that it was time for the belligerents in
Korea to discuss peace.

The Peking People's Daily, a semi

official organ of the Chinese government, endorsed Malik's
statement two days later.319

Grasping at this slender

3l6iruman wrote that this policy "represented no
change," when, in fact, it was a return to the original
objective of American involvement. Truman, Memoirs, II,
Jj-55-56. See also, Acheson, Present a.t the Creation, 529.

317

'Truman, Memoirs, II, ij.55-56* See also,
Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," 630.
Acheson, Present at the Creation, 532-33*
•^■^Truman, Memoirs, II, lj-56; Hermes, Truce Tent
and Fighting Front, l 5 .
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straw, on June 29 Truman ordered the following message
transmitted to RidgwayI
The President has directed that 0800 Saturday Tokyo
Daylight Saving Time you send following message by radio
in clear addressed to Commander in Chief Communist
Forces in Korea and simultaneously release to press:
"As Commander in Chief of the United Nations
Command I have been instructed to communicate to you
the following:
"I am informed that you may wish a meeting to dis
cuss an armistice providing for the cessation of
hostilities and all acts of armed force in Korea,
with adequate guarantees for the maintenance of such
armistice. . • ."320
A favorable response to this message was received
from the Communist commander on the first day of July.

He

suggested that the meeting place be the town of Kaesong,
a site between the lines, quite near the thirty-eighth
parallel.

The first plenary session of the truce talks

was held on July 10, 1951 t with hostilities to continue
until an armistice was agreed upon.

It would take another

158 such sessions, stretched out over more than two years
of bitter disputation before the fighting was at last
stopped.-^3- Throughout it all, until the end of his term

320jQg to Ridgway, June 29, 1951 t quoted in
Truman, Memoirs, II, lj-58. For text of the directive to
Ridgway communicating acceptable terms, see ibid., 45859. See also, Millis, Arms and M e n , 300; Hermes, Truce
Tent and Fighting Front, 16-IV.
^^Truman, Memoirs, II, 459; Acheson, Present at
the Creation, 534“3f?JHF5eKrenbach, This Kind of War,~4W.
See also, Steinberg, Man from Missouri, h00» Lichterman,
"To the Yalu and Back," 630'; Stone, Hidden History of the
Korean War, 28i|.—85•
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of office, Truman maintained an active supervision of the
limited military operations and of the frustrating efforts
to obtain a satisfactory cease-fire.

Now, along with the

daily battlefield reports he also received a daily account
of the truce proceedings.

As he recalled:

"No major

steps were taken without specific approval of the Presi
dent, even to the wording of announcements made by the Par
East commander or the chief negotiator at crucial
points."^^

The fact is that there was little need for

Truman to exercise his powers as Commander in Chief
following the removal of MacArthur and the decision to
halt and seek a settlement near the thirty-eighth parallel.
Tnlhile he continued to act as an overseer and exercise
final authority, the decreased level of combat and smooth
functioning of his subordinates sharply diminished his
active participation in the conduct of the war.

Truman

now lost his trusted Secretary of Defense, General Marshall,
who retired for personal reasons in September, 19£l> but
was quite pleased with Marshall's successor, Robert A.
Lovett.3^3

in May 195>2 Eisenhower resigned as Supreme

Allied Commander in Europe in order to seek the Republican
presidential nomination.

Truman ordered General Ridgway

■^^Truman, Memo irs, II, lj.j?9.
323Marshall to the President, September 1, 195>1 >
and reply, September 11, 1951* Truman Papers, OP, 1285*
Truman Library.
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to assume the NATO command, which is seme indication of
the declining importance to the President of the limited
military activity in Korea.

General Mark W. Clark served

as Ridgway’s successor in the Par East command.
The policy adopted for military operations in Korea
in mid-195l was held relatively constant by the President
until the end of his term in January, 1953 » his adherence
to this policy being reinforced by a recommendation of
the National Security Council in December, 1951

The

President did not "shortchange" the troops serving in
Korea, for he insisted that the "overriding priority" on
all military end items was to be accorded to combat con00 A

sumption requirements.

However, Truman also kept the

troop levels in Korea substantially unchanged for the
remainder of his Presidency.327

This assured a battlefield

stalemate and may well have contributed to the protracted
truce negotiations.
In June 1952 a public opinion poll revealed that

3^-Truman, Memoirs, II, I4.62 . See also, American
Military History, 56? J Mark W. Clark, From the Danube To
the Yalu (New York: Harper and Brothers, i95^T> 30.
Hereinafter cited as Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu.
^^Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 130.
32^Truman to Lovett, January 9, 1952, RG330, OSD,
CD 091«3> National Archives.
327Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 331*
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forty-three percent of those surveyed believed that the
United States should have been bolder in Korea, "• • •
even at the risk of starting World War I I I . "328

Asked

what policy should now be adopted to Korea, a majority
(fifty-three percent) said that the United States should
". . • stop fooling around and do whatever is necessary to
knock the Communists out of Korea once and for all."329
But the President was convinced that his course was the
only proper one.

In a meeting with the JCS and Secretary

of Defense on September 15, 1952, Truman did authorize a
very limited increase in military pressure in hope of
forcing a more conciliatory attitude out of the Communist
truce negotiators.

But he told his advisers that he could

envision no genuine prospect for any armistice other than
by persisting with the established course of

a c t i o n .

330

The campaign to select Truman’s successor was
heating up in September, as were the Republican condem
nations of his strategy in the Korean War.

While an

armistice at the time would have been of inestimable value

328Twenty-three percent felt the U.S. should have
stayed out and let the Communists take Korea. Only nineteen
percent endorsed the policies that had been pursued by the
Administration. Roper, You and Your Leaders, I 63- 6I4..
32<?t o this question, only twenty-two percent believed
that the existing strategy should be pursued. See ibid.
330Memorandum for the record, Robert A. Lovett,
September 15, 1952, USA, Office of the Chief of Staff,
091-Korea, National Archives.
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to his party and a desirable climax to his Presidency,
Truman refused to allow personal or political considerations
to influence his

position on a negotiated settlement.

determination is

revealed in the excerpts below, taken

His

from the transcript of a meeting in the White House with
his principal advisers on September 21±:
The President stated that as he saw the situation
we were faced with the question of whether "we should
do anything in the world to get an armistice in
Korea." He said that he was not willing to get an
armistice just for the sake of an armistice, and
particularly one which would leave the Communist
Chinese in a
position to renew hostilities. • . •
He added that we must maintain the morale of our
forces at home and abroad and strive to handle the
worldwide situation in a way to prevent war. He said
that he had been conducting his administration for
seven years in an effort to avoid World War III and
he did not want to wind up his political career by
bringing war on. Nevertheless, he would not weaken
on the
les that we are striving to maintain.
The Communists, finding the American peace offer of
September unacceptable, broke off negotiations in October
1952.

On the twenty-fourth of the month, the Republican

nominee, General Eisenhower, made a major campaign address
at Detroit in which he bitterly denounced the Korean
policies of his former Commander in Chief.

He said that

Korea and the twenty thousand Americans who had died there
were ". • . a measure— a :damning measure— of the quality

33lTranscript of White House meeting, September 2lj.,
19£2, ibid.
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of leadership we have been given,"

332

Eisenhower said

that the Korean War was a direct result of Acheson's
"perimeter" speech.

If elected, he would not be diverted

by political considerations (the implication being that
Truman had), but would go personally to Korea to determine
333
how best to bring about an honorable settlement.
In
earlier speeches Eisenhower had given some indication
that he would make Korea a major issue.

Truman had written

to him on August 13, inviting him to attend Cabinet
meetings and receive full briefings from the White House
staff.

He also told the Republican candidate that he had

arranged for the CIA to provide him and his Democratic
opponent, Adlai Stevenson, with weekly intelligence
summaries on the world s i t u a t i o n . R e p l y i n g the next
day, Eisenhower declined the invitation so as to remain
free to "analyze publicly" the present administration.
While welcoming the weekly CIA reports> Eisenhower

33% e w York Times, October 25, 1952.
333I b i d .

In

a press conference on December 11,
1952, Truman described Eisenhower’s announcement that he
would go to Korea as "a piece of demagoguery" which Eisen
hower was obligated to carry through on after the election.
Item No. 3l].5* Public Papers . . . Truman, 1952-53? 1075*
Truman repeated the' c h a r g e o f demagoguery againsu Eisen
hower in interviews held late in December.
See Anthony
Leviero, New York Times, December 27, 1952; Edward T.
Polliard, Washington Post, December 27? 1952.
33ij-Truman to Eisenhower, August 13, 1952, printed
in Truman, Memoirs, II, 512.
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cautioned that he would not consider them a restriction
on his freedom to discuss foreign policy. ^3$
admitted that the response made him angry.

Truman
In a personal

note he told Eisenhower that he was very sorry that the
latter had allowed "a bunch of screwballs" to come between
/
them. His closing sentence reads:
"Prom a man who has
always been your friend and who always intended to be I"336
The presidential campaign of 1952 must have been
doubly disappointing to Truman.

Not only because the

result could be interpreted as a repudiation of his Korean
policies, but also because Eisenhower, whom he greatly
respected and admired and counted as a friend, chose
unfairly (in Truman's view) to attack Administration policy.
In the years between World War II and the 1952 campaign,
the President had given every indication of his great
faith in the general.

In

he had appointed Eisenhower

to the permanent rank of General of the Army for life.
As previously recorded, Truman subsequently made Eisen-.
hower Chief of Staff of the Army, later Chairman of the

335Eisenhower to Truman, August llj., 1952, ibid.,

512-13.
336Truman

Eisenhower, August 16, 1952, ibid.,

513.
337

Truman to Patterson, August 2, 19lj-6, OSW (211),
AG031.1, National Archives. See also, Patterson to Eisen
hower, August 23, 191+6, Eisenhower Papers, PP/DDE,
Patterson folder, Eisenhower Library.
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Joint Chiefs and, finally, NATO Supreme Commander.

Their

correspondence throughout these years is replete with
mutual assurances of respect and loyalty.

Eisenhower, for

example, wrote early in 191+8 of the "high sense of distinc
tion and privilege" he felt for the opportunity to serve
under Truman and his gratitude for the President’s under
standing, encouragement and friendship.33®

Resigning

from the chairmanship of the JCS in 191+9» the general
assured Truman that it had been ". • . a great honor and
privilege to do what I could . . .
Commander-in-Chief.

339

under your direction as

When Eisenhower resigned as Army

Chief of Staff in January 191+8, Truman told him:

"You

have my heartiest good wishes in whatever you may decide
to do— and my friendship and admiration always."3^®
There was a short-lived attempt to obtain the Democratic
nomination for Eisenhower in 191+8 which he helped to kill
himself.

Writing to him after the election, Truman told

Eisenhower that it had been unnecessary to reaffirm his
loyalty to the President:

"I always know exactly where

you stand.

33®Eisenhower to Truman, January 22, 191+8, Eisen
hower Papers, PP/DDE, Truman folder (1), Eisenhower
Library.
33^Eisenhower to Truman, August 17, 191+9 > ibid.
3^°Truman to Eisenhower, January 23, 191+8, ibid.
3^-Truman to Eisenhower, November 16, 191+8, ibid.
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Despite his personal pique at Eisenhower, Truman
sent him a message of congratulations immediately after
the election and offered the use of the presidential air
craft should he still desire to go to

K o r e a .

3^

This was

the first of a series of messages exchanged between the
two men in the next few days, in all of which Truman
emphasized his strong desire to keep the President-Elect
abreast of the international scene as well as to bring
about as effortless a change of administrations as pos
sible. 3^3

Truman’s sincerity in this was displayed in a

letter he addressed to all of the principal officers of
his Administration in December, asking their full cooper
ation in facilitating an orderly transition.

He required

that each of them report to him on the steps taken in his
respective enclave to bring this about.3^-

In compliance

with this request, Secretary Lovett reported that the
Defense Department had provided General Eisenhower with
transportation, accommodations and military intelligence

f November 5, 1952, quoted
in Truman, Memoirs, II, 505* See also, Item No. 325,
Statement by the President on the Election of Dwight D.
Eisenhower, Public Papers . . . Truman, 1952-53* 1028.

3^-3The se several communications are all published
in Truman, Memoirs, II, 505-510. See also, Corwin and
Koenig, Presidency Today, 128-29.
3 ^Truman to Secretary of State, et. al., December
31, 1952, Truman Papers, Murphy Piles, Correspondence and
General Pile, Truman Library.
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on his trip to Korea, accompanied throughout by Omar
Bradley, the JCS Chairman.

Eisenhower, as well as the men

he designated as appointees to the various posts in the
departments, was being fully briefed and constantly
acquainted with the military and administrative information
necessary for the conduct of office.
Truman’s efforts resulted in a governmental change
over brought about with minimal friction or disruption.
However, he had little faith in his successor’s ability to
govern.

MacArthur has recorded that while he and the Pres

ident were talking privately at Wake Island, the conver
sation got around to politics.

Truman renarked that while

he liked the general personally,

"Eisenhower doesn't know

the first thing about politics.

Why, if he should become

President, his Administration would make Grant's look like
a model of perfection.

In his own memoirs, Truman

said he agreed with the observation of Sam Rayburn, power
ful House Democrat, who, when asked to comment on the
possibility of General Eisenhower running for the
presidency said:
business.”3^4-7

"No, w o n ’t do.

Good man, but wrong

Contemplating the possibility of an

3^5>Lovett to the President, January 3, 195>3>
RG330, OSD, 031.1, National Archives.

3^-^MacArthur, Reminiscences, 363? Whitney,
MacArthur, 3 8 9 •
3VJrruman, Memoirs, II, 187.
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Eisenhower victory in the summer of 1952* Truman report
edly commented:

"He’ll sit here and he'll say,

Do that!’ And nothing will happen.
a bit like the Army.

’Do this!

Poor Ike— it w o n ’t be

H e ’ll find it very frustrating.’’^ ®

Certainly Truman found his own last months in office
very frustrating.

He relinquished national leadership on

January 20, 1953* and left Washington for his home in
Independence, his every effort to find a solution to the
Korean conflict having ended in abject failure.

Too

politically weak at home to make peace and too wise to
embark on military adventures that might have resulted in
a general war, he chose to leave office with the great
issue of his second term unresolved.

But Eisenhower faced

no such dilemma and was able to end the fighting (July 27,
1953)* by accepting a settlement for which Truman would
have been damned, a peace without victory.3^9

3^®Quoted in Neustadt, Presidential Power, 22.
3^9^axter Lippmann, New York Herald-Tribune, August
2t\., 1956. See also, Warren, President as World Leader,
3U5.
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CHAPTER IX

THE RELIEF OF DOUGLAS MACARTHUR

He was insubordinate and I fired him, just like
Lincoln fired McClellan. Sure I knew there would
be a lot of stink about it, but I didn't give a _
damn. It was the right thing to do and I did it.

At the end of World War II, President Truman had
boundless respect for his European and Pacific theater
commanders, Generals Eisenhower and MacArthur.

But his

regard for both men was diminished by their separate
challenges to his decisions as Commander in Chief.during
the Korean War.

Although Eisenhower's bid for the presi

dency in 19!?2 was based on his credentials as a profes
sional soldier, it was as a nominally-civilian candidate
that he disputed Truman's military policies in the poli
tical arena.

The American system can tolerate this type

of dissent.

But the challenge with which MacArthur con

fronted his Commander in Chief endangered the very basis
of the civil-military relationship, if not the democratic
system itself.

■^Truman is quoted in Phillips, wTruman at 7£»” 107.
633
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The man destined to clash with Truman over Korean
strategy was unlike the President in almost every respect.
Where Truman had failed to be admitted to the United States
Military Academy, MacArthur had graduated from West Point
with a superlative record.

The blunt, earthy Truman was

so avowedly middle-class, middle-American that he seemed
at times to be a caricature of the virtues and foibles
ascribed to the type.

His frequent trips back to his small

hometown in Missouri seemed to be a necessary restorative.
The suave, articulate MacArthur, on the other hand, was
the regal, proud heir of his father (Arthur), a Medal of
Honor winner, who retired in 1909 with the rank of
p

lieutenant-general.

Douglas MacArthur had not even visi

ted the United States for over a dozen years prior to his
relief in 1951*

Aside from their both being born in the

l88o*s and that both were sincere, dedicated Americans,
there are few common denominators in the lives of the
President and the General.
The potential for conflict had always been there.
Truman was a firm believer in the principle of civil su
premacy.

MacArthur later testified to his acceptance of

the fundamental concept of military subordination to

p

Joseph G. Hopkins (ed.), Concise Dictionary of
American Biography (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,

T96Ii!J7T9T."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

635
civilian authority. ^

But there was a lofty, imperious at

titude about the General, probably fostered by his years
as American proconsul for Japan, that belied these assuran
ces.

Perhaps the best indicator of the attitude that will

lead him into contention with Truman can be found in a
framed quotation from Livy which was prominently displayed
on the wall of MacArthur's office in the Dai-Ichi Building,
his headquarters in Tokyo.

In part, it read:

• • .1 am not one of those who think that comman
ders ought at no time to receive advice. . . . What
then is my opinion? That Commanders should be coun
selled chiefly by persons of known talent. • .who
are present at the scene of action, who see the
country, who see the enemy. • .and who, life people
embarked in the same ship, are sharers of the danger.
If, therefore, anyone thinks himself qualified to
give advice respecting the war which I am to con
duct. • .let him come with me into Macedonia. He
shall be furnished with a ship, a horse, a tent;
even his traveling charges shall be defrayed. But
if he thinks this too much trouble, and prefers the
repose of city life. . .let him not. • .assume the
office of a pilot. The city in itself furnishes
abundance of topics for conversation; let it confine
its passion for talking within its own precincts and
rest assured that we shall pay no attention to any
councils but such as shall be framed within our
camp.4

^See, for example, Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 27-28,
283-81j., 289, i|lj.9-50; MacArtEur, Reminiscences, 393* Truman
made an extended statement on civil supremacy in his
Memoirs, II,
•
^Phe quotation from Livy is purported to be the
views of Lucius Aemilius Paulus, a Roman general
(c. 168 B.C.), see Rovere and Schlesinger, The General
and the President, 120-21,
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It would be an injustice to MacArthur to assume
that his attitudes parallel those of the Roman general
quoted in Livy.

MacArthur did not ignore the "councils”

framed by the Joint Chiefs and the Commander in Chief,
even though they did not go with him into "Macedonia.”
But there is ample evidence that he did fight mightily
against any of their orders which ran counter to his own
thinking.

He was also not above giving an interpretation

to his directives which had the effect of accomodating Ad
ministration policy to his strategic concepts.
The first indication that MacArthur did not feel
absolutely bound by the injunctions in his directives can
be found in his order to the Par Bast Air Force on June 29,

19J?0 (Korean time), prior to the President’s decision to
become completely involved in Korea.

MacArthur had ordered

that airfields in North Korea be destroyed.'*

His operat

ing directive, dated June 26, gave the Par East commander
the authority to attack by air all military targets south
of the thirty-eighth parallel.^

The General made no ef

fort to obtain clearance for an attack upon a nation with
which the United States was not even "unofficially” at war.
Courtney Whitney, MacArthur's aide and apostle, explained

q
Appleraan, South to the Naktong,
has been previously n o t e d T n Chapter VTI.
^Far East Hearings. Pt. 1, 535*
Korean Decision, 179-02.

This incident

See also, Paige,
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ported to the President that MacArthur denied making any
political comments in his conversations with Chiang and
that while he disagreed on Formosan policy would

. .as

a soldier, obey any orders that he received from the
President.”'1"1’
In a press conference following Harriman's return,
Truman was queried about MacArthurfs views, which led to
the following exchange:
Q, General MacArthur says there are defeatists
and appeasers who are working against him. Is any
body trying to set you against General MacArthur?
THE PRESIDENT.
I haven’t met anybody yet.
Q. What was your answer, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT.
I haven't met anybody of that
sort yet. General MacArthur and I are in perfect
agreement, and have been ever since he has been in
the job he is now. I put him there, and I also ap
pointed him Commander in Chief of American and Al
lied Forces, at the suggestion of the United Nations.
I am satisfied with what he is doing . ^
Truman's satisfaction with the perfect accord be
tween himself and MacArthur was short-lived.

The Presi-

Quoted from Harriman's report to the President,
which is printed in Truman, Memoirs, II, 314-9-53. For MacArthurls statement regarding’ Harr'iman»s visit, see his
Reminiscences, 314-O-lp.. See also, Ridgway, Korean War, 38 ;
Spanier, ^ruman-MacArthur Controversy, 70-72; Phillips,
Truman Presidency,' 317; fteust'ad't,-Presidential Power, 2lj..
•^Item No. 209, Press Conference, August 10, 1950,
Public Papers . . • Truman, 1950* 580. The reporter's question with regard to ^defeatists and appeasers” was probably
inspired by a press release Issued by MacArthur just after
Harriman's visit. Spanier believes the statement was di
rected at MacArthur's superiors in Washington. TrumanMacArthur Controversy, 72-73.
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that the General had made a discretionary decision within
the ’’normal latitude” granted to field commanders.^

Only

an extraordinarily-broad reading of the directive would
allow such an interpretation.

In any event, on the fol

lowing day, (June 29 in Washington), Truman approved an
order giving MacArthur the authority he had already asQ
sumed to attack beyond the thirty-eighth parallel.
MacArthur paid a brief visit to Formosa on July 31,
1950.

While the General did not say so specifically, Tru

man received the clear impression from newspaper accounts
and statements by Chiang Kai-shek and his aides, that Mac
Arthur rejected the President's decision to neutralize
q

the Nationalist Chinese refuge .7

Truman was concerned

enough about the comments in the press to send Averell
Harriman to Toyko to give MacArthur an account of the Ad
ministration's views on foreign policy, particularly as to
planning with regard to the Far East .10

Harriman later re

^Whitney, MacArthur, 326.
®Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 536.
^Statement of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Au
gust 2, 1950, in Far East Hearings, Pt. 5» 3383-8l|.. See
also, Truman, Memoirs, II, 35^4-J Collins, War in Peacetime,
272. For MacArthuris statement regarding his trip to IPormosa, see New York Times, August 1, 1950. See also, a fur
ther statement attributed to a ’’reliable source” in ibid.,
August 6 , 1950.

10Truman, Memoirs, II, 353—5U-*
War in Peacetime,'

Se® also, Collins,
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dent later recalled that he erred in assuming n . • .Gen
eral MacArthur would accept the Formosa policy laid down
by his Commander in Chief,”^3

two weeks after Harriman's

return, on August 26, Truman was given a copy of a message
from MacArthur to Clyde A. Lewis, commander of the Vet
erans of Foreign Wars.

The message, sent at Lewis' request,

was to be read at the National Encampment in Chicago on Au
gust 2 8 , ^

MacArthur told the VFW that he believed it to

be in the public interest that he clear up the w. • .mis
conceptions currently being voiced concerning the relation
ship of Formosa to our strategic potential in the Paci
fic."^

He then went into detail on the great strategic

importance that the island of Formosa represented, de
scribing it as the keystone of the protective shield de
fending the Pacific area and the Americas.

After estab

lishing that Formosa was pivotal to maintenance of the de
fensive perimeter in the Pacific, MacArthur said that if
this line were lost, war would inevitably result.

The

neutralization of Formosa, on the grounds that it lacked
strategic importance and that any other course might alien
ate continental Asia— which was Truman's policy as communi-

■^Truman, Memoirs, II,
^Ibid.
MacArthur, li&2.

See also, Hunt, Untold Story of Douglas

^ N e w York Times, August 29# 1950.
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c a te d t o M acA rth u r by H a rrim a n — was f a l l a c i o u s re a s o n in g
by tho se who u n d e rs to o d n e i t h e r ’’b ro a d s t r a t e g i c
c e p ts ” n o r th e O r i e n t a l m in d .

con

To M a c A rth u r, e x is t i n g

p o lic y was d e fe a tis m and appeasem ent.

He c lo s e d w it h h ig h

p r a is e f o r th e P r e s id e n t 's d e c is io n to in te r v e n e in
K o r e a .^
M acA rth u r l a t e r w ro te t h a t h is VFW message was
a p o l i t i c a l and in f u l l s u p p o rt o f Trum an's p o lic y r e s p e c t 
in g Form osa.

He s a id he d id n o t know how h is message was

so c o n s tru e d §s to im p ly th e r e v e r s e o f th e in te n d e d mean
in g , n o r how th e P r e s id e n t c o u ld be ” so e a s i l y d e c e iv e d ,”
p re s u m a b ly , by h is m i l i t a r y

or p o lit ic a l a d v is e r s .^

T ru 

man, on th e o th e r h an d, b e lie v e d t h a t th e to n e o f th e en
t i r e message was an e x p re s s io n o f c r i t i c i s m

o f th e p o lic y

M acA rth u r had t o l d H a rrim a n he w ould s u p p o rt, and t h a t t h is
was th e way th e G e n e ra l in te n d e d i t

to re a d .

The P re s id e n t

Ibid. Text of MacArthur's message also appears
in Far Bast gearings, Pt. 5, 3187-89; Bernstein and Matusow' (edsV)V frruman^Administration, I4J4.3—lp6 • See also, Tru
man, Memoirs, ll',‘ 3£U--55>; MacArthur, Reminiscences, 3I4.I;
Acheson, Present at the Creation, 2+231 Spanler,' frrumanMacArthur Controversy, 73—72+J Hunt, Untold Story of Doug
las MacArthur, Lib2-bo.j Higgins, Korea and the Fall of Mac
Arthur, 39.
^MacArthur, Reminiscences, 3hl-!j.2. General
Whitney claims that MacArthur always felt that his message
“innocently ran afoul” of a State Department scheme to
turn Formosa over to the Communists. Whitney, MacArthur,
381.
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felt that the VFW message was a direct contradiction of
his statements to Congress as well as his announcement of
June 27.

It was also, he felt, contrary to a letter Am

bassador Austin had just written to the UN SecretaryGeneral on his instructions.
Shortly after reading a copy of the VFW message
on August 26, Truman attended a previously-scheduled meet
ing with the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury,
the Joint Chiefs, and Harriman.

Acheson recalls that the

President entered the room obviously disturbed, his lips
!,white and compressed.** He read them MacArthur's message
and then asked each in turn if he had any prior knowledge
of the document.

All responded negatively.

Truman then

instructed Secretary of Defense Johnson to inform MacArthur
.that-.he..(.the...President) was ordering him to immediately
19
withdraw his statement to the VFW.
Truman was aware that

Truman, Memoirs, II,
For text of the
letter, Austin to Trygve Lie, August 25, 1950, see Far
Ea 3t Hearings, Pt. 5, 314-73—714.* The June 27 statement was
Truman's original announcement of his decision to neutra
lize Formosa. See Item No. 173, Public Papers . . . Truman^i>1950, lj-92. I.F. Stone felt that MacArthur, through,
means like the VFW message, deliberately tried to start a
world war. See Hidden History of the Korean War, 92.
■^Acheson, Present at the Creation, 1^235 Truman,
Memoirs, II, 356. See also, Phillips, Truman Presidency,
318. Many of those present at this meeting later testi
fied to their views on the VFW message during the hear
ings on MacArthur's relief.
See Far East Hearings, Pt. 1,
716-18; Pt. 2, 929-30, 93h-36, l O ^ ^ T T ^ O b , 1590-91;
Pt. 3, 2002; Pt. 4, 2586-87, 2589-90, 2616-17.
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th e m essage, h a v in g been r e le a s e d by M a c A rth u r’ s s t a f f to
th e p re s s in Tokyo, had a lr e a d y a p p ea re d in s e v e r a l news
pap ers and a t l e a s t one n a t io n a l m ag azine when he o rd e re d
it

w ith d ra w n .

s tra te
p o lic y ,

B u t by o r d e r in g i t s

t h a t th e G e n e r a l’ s view s d id n o t r e p r e s e n t n a t io n a l
on w h ic h , Truman s a id , t h e r e c o u ld be " o n ly one

v o ic e " — h i s .

20

The o r d e r r e a d :

U n ite d S ta te s d i r e c t s
fo r.

.

r e c a l l he c o u ld demon

’’The P r e s id e n t o f th e

t h a t you w ith d ra w y o u r message

.V e te ra n s o f F o re ig n Wars because v a rio u s f e a t u r e s

w i t h r e s p e c t t o Formosa a re in c o n f l i c t w it h th e p o lic y o f
th e U n ite d S t a t e s .

• • , " 2 -*-

P e rs o n a l memoirs a re p a r t i c u l a r l y s u s p e c t on such
p o in t s , b u t Truman has re c o rd e d t h a t i t was a t t h i s

ju n c 

t u r e he f i r s t gave ’’’ s e rio u s th o u g h t" to r e l i e v i n g MacArthur.
If

s o , he k e p t i t

to h i m s e lf .

e re d t a k in g j u s t th e f i e l d
and g iv in g i t

He r e c a l l e d

t h a t he c o n s id 

command i n K o rea away fro m him

t o Omar B r a d le y .

Truman r e je c t e d th e id e a

s in c e i t w ould appear he was dem oting M a c A rth u r, whom he
had no d e s ir e t o i n j u r e p e r s o n a l l y . 22

20Trum an, M em oirs, I I ,
A ugust 29, 1950.

In s t e a d , he d e c id e d

355; New Y o rk H e r a ld -T rlb u n e ,

21

Johnson to MacArthur, August 26, 1950, printed
in Far Bast Hearings, Pt. 5* 34®0; New York Herald-Tribune,
August 29, l55o; Truman, Memoirs, II, 356.
22Trum an, M em oirs, I I ,

356.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

61*3

on a far milder course, a note to his Par East Commander
explaining the necessity for his order to withdraw the VFW
message.
Truman wrote to MacArthur on August 29, enclosing
a letter he had written to Ambassador Austin, and calling
the General’s attention to a letter from Austin to UN
Secretary-General Lie, a copy of which had been forwarded
to Par East Headquarters on the date it was written, Au
gust 25*

The President’s note was brief, explaining that

he was certain that once MacArthur had read these letters
he would understand why the withdrawal order was given . ^
The letter Truman sent to Austin, dated the twenty-seventh,
the day after he became aware of MacArthur's message to
the VFW, was released to the press by the White House.

An

obvious effort to counter the effect of the VPW message,
it restated the points made in Austin's letter to the Sec
retary-General, emphasizing that the ambassador’s letter
accurately reflected the fundamental position of the Gov
ernment respecting neutralization of Formosa and a desire
to limit conflict in the Par E a s t . ^

The controversy died

down soon afterward, smothered by the news of MacArthur’s

Truman to MacArthur, August 29, 1950, Truman
Papers, OP, $81j-Mac Arthur's Proposed VFW Message, Truman
Library.
^ T r u m a n to Austin, August 27» 1950, Tannenwald
Papers, Subject Pile (Benton-MacArthur), Truman Library.
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smashing triumph in the Inchon invasion and the subsequent
elimination of the aggressors from South Korea.
Truman and MacArthur had their only face-to-face
meeting on Wake Island October 15* 1950* a month after
I nchon.^

Tv/0 years later, Truman said regarding Wake

Island:

**I made a Hj.,l|.00-mile trip to get a lot of mis27
information.”
He described the misinformation from
MacArthur as the assurance that China would not intervene,
that the war was over, and that it would be possible to
release a regular Army division from Par East service for
pQ

occupation duties in Germany.

There is ample evidence

^Richard Lowitt (ed.), The Truman-MacArthur Con
troversy (Chicago: Rand-McNally/ l9b7)* I'3~ 'Truman
claimed that in their private conversation at Wake Island
(October 15)» MacArthur apologized for the embarassment
caused by his VFW letter.
See Memoirs, II, 3&5*

26

T h is m e e tin g has been exam ined a t le n g th i n th e
p re c e d in g c h a p te r .

27

Ite m No. 3^5 » Press C o n fe re n c e , December 11,
1952, P u b lic Papers . . . Trum an, 1952-53* 107J+. Truman
had made an e a r l i e r r e f e r e n c e t o M a c A rth u r's mis judgm ent
( a t Wake I s l a n d ) in a J e ffe rs o n -J a c k s o n Day a d d re s s ,
A p r i l llj., 1951. See M acA rth u r C h ro n o lo g y , e n t r y f o r Oc
t o b e r 15* 1950, Tannenw ald P a p e rs , S u b je c t P i l e , C h ro n o lo 
gy -M a c A rth u r H e a rin g s , Truman L i b r a r y .
pO

Item No. 3I4.5 , Press Conference, December 11,
1952, Public Papers . . . Truman, 1952-53* 107i|.. D.P.
Fleming felt MacArthur lied about Chinese intent, that he
already knew they were in North Korea in force. See The
Cold War, II, 617-18, citing Gordon Walker, Christian
Science Monitor, November 29, 1951.
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that MacArthur did make these estimates and that they were
gross miscalculations of what subsequently transpired; but
the General was guilty only of overconfidence.

The same

intelligence information upon which he based his unfortu
nate estimates was also known to the President, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the others present at
this meeting.

No one saw fit at the time, nor, in fact,

until events proved otherwise, to challenge MacArthur's
assertions.^9
In his post-Wake Island statements, the President
went to great pains to emphasize that there were no dis
agreements on policy between himself and MacArthur.

In

a statement issued the day of the meeting Truman spoke
of, 11. . .the very complete unanimity of view which pre
vailed. . .

. " 3 °

Two days later, speaking at San Fran

cisco, the President admitted that one of his reasons for
going to Wake Island was that he felt a need to make it
clear, by talking with MacArthur, ” . • .that there is com
plete unity in the aims and conduct of our foreign

policy."3i

^Substance of Statements Made at Wake Island
(passim.); Appleman, South to the Naktong,' 761.
3°Item No. 266, Statement by the President on His
Meeting with General MacArthur at Wake Island, October 15,
•*•950, Public Papers . . . Truman, 1950* 672.
3^Item No. 269, Address in San Francisco at the
War Memorial Opera House, October 17> 1950, ibid., 673*
Full text of this address is also printed in' Far East
Hearings, Pt. 5> 3*+86-91.
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To a press conference on October 19 Truman explained:
"There is no disagreement between General MacArthur and
m y s e l f .

"32

MacArthur did not see it this way.

When asked

in his dismissal hearing if Truman’s statement regarding
their complete accord, particularly regarding Formosa, wasi
a misinterpretation, MacArthur agreed that it was.

The

day after his return to Tokyo, MacArthur testified, "I
issued a statement. • .that there had been absolutely no
change on my part in any views I held as to the strategic
value of Formosa."^

This is most revealing of MacArthur’s

inability to completely subordinate himself to the Presi
dent’s authority.

It seemed never to occur to him that a

soldier on active duty should not issue press releases as
counters to statements made by his commander in chief.
Two incidents which occurred shortly after the
Wake Island meeting demonstrate MacArthur’s irresponsible
disregard for the limitations imposed by modern warfare.
On October 21+ he told his commanders to use American units:
in their drive to the Yalu, in unquestionable violation of

•^Itera No. 270, Press Conference, October 19,
1950, Public Papers • . • Truman, 1950, 679. See also,
Neus tadi, Pre sidential Power, 1+8.
33m&CArthur testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 1,
l+l• See also, Fleming, The Cold War, II, 618. For Tru
m a n ’s initial statement regarding the accord on Formosa,
860 Substance of Statements Made at Wake Island, 8 ; Brad
ley teatimon'y,~~Far East Hearings ,~TPt. 2,' 92tf.
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a directive received a month earlier, stipulating that
only Korean forces were to be used in the northern provin
ces.^

Less than two weeks later (November £), MacArthur

ordered the Air Force to destroy the Korean end of all
bridges crossing the Yalu River.

Again, his order was not

consistent with his instructions regarding aerial opera
tions near the Manchurian border .^5

in both instances the

Far East commander did not request a change of orders.

In

both instances the General later explained away his preemptory actions on the basis of military necessity and a
broad, unique interpretation of his directives that was
never envisioned by their authors .^6
cases:

MacArthur won both

in the first, the JCS deferred to his judgment,

although aware he had violated orders.

In the second, he

^Collins testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 2,
1216-17, 1228-31, 121+0; Ridgway, KoreanTWar, 61. See also,
Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 1&I+-25, 128-29.
Acheson, Present at the Creation, 1+63; Collins,
War in Peacetime, 200; Truman. Memoirs, II, 373-71+. See
also, MacArthur, Reminiscences, 360; Lichterman, ”To the
Yalu and Back,” 602-603•
36

In 195>1 Admiral Sherman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff testified: tt. . .throughout this period the conduct
of affairs was made difficult by a lack of responsiveness
to the obvious intentions of the directives which were
transmitted out there and a tendency to debate and in cer
tain cases to criticize.tt Far East Hearings, Pt. 2, 1630.
See also, Bradley testimony, ‘ibid., 111+6; Payne, Marshall
Story, 316.
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successfully appealed over the heads of his military su
periors to the Commander in Chief.

In winning these two

skirmishes against Washington, MacArthur converted the
strong likelihood of massive Chinese intervention into a
certainty, and then lost this last battle of a brilliant
career.
The overwhelming Chinese onslaught in late Novem
ber brought about a dramatic military reversal and marked
the beginning of the second and final phase of the con
flict between the President and the General.

Truman,

while believing that the general assault northward begun
on the twenty-fourth was ill-advised, did not blame Mac
Arthur for failing to defeat a vastly-superior army.
What the President found inexcusable was MacArthur1s re
sorting to public attacks on the Administration, alleging
that extraordinary limitations made his defeat inevitafe:

ble.37
Prom the time China intervened until his relief,
MacArthur persisted in taking his case to the people, ar
guing that the military limitations imposed upon him were
all that stood in the way of a decisive victory.

On Novem

ber 28 MacArthur denied that he had made the "home by
Christmas” statement when launching the general offensive

^Truman, Memoirs, II, 381- 82 .
"Truman," 202.

See also, Hoare,
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on the twenty-fourth.

38

Two days later, responding to a

radiogram from Arthur Krock, MacArthur said that every
strategic and tactical movement made by his forces was in
accord with UN resolutions and his directives.

He had

taken no "major steps" without prior, full approval.

Mac

Arthur told Krock that no "authoritative source" had ever
suggested he halt his advance at any point before the Yalu
River boundary.
tion. )

(The Joint Chiefs had made such a sugges

China's intervention, MacArthur continued, was

long premeditated.

"It is historically inaccurate to at

tribute any degree of responsibility for the onslaught of
the Chinese Communist armies to the strategic course of
the campaign itself.
On the first day of December MacArthur granted an
interview (by telegraph) to the editor of U.S. News and
World Report.

When asked how his military operations were

affected by the imposed limitations, particularly regard
ing the Manchurian sanctuary, the General described these
limitations as "an enormous handicap, without precedent in

MacArthur to Ray Henle ("Sun Oil Three-Star Ex
tra" radio news broadcast), November 28, 1950, quoted in
Washington Post, November 29, 1950.
"^MacArthur to Arthur Krock, November 30, 1950,
published in New York Times, November 30, 1950. Text is
also printed in Far East hearings, Pt. 5, 3ij-96.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

650
military history."^5 In a telegram to the United Press of
the same date, MacArthur expressed similar sentiments.

He

said that he was faced with an "entirely new war" against
vastly superior numbers, a situation brought about by his
having to accept military odds,

• .without precedent in

history— the odds of permitting offensive action without
defensive retaliation."^

Comments in a similar vein from

MacArthur were contained in a general press release to the
Tokyo press corps on December 2 . ^
In all these statements to the press, MacArthur
consistently stressed four points:

First, he denied that

his movements toward the Yalu had in any way triggered
China's intervention.

Second, his "end the war"

(or,

"home by Christmas," or, "reconaissance in force") offen
sive launched on November 2l\. had forced the enemy to com
mit forces prematurely and had totally disrupted the ene-

^°New York Times, December 2, 1950;
See also, Far
East Hearings, Pt. 5> 3532-33; Collins, War in Peacetime,
279. For a list of all restrictions placed upon the con
duct of military operations in Korea, see Marshall to Rich
ard B. Russell, May 23, 1951, printed in Far East Hearings,
Pt. 5, Appendix K, 3192-93.
^MacArthur to Hugh Bailie, December 1, 1950, pub
lished in New York Herald-Tribune, December 2, 1950.
^^Washington Post, December 3, 1950. MacArthur
communicated similar messages to Barry Faris, Internation
al News Service, and Ward Price of the London Daily Mail.
See Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Cbntroversy, 11+9•
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m y ’s strategic plans, which called for the conquest of all
Korea by a continuous sweeping movement southward.

Third,

MacArthur took exception to reports that his forces were
in full retreat, explaining that his troops were executing
a predetermined retrograde movement in magnificent order.
Fourth, he was unable to defeat the Chinese because of the
unreasonable strictures imposed upon the conduct of his
operations .^*3
Truman grew quickly out of patience with the press
barrage coming from his Far East commander.

He was con

cerned, too, over the confusion regarding American policy
that MacArthur’s statements were generating in other
nations.^- The President sent the following memorandum
to all government agencies on 'December 6 :
In the light of the present critical interna
tional situation, and until further written notice
from me, I wish that each one of you would take
immediate steps to reduce the number of public

^ These four "themes” in MacArthur's statements
were identified and elaborated upon by Spanier, TrumanMacArthur Controversy, llj.9-50. See also, Rovere and.
SchlWinger, The General and the President, 152-53; Hig
gins, Korea diicT'the Pall of Ma'c'Ar~bhur, 5o« For his own
exposition on the second and third' points, see MacArthur
to Frank W. Boykin, December 13, 1950, Truman Papers, OF,
lj.71-B - Korean Emergency, Truman Library.
^Truman, Memoirs, II, 383. Truman also wrote
that while he was disturbed that he and MacArthur were so
far apart in their viewpoints, H . . .it was always proper
and appropriate for him to advance his opinion to his Com
mander in Chief. If he had gone no farther than that, I
would never have felt compelled to relieve him .n Ibid.,

hi6.
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speeches pertaining to foreign or military policy
made by officials of the departments and agencies
of the executive branch. This applies to officials
in the field as well as in Washington.
No speech, press release, or other public state
ment concerning foreign policy should be released
until it has received clearance from the Department
of State.
No speech, press release, or other public state
ment concerning military policy should be released
until it has received clearance from the Department
of Defense.
In addition to the copies submitted to the De
partments of State or Defense for clearance, advance
copies of speeches and press releases concerning
foreign policy or military policy should be sub
mitted to the White House for information.
The purpose of this memorandum is not to curtail
the flow of information to the American people, but
rather to insure that the information made public
is accurate and fully in accord With the policies
of the United States Government.h?
In a memorandum to the Secretaries of State and De
fense the same day, Truman instructed them to order all
overseas officials, “including military commanders," to be
extremely cautious in their public utterances and to ob
tain clearance for all but the most routine statements.
Additionally, they were to be Instructed, in Truman's words,
". • .to refrain from direct communication on military or
foreign policy with newspapers, magazines, or other publi
city media in the United S t a t e s . A l t h o u g h these messa-

h.5
^ Truman's memorandum was transmitted verbatim to
MacArthur in JCS to CINCPE, December 6 , 1950, Truman Pa
pers, OP, 5 8l4--MacArthur's dismissal, Truman Library.
^ I b i d . See also, New York Herald-Tribune, April
12, 1951* !Far East Hearings, Pt. 5» 353^ > Guttraan (ed.),
Korea and the theory of Limited War, 11; Collins, War in
Peacetime, 280.
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ges were not addressed directly to MacArthur, there can be
no doubt that he was the target.^

General Bradley later

testified that prior to MacArthur’s press statements such
an order had never been necessary, ". . .because it is
tradition and custom and common practice of military men,
when speaking on policy matters, to submit them, submit
their views, for approval."^®
For the second time Truman considered dismissing
MacArthur, but rejected the idea.

He later regretted it:

"I should have relieved General MacArthur then and there.
He said he did not because it would appear that MacArthur
was being fired for the failure of the November offensive.
Truman said that he had no desire to hit the General while
he was down.
ly .^0

He did not even wish to reprimand him direct

This, then, is the apparent reason for the "scatter-

gun" technique of issuing orders that every government emmust clear military and foreign policy statements.

Il7
^ See, for example, Truman, Memoirs, II, 383;
Acheson, Present at the Creation, l\.72; Aches on testimony,
Far East Hearings, Pt. 3, 1863; Marshall testimony, ibid.,
Pt. 1", 314-2; Bradley testimony, ibid., Pt. 2, 880.
^ F a r East Hearings. Pt. 2, 889. See also, ibid.,
1020. MacArthur's view was that he had been "rauzzle&w "by
"anonymous sources high in government circles," who were
propagandizing against him. See Reminiscences, 385*
^Truman, Memoirs, II, 38I4..
^°Ibid.
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6514The target of Truman's orders must have been hit
by the salvo, for MacArthur was publicly silent on policy
questions throughout December and January,

He continued

to struggle with the Joint Chiefs, but through the proper,
non-public channels.
was still vigorous.

The old warrior's private dissent
In a mid-January lotter to a West

Point classmate, who had written to congragulate his on
his seventy-first birthday, MacArthur said he was having
a

difficult time maintaining troop integrity and a stable

situation because of the "handicaps and delimitations”
which had been imposed upon him.

The confusion which ex

isted over the political ramifications determining mili
tary conduct, he wrote, were without parallel in American
history.

MacArthur closed by telling his friend not to

be shocked if news came that he had gone to his "last
round-up” at the end of a rope, hanged from an oriental
telephone p o l e , ^
A "leak” developed in MacArthur's headquarters on
February 6 , 1951*

The Associated Press reported that Mac

Arthur had recommended the use of Chinese Nationalist
forces against the Chinese mainland and in Korea.

The un

identified source also indicated that the General had, on
three occasions, sought permission to bomb the "privileged

51

MacArthur to Charles Patterson, c. January 15,
1951, quoted in MacArthur, Reminiscences, footnote, 382.
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sanctuary 11 in Manchuria.

MacArthur was reportedly stress

ing that there could be no turning back in the struggle
against Communism, not just in Korea, but throughout the
Orient.

52 A week later, under his own name, MacArthur

issued a public statement which attacked strategic propo
sals then under active consideration by the Joint Chiefs,
the National Security Council and the President.

He said

that he was still fighting a war of maneuver and dismissed
nthe concept being advanced by some 11 that a switch be made
to positional warfare by the establishment of a defensive
line across the Korean penisula.

This, MacArthur said,

was strategically unsound and would result in the piece
meal destruction of UN forces.

He again lashed out at the

unprecedented military advantage which sanctuary gave to
the Chinese, who were n . • .engaging with impunity in un
declared war against us. . , .**^3
General MacArthur must have come to a decision in
February that he could no longer remain publicly silent on
policy.

Whether he sought only personal exculpation from

the defeat in Korea, or still hoped to garner victory by
forcing Truman and the Defense Department to yield to mass

^2New York Herald-Tribune, February 7» 1951*
New York Times, February li|., 1951* Secretary
Marshall later testified that this statement did not, in
his judgment, comply with the December 6 , 1950, directive
of the President. Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, JLpT5•
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popular support for his ideas is not certain.

He begins

to emerge as a Billy Mitchell-type figure, striving to
change the strategic thinking of a static bureaucracy.
There was one significant difference:

MacArthur wished to

revert to an older concept of warfare, one that recognized
no political limitations.
The depths of MacArthur*s bitterness and frustra
tion can be gathered from a conversation he had in Febru
ary with General Mark Clark, then Chief of Army Field
Forces.

MacArthur dwelt on the errors in policy of “great

magnitude and danger” being made in Washington.

His views

and recommendations, he told Clark, had been largely ig
nored “at critical times."

In this regard, he was most cri

tical of the Joint Chiefs.

MacArthur found it incomprehen

sible that the Administration continued to allow sanctuary,
providing the enemy with a secure base of supply and air
operations.

Clark, who would eventually replace Ridgway

in the Far East command post, agreed with MacArthur on the
sanctuary question then and l a t e r . ^
The Far East commander was back on his most persis
tent theme, the "abnormal conditions" affecting his com
mand, in another public statement issued March 7* 195l»
MacArthur closed this release by insisting that important
politico-military decisions, far beyond his authority, had

^Clark, Danube to the Yalu, 25-26.
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yet to be made.

These decisions, he said, would have to

provide ". • .on the international level an answer to the
obscurities which now becloud the unsolved problems raised
by Red China's undeclared war in K o r e a . L a t e r ,

when

asked by Senator Lyndon Johnson if the closing lines of
this release complied ’'meticulously" with the President’s
directive, Secretary Marshall testified that he did not
think that it d i d . ^

The Secretary of State had an even

stronger reaction to a statement by MacArthur to Hugh
Bailie, president of United Press, eight days later.

The

General criticized the decision to halt at the thirtyeighth parallel, since this did not achieve the mission of
Korean unification.

Acheson believed that MacArthur’s

March 15 statement was a new move, from "private harass
ment" of the Administration, to open defiance of Truman’s
order regarding unauthorized comment on national policy.
The conflict between Truman and MacArthur was
rapidly intensifying.

On March 20, as previously described,

the Joint Chiefs informed MacArthur that the State Depart-

^ N e w York Times, March 8 , 1951* This statement,
like those issued in February, was not cleared through the
Pentagon. See also, Higgins, Korea and the Fall of Mac
Arthur, 105-106.
^ F a r East Hearings, Pt. 1, I4.76 .
57

Acheson, Present at the Creation, 5l8.
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ment was in the process of drafting a statement in which
Truman would seek a negotiated settlement.-*®

In a release

from Tokyo four days later MacArthur stated his willing
ness to negotiate a military settlement with the enemy com
mander.

His statement also contained a thinly-veiled

threat that if a settlement were not reached the United
Nations might well extend military operations to the coast
al areas and interior bases of China, bringing about its
military collapse.
An Administration spokesman quickly informed the
press that MacArthur’s statement involved political issues

An

beyond his responsibility as a field c o m m a n d e r H o w e v e r ,
convinced that any possibility for negotiations had been
temporarily forestalled, Truman abandoned the effort.

In

the President’s view, MacArthur's statement ''flouted’* UN
policy.

The General, Truman said, was in open defiance of

the Commander in Chief, challenging the very basis of the
civil authority of the President over the military estab-

^®JCS to CINCFE, March 20, 19$1, copy in Tannenwald
Papers, Subject Pile, Chronology-MacArthur Hearings, Tru
man Library.
^ N e w York Times, March 2J4., 1951 p Text of MacAr
thur 1s statement is" also printed in Reminiscences, 387-88;
Far East Hearings, Pt. 5» 3181, 35^-1”1+2; towitt (ed.),
Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 39. See also, Millis, **Truman and' MacArthur,d 50-5l.
®°M.J. McDermott (Statement), March 21}., 195l> Tru
man Papers, OP, 581+, Truman Library.
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lished in the Constitution.

"By this act,1* Truman wrote,

MacArthur left me no choice--I could no longer tolerate
his insubordination.'*

6"l

Despite this emphatic statement

(in his memoirs), Truman waited over two more weeks before
relieving the Par East commander.

His only immediate act

was to order the JCS to tell MacArthur that he (the Presi
dent) was directing his attention to the December 6 order
and stipulating that any further statements be cleared
through channels.

62

Millions of copies of his March 21}. statement had
been printed and air-dropped over enemy territory on Mac
Arthur’s authority.
of "psychological

He explained later that this was part

w a r f a r e . * * ^

MacArthur testified in his

dismissal hearing before Congress that his statement was
a "cold military appraisal" designed to end the bloodshed
and bring peace.

It had, he said, no relationship to the

JCS message of the twentieth regarding the drafting of a
peace-feeler for issue by the President.

Nor, according

^Truman, Memoirs, II, kl±2. See also, Hoare,
"Truman," 203. For the views of other participants regard
ing! the effect of MacArthur’s March 21}. statement, see Mar
shall testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 3i|.9, lj.28-29*
1}1}.2-1}.5> Ij.86-7; Co'llTns test'imonyT ibid., Pt. 2, 1196-97*
1207? Sherman testimony, ibid., 1591-92; Acheson testi
mony, ibid., 1591-92 .
^2JCS to CINCFE, March 21}., 1951* copy in Tannenwald Papers, Subject File, Chronology-MacArthur Hearings,
Truman Library.
^MacArthur testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 1,
7 2 .
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to MacArthur, was his message designed to embarrass Tru
man ” . . .or anyone else working to bring about peace.
Less than six months later, addressing the American Legion,
MacArthur was to say that his statement had prevented a
disgraceful plot to appease China by surrendering Formosa
and turning Nationalist China’s United Nation's seat over
to Peking in return for peace in Korea.

MacArthur told the

Legionaires that he had ”unquestionably wrecked’* this
plot.6^
House Minority Leader Joseph W. Martin precipi
tated MacArthur'a dismissal by disclosing a letter re
ceived from the General on the floor of the House, April 5»

Martin had written to MacArthur on March 8 request66
ing his views on the Far East.
The General's now-famed

1951.

response wa3 not unique.

He dwelt on the same basic themes:

^Ibid., 68-72, 285.
65

Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 201.
Without offering any more substantiation than MacArthur
did, two of his boiographers claimed such a plot existed
and that MacArthur deliberately blocked it with his
March 2J4. statement. See Whitney, MacArthur, 1+67-68; Hunt,
Untold Story of Douglas MacArthur, 507-5>l0»
^ M a r t i n to MacArthur, March 8 , 195l> printed in
Far East Hearings, Pt. 5» 3182, 35^3• Text of letter is
also published in Hunt, Untold Story of Douglas MacArthur,
511. For Martin's explanation "o'if why- Ee made MacArthur»s
letter public (a ’’tocsin” needed ”to bring the President
and the Secretary of State to their senses” ), see Lowitt
(ed.), Truman-MacArthur Controversy,
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Release from the imposed limitations, utilization of Chinese
Nationalist armies, recognition that while Europe received
all of the attention, he was fighting the Battle of Arma
geddon in A s i a . M a c A r t h u r considered the exchange of
letters letters with Martin innocuous, just another cour/o
tesy to a Congressman, phrased in very general terms.
Viewed as a piece of private corrospondence, it was just
that.

When Martin chose (without MacArthur’s consent) to

make the letter public it became a controversial document.
Writing in his memoirs, Truman dealt at length
with the letter to Representative Martin.

He dissected

the two principal paragraphs, noting MacArthur’s incon
sistency on the employment of Formosan troops, disagree
ing with the General's “Asia-first” philosophy, and hold
ing that the idea of ‘‘meeting force with maximum counterforce'* was not part of the American tradition.

He ended

his examination of MacArthur's letter with the following
comments:

67

MacArthur to Martin, March 20, 1951* printed in
Far East Hearings, Pt. 5* 3182, 3^1p3—Ult-* Test of the let
ter also appears in MacArthur, Reminiscences, 386; Guttman (ed.), Korea and the Theory"of Limited War, 13; Tru
man, Memoirs, II, J4J4.5 — » Payne, Marshall Story, 317;
Willoughby and Chamberlain, MacArtEur, lj.2l-£2.
/o
MacArthur, Reminiscences, 386; MacArthur testi
mony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, b.b-14-7* il3.
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The time had come to draw the line. MacArthur'a
letter to Congressman Martin showed that the gener
al was not only in disagreement with the policy of
the government but was challenging this policy in
open insubordination to his Commander in Chief,°9
It was not the Martin letter that determined the
President to dismiss MacArthur.

Truman wrote that after

March 2lp he could no longer tolerate this insubordination.^0
That MacArthur was to be fired had already been decided;
only the means and timing were undetermined.

The Martin

letter was merely the catalytic agent which initiated
the process.^
Shortly after Martin read MacArthur's letter to
the House of Representatives, Secretary of State Acheson
received a call from the White House instructing him to
meet with the President and Secretary of Defense Marshall
the next morning.

Acheson had no doubt as to the subject

of this m e e t i n g . G e n e r a l Bradley also received a call

69

Truman, Memoirs, II,
—14-7* For other partici
p a n t s opinions in testimony on the Martin letter, see Far
East Hearings, Pt. 1, 113-15* 380, l|i|5-l+7, 572-73, 581-82.
^^Truman, Memoirs, II, 1}1}.2, L1
J4.8 .
71 j .f . stone, for one, would disagree with this
conclusion. He said that the Martin letter— an "open
alliance" between MacArthur and the Republican oppositionprecipitated MacArthur's relief. Hidden History of the
Korean War, 275* Spanier takes a somewhaV similar view
in Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 202-201}..
72

Acheson testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 3,
1733, 1751, 1910. See also, Acheson, Present at the Crea
tion, 520.
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that afternoon, although he was not able to recall who it
was from, advising him that the President was very con
cerned about MacArthur*s statements.

Bradley held a brief

meeting with the Chiefs of Staff immediately afterward,
warning them that they should consider what recommenda
tions they would make respecting the military implica
tions of a possible relief of General MacArthur.73
Truman met wich Acheson, Marshall, Bradley and
Harriman in his office, Friday morning, April 6 .

He asked

for their views ovx what should be done about MacArthur’s
open defiance of the Commander in C h i e f K n o w i n g that
if he stated his views it would influence the advice he
received, Truman did not contribute to the discussion.
Harriman offered the opinion that MacArthur should have
been dismissed two years earlier.

The three other advi

sers present were more conservative in their remarks.
Marshall wanted time to reflect.

He also told Truman that

firing MacArthur might cause problems in getting the mili
tary appropriations bill through Congress.

Bradley be

lieved that on the basis of his statements the President

^General Collins, the Army Chief of Staff, was
not present at this meeting. He was represented by his
deputy, General Haislip. For testimony concerning this
meeting, see Far East Hearings, Pt. 2, 739* 7l4-5 -M>,
759-60, 1015,“ToiB ^ l 9 ,“ 1601; pt. 3 , 173i.
^Truman, Memoirs, II, ljij.7; Acheson, Present at
the Creation, 521; Acheson testimony, Far East Hearings,
PtT 3, 19l0.
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would be justified in relieving MacArthur, but indicated a
desire to consult with the other members of the Joint Chiefs
before making a final recommendation,

Acheson agreed on

the question of dismissal, but was concerned about the
political, military and diplomatic repercussions.

He cau

tioned against making a hasty decision, since basic ques
tions were involved, particularly the prerogatives and
duties of the President as Commander in Chief in his rela
tionship to a prestigious commander who was one of his
most important military subordinates.

He warned the Presi

dent that if the decision was made to relieve MacArthur,
he would face the greatest political battle of his Admini
stration.

Acheson later confided in his memoirs, "There

was no doubt what General MacArthur deserved; the sole
issue was the wisest way to administer it. "7$
made no decisions at this meeting.

Truman

He asked those present

to meet among themselves and then meet again with him the
following morni n g . ^

'^Acheson, Present at the Creation, £21. See also,
Truman, Memoirs, II, I4J4.7i AciEeson testimony, Par East Hear
ings, Pt. 3, 1*776-77, 1910, 1979-80.
^B r a d l e y testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 2,
10li7* Acheson testimony, ibid., Pt. 3, l7£l; Truman,
Memoirs, II, J4I1.7-I4.8 . During the Far East Hearings, Gen
eral Bradley, under questioning by Senator Alexander
Wiley (Republican, Wisconsin), refused to divulge what was
said by any persons present at the meetings with the Presi
dent regarding MacArthur*s dismissal: w . • .in my position
as an adviser, one of the military advisers to the Presi
dent. e .if I have to publicize my recommendations and my
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The meeting together of the four advisers Friday
afternoon and their subsequent meeting with the President
on .Saturday, April 7# were inconclusive.

In the Friday

meeting General Marshall asked the others for their opin
ions as to the possibility of ordering MacArthur to Wash
ington for consultation and arriving at a final determina
tion after that.
opposed.

Acheson, Bradley and Harriman were all

The Secretary of State’s objections were all

based on political considerations.^

Truman’s session with

the Game four advisers on Saturday morning was brief.

Mar

shall told the President that he had read all the communi
cations received from MacArthur since 191+.9 and now agreed

discussions. • .my value as an adviser is ruined.w Far
Bast Hearings, Pt. 2, 7&3« Chairman Richard Russell
^Democrat, Georgia), ruled that Bradley was justified in
holding that his talks with Truman constituted a privi
leged communication and was not, therefore, in contempt
of Congress. Russell's ruling was appealed and a lengthy
debate ensued lasting two days and occupying over one hun
dred pages of the hearings record. The senators argued at
length over the principle of the separation of powers, in
vestigative powers of Congress, the relationship of the
military to the Commander in Chief, and numerous other re
lated questions. In the end, the chair was sustained,
eighteen to eight, on a bipartisan vote. Four Republicans,
voted with the majority, and two Democrats, J. William
Fulbright (Arkansas), Guy M. Gillette (Iowa), voting with
the minority. See Far East Hearings, Pt. 2, 762-872. Tru
man later had high praise for Bradley's refusal to testify
to conversations held with him as Commander in Chief, be
lieving it to involve a basic question as to the validity
of the separation of powers principle. See Truman, Memoirs,
II, 1^52-53.
^Acheson, Present at the Creation, 521-22; Ache
son testimony, Far Bast" Hearings, pt. 3, I75l> Bradley
testimony, ibid., Pt"." 2, 161+7.
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with. Harriman that he should have been fired two years
earlier.

Truman directed Bradley to obtain the opinions

of the Chiefs of Staff from a "purely military" point of
view.

He accepted a suggestion that all present dwell

privately on the question over the weekend and instructed
them to be prepared to make their final recommendations
to him on Monday.^®
General Bradley met with the Chiefs of Staff at
the Pentagon on Sunday afternoon, April 8 , in order to
obtain their views.
be dismissed.

They all concurred; MacArthur should

There was discussion among them as to the

feasibility of relieving MacArthur of just the Korean com
mand and allowing him to remain in his post as Supreme
Commander of the Allied Powers for Japan (SCAP), but this
was ruled out as impractical.

The four members of the

JCS met later in the afternoon with Secretary Marshall,
and each presented his own reasons for agreeing to the
dismissal.

As later reported by General Bradley, the

Joint Chiefs had three basic reasons for concurring in
the removal:

first, the General's official communications

and public statements indicated a lack of sympathy with
the limited war policy in Korea; second, MacArthur had

78

Truman, Memoirs, II,
Acheson, Present at
the Creation, 522; Marshall testimony, Far East Hearings,
Pt. i, 31+5, 14-20 ; Bradley testimony, ibid., Pt. 3, 1751-52,
1911.
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violated the President's directive relative to clearing
public statements; third, ”. . .the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
have felt and feel now that the military must be controlled
by civilian authority in this country,” and MacArthur*s ac
tions were jeopardizing this

c o n t r o l .

Meeting with the President at nine o'clock Monday
morning, Bradley informed him of the unanimous concurrence
Q
of the JCS.
Marshall, Acheson and Harriman, each in his
turn, indicated agreement that General MacArthur should be
immediately relieved of all his commands.
then that Truman told them:

It was only

”1 had already made up my

mind that General MacArthur had to go when he made his
statement of March 2l|..,*^‘ The President directed that or-

79

'Bradley testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 2,
878-81; Collins testimony, ibid., 12X5-18. The reasons
that the Joint Chiefs concurred in the dismissal were ex
amined at great length by the members of the committee.
Perhaps this was because MacArthur had repeatedly insisted
that he and the JCS were in total accord. MacArthur testi
mony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 283 . The page numbers
that follow all cite testimony on this singular subject of
the reasons for JCS concurrence.
Ibid., Pt. 1, 322-23,
i+75, 517-18, 586-87; Pt. 2, 739-lj.oTTO, 908-909, 10k2-l|.3,
1107, 1187, 1195-96, 1198-1200, 1209, 1215, 1252, 1264.,
1269, 1314.8-51, 1356-58, 1391, 1403, ll^l-lt.6, 1571-72,
1578-79, 1598-99; Pt. 3, 23I4.6 -I4.7 •
®^Truman, Memoirs, II, iflj.8; Far East Hearings, Pt.
1, 3^7. After his presidency, Truman said MacArthur would
never have been relieved if the Joint Chiefs of Staff were
in control of policy. Truman Speaks, 2l+.
^Truman, Memoirs, II, 1^1-8; Acheson, Present at
the Creation, 522. See-"also, Marshall testimony, yarHBast
Hearings, Pt. 1, 3I4.5 • ij.20-21; Acheson testimony, ibid.,
Pt." 3 7 1752, 1911.
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ders be prepared relieving MacArthur and appointing General
Ridgway as his successor.

These orders and a draft public

statement were brought to the President at three o'clock,
Op

Tuesday, April 10, and he approved them.
An unfortunate series of events disrupted the pro
cess by which MacArthur was to be informed of his relief.
It was originally planned that the Secretary of the Army,
Prank Pace, who was then in Korea, would personally inform
the General in Tokyo.

The orders were to be wired in

State Department code to Ambassador Muccio in Pusan for de
livery to Pace, whom, it was assumed, was with Muccio.
However, Pace was visiting the front with Ridgway at the
time.

In addition, a power unit failed at Pusan, delaying

receipt of the message from the State Department.

At this

point, General Bradley came to Blair House to tell Truman
that the news had apparently leaked and wa3 to be published
by a Chicago paper in the morning, long before Pace could
reach MacArthur.

The President, perhaps to avoid giving

his antagonist an opportunity to resign before he was
fired, ordered that MacArthur be informed immediately and

Op

Truman, Memoirs, II, l|l+8. See also, Far East
Hearings, Pt. 1, 341? J Pt. 3, 17p2. Truman apparently
erred when he wrote that he received and approved of these
draft orders relieving MacArthur on Monday, April 9. See
Memoirs, II, 1+48 •
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Qo
directly over the Array’s own comraunications network.
At one o ’clock in the morning, April 11, reporters
were summoned to the White House and given a series of
hurriedly-reproduced copies of the dismissal order, a
statement by the President, and several "background" docu
ments.®^"

The order, summarily relieving MacArthur of all

commands, has been previously quoted.®^

In the accompany

ing statement, Truman said it had become necessary to re
move the General because he could not give "wholehearted
support" to the policies of the United States and the
United Nations.

Acknowledging that "full and vigorous de

bate" is a vital element in democracy, the President went
on to say:

"It is fundamental, however, that military

Q-j

Truman, Memoirs, II, J4I4.8—1+9; Acheson, Present at
the Creation, 522-23. A f u l l description of the press
■"Teak’1 can be found in Phillips, Truman Presidency, 3U-2—i+3»
For detailed testimony dealing with the method of relief,
see Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 3k5-kh* 3k8-k9* l|.l8-19> 51920, SBSjTfcT '2,' 714.6-1+7; pt. 3, 1777.
®^Fruman, Memoirs, II, 1+1+9• See also, Item No. 77
Statement by the President on Relieving General MacArthur
of His Commands, April 11, 1951* Public Papers . . . Tru
man, 1951* 222-23. The documents released to accompany
this statement were copies of the President’s directive of
December 6, 1950* the JCS messages of March 20, 21^., 1951»
MacArthur’s statement of March 21+, and MacArthur '3 letter
to Congressman Joseph Martin. See ibid., 22 3 . See also,
Washington Post, April 12, 1951.
See preceding chapter.
Far East Hearings, Pt. 5# 35hh.

Text is also found in
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commanders must be governed by the policies and directives
issued to them in the manner provided by our laws and ©onO/
stitution.**
Truman also addressed the nation by radio
on the evening of April 11.

The bulk of the speech ex

plained basic policies in Korea.

Only two paragraphs men

tioned the dismissal of MacArthur and they were largely a
rephrasing of the statement he had issued early that morn
ing.
General MacArthur was informed of his dismissal by
his wife, who learned of it from an aide listening to a
O O

news broadcast.

The relief process was abrupt and lack

ed the courtesy many felt he should have been accorded.
The method of dismissal did seem, as MacArthur said, to
89
show w . • .callous disregard for the ordinary decencies.1*
His relief came, he said, **. . .just when victory was
within my g r a s p .1^ 0

Shortly after the news was received,

®^Item No. 77, Public Papers • • • Truman, 195>1,
222; Truman, Memoirs, II,Tp^.
®^Item No. 78, Radio Report to the American People
on Korea and on U.S. Policy in the Par East, April 11,
1951* Public Papers . . • Truman, 1951 1 223-27*
OO
MacArthur testimony, Par East Hearings, Pt. 1,
26; Willoughby and Chamberlain, MacArthur, k23»
®^MacArthur, Reminiscences, 395* 3®® also, Wil
loughby and Chamberlain, MacArthur, h17; Whitney, Mac
Arthur, I}.73 .
^MacArthur, Reminiscences, 392.
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General Whitney told the Tokyo press corps somewhat melo
dramatically:

"I have just left the General.

He received

the word magnificently. . . • His soldierly qualities were
never more pronounced.
hour.‘*91

I think this has been his finest

MacArthur*s own estimate of his personal worth

was never higher than when he described in his memoirs
the world's reaction to the news of his dismissal;
Moscow and Peiping rejoiced. The bells were rung
and a holiday atmosphere prevailed. The left-wingers
everywhere exulted. But in the Far East, there wa3
bewilderment and shock. I had been there so long in
supreme command that I had become a kind of symbol
of the free world--a bulwark against the spread of
Communism. The removal of the symbol was not under
stood, and tended to shake faith in our ways and
methods.92
Much of the intial response to MacArthur*s dismiss
al in the United States took the form of vehement attacks
on President Truman.

He was burned in effigy in numerous

cities.

Dock workers in New York walked out in a protest

strike.

The Los Angeles City Council adjourned to sorrow

fully contemplate the "political assassination" of MacAr
thur.

The legislatures of Illinois, Michigan, Florida and

California all passed resolutions condemning Truman's ac
tion. ^

Time magazine commented, "Seldom had a more unpopu-

^■Quoted in Willoughby and Chamberlain, MacArthur,
11-23.
^MacArthur, Reminiscences, 395. See also, Whitney, MacArthur, l\73i Hunt, Untold' Story of Douglas MacArthu'r, f?l6-l7.
^Spanier, Tnunan-MacArthur Controversy, 211; Lu*
kacs, History of the ColcT War, fhaEnote, 9ll-«
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lar man fired a more popular one.M<^
were incredulous.

Many in the Senate

Senator William Jenner announced solemn

ly that "a secret inner coterie1* directed by Soviet agents
was running the government of the United States.

Senator

Richard M. Nixon saw the dismissal as rank appeasement of
Communism.

He suggested that the Senate censure the Presi

dent and insist that he reinstate MacArthur to command.
Senator Joseph McCarthy said the President must have made
his decision while drunk on benedictine and bourbon.
Carthy added:

"The son of a bitch ought to be

Mc

i m p e a c h e d .

"95

Writing at the time of the dismissal, journalist
Arthur Krock said that it is a "basic American principle"
that the authority of the President as Commander in Chief
must not be undermined by military officers:

"This basic

principle General MacArthur disregarded with increasing

^■Quoted in Eldorous L. Dayton, Give 'em Hell
Harry: An Informal Biography of the Terrible Tempered
Mr. T. *7New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1956), 2bl.
A report of a public opinion poll taken at the end of
June 1951 showed Republicans to be very "solid" in their
support of MacArthur in the dispute with Truman. Demo
crats were "evenly divided" in their support according to
a White House memorandum, Lloyd to Murphy, et. al., (un
dated), Lloyd Piles, MacArthur Firing, Truman Library.
95

Richard H. Rovere, Senator Joe McCarthy (New York:
World Publishing Company, 1959), 12. Hereinafter cited as
Rovere, Senator Joe McCarthy. See also, LaPeber, America,
Russia, and the 'Cold W a r , 120; Spanier, Truman-MacArthur
Cb'ntroversy,~212-13; Rovere and Schlesinger, Hh'e' General
and the Preaident, 12-13; Warren, President as World leader,
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openness, but it certainly does not seem to be disapproved
by millions of Americans.‘*96

Author John Spanier claimed

that telegrams poured into Congress at a ratio of ten to
one against Truman’s decision.^7

if internal White House

reports can be accepted on this subject, Truman faired
much better in messages addressed directly to him.

By the

end of the fifth week following MacArthur's relief, Truman
had received ij.6,389 letters and telegrams described as
"Pro MacArthur" and 37*708 that were "Pro President."^®
Apparently some of the President's correspondents became
quite abusive in their denunciations of his decision.
Memoranda from the White House mail room listed a total
of 1,71|.5 letters and cards "critical of the President" as
99
having been sent to the Secret Service.
Untold millions of Americans may have opposed Tru

m a n ’s recall of MacArthur, but an overwhelming majority of

96

Arthur Krock, "MacArthur and Truman," New York
Times, April 21, 1951, reprinted in Krock, In the Nation,
97

Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 211.

oA

0

Margeurite Mondlock to William Hopkins, May 8,
1951, Truman Papers, OP, 58lj.-MacArthur 1a Dismissal, Presi
dent's Action in Relieving General MacArthur (folder 2),
Truman Library.
99

This figure is a compilation of data contained
in numerous file memoranda from the weeks just after Mac
Arthur 's relief, located in ibid.
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the working press supported his decision.

An extensive sur

vey of 332 newspaper and periodical correspondents in Wash
ington, Korea, Tokyo, and at the United Nations was made a
few weeks after the relief action .'*’00

Eighty-five percent

of the reporters questioned believed Truman to be right in
removing the General; only thirteen percent felt he was
wrong.

Most also agreed that the decision was ”. . .delay

ed too long and delivered too bluntly. ”’*’0’*’ The main rea
sons given by those correspondents who agreed that the re
call was warranted were almost identical to the reasons
stated for their concurrence by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The reporters saw MacArthur as obviously out of sympathy
with national policy.

More importantly, they emphasized

the necessity for civilian control:

” . • .we must pre

serve the Constitutional right of the Commander-in-Chief
to remove an insubordinate general.”^0^

With considerable

foresight, seventy-two percent of the reporters polled in
dicated a belief that the American people would eventually

'*’00Elmo Roper and Louis Harris, ”The Press and the
Great Debate: A Survey of Correspondents in the Truman MacArthur Controversy,” Saturday Review of Literature,
XXXIV (July II4., 1951),
Hereinafter cited as Roper
and Harris, ”The Press and the Great Debate.”
101ibia.. 7.

102Ibld,, 6.
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approve the President’3 decision.
The emotional fever was running high as MacArthur
arrived in San Francisco from the Far East.

The defeated

commander, stripped of all powers and accused of flagrant
insubordination, was driven about the streets, not in a
tumbrel, but in a Cadillac limousine of the type used for
a conquering hero or a visiting monarch.

In the minds

of many, he was both.

MacArthur described his welcome

home as “tumultuous.“

With unabashed conceit he wrote:

“It seemed to me that every man, woman, and child in San
Francisco turned out to cheer us.“^ ^

Having been invited

to address a joint session of the Congress on April 19, he
flew on to Washington where, the General recalled, ”. • .it
looked as though the whole District of Columbia greeted

^Ibid., 8 . Editor Harold Stein may have inter
preted the public mood best when he wrota: “ . . .the
noisy but evanescent outcry in MacArthur’s favor really
reflected dismay over the dismal events in Korea, the
stirrings of violent partisan political warfare, and gener
al distaste with the Truman Administration; it did not
represent any substantial support of MacArthur’s proposal
to enlarge the fighting.” See “Editorial Comments: To
the Yalu and Back," in Stein (ed.), American Civil-Mili
tary Decisions: A Book of Case Studies (University, Ala
bama: University”"on
f AlaBama Press, 1963), 61j.l. A similar
view has been expressed by John Spanier in his, American
Foreign Policy, 96-97*
■^^Rovere and Schlesinger, The General and the
President, 11.
^MacArthur, Reminiscences, lj.00.
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our arrival."10^
MacArthur*s speech to the Congress was a forensic
masterpiece.

He began by depicting himself as just another

American "in the fading twilight of life," desiring only
to serve his country.

In the body of the speech he empha

sized the importance of the Par East and his role there,
glossed over the reasons for his recall, reiterated his be
lief that there was no substitute for total victory, and
dismissed the President’s policies as appeasement.

He

closed with the touching, now-famous lines about old sol
diers not dying, but just fading away, promising to do
likewise.
The "fading away" process was protracted and
voluble.

It began with MacArthur’s being borne from the

Congress down Pennsylvania Avenue to the Washington Monu
ment in yet another ceremonial automobile.

As he rode be

tween ranks of cheering admirers, formations of Air Force
jet fighters and bombers provided an aerial escort.

In

ceremonies at the monument grounds, MacArthur was awarded
a silver tea service by his followers along with a seven-

106Ibld.
107

MacArthur, Address to Joint Meeting of the Con
gress, April, 19£l> printed in Far East Hearings, Pt. 5>
35>53-p8« Text of address is also published in MacArthur,
Reminiscences,
Bernstein and Matusow (eds.),
Truman Administration, l|bl-69.
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teen-gun s a l u t e . T r u m a n ,

sitting in the White House a

short distance from this scene, had anticipated it all.
In a litter to a friend on the day he signed the dismissal
order, he had written:

11It will undoubtedly create a

great furor but under the circumstances I could do nothing
else and still be President of the United States
Through these ceremonies and numerous addresses,
General MacArthur had ample opportunity to present his
case to the public.

The climax came in the Senate investi

gation of the reasons for MacArthur*s dismissal, which be
gan on May 3, 1951*

Thirteen witnesses were heard in a

forty-two day period in which a total of 2,l|.£0,000 words
were recorded on 3*691 pages of printed testimony.

110

MacArthur, the lead-off witness, testified for three
n t
days.
The General assured his questioners that he did
not "in any way" question the President's decision to fire

Rovere, The General and the President, 11. A
similar reception followed shortly after in New York City
where an estimated 7.5 million people lined the streets
of his procession. See Spanier, American Foreign Policy,
96; Rees, Age of Containment, i|0.
^•°^Truman to unidentified correspondent, April’10,
1951* quoted in Hillman (ed.), Mr. President, 33*
•1-^Payne, Marshall Story, 319; !tA Brief Commentary
on the Witnesses Appearing"Before the Committee,11 Far East
Hearings, Pt. 5, 357k■^■^The bulk of testimony taken, in addition to MacArthur's, came from General Bradley and Secretaries Mar:^»i
shall and Acheson, who testified for five, eight, and nine
days, respectively. Far East Hearings, Pt. 5>» 357^-75*
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him or his right to do so.

But he repeatedly dismissed as

"completely invalid" the reason Truman gave for dismissing
him— a lack of sympathy with established policies— by
claiming that while he sometimes disagreed with the wisdom
and judgment of the orders and directives he received, he
carried them out to the best of his ability.

112

There appeared to be an area of agreement between
MacArthur and Truman over the command latitude that must
be accorded by the commaider in chief to a theater comman
der.

MacArthur testified that once war began a theater

commander had to direct— politically, economically, and
militarily— the whole area encharged to him:

"You have

got to trust at that stage of the game when politics fails,
and the military takes over, you must trust the mili
tary. • • ,"-^3

on the same subject, later in his testi

mony, he said, ". • .there should be no non-professional
interference in the handling of troops in a campaign.

You

have professionals to do that job and they should be per-

112

MacArthur testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 1,
27-28, 197, 282-8lj., 289, 308. An erabarassing typographical error (or Freudian slip) at one point in his testimony,
records MacArthur as saying: "I have not carried out every
directive that X have ever received. • • ." See ibid., 30.
Emphasis supplied. For additional statements by WacArthur
relative to his avowed belief in civil supremacy, see
Reminiscences, 292-93*

113

Far East Hearings, Pt. 1,
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mitted to do it. . .

Truman once related in an in

terview hia belief that one of MacArthur*s tactical deci
sions seemed wrong, but that he did not countermand it be
cause the General was commander in the field.
ed:

He explain

”You pick your man, you've got to back him up.

119
That's the only way a military organization can work.**
Truman's belief in allowing commanders tactical latitude
was more than an abstract principle to him.

He never pub

licly criticized his commanders' conduct of field opera
tions, nor dictated troop dispositions to them, except in
the broad, strategic sense.
told reporters:

For example, in July 1950 b.e

”1 am not in charge of the military in

Korea. . . , a report is made every day by General MacAr
thur, and he is the one to evaluate the situation.

116

on his evaluation.11

I rely

To this extent, the General and

the President were in agreement on the civil-military re
lationship.

^Ibid.,

289.

‘^'’Quoted in Neustadt, Presidential Power, 12l|-25.
See also, Dahl, Pluralist Democracy, ld)5»
^ ^ I t e m No. 191, Press Conference, July 13, 1950,
Public Papers. . • Truman, 1950, 523. In another press
conference following MacArthur's removal, Truman said that
the decision to send UN forces up to the Yalu was, n . • .a
matter of tactics in the field, and is the responsibility
of the field commander.
I never interfere with the field
commander in any of their maneuvers.” Item No. 95, ibid.,
(1951), 2614..
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A major area of disagreement between Truman and
MacArthur which was highlighted in the latter’s testimony
was, of course, the political restrictions which the Presi
dent's limited war policy placed on the conduct of mili
tary operations.

"I do unquestionably state," MacArthur

said, "that when men become locked in battle, that there
should be no artifice under the name of politics, which
should handicap your own men.

. . .

t»117

In voicing public

opposition to these limitations, MacArthur believed he was
performing a service, because the American public had the
right to know the truth and Truman had no right to "gag"
him.

In his memoirs, MacArthur quoted British Field

Marshall Lord Alanbrooke, who had defended MacArthur's ac
tions by saying that any general who is unable to obtain
the political advice and guidance he seeks has a responsi
bility to act on his own.119

The fullest expression of

MacArthur's revolutionary interpretation of his responsi
bility to civilian authority can be found in an address

•*~^ F a r East Hearings, Pt. 1,
39-1+0, 67-5*57

See also, ibid.,

^ ^Ibid., 99-100. For some general analyses of MacArthur's testimony in the hearings, see Spanier, TrumanM a c A r t h y Controversy, 236-38; Osgood, Limited W a r ,' I73“7U-?
Arthur ftrock, "hacArthur ’s Test imony," Hew York"1¥Imes,
May 5, 1951 3 reprinted in Krock, In the Nation, 186-89.
119

MacArthur, Reminiscences, 392-93*
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he made to the legislature of Massachusetts three months
after his dismissal:
I find in existence a new and heretofore unknown
and dangerous concept that the members of the Armed
Forces owe their primary allegiance and loyalty to
those who temporarily exercise the authority of the
executive branch of the government, rather than to
the country and its Constitution they are sworn to
defend. No proposition could cast greater doubt on
the integrity of the Armed F o r c e s , 120
The Truman Administration did not sit passively
by during this period, but counterattacked; the basic ar
gument being that the really "new and dangerous concept"
was embodied in MacArthur’s public challenge to the poli
cies of his Commander in Chief.

A major response to the

charges MacArthur was publicizing at the time was deliver
ed by General Bradley one week after the dismissal.

Speak

ing at Chicago, Bradley refuted MacArthur point by point.
Whereas MacArthur said there was no Korean policy, Bradley
listed its primary objectives, making it plain that ap
peasement— another MacArthur charge— was not part of that
policy.

Without naming him specifically, Bradley described

MacArthur’s solutions for Korea as not being militarily
feasible.

Bradley emphasized that the Korean conflict had

to be understood as part of a worldwide American commit
ment to contain Communism and prevent the onset of a third

Quoted in Ridgway, Korean War, 233*
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world war.

121

To counter rumors to the contrary, on April

19, 1951, the Pentagon issued a statement saying that
**. • .the action taken by the President in relieving Gen.
MacArthur was based upon the unanimous recommendations of
the Presidents principal civilian and military advisers,
including the Joint Chiefs of Staff."’*’22
Truman remianed publicly aloof from the contro
versy engendered by MacArthur's relief throughout April,
Issuing no statements in rebuttal and responding noncommitally to pointed questions in his press conferences.
Privately, he was not as disinterested.

For example, in

a note to Averell Harriman on April 21}., Truman wrote:
"He (Eisenhower) seems to be on top of the situation and
he also seems to understand the international situation
better than another 5-star General I can name."^23

In a

press conference held the day MacArthur first testified in
the hearings on his dismissal, Truman openly joined the
battle to defend his policies.

The President told report-

•^■^DOD Release No. 72-51S, "Address by General Omar
Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Na
tional Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters,
April 17, 1951 ,n copy in White House files, Korean Docu
ments (folder 2), Truman Library. For examples of MacAr
thur *s charges, see his testimony in Far East Hearings,
Pt. 1, 30, 39-40, 146-47.
122Statement on the Relief of General MacArthur,
April 19, 1951, copy in White House Files, Korean Docu
ments (folder 2), Truman Library.
■^Truman to Harriman, April 24, 195>1, Eisenhower
Papers, FF/DDE, Truman folder (2), Eisenhower Library.
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ers that it was only ’’just recently" that MacArthur had
permitted the Central Intelligence Agency to operate in
his command.

He said that it was MacArthur's persuasion

at Make Island that convinced him the Chinese Communists
would not intervene in North Korea.

Truman also told the

assembled reporters that he was confident of vindication
once testimony in the hearings was completed.
In a nationally-broadcast address on May 7 the
President struck back repeatedly at the various charges
levelled by MacArthur in his ju3t completed testimony.
Acknowledging that he had refused to extend the Far East
conflict, he explained that such action offered no real
promise of ending the war, but posed the very real threat
of expanding and protracting the hostilities.

As to the

As to the suggestion by MacArthur that the United States
"go it alone," if the allies were unwilling to attack
China, Truman said this would destroy the United Nations,
NATO, and the entire collective security system.

Through

out, he returned to the overall guiding principle of his

■^^Item No. 95, Press Conference, May 3, 1951, Pub
lic Papers . . . Truman, 1951» 261-62. Truman had private
ly expressed the belief that justification for his firing
of MacArthur would emerge in the congressional hearings.
Writing in late April to a New Jersey legislator, Truman
had first expressed this conviction. Truman to Robert G.
Hendrickson, April 27, 1951, Truman Papers, OF, 58h-MaeArthur Dismissal, President’s Action in Relieving General
Douglas MacArthur of His Commands, (folder 2), Truman
Library.
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policy decisions, the prevention of a third world war.^^^
MacArthur was never mentioned by name, but he was unques
tionably the main topic, a point not lost to the press in
their accouhts the next day.

126

In the lengthy, often tedious pages of the hear
ings in Congress can be found the vindication which Truman
had predicted.

No objective reading of these pages can

lead to any other conclusion but that the President was
amply justified in removing MacArthur from command.

Vir

tually all of the testimony which followed MacArthur’a
rebutted his basic contentions.

This evidence, cited at

great length throughout the present and preceding chapters,
does not require restatement here.

The case for MacArthur's

dismissal was cogently summarized by General Marshall:
• • .the responsibilities and the courses of ac
tion assigned to a theater commander necessarily
apply to his own immediate area of responsibility.
It is completely understandable and, in fact, at
times commendable that a theater commander should
become so wholly wrapped up in his own aims and re
sponsibilities that some of the directives received
by him from higher authority are not those that he
would have written for himself. There is nothing
new about this sort of thing in our military his
tory. What is new, and what has brought about the
necessity for General MacArthur ’s removal, is the

125

Item No. 96, Address at a Dinner of the Civil De
fense Conference, May 7# 1951# Public Papers . . . Truman,
1951, 265-69, passim.

126

See, for example, New York Herald-Tribune, May 8,
1951# Washington News, May 8, 1951*
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wholly unprecedented situation of a local theater
Commander publicly express'lng^hTs displeasure at~and
his disagreemen'b with the foreign and military poTT^
cy o f the United States.
TE became apparent that General MacArthur had
grown so far out of sympathy with the established
policies of the United States that there was grave
doubt as to whether he could any longer be permitted
to exercise the authority in making decisions that
normal command functions would assign to a theater
commander. In this situation, there was no other re
course but to relieve him.127
Douglas MacArthur had described the onset of the
Korean conflict as *Mars* last gift to an old warrior.**128
Seemingly, fate had handed him the capstone for a career
already legendary.

Up to the moment of Chinese interven

tion, the final chapter was ending in fairy-tale fashion;
the hordes of the defeated aggressor in mindless flight
from the righteous wrath of the avenging angel.
however, when shown a hero, wrote a tragedy.

Fortune,

If was not

the defeat, nor the conceit that could not acknowledge
failure which tarnished the heroic figure, but the paranoidal assault on his civilian superiors, striking at the
very base of the system to which he had devoted over a
half-century of his life.

Wilber Hoare has described Mac-

7par East Hearings, Pt. 1, 325. Emphasis supplied
See also, Payne, Marshall Story, 319-20. The other impor
tant Army commanders of the period are in substantial agree
ment with Marshall. For example, see Bradley testimony,
Far East Hearings, Pt. 2, 752-53* 10l}.l-I|4; Collins testimony, ibid., li9h-95; Ridgway, Korean War, lij.l-ij.2, 152-53#
T oA

Quoted in Higgins, Korea and the Fall of Mac
Arthur, 25.
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Arthur as a "politico-military anachronism,” whose

• •

sense of frustration and rage at being denied an unequivo
cal victory were not those of a man who understood the
reasons for denial and opposed them, but of one who did
129
not understand at all."
But in view of MacArthur's ac
knowledged brilliance, it is difficult to believe that he
had no comprehension of the concept of limited warfare.
Rather, it seems, he fully grasped the concept intellec
tually, but rejected it as a principle for the conduct of
military operations.

Then, failing to win acceptance for

his views through the established channels, he took his
case to the public in clear and open opposition to the
Commander in Chief.
The historical parallel between Lincoln's diffi
culties with General George McClellan and his with MacAr
thur was not overlooked by a Civil War buff like Truman.
He recognized a basic difference, in that he was trying to

129

Hoare, "Truman,” 199-200. For a discussion of
the "living legend" image attached to MacArthur, see Rovere and Schlesinger, The General and the President, 3-5J
Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, lij.7-ll9.
13°General agreement with the view expressed can be
found in Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 198-99.
Wilber Hoare disagrees with this interpretation.
It is his
belief that MacArthur never intended to dispute Truman's
authority as Commander in Chief and never felt that he had
done so. See Hoare, "Truman," 205-207. For an example of
MacArthur's refutation of Truman's limited war policy, see
his testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 1, 39-lj.O.
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keep;a checkrein on MacArthur, whereas Lincoln was trying
desperately to get McClellan to attack.

131

But Truman im

plies that McClellan (like MacArthur) was fired for politi
cally opposing hi3 commander in chief, when in truth he
was dismissed for his failures as a general .^32

The real

parallel may well be, as one writer noted, that like Mc
Clellan, MacArthur was ". . .confusing his popularity as a
symbol of patriotism in a nation at war with his duty as a
general on active

s e r v i c e .

"^33

Had MacArthur first retired

and then opposed Truman's policies in the political arena
(as Eisenhower did), he would have been beyond reproach.
But by attacking from within, he forced his own dismissal:
• . .it is • • • obvious that a democratic govern
ment cannot permit a general of the Mac(Arthur) type
to continue in his position. His sustained opposi
tion would unsettle the very basis of democratic
authority. In such a situation the general can ren
der a greater service to his cause and can stimulate
democratic discussion of the issue involved by get
ting out of the army and taking his case to the
people. • «. .^3q-

^ Truman, Memoirs, II,
MacArthur unfavorably
compared Truman'3 attitude toward him with Lincoln's in a
somewhat "comparable circumstance" involving General Grant,
See his Reminiscences, 39k»
132t . Harry Williams, "The Macs and the Ikes, Ameri
ca's Two Military Traditions," American Mercury, LXXV (Oc
tober, 19f?2), 37* Hereinafter cited as Williams, "The Macs
and the Ikes."
Korea;: and the Fall of MacArthur, ij.0.
Another commentary orTTjKe parallels between McClellan and
MacArthur is in Ridgway, Korean War, 15>2, 261,
‘^Nfilliaras, "The Macs and the Ikes," 38-39.
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The basis for the disagreement between Truman and
MacArthur rested upon fundamental strategic policy deter*
minations.

Truman had decided that extending military

operations beyond Korea itself, in order to obtain a vic
tory in Korea, involved too great a risk of general war.
Also, the President determined that victory— in the sense
of Korean unification— was neither worth the increased ef
fort that would be required, nor esserbi/OL to American
security.*^5

MacArthur, of course, o n.- idered the Par

Eastern struggle to be the pivotal, climactic contest be
tween the forces of capitalism and communism.

Truman came

to accept a military stalemate which preserved South Korean
sovereignty as achievement enough; MacArthur could accept
no alternative to complete victory.

Since Truman neither

could nor would relinquish his authority as Commander in
Chief to conduct the war, MacArthur had to go.
The restrictions placed upon MacArthur by the
limited war policy— a few were later lifted— did represent
a significant check by the President on the conduct of
military

o p e r a t i o n s . * - ^

Raymond G. O'Connor correctly

*^Hoare, Truman,1* 205.
*-^MacArthur was denied permission to bomb Racin, a
North Korean port near the Soviet border. In August,1951
Ridgway was allowed to strike this target. Hermes, Truce
Tent and Fighting Front, 107-108.
In June 1952 Truman
Tifted’"the" ban on bombing dams and hydroelectrice plants
on the Yalu. Ibid., 319-22. In July 1952 Truman allowed
the bombing of Pyongyang which had previously been offlimits. Ibid., 321+.
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maintains that these controls ". • .enlarged the President’s
role as Coramander-in-Chief."

137

He is probably correct in

holding that the conflict with MacArthur was an understand
able consequence of Truman’s exercising this role.

But

O'Connor stands on shakier historical ground when he as
serts that Truman's "detailed control of battlefield
operations" was without any precedent.

"Even Lincoln,"

O ’Connor says, "did not match Truman's interference with
military t a c t i c s . s o

long as MacArthur (and his suc

cessors) operated within the strategic guidelines imposed
by the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, tactical
decisions were neither dictated nor countermanded.

Truman

did not believe that the field deployment and utilization
of forces was a proper function of a commander in chief.
Lincoln, particularly when McClellan was in command in the
East, was actively engaged in tactical direction of armies
in the

f i e l d .

^39

Truman commented often, after the event, on Mac
Arthur 's dismissal and its meaning.

He believed that Mac

Arthur did not deliberately set out to challenge his au-

137o'Connor, "Harry S. Truman:
Power," 72.

New Dimensions of

130ibid.
^^See, for examples, Lincoln to McClellan, April 9,
May 2i|., October 13, 1862, in Basler (ed.), Collected W orks
of Lincoln, V, 185-85, 231-32, M>0-62.
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thority as Commander in Chief, but that his actions did
endanger the principle of civilian control which Truman
considered fundamental to the existence of a free society,,^^

As he wrote to the President of the University of

Virginia:

‘*1 regret very much that the action had to be

taken but the civilian control of the military was at
stake and I simply had to do something about it.n^ ^
in a similar vein, to the mayor of Paterson, New Jersey:
". • .in time, people will realize and understand that
military commanders must be governed by the policies and
directives issued to them in the manner provided by our
laws and Constitution.
A college student once asked the ex-President the
rationale behind MacArthur’s firing.
him for disobeying orders.

Truman said he fired

He added that "maybe" he should

have court-martialed him as well.'*’^

When an interviewer

asked him if he considered relieving MacArthur the most
courageous act of his Presidency, Truman told him that it

■^■°Truman, Memoirs, II, 1^3-l\$,
^■^Truman to Colgate W. Darden, April lip, 1951,
Truman Papers, OP, 58Ij.-MacArthur’s Dismissal, President's
Action in Relieving General Douglas MacArthur of His Com
mands (folder 2), Truman Library.
■^■^Truman to Michael U. DeVita, April 27, 1951,
ibid.
^^ T r u m a n Speaks, 97.
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had not involved courage,.
and was fired.

The General was insubordinate

That was a l l . * ^

But at the time of the

dismissal, Truman was not as cavalier as he was in his
later comments.

A week after the recall, he told Repre

sentative Carl Albert that MacArthur's distinguished
record of military service made his decision very diffi
cult.

Two days later the President wrote to another

correspondent about the difficulty he had in determining
to dismiss, "one of our greatest military commanders
Prom Truman’s letters in the weeks after the re
call order there emerges a constant emphasis:

he had

acted only after being forced to by MacArthur in consid
eration of his constitutional responsibilities as Comman
der in Chief.

As, for example, on April 23, he wrote:

"In justice to my own responsibility . • 0 I found myself
compelled to take this distressing a c t i o n . T h i s
lk8
reasoning is repeated in his memoirs.^"

same

■^"Quoted in Phillips, Truman Presidency, 350.
^ ' ’Truman to Albert, April 17, 1951, Truman Papers,
OP, 581j.-MacArthur!s Dismissal, President's Action in Re
lieving General Douglas MacArthur of His Commands (folder
2), Truman Library.
■^■^Truman to (Mrs.) W. Coleman Branton, April 19,
3.951, ibid.
■^Truman to A.E. Augustine, April 23, 1951, ibid.
This file contains many other letters in which Truman em
phasized that he acted from a compulsive sense of duty.
■'‘^Truman, Memoirs, II, l|l|4“l4-5*
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In a letter to Dwight Eisenhower, then NATO Su
preme Commander, Truman expressed himself on MacArthur's
recall with his characteristic bluntness and pungency:
”Dear Ike,1* he wrote on April 12, nI was sorry to have to
reach a parting of the way with the big man in Asia but
he asked for it and I had to give it to him.1* ^ ^

And so

he did.
The nation should not be made to endure another
such controversy.

For the future, a new philosophy must

enter into the training of the military leadership.

It

must be clearly understood that the objective in limited
warfare is not necessarily victory in the historic sense,
but a modus vivendi, a reasonable peace which precludes a
general war.

Douglas MacArthur would consider this a

shameful compromise with "evil.1* But Truman knew, that
barring a fundamental change in man's nature, in a nuclear
age there could be no other way.

■^Truman to Eisenhower, April 12, 19^1, Eisenhower
Papers, PF/DDE, Truman folder (2), Eisenhower Library.
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CHAPTER X

A SUMMING UP
I will leave it to future historians to judge
how well I have done.^The American presidency has evolved with the times.
The less hectic pace of the first half of the twentieth
century allowed the presidents time for personal direction
of the government, time to examine all sides of an issue,
time for an endless procession of pro forma ceremonials,
and time to relish the perquisites of the office.

The

Roosevelt Administration may be viewed as a transitional
phase.

World War II greatly accelerated the continuous

process of social, political and technological change
with which a president must contend.

The pace and com

plex interrelationship of postwar issues have been such
that the executive authority has expanded along with the
difficulties of administering the office effectively.

^Truman to John T. Carlton, April 17* 1951 » Tru
man Papers, OP, 584> President’s Action in Relieving Gen
eral Douglas MacArthur of His Commands (folder 2), Tru
man Library.
693
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Harry Truman was the first incumbent in the "new"
presidency.

The preceding chapters represent only a se

lective recounting of events relating to exercise of Just
the military function during his two terms in office.
But there is enough here to suggest the enormity of the
task which Truman faced.
siter wrote:

Considering this, Clinton Ros-

"... • it was no mean achievement simply to

have gone through the motions of being President in these
eight y e a r s . T r u m a n came to believe that no one man
could truly fill the presidential office because the re
sponsibilities had become "too many and too g r e a t . H e
also believed that there was a quality about the presi
dential office that could make the man equal to the task:
It is a tremendous job. . . . A really huge job.
One to make a person stop and think. . . . Any man
faced with this job, no matter what he's like, no
matter how much or how little he's capable of to
begin with— any man will be lifted up by the dig
nity and responsibility of this job to a place
where he can meet it.4Truman was a man of strong principles.

Despite a

lack of formal education, his own extensive reading in

p
Rossiter, American Presidency, 116.
3
Quoted in Hillman (ed0), Mr. President, 10. See
also, Phillips, "Truman at
" i d E J Truman, Memoirs, I,
199.
k
Quoted in Hersejs, "Profiles," Pt. 5, J>2.
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history and government provided him with what Rossiter
has called:

” . • • a more clear-cut philosophy of

presidential power than any predecessor except Woodrow
Wilson.”** Truman saw the President as holder of the
final authority, a responsibility that could not be dele
gated to subordinates.^

He believed in strong executive

leadership and emulated strong liberal Presidents like
Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Wilson and the two Roose
velts. ?

Truman was constantly wary of congressional en

croachment on executive functions, believing entirely in
the separation of powers principle, even to the point of
refusing a subpoena from a House committee on those
grounds after his presidency.

Q

q
Rossiter, American Presidency, 118. See also.
Binkley, President and CongreSs, 3 jB. Truman wrote: "I
had trained myself to look back in history for precedents,
because instinctively I sought perspective in the span of
history for the decisions I had to make.” Memoirs, II, 1.
He expressed the same sentiment in ibid., I, 121.
A
Truman, Memoirs, I, 51+5-1+6*
7Ibid., II, 172-73; Truman, Mr. Citizen, 175.
See also, Paige, Korean Decision, 22^53> O ’Connor, ”Harry
S. Truman: New Dimensions of Power,” 2l|.-25.
Q
Truman's rejection of the House Un-American Ac
tivities Committee's subpoena (November 1953)» is quoted
in Koenig (ed.), Truman Administration, 70-73. A speech
Truman delivered May 8, 195l+> deals at length with the
dangers of congressional encroachment on the executive
powers. See ibid., 16-21. See also. New York Times, De
cember 27 » 19527”
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**The President,'* Truman wrote in his memoirs,**
must use whatever power the Constitution does not express
ly deny him.'*9

Despite the powers given to the office by

the Constitution and legislative enactments, Truman felt
that the prime power of the Chief Executive was exhorta
tions

**•-• .the principal power that the President has is

to bring people in and try to persuade them to do what
they ought to do without persuasion. . . .
powers of the President amount to.**1®

That's what the

Truman commented on

the same subject in a meeting with James Forrestal in 19i+7»
He said that, as President, most of his time was taken up
soothing hurt feelings and **. • .saluting the backsides of
a large number of people.'*11

On another occasion, without

being anatomically specific, Truman told an interviewer:
**. • .1 sit here at the President's desk talking to people
and kissing them on both cheeks trying to get them to do
what they ought to do without getting kissed.**1^
The Constitution, in particularizing the powers of
the President, invests him with only one substantive title,

^Truman, Memoirs, II, 1|73» See also, O'Connor,
'*Harry S. Trumans New Dimensions of Power,'* 23.
_

-

•

«j

Item No. 92, Remarks at the National Conference
on Family Life, May 6, 1914.8. Public Papers . . . Truman,
1914-8, 21+.7•

11Diary Entry, September 25, 19lj.7, in.Millis (ed.),
Forrestal Diaries, 319-20.
IP

Quoted in Hillman (ed.), Mr. President, 11.
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that of Commander in Chief.

The title and the military

function it designates are inseparable from the office."^
Like many another President, however, Truman liked to think
of his military command function as one of the separate and
distinct ‘’jobs’* or "hats" incumbent within the executive
authority.As

such, Truman conceived of his function as

being executor of all military policy.

He defined the

issues and objectives, but did not personally determine
military policy.

Rather, the staff process, channeled

through the National Security Council, presented him with
military policy recommendations which he accepted, reject
ed, or r e v i s e d . ^
Truman did not attempt to direct the military, but
he did exercise unquestioned control.

He usually enjoyed

a harmonious relationship with the Joint Chiefs and the
Defense Secretary, but never allowed them to intrude upon

^ F a i r m a n , "President as Comraander-in-Chief, ” ll|.5.
Among the other presidential "jobs" Truman has
described at various times are chief executive, party
leader, legislator, social head of state and chief diplo
mat.
Truman Speaks, 5-8? Hillman (ed.), Mr. President,
206; Koenig (ed•), Truman Administration,“31; item No. 366,
Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the TJnion,
January 7» 1953* Public Papers . . . Truman, 1952-53 » lllil-.
15

For a detailed examination of the functional
role of the President under the unification act (191+7)*
see Fairman, "President as Commander-in-Chief," llj.5-61.
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his presidential prerogatives.

Maintaining this control

meant devoting much time and study to each military pro
posal and directive.

By requiring that all but the most

routine of military matters receive his approval prior to
issuance, he precluded the possibility of a strong, inde
pendent military arising to intimidate the civilian lead
ership.

Truman trusted his military advisers (notably

Bradley and Marshall) because they never gave him the
slightest cause to mistrust them.

He was also willing to

allow theater commanders freedom of action, so long as
they remained within established policy guidelines.

Time

and again he emphasized that he did not believe the Com
mander in Chief should become involved in tactics:

"I am

not a desk strategist and don't intend to be one,”

Truman

told reporters in 1950.
men.”1^

ttI leave that to the military

Or, again in 1951 '•

”That is a military matter,

and the President of the United States has never inter
fered with military maneuvers in the field, and he doesn't
expect to interfere in it n o w . ”^7
Truman was a strong Commander in Chief of the type

^ I t e m No. 238, Press Conference, September 7,
1950, Public Papers • • • Truman, 1950* 622.
■^Itera No. 37, Press Conference, February 15, 1951,
ibid., (1951), 154. For similar statements by Truman, see
IbI5., (W
), 250-51; ibid., (1950), 523, 580; Truman,
Memoirs, II, 402; Neust'adt, Presidential Power, 12l\.-2$,
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envisioned by the drafters of the C o n s t i t u t i o n H i s

ef

fectiveness, unlike that of his predecessor, was not based
on personal leadership, or any particular insight or in
tuition.^

One of the major accomplishments of his incum

bency was that he "institutionalized” the presidency. 20
While all of the structural components have not always
functioned as they were designed, the command system of
today, somewhat modified, is that instituted by Truman.21
In an age of intercontinental missies and thermonuclear
weaponry, it can be validly argued that this structure is
too cumbersome.

Truman himself bypassed the staff mechan

ism when the occasion demanded.
In the crisis over Berlin the President acted
without waiting for policy recommendations to evolve.

It

was his decision alone to stay in Berlin and supply the
city by

a i r l i f t . 22

jn

the early days of the Korean War

/
•^®Hoare, "Truman," 210.
■^Williams, Americans at W a r , U+2.
20
Elmer Davis, "Harry S, Truman and the Verdict of
History," The Reporter (February 3, 195>3)> 18. Hereinafter
cited as Davis, "Harry S. Truman and the Verdict of His
tory."

^Williams, Americans at W a r , llj.2-l|3> Hoare, "Tru
man," 183—8J^. See also, Davis, "Harry S. Truman and the
Verdict of History," 18-19.
^ S e e Chapter VI, passim.
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Truman unhesitatingly ordered ground troops into action
(one regimental combat team) from his bedside telephone.^
In the entire week-long process of decision committing
the United States in Korea, the President did not once
involve the National Security

Also, Truman de

Council.

cided to fire General MacArthur and then went through the
motions of obtaining the recommendations of his military
advisers.

What he would have done had they not concurred

remains open to conjecture.
In retrospect, one of Truman's most serious misjudgments was allowing the success of the Inchon inva
sion to influence a departure from the original objective
in Korea.

The United States had gone to war to repel the

North Korean invaders and restore peace.
sault restored the status quo.

The Inchon as

Truman then allowed what

had been essentially a defensive action to become offen
sive by sending MacArthur across the thirty-eighth paral
lel.

Through military operations the Administration hoped

to gain a political objective— Korean

unification^!?

The

2^See Chapter VII, passim.
^ S e e Chapter VII, passim.
2^Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, $2. See
also, Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back,™
593; Brad
ley testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 2,
10$\\.l Ridgway, Korean War, 230-51. fc*or a full study of the factors
which" led’Truman to accept Korean unification as a new war
objective, see Neustadt, Presidential Power, 125-32, llt.0ip..
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United Nations, in a General Assembly resolution adopted
October 7, 1950, sanctioned this action.
The Chinese Communist intervention in November re
quired Truman to choose between committing far more re
sources or modifying his war aims.

He did not immediately

act, but waited until~the UN forces had regained the
thirty-eighth parallel before accepting a position approx
imating status quo ante bellum as an appropriate basis for
negotiation.

It was in the hearings on MacArthur*s recall

that this new policy was acknowledged.

Secretary Acheson

testified that the Apolitical objective” of the United
States since 191J-5, and of the United Nations since 1914-7*
was the establishment of a free, unified, democratic
Korean state.

The ’’military mission” was to repel the

North Korean aggressors and establish peace and security
in the area.

’’Unhappily,” Acheson said, ’’the interven

tion of the Chinese Communists threw our forces back and
made it militarily difficult, if not impossible, to acheive
the political objective.”

27

Truman's decision to invade and conquer North

^ U n i t e d States Policy in the Korean Conflict, 3*

27

Acheson testimony, Far East Hearings, Pt. 3*
1729, 1731J.-35, 1782, 2256-57. Generals Marshall and Brad
ley testified to the same effect, see ibid., Pt. 1, 570;
Pt. 2, 937-38. See also, Acheson, Present at the Crea
tion, 517-18, 529, 531.
v.->-
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Korea was a revision of the containment doctrine.

In pre

vious applications of this policy during the Cold War— in
Greece, Turkey and Berlin— the American military response
had been carefully gauged so as to counter Communist ex
pansionism and restore the status quo.

Once this was a-

chieved, diplomatic means were found to end the confrontation.

28

But by insisting on the unification of all

Korea, Truman had taken the offensive, intent upon the de
struction of a Communist satellite nation.

The Communist

version of containment then required a response which re
stored equilibrium and culminated in a negotiated settle
ment that returned the penisula to its prewar condition,
American strategic policy has generally been based
not on action, but reaction to stimuli.

In the post-World

War II era the stimulus has been provided by "Communist
aggression.1*

This defensive posture, perhaps requisite

in a democratic system, takes away any advantages that
accrue to an aggressor, such as picking the time and place
for disputation.
The "limited-action/limited-response" military de
cisions made by Truman were ad hoc adaptations to a succes
sion of tense confrontations in a sadly-bipolarized world.
His decisions in each instance were designed to avoid the

28

Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 259-60.
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atomic maelstrom of another total w a r . ^
words:

In Truman's

". • .the one purpose that dominated me in every

thing I thought and did was to prevent a third world
war.”
ti

•an

As the sole human ever to press the nuclear

er, Truman must have been more aware than anyone

that atomic technology made total war the ultimate irra
tionality.

"The atomic bomb," John Spanier aptly ob

served, !,made the world safe only for limited wars."-^
Viewed in that context, the fear of nuclear holocaust
has returned a measure of rationality to warfare, reason
dictating strict limitations on both means and ends.-^
It is to Harry Truman's everlasting credit that he estab-

^McLellan and Reuss, "Foreign and Military Poli
cies," 31+.
3®Truman, Memoirs, II, Preface, x. See also,
Osgood, Limited War, 169; Halperin, "Limiting Process in
the Korean War," 97.
31
^ Spanier, Truman-MacArthur Controversy. 2.
James, Contemporary Presidency, 161. In his last
annual message to" Congress, January Y> 19S>3> Truman empha
sized this change in warfare. He said that nuclear war
was ". . .not a possible policy for rational men." Then,
addressing himself to Soviet Premier Stalin, he said:
"You claim belief in Lenin's prophecy that one stage in
the development of Communist society would be war between
your world and ours. But Lenin was a pre-atomic man, who
viewed society and history with pre-atomic eyes. Some
thing profound has happened since he wrote. War has
changed its shape and its dimensions. It cannot now be a
'stage' in the development of anything save ruin for your
regime and your homeland." Item No. 366, Public Papers. • •
Truman, 1962-63, 1125-26.
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7014lished a Cold War precedent based on this proposition.
There was certainly no diminution in the tradi
tional role of the commander in chief during Truman’s
tenure of office.

In his exercise of the military func

tion of the presidency, Truman had enlarged somewhat on
the prevailing concepts.

This is particularly true in

consideration of his disregard for the military authority
of the Congress.

Truman decided to aid Turkey and Greece,

defy the blockade of Berlin, and intervene in a foreign
war, all without the prior approval of Congress.

Also,

after the Korean War began, Truman sent four Army divi
sions into Europe to bolster NATO defenses in the belief
I
that the attack in Asia was simply a feint by the Soviet
Union.

The President did so despite strong minority op

position from the Senate.

"In so doing, he expanded

presidential authority as Commander-in-Chief to encompass
the peacetime disposal of forces in meeting the obligations of a military alliance.
Through his efforts as Commander in Chief, Truman
made the military establishment over, generally, for the
better.

His desegregation of the military services not

only preceded but also had an immeasurable influence upon
the domestic civil rights movement in the 1950’s and '60’s.
Unification of the armed forces did not achieve all that

^ O ’C o n n o r ,

’’Harry S. Truman:

New Dimensions of

Power," 59.
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Truman had envisioned.

It did modernize the command sys

tem and make the military establishment more responsive to
the Commander in Chief's direction.

But, for the most

part, the massive Pentagon monolith absorbed the imposed
reforms of unification and continued cn without marked
change, save that it obtained strength from unity

By

the passage of the Atomic ini^rgy Act of 19l|-6 and his re«
sistance to subsequent military encroachment on atomic
weapons policy, Truman preserved for future commanders in
chief the ultimate decision on utilization of the ultimate
weapon. 35
^
Harry Truman was the kind of leader whom, in
Clinton Rossiter's words,
remember.The

n ,

• .history will delight to

very foibles and contradictions for

which he was scorned will set him apart from the mass of
of his predecessors and successors who have been too often
absorbed in posturing for posterity.

He was not the most

intelligent, articulate or inspiring President this nation
ha3 ever had, and he was aware of that.
worked all the harder.

Knowing it, he

One of his favorite, oft-repeated

anecdotes concerned a gravestone in Arizona which bore the

^ S e e Chapter V, passim.
35

See Chapter IV, passim.

^Rossiter, American Presidency, 119.

A
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inscription:

’’Here lies Jack Williams, he done his

d a m n d e s t . p or Harry Truman's Presidency, no more
fitting epitaph could be devised.

Pour days after

taking the oath of office as President he had said, "I
ask only to be a good and faithful servant of ray Lord
and my people.*^®

And so it was; for whatever his short

comings, the nation has never known a more dedicated or
faithful servant.

•^Item No. 98, Press Conference, April 17, 1952,
Public Papers . . • Truman, 1952-53, 270. See also, New
York Times, December 27. 1952; Washington Post, December
2?, 1952; Koenig (ed.), Truman Administration, 29.
^ I t e m No, 2, Address Before a Joint Session of
the Congress, April 16, 191+5, Public Papers . . . Truman,

19k5, 6 .
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